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              Abstract  
 
In the 21st century, increasing demand for energy stimulated by high rates of 
economic development has pushed China to increase imports, leaving the 
country highly dependent on foreign energy sources. China’s energy security 
is therefore under threat from the constant risk of supply falling short of 
demand. Historically, various approaches have been proposed to attempt to 
resolve or, at least relieve, this security issue but those discussions focus on 
either competition or cooperation. The combined approach, co-opetition has 
been applied in business and this research has attempted to combine these 
two approaches when dealing with energy security issues, thus the original 
contribution of this research is to take a unique approach, combining the 
co-opetition approach with the added benefits of a traditional Chinese 
philosophy known as ‘Hehe culture’. In addition, the ‘Chinese 
characteristics’inherent in the energy security strategy, advocated by the 
Chinese government, has contributed a specific viewpoint in the academic 
field. Moreover, this research employs the PARTS model from game theory, 
an analytical tool originally applied in the field of business and economics, to 
build a framework for evaluating Chinese co-opetition in energy relations. 
Three case studies of China’s energy co-opetition with Japan, Russia and 
Africa are analysed according to the framework, revealing how co-opetition 
		 ii	
affects China’s energy security. The findings of this research include the 
prerequisites for successful co-opetition, and the value and function of 
incorporating Hehe culture into co-opetition. The research identifies the impact 
of these prerequisites on the strategic value of co-opetition, generating a new 
model for Chinese energy security, which will allow for accurate determination 
of the best approach to the game of energy co-opetition with different players. 
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     Chapter One: Introduction 
 
Energy plays a fundamental role in the performance of everyday activities, 
meeting the residential, commercial, industrial and transportation needs of 
both people and the state in developed and less-developed countries. (Ryding, 
1998) Brown (2002:5) explains that energy is ‘the capacity to do work and is 
available to us in various forms and from many different sources.’ From a more 
dynamic perspective, energy can be transformed into different forms and 
supplies basic material resources. Such is the crucial importance of energy, 
that terms for natural resources, such as oil, gas, biofuel, electrical power and 
hydropower have entered the vernacular, not only in academia but also across 
the media. 
 A review of recent editions of World Energy Outlook reveals at first 
glance that the prominent and unchanging trait of current world energy, 
especially for oil and natural gas, is the instability of the balance between 
energy demand and actual or potential energy supply.1 In other words, the 
principal problem affecting world energy is that, over extended periods of time, 
energy supply cannot meet increasing demand. There are three major factors 
contributing to this dilemma: imbalanced energy allocation and consumption, 
																																																								
1Comparing and contrasting the energy outlook from 2010 with that of 2013, it suggests that in 
major energy consumption areas, such as Europe, Asia-Pacific and North America, there is a 
continuing need to rely on energy imports to meet ever-increasing demands. Although the 
initial success of shale gas extraction in the United States has relieved the pressure on gas 
imports, this cannot resolve the reliance on foreign oil. In other words, though energy supply is 
mostly able to meet current demands, there is a constant risk that supply will fall short. For 
more on this, see (IEA, 2010; 2011b; 2012b; 2013) . 
2The concept of Hehe culture will be examined comprehensively in Section 2.3. 
3PARTS model is firstly proposed by Brandenburger, and Nalebuff, in 1997 in the book 
‘Co-opetition’ Five elements (players, added value, rules, tactics and scope) will be explained 
		 2	
increasing demand for energy, and decreasing levels of energy production. 
 
 
        Figure 1: Distribution of Proven Oil Reserves in 1991, 2001 and 2011 
(BP, 2012c:7) 
 
First of all, imbalanced energy allocation, or distribution, is one of the key 
factors in terms of the unstable balance between energy supply and demand. 
For example, Figure 1 compiled by BP (2012c:7) presents the imbalance of oil 
distribution in the world. The Middle East accounts for the largest proportion of 
oil allocation, followed by the Americas, and then Africa and Eurasia. Other 
non-renewable fuels, such as coal and natural gas, share a similar distribution 
to oil, with the most abundant reserves being found in the Middle East, Russia, 
North America and Africa. But, with greater exploration, the discovery of fuel 
reserves in the African continent is on the increase. In addition to this 
imbalance in the distribution of fossil fuels, there is also an imbalance in the 
usage of non-renewable sources of energy. The BP statistical reviews of world 
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energy from 2011 to 2013 (BP, 2011; BP, 2012c; BP, 2013) show that the 
consumption of nuclear energy and hydroelectricity are mainly distributed 
across North America, Europe and the Asia-Pacific region, whereas the Middle 
East and Africa report little usage of these energy types. In other words, due to 
these vastly different geographical distributions of energy, different countries 
are forced to take different approaches to energy.  
Further to the imbalance of geographical distribution, the imbalanced 
consumption of different energy types also influences the shortfall between 
energy supply and demand. Figure 2 shows that in early 2005, the IEA 
calculated that the demand for fossil fuels – coal, oil, and natural gas – 
accounted for by far the largest proportion of energy consumption worldwide. 
Figure 3 shows the IEA go on to predict that this would remain the case by 
2030, and that oil would actually account for an even greater proportion of total 
energy at that time. (IEA, 2005) Although it was predicted that the proportional 
usage of renewable energy would be on the increase, it was also predicted 
that it would still lag far behind fossil fuels. In some cases, the use of 
renewable energy had, in fact, been unprecedented. For instance, 
consumption of nuclear energy in the Asia-Pacific region had reached 18% of 
the region’s total energy use, but by 2013 this had declined suddenly by 89% 
compared with 2011, as a consequence of the Fukushima incident. (BP, 2013) 
In other words, predictions on the use of renewable energy may be unreliable 
as the usage of these energy types remains unstable over long periods of time. 
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Overdependence on fossil fuels, on the other hand, is a steady and predictable 
trend. This high dependence on traditional non-renewable resources poses a 
significant danger to state actors, but according to the Department of Trade 
and Industry of Great Britain (2012), this high reliance will continue in the 
short-term, bringing higher risk to those countries which depend on the import 
of energy.  
 
 
Figure 2: World Primary Energy Demand in 2005 (Pochettino, 2005:3) 
 
World	Primary	Energy	Demand	in	
2005	
Coal	Oil	Natural	Gas	Newclear	Energy	Hydroelectric	Power	Other	Rewables	
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        Figure 3: Predicted World Primary Energy Demand in 2030 
(Pochettino, 2005:3) 
 
Another factor affecting the stability of the relationship between supply and 
demand is increasing rates of energy consumption. A 2011 IEA report 
calculates that energy consumption will increase by 53% of 2011 levels by the 
year 2035. (IEA, 2011b) Various aspects contribute to increasing levels of 
production, one of the main aspects being the growing world population. As 
Tester et al. (2005) corroborate, as a result of the growth in world population 
and the requirements of expanded development, world energy consumption 
over the next century is expected to increase by a factor of four. Besides this, 
Moan and Smith (2007) explain that in the past 150 years, alongside a boom in 
population, there has been an exponential growth in global energy 
consumption. That is to say, with such a rapidly expanding population, it is 
World	Primary	Energy	Demand	in	
2030	
Coal	Oil	Natural	Gas	Newclear	Energy	Hydroelecity	Power	Other	Rewables	
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almost inevitable that world energy consumption will increase.  
The second factor, which has influenced the relationship between the 
supply and demand of energy, is overexploitation or even depletion. This 
exploitation has led to the situation of instability, due to changes in both energy 
consumption practices and energy production levels, and as a consequence, 
people worldwide will be forced to face the challenges of an energy shortage. 
As Clarke (2008) points out, the gap between energy demand and supply has 
widened more than expected; a situation which has come about due to the 
continuous and often mindless exploitation of energy resources and the vast 
increase in energy consumption levels. 
Changes in energy production are the third explanation for the 
instability of energy supply and demand. Hubbert (1949) predicted that the 
production of non-renewable resources would pass its peak and reserves 
would suffer from shortages in the early 1960s. In addition, Demirbas (2006) 
predicts that although levels of global oil production will continue to increase 
until 2015, oil production will most likely dramatically decrease after this time. 
Under such circumstances, it will be difficult to sustain current energy 
consumption, let alone face the increased consumption levels expected in the 
future, and thus ever greater uncertainty over energy is predicted. However, 
there are arguments that the balance between energy demand and supply 
may maintain equilibrium in the future. IEA (2005) predicts that the demand for 
oil will grow more slowly than expected increases in GDP; a situation that can 
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be explained by two factors. Firstly, population growth may slow down and 
plateau, resulting in lower demand than expected. Secondly, the wider use of 
natural gas and other energy resources may help redress the imbalance of 
supply and demand. 
The above three factors demonstrate the imbalanced relations 
between energy supply and demand caused by various situations. However, in 
recent years, the global energy situation has dramatically changed. That is not 
to say that demand and supply have balanced; rather, new factors are 
beginning to play a part in the situation. Previously untapped energy reserves 
are being explored and exploited, including fields in Africa and Russia. 
Meanwhile, development, and therefore also energy consumption, are on the 
rise in developing economies, particularly massive powerhouses such as 
China and India. As a result, as the IEA (2013) explains, the new geography of 
demand and supply means the re-ordered global oil trade is flowing towards 
Asian markets, with implications for cooperative efforts to ensure oil security. 
 In fact, faced with these new global energy flow patterns, the 
implications for different countries and regions vary greatly, both for suppliers 
and consumers of energy. Firstly, the leading role of the Middle East, 
traditionally the world’s most important energy supplier, is under threat due to 
the discovery of new oil fields. Meanwhile, due to the success of shale gas, 
North America’s dependency on oil from the Middle East has been reduced. 
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This is pushing the Middle East to shift the focus of its oil trade from North 
America to the Asia-Pacific market. (Jones et al., 2014) 
        Another energy abundant country, Russia, has a different role in the 
world market. Russia has largely focused on finding new partners. According 
to Goodrich and Lanthemann (2013), Russia currently supplies a third of 
Europe's oil and natural gas, but is starting to export more to the 
energy-hungry East Asian markets. In addition, Russia plans to explore further 
oil and natural gas fields and push ahead with pipeline projects in order to 
cope with the large demand from the Asian markets. (Chen, 2008) 
The considerations for the African continent are different yet again. 
Although many African countries possess significant energy reserves, 
underdevelopment of technology means that exploitation remains difficult. 
Despite abundant reserves, the lack of ‘a well-trained labour force, managerial 
skills, necessary investments, and modern technology’ prevents the full 
employment of these resources. (Bahgat, 2011:126) For Africa, the most 
important consideration in terms of energy is the creation of possibilities for 
increased exploitation of existing reserves. 
In terms of energy-consuming countries, a recent report from the U.S. 
Energy Information Administration (2014) clearly points out that the United 
States may be in a position to stop importing oil by 2037 due to the abundance 
of domestic crude supplies. The U.S. also plans to become a net natural gas 
exporter in the following 10 years. If the United States is successful in this 
		 9	
endeavour, the country’s dependency on the Middle East for oil will become 
negligible.  
        In stark contrast to the United States’ moves towards increasing 
energy independence, dependence on foreign oil is rising in South Asia and 
East Asia due to rapid economic growth, with China and India at the fore. As 
Downs (2004) states, China became a net importer of oil in 1993, ending three 
decades of self-sufficiency. China has now become the second largest oil 
consumer in the world after the U.S. and demand continues unabated. (EIA, 
2014)  
It is important to identify why the application of co-opetition in China is 
a particular cause for concern when dealing with energy security. In this newly 
drawn-up energy pattern, energy supply still cannot meet demand and it is of 
global significance that China - a rising power and one of the most important 
actors in world energy consumption due to its fast development and 
considerable population - is currently expending great effort to gain a firm 
foothold in the uncertain struggle for energy. The intense energy situation is 
pushing China towards both competition and cooperation, by integrating all 
available resources including the economy, military, and environment to 
achieve energy diversity. On one hand, co-opetition reflects how China 
handles energy foreign policy with other countries, while on the other, 
co-opetition carries forward the Hehe culture spirit, which represents China’s 
resolution to relieve energy security threats. Thus, this research will investigate 
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how the Chinese philosophy of Hehe culture2 can be integrated into the 
concept of co-opetition to respond to China’s energy security situation and 
provide a better understanding of how best to address China’s energy security 
when covered in foreign academia. 
 
Research Questions 
 
How does co-opetition contribute to China’s new concept of energy security 
under Chinese Hehe culture heritage?  
Expanding on the primary research question, this research further 
encompasses three secondary research questions: 
1. How does co-opetition integrate competition and cooperation in 
international relations? 
2. How does the ‘PARTS model’3 shape the framework of co-opetition? 
3. How does Hehe culture encapsulate co-opetition throughout the many 
transformations in Chinese strategies?  
 
In order to answer these research questions, the research aims to construct an 
analytical framework by way of the literature review, which is presented in 
Chapter Two. The research will further comprise three case studies to support 
the assumptions of the analytical framework: 																																																								
2The concept of Hehe culture will be examined comprehensively in Section 2.3. 
3PARTS model is firstly proposed by Brandenburger, and Nalebuff, in 1997 in the book 
‘Co-opetition’ Five elements (players, added value, rules, tactics and scope) will be explained 
in detail in section 2.2. (Brandenburger and Nalebuff, 1997)  
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(1). Co-opetition applied to the case of Sino-Japanese cooperation 
(2). Co-opetition applied to the case of Sino-Russian cooperation  
(3). Co-opetition applied to the case of Sino-African cooperation 
 
This study will be conducted using analysis of primary resources. These 
resources will be focused around documental analysis of data, such as white 
papers of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), national statistics, official 
governmental publications, and government speeches, as well as relevant 
archival documents in the field of international relations, energy security, and 
policy-making. After analysis of the collected data, it will be possible to 
consider the theoretical propositions proposed within this research. 
1.1 Understanding Energy Security 
Regardless of the actions of any states, the global supply of energy still cannot 
meet demand as it stands. This is the fundamental issue consistently plaguing 
global energy security. The origins of the conception of energy security as a 
major state policy can arguably be traced to Winston Churchill’s historic 
decision to shift the power source of the British navy’s ships from coal to oil. 
(Yergin, 2006; Su and Zhang, 2012) The originally vague notion of energy 
security was therefore hatched from an increasing desire for oil. Since then, 
the concept of energy security has been further shaped by the need to secure 
supplies, triggered in large part by the first oil crisis. (IEA, 2011a) Current 
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energy security norms were mostly created after the establishment of the IEA4. 
(Yergin, 2006)  
It is important to stress that energy security is not limited to oil; it also 
includes other resources. For example, the IEA (2014:3) mentions: ‘Secure 
supplies of natural gas and electricity are also ‘of growing importance for 
keeping our economies and societies functioning.’ Even so, oil is generally the 
most crucial focus in energy security policies, due to the extremely uneven 
distribution of world energy reserves5, and previous oil crises experiences. 
Petroleum-dependent countries6 are particularly sensitive to this and may be 
at risk of unprecedented or unpredictable threats caused by the shortfall in oil 
supply compared to demand. Further to this, oil has important applications in 
transportation and weaponry, amongst other fields, and alternative energy 
sources are often not suitable substitutes.  
The importance of oil was noted as early as 1950. For example, 
Hoskins (1951:229) notes: ‘In the contemporary world oil is power. It is power 
in times of peace to develop great industrial establishments, and to transport 
goods and passengers on land, at sea and in the air. Its value as an item of 
																																																								
4The International Energy Agency was established in 1973 in order to help release emergency 
oil stock and prevent a repeat of the first oil crisis, during which oil consumer countries had 
been caught off-guard. The concept of supply security was proposed with regard to assessing 
oil security, and subsequently, a publication series of the IEA focused on raising awareness of 
the importance of energy security.  
5Energy reserves such as oil are mainly located in the Middle East, Africa, and North America, 
which leaves other regions with a less abundant supply and reliance on imports. (BP, 2012b)   
6The term ‘petroleum-dependent countries’ was first coined by Choucri in 1976. (Choucri, 
1976)  
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trade exceeds that of any other commodity. In times of war, oil is power to 
expand industry and to exert strength at great distances.’ In fact, this example, 
though specifically highlighting the importance of oil, is also an apt reflection 
on the overall importance of energy security in global society. Nonetheless, it 
is clear that high dependency on oil, and particularly oil sourced from other 
countries and regions, carries significant risk, and it is for this reason that most 
research into energy security focuses on oil. 
The major issue for both energy security research and policy is how 
best to balance or offset the relations between supply and demand. This 
inevitably draws on two different key perspectives – domestic and global. From 
a domestic perspective, current literature suggests that imperative actions in 
terms of energy security include, mainly: saving energy, securing energy 
transportation and exploring alternative energy sources in order to reduce over 
dependence on oil, coal or natural gas. Globally, the imbalance of energy 
distribution determines the interdependence between countries around the 
world. As a result of this interdependence and the trans-boundary nature of 
energy, countries have no choice but to concentrate on relations with other 
nations in order to meet their own energy needs. As Yergin (2006) explains, in 
the 21st century, energy security hinges on how nations manage their 
relationships with others. In other words, inter-state relations are a key focus of 
energy security research. Thus, this gave rise to the original aspiration to 
explore energy foreign relations in this study.  
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In general terms, the IEA defines energy security as obtaining energy 
source without the uninterrupted availability at an affordable price. (IEA, 2012a) 
Even this definition can be broken down into two separate points: sustainable 
supply and reasonable price. In order to evaluate the risk to supply, an IEA 
energy management conference declared that if oil demand exceeded 7% 
more than the supply at any one point, the supply could be seen as insecure, 
and interruption or disruption may occur at any time. (Houssin, 2004) Similar 
definitions of energy security centring on supply have been proposed, which 
also mention quantified measurements of energy security such as 
interruptions to energy supply and frequency of energy supply disruptions. 
(Wright, 2005; Winzer, 2012) 
Along with the importance of uninterrupted supply, price is another 
inevitable consideration in the analysis of energy security. Martin (1996) 
argues that one of the main targets of energy security is to obtain adequate 
energy at a reasonable price to meet growing demand. The volatility of energy 
prices influences the imbalance between demand and supply and further 
affects the economy and markets. (Labandeira and Manzano, 2012)  
Although securing both supply and price remain undeniably crucial 
concerns relating to energy security, changes in the international political 
environment and the natural environment consistently raise new risks for 
energy security, and this prompts the inclusion of ever broader aspects into the 
definition of energy security. For instance, recent research from the 
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Asia-Pacific Energy Research Centre (2007) raises the fact that energy 
security refers to whether the economic state is able to obtain sustainable 
energy resources within a reasonable price range under the premise of 
reducing environment pollution. Jansen (2009:9) touched upon this concept in 
his claims that energy security related to ‘the extent to which the population in 
a defined area (country or region) can have access to affordably and 
competitively priced, environmentally acceptable energy services of adequate 
quality.’  
Here, we find that the definition of energy security is undergoing 
development and growth, but the core nature of this issue – supply and price – 
has yet, and is unlikely to, change. Additions to the concept of energy security 
seem in large part to be incorporated in light of global environmental protection 
requirements under the umbrella of emissions reductions. These energy 
security dimensions closely tally with the idea of sustainable development. 
Sustainable in terms of energy security refers not only to environmental 
concerns, but also to the maintenance of a consistent supply. What’s more, the 
addition of environmental concerns into the definition more specifically 
matches the concept of long-term energy security as given by the IEA 
(2012a:1): ‘long-term energy security mainly concerns timely investments to 
supply energy in line with economic developments and environmental needs.’  
Despite this nod to the importance of long-term energy security, it is 
more practical and immediate for states and other actors to focus on 
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short-term energy security. According to the Model of Short-term Energy 
Security (MOSES) announced by the IEA, short-term energy security attempts 
to measure energy security in terms of national scope, and helps countries to 
identify energy policy priorities by drawing up their own energy security profiles. 
According to the IEA, interrelated publications ‘can serve as a starting point for 
studies of national energy security by providing a systematic, generic 
assessment framework that can be complemented by nationally relevant 
indicators and considerations.’ (Jewell, 2011:6) Four dimensions are identified 
to indicate a country’s energy security, namely domestic and external risk 
exposure and domestic and external resilience. The functions of each 
dimension are described in Table 1 overleaf.  
        Taking crude oil as an example, these indicators aim to measure the 
external risks of import dependence and the political stability of supply. 
Domestic risk is indicated by the proportion of offshore production and the 
volatility of domestic production. The quantity and quality of ports and pipelines 
as well as the diversity of suppliers represent external resilience, and domestic 
resilience is based on the average storage of energy supplies. The existence 
of these clearly outlined indicators can assist in better measurement and 
evaluation of state energy policy in order to achieve smoother coordination. 
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          Table 1: Dimensions of Energy Security addressed in MOSES (Jewell, 2011) 
 Risk Resilience  
 
External 
 
External Risks: risks associated 
with potential disruptions to 
energy imports. 
 
External Resilience: 
ability to respond to 
disruption to energy 
imports by substituting 
with other suppliers and 
supply routes. 
 
Domestic 
 
Domestic Risks: risks arising in 
connection with domestic 
production and transformation of 
energy. 
 
Domestic Resilience: 
domestic ability to 
respond to disruptions in 
energy supply such as 
fuel stocks. 
 
In terms of energy security, both long-term and short-term security are related 
to supply and demand. Besides this, the best-known threat dimensions that 
can influence energy security include the concept of peak oil, as well as 
geopolitical conditions affecting the oil trade. The Hubbert bell curve shows 
that production of fossil fuels will peak and then rapidly decrease; this is known 
as peak oil. (Hubbert, 1949) Campbell (1998) also claimed that the era of 
cheap oil prices would soon come to an end, which matched the Hubbert 
theory of peak oil and the increasing oil prices at the time. The establishment 
of the Association for the Study of Peak Oil and Gas (ASPO) represented a 
further development in the concept of peak oil. (Feng et al., 2006) 
According to the peak oil curve, the continual exploitation of vast 
amounts of energy is speedily depleting the existing energy reserves around 
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the world. Fossil fuels will inevitably diminish and potentially disappear 
completely not too long into the future. Shafiee and Topal (2009:187) predict 
that coal reserves will be available until 2112, but that coal ‘will be the single 
fossil fuel in the world after 2042.’ According to the Department of Trade and 
Industry of Great Britain (2007), the rapid growth in global energy demands will 
only continue in the foreseeable future. Countries that depend on imported 
energy will be at elevated risk if supplies run short. Meanwhile, countries 
worldwide continue to rely on fossil fuel sources rather than renewable 
sources. Larson (2007) points out that 84% of U.S. energy is dependent on 
fossil fuel, 40% of which is oil. The reserve, production, and consumption of oil 
are at 3%, 10% and 20.5% respectively. Thus, it is vitally important to reduce 
the use of non-renewable fossil fuels and instead explore renewable energy 
options, in order to slow down the total depletion of all existing resources. 
There is a suspicion amongst some observers that the claim that oil 
will soon reach a peak of production is merely a covert way to bring in a carbon 
tax so that certain nations are able to obtain benefits. The carbon tax policy7 
may influence the economies of developing countries in two main ways. Firstly, 
carbon tax may force economic structures in developing countries to change 
rapidly. For example, due to the large population and relatively low level of 
technology in China, the manufacturing industry has to engage a great deal of 
energy and resources. As Kahn and Yardley (2007) indicate, in 2006, the 																																																								
7Carbon tax is defined as ‘a tax on the use of fossil fuels in direct proportion to their CO2 
emissions.’ (Hoeller and Wallin, 1991:7) 
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energy equivalent of 2.7 billion tonnes of coal was burned in China. The 
imposition of a carbon tax on China may drive the costs of its manufacturing 
industry to rise considerably, which would force China to change its industrial 
structure, potentially changing from labour-intensive industry to 
technology-intensive. Secondly, carbon tax may notably increase the level of 
unemployment in the developing world. As a result of rising production costs 
brought about by the imposition of a carbon tax, manufacturing companies 
would record lower and lower profit margins, leading to potential bankruptcy or 
layoff of staff. This would result in high rates of unemployment in developing 
countries dependent on manufacturing. These suspicions and controversy are 
furthered by the fact that the initial predictions for peak oil are yet to play out. In 
2010, oil production was three times higher than predicted by Hubbert. (IEA, 
2010) 
In addition, according to the IEA 2012 world energy outlook report, 
the United States would become one of the largest oil-producing countries by 
2020, and due to abundant shale gas, oil independence would be achieved in 
the year 2030. (IEA, 2012b) After the release of this report, it seems that these 
new opportunities put the possibility of resolving U.S. energy security concerns 
within reach. However, it is interesting that it is difficult to draw the same 
optimistic conclusion from the IEA 2013 world energy outlook report, which 
instead simply presents data on the enhanced percentage of shale gas and 
other resources. (IEA, 2013) How can the differences between the 2012 and 
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2013 reports be explained? The key point of contention is whether energy 
production levels have in fact arrived at a peak and will soon run out entirely, 
or whether this problem can be abated by the development of alternative 
energy sources. 
Peak oil theory arguably neglects certain important factors. The first 
is the price effect, which shows negative relevance8  with peak oil. The 
existence of incentive will continue to promote production even when supply 
cannot meet demand. Secondly, peak oil theory does not take into account 
improvements and new technological developments in the exploitation of 
energy. Shale gas is a good example. There is another additional factor which 
deserves consideration: the exploration of a new oil field brings with it a 
prohibitively high cost which must be borne, whether current supplies have 
dried up or not. Taking these developments into account, it can be premised 
that whilst the theory of peak oil does directly reflect the current condition of 
supply not meeting demand, this may well be a short-term phenomenon, and 
the case for long-term energy security remains difficult to predict and analyse. 
Another important dimension of energy security is geopolitical oil. 
Geopolitical debates over energy security are mostly centred on the 
importance of geographical location. The uneven geographical distribution of 
fossil fuels pushes world energy into ever-fiercer competition and affects both 
																																																								
8I.e. when production increases, prices will decrease, and when production decreases, prices 
will increase. 
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those states that produce energy and those that import resources. Mackinder 
(2012) states that, owing to the abundant resources available, if one nation 
builds up sufficient structure to utilise these energy sources to their advantage, 
potentially at a cost to other states, it could result in dramatic conflict. That is to 
say, the more resources a country has, the more conflict it may face. The 
competition over oil in the Middle East and the ensuing conflicts it has raised is 
an example to evidence this point. For oil-rich countries, the most important 
factors to consider are therefore seeking reliable, secure customers and 
ensuring stable political conditions. 
Reserves also tend to be amassed in certain locations. According to 
Larson (2004:10), ‘two-thirds of the world’s known oil reserves are in the 
Middle East.’ Besides the Middle East, another area of intense competition is 
the Caspian Sea region. It is believed that there may be massive reserves of 
oil and natural gas in and around the Caspian Sea, giving the region the 
capacity to produce at much higher levels than at present. (Gelb, 2005) 
Effimoff (2000) predicts that there are approximately 236-337 trillion ft3 of 
reserves in the Caspian Sea region, which is similar to the amount of North 
American reserves at 300 trillion ft3, and larger than all of Western Europe, 
which stands at 168-242 trillion ft3. The oil production in Kazakhstan, which 
borders the Caspian Sea, is likely to exceed 3 million barrels per day by 
around 2015. (Davis et al., 2003) According to BP (2012b), the proven natural 
gas reserves in Turkmenistan, another bordering nation, measure 858.8 trillion 
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ft3, accounting for 11.7% of total global reserves. Tolosa et al. (2004) note that, 
since the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, those nations encircling the 
Caspian Sea, in possession of rich natural gas and oil reserves, have attracted 
a great deal of attention from the oil and gas industry. 
The data demonstrates that the Caspian Sea region has great 
potential for significant future exploitation. In other words, the Caspian Sea has 
become of immeasurable significance in terms of energy reserves. This brings 
with it the spectre of inevitable competition and conflict. Relations between 
countries become more sensitive as a result of the added factor of energy. 
There is a distinct possibility that the focus of the US, one of the largest and 
most powerful energy importers, will turn to the Caspian Sea, perhaps creating 
further tension. Croissant (1997) argues that current increasing levels of U.S. 
investment in the Caspian Sea region clearly show the U.S. expectation to play 
a positive role there. As noted by Kailcki (2001:121), ‘American firms have 
already acquired 75%of Kazakhstan’s mammoth Tengiz oil field, which is now 
valued at more than $10 billion.’ In addition to capital investment, Kalicki 
(1998:146) claims that U.S. engagement ‘covers a wide range of issues such 
as working to resolve regional conflicts, providing economic and humanitarian 
assistance, achieving the removal of nuclear weapons and promoting 
democracy and the rule-of-law.’ 
In terms of geopolitics, a further important debate is the issue of 
energy transportation. When competing over energy resources, countries also 
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have to consider the security of energy transportation. As Sahir and Qureshi 
(2007) argue, the key threat for energy security is not energy storage, but 
energy transportation, as this affects whether energy supplies can reach their 
destinations in a timely manner at reasonable prices. Winstone et al. (2007) 
state that researchers in the field of energy security should attempt to propose 
appropriate solutions to protect energy pipelines from various attacks. As 
areas of energy production and energy consumption are often geographically 
isolated from one another, the importance of energy pipelines may force both 
government policymakers and scholars alike to seriously consider how to 
protect energy pipelines, in order to ensure the security of supply. Secure 
transportation, needed to deliver energy resources from oil-producing 
countries to oil-consuming countries, is extremely crucial. In other words, 
geopolitics dictates the direction of oil pipelines and further influences 
transportation.  
Geographical factors are an important issue in securing energy 
supply, as the nature of the terrain and recourse in a region may affect 
transportation choices. In fact, 60% of energy is delivered through maritime 
transportation, meaning that the geopolitics of the world’s oceans and seas are 
crucial for energy security and are receiving more and more academic 
attention. One pertinent example relating to maritime transportation is that of 
the Spratly Islands. Sovereignty over the islands is hotly contested by Vietnam, 
Brunei, Malaysia, the Philippines and China, all of which hope to explore 
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energy exploitation possibilities around the islands. However, the location of 
the islands is also crucial to transportation. Sovereignty over the surrounding 
seas can help to secure the shipping lanes for said transportation. As Chen 
(2010) points out, 80% of China’s energy comes through the nearby Straits of 
Malacca. In order to cope with the Malacca dilemma, the Chinese government 
has taken a series of actions, such as increasing the Chinese navy power in 
the strait, diversifying energy import sources and constructing alternative ports 
to avoid Malacca straits. 
In conclusion, these different dimensions, including peak oil, 
geopolitical aspects, price, domestic and external risks and resilience 
influence energy security, but maintaining the balance between supply and 
demand is still the key. In addition, it is inevitable that conflicts will arise around 
supply and demand and therefore consideration of the relations between 
competition and cooperation cannot be avoided. However, the specific face of 
each country’s energy security differs. With rapid economic development in 
recent decades, China’s energy security has evolved over time. The following 
section will outline the situation in the 21st century. 
 
1.2 China’s Energy Security in the 21st Century 
The growing discussion on China’s energy security was officially written up in 
an official government paper in 2012, in the white paper of China’s energy 
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policy. According to the Information Office of the State Council of the People’s 
Republic of China (2012), the global situation of an imbalance between supply 
and demand also applies to China, and is the primary problem and emphasis 
of China’s energy security. In the white paper, the issues of energy exploration, 
reservation, transportation, and emission reductions are also mentioned, and 
are considered secondary problems. However, as early as 2007, the Chinese 
government had already issued a white paper on China’s energy conditions 
and policies. This paper, from the Information Office of the State Council of the 
People’s Republic of China (2007), mainly introduces concrete energy 
conditions including various statistics on energy consumption and reserves in 
China, and pays relatively less attention to the threats facing China’s energy 
security, or to how the Chinese government might cope with this situation. In 
fact, China’s energy consumption is growing rapidly and demand is ever 
increasing due to incessant economic development, whilst total energy 
consumption continues to increase. Ma (2010) notes that, from 1952 to 2000, 
China’s fossil fuel energy consumption rose by a factor of 26, and in those 48 
years, the average annual growth rate was 7.08%. The average annual growth 
rate was as high as 10.72% in 2000 to 2007. In fact, in just the seven years 
from 2000 to 2007, China’s total energy consumption growth was nearly the 
same as the previous 48 years. 
In addition to the increasing levels of consumption, China is also 
troubled by imbalance in the consumption structure. China’s fundamental 
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infrastructure and continuing industrialisation require a plentiful supply of 
energy, and coal has long dominated the Chinese energy structure and 
provided this fuel. China enjoys an abundant distribution of coal, and therefore 
relatively easy exploration, low prices and relatively secure transportation 
compared with other fossil fuel sources. (Ma, 2010) Ma (2010) calculates that 
China’s total energy consumption equates to 2.655 billion tonnes of standard 
coal, which makes up 16.1% of the whole world’s energy consumption. What’s 
more, in 2002, oil only accounted for 23.6% of China’s primary energy 
consumption structure, whereas the proportion of coal was as high as 67%. 
(Ma, 2010) This differs considerably from the world primary energy 
consumption structure, in which oil accounted for 39.9% and coal accounted 
for 27%. (BP, 2012c) This indicates that, within China’s energy consumption 
structure, coal takes the leading position, while oil, gas and other hydrocarbon 
energy sources are relatively less significant. 
However, under global demands for emission reduction, China has 
begun to alter the primary energy structure away from coal, increasing oil 
demand during recent years, with considerable knock-on effects for both 
China’s and the world’s energy security. It is predicted that China may depend 
on foreign oil for 66% of its fuel supplies by 2020 (Pang, 2013), which is 
particularly risky in terms of transportation security. As Yu (2010) explains, 85% 
of China’s oil imports must pass through the Straits of Malacca; if there is any 
hindrance to the safe passage of energy supplies, this could cause a massive 
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disruption to total energy supply, leading to a considerable crisis. What’s more, 
as China is actively buying oil in the world markets, other countries may feel 
the threat of insecurity and act in response. Due to the increasing demand for 
energy fuelled by China’s rapid development, and the significance of this 
energy to China’s fundamental national security, understanding China’s 
concrete energy situation can help understand China’s foreign policy. China’s 
energy security situation can be analysed from two approaches: internal 
challenges and external challenges. 
 
China’s Internal Energy Security Challenges 
The first internal challenge for China is posed by decreasing energy reserves. 
The increase in the consumption of coal in recent years is likely to dramatically 
deplete China’s domestic coal reserves. According to data supplied by BP 
(2012a), in 2001, China’s consumption of coal was 809.5 million tonnes and by 
2010, this had risen to 1797.9 million tonnes. This clearly shows the increasing 
amount of coal production in recent years. As Li and Liu (2009) state, the 
volume of coal exploitation in China has remained extremely high in recent 
years. They go on to state that reserves of coal may be at less than 15% of 
capacity and, as most reserves are located in rural areas, exploration and 
transportation can be relatively difficult. 
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In addition, the per capita, energy resources in China are relatively 
low. The Information Office of the State Council of the People’s Republic of 
China (2007) notes that although the sum total of China’s energy resources is 
enormous, the per capita average of energy resources is low due to the large 
population. For example, according to a report by BP (2012c), at the end of 
2011, the proven energy reserves in China were calculated at the equivalent of 
14.7 billion barrels of oil. According to the National Bureau of Statistics of 
China (2012), the population of China in 2010 reached 13.3 billion. Thus, 
energy resources are only around 0.85 barrels per capita. By way of 
comparison, BP (2012c) states that the U.S. has 30.9 billion barrels of proven 
reserves, whereas the population of the U.S. is 314 million. (United States 
Census Bureau, 2012) Thus energy resources in the U.S. come in at 98.40 
barrels of oil per capita, nearly 116 times more than per capita resources in 
China. Thus, the low per capita energy reserves in China constitute another 
potentially severe problem that the Chinese government must acknowledge. In 
addition, in terms of energy reserves, China’s strategic reserves fall far below 
the strategic reserve maintenance standard of IEA members, which need to 
meet 90 days net import in a year. (IEA, 2012a) According to data released in 
2013 (Qi, 2013), China’s current reserves would be used within 42 days. 
        The second internal challenge for China’s energy security is 
increasing energy needs. China is undergoing a process of fast development 
and industrialisation. According to the World Bank (2011), since 1995, China 
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has been developing rapidly and the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) has 
reached 5.879 trillion U.S. dollars. Even if, as Rawski (2001) claims, the official 
Chinese statistics contain exaggerations of output growth beginning in 1998, 
there is still no doubt that China’s economic development is having increasing 
knock-on effects across the globe. However, with this rapid economic 
development, the demand for energy also increases. Chang et al. (2003) point 
out that large-scale economic development requires considerable amounts of 
energy supplies, and Cunningham (2009) warns that the speed of China’s 
GDP growth must not be too rapid, as it is a feat which requires a massive 
input of energy resources. Increasing domestic demand for energy has pushed 
China into increasing supplies through imports. 
The third big challenge that China must confront is the environmental 
destruction and pollution caused by the consumption of fossil fuel resources 
such as coal. What’s more, according to Li and Liu (2009), the burning of coal, 
China’s major fuel resource, may create much more air pollution than oil and 
natural gas. China is therefore encouraged to reduce emissions and decrease 
the usage of fossil fuel. Moreover, China’s economic development is also 
challenged by the tense pressure of emission reduction quotas. As Chan and 
Yao (2008) explains, the urbanisation of the Chinese population and the 
emergence of considerable metropolises have given rise to a dramatic 
increase in energy consumption, which in China’s energy consumption 
structure, means an increase in the combustion of coal, oil and natural gas. As 
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a result of these concerns, as Che et al. (2002) notes, it can be extremely hard 
for China to develop its economy on the one hand, and protect and conserve 
the environment on the other. The dilemma between the economy and the 
environment creates an unavoidable but weighty challenge for China. 
  
China’s External Energy Security Challenges 
The first external challenge for China’s energy security is the instability of 
China’s major oil suppliers. China’s oil imports are mainly from the Middle East 
and Africa. It had been predicted that, by 2010, 76% of China’s consumed oil 
would be imported from the Middle East. In fact, the Middle East’s oil is vital to 
China’s economic development and its diplomatic-superpower status. 
(Salameh, 2003) The Chinese government’s energy white paper of 2007 
discusses the transformation of China’s energy suppliers. Due to the instability 
in the Middle East, China has begun to increase cooperation with other 
countries, such as African states. (Information Office of the State Council of 
the People's Republic of China, 2007) 
        Meanwhile, conflicts over offshore oil exploration between China and 
other countries can be seen as the second key external challenge to China’s 
energy security. This is mainly caused by disputes about sovereignty over the 
seas. China has had various running clashes with other countries, on issues 
such as maritime demarcation, sovereignty of surrounding islands, and rights 
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to resource development. One example is the oil and gas exploration in the 
South China Sea. According to Baker and Wiencek (2002), geologists predict 
that the South China Sea is rich in energy resources such as natural gas and 
oil. The dispute here mainly refers to the Spratly Islands (known to the Chinese 
as Nansha Islands). The major claimants include Vietnam, Brunei, Malaysia 
and the Philippines. In addition, Baker and Wiencek (2002) continue to explain 
that some claimant developing countries, such as Vietnam, ‘have a strong 
need for reliable and inexpensive energy sources to sustain their future 
economic development’, increasing the intensity of their fight for national 
security. The East China Sea is another current dispute relating to exploration 
for energy. A famous example of this is the ongoing dispute over the Senkaku 
Islands (Diaoyu Islands). Like the South China Sea, the East China Sea is ‘one 
of the last unexplored high-potential resource areas located near large 
markets.’ (Valencia, 2007:127) Owing to this, territorial disputes in this region 
are as strained as those over the South China Sea. For example, as Valencia 
(2007) elaborates, even though China and Japan signed an agreement on 
joint approaches to the exploitation of hydrocarbons in the East China Sea in 
2008, the two countries have very different understandings of what this joint 
development implies. Intensification in this difference of opinions could easily 
escalate into the destruction of this positive element of Sino-Japanese 
relations.  
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The third external challenge for China’s energy security relates to 
highly risky transport channels. The latest data demonstrate that 51.2% of 
China’s imports are from the Middle East and 24.4% from Africa, and that 
these supplies are transported by sea. (Bahgat, 2011) Furthermore, Zubir and 
Basiron (2005) note that most of China’s shipping lines run through the Straits 
of Malacca. According to Alon and McKee (2006), the Straits of Malacca can 
be considered the most dangerous shipping lane in the world due to 
widespread piracy in the area. A massive problem in the Straits of Malacca is 
maritime terrorism. Raymond (2006) stresses that the importance of the Straits 
of Malacca has led many countries to become involved in the region, 
potentially leading to increased risk of clashing interests. In sum, piracy and 
terrorism in the Straits of Malacca in particular may have a considerable 
influence on the security of oil imports from the Middle East and Africa to China. 
As a result, in a white paper as early as 2004, the Chinese government 
proposed enhancing the strength of the navy in order to protect marine 
sovereignty and transportation. (Information Office of the State Council of the 
People's Republic of China, 2004) 
In conclusion, China’s energy security is influenced by both internal 
and external risks, and this analysis is corroborated by the government’s own 
energy white paper. These challenges in particular will form key parts of the 
analysis in the case studies presented in this research. On the one hand, 
China’s energy situation requires domestic policies focusing on saving energy, 
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reducing CO2 emissions, establishing strategic energy reserves, altering the 
consumption structure and exploring alternative energy. On the other, China, 
whilst guaranteeing more energy imports from more suppliers, also needs to 
improve cooperation with other countries to collaborate on advanced 
energy-related technology, including new energy, energy reserve exploration, 
maintenance of reserves and exploration of offshore sources. In other words, 
China’s major energy security strategy will address the primary issue that 
supply cannot meet demand, whereas other tactics are focused on the 
secondary issues troubling Chinese energy security, namely energy 
exploration, reserves, transportation and emission reduction. These secondary 
issues and solutions contribute to relieving the major issue of supply and 
demand. The following case study chapters will analyse China’s energy 
relations by taking into account both the primary and secondary problems and 
policies of China’s energy security, and will show that the co-opetition 
approach can combine both competition and cooperation to address these 
issues. 
 
1.3 The Nature of the Research 
Energy has the inherent trait of being trans-boundary and distributed 
asymmetrically. As such, interdependence between countries is inevitable, as 
it is not possible for one country to be able to resolve its energy 
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security-related problems entirely on its own. This interdependence dictates 
the necessary existence of common interest. However, conditions of pure 
competition would only lead to unreasonable allocation of energy, and market 
turmoil and finally, loss of common interest. Therefore, policymakers are faced 
with the dilemma of having to competitively obtain energy with no effect on 
conflict and instability outcomes. China’s traditional philosophy and current 
strategies and policies have generated a leaning towards the establishment of 
co-opetition in energy security. 
Co-opetition is known as jinghe in Chinese, which has become a 
commonly used term. However, use of the word ‘co-opetition’ in Western 
literature is more rare particularly in work relating to politics. The earliest 
expression of the co-opetition concept in fact appeared in the business world, 
focused on enterprise theory and transaction costs theory. (Huang, 2011) In 
business, the existence of complementors9 provides the foundation for a 
strategy of co-opetition, and can significantly influence its rate of success. A 
pertinent example could be the alliance between a car sales company and a 
car insurance company. Any enhancement in car sales could also bring more 
profits to the insurance company. 
In 1997, the pioneers Brandenburger and Nalebuff first proposed this 
new business mindset of co-opetition. The term ‘co-opetition’ is a portmanteau 
of competition and cooperation, which stems from cooperation diversification 																																																								
9An actor is your complementor in business if customers value your product more when they 
have the other actor’s product than when they have your product alone. 
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concepts whereby two or more involved parties maintain a relationship 
balanced between competition and cooperation. (Brandenburger and Nalebuff, 
1997). This can be seen as a strategy of ‘survival of the fittest’ in terms of 
competition, and a search for a better way of co-existence in terms of 
cooperation. In short, co-opetition in business is a way to ‘make the pie bigger.’ 
Brandenburger and Nalebuff state that the key factor behind building a 
strategy of co-opetition is seeking a common interest that can help businesses 
(or nations) work together for mutual benefit. That is to say, in order to develop 
co-opetition, players or nations should at least have a potential common value.  
Brandenburger and Nalebuff (1997) also warn that the pie will, 
ultimately, be divided up. Furthermore, what you can get ‘does not depend just 
on the size of the pie to be divided. Nor does it depend just on how well you 
play. What you get depends on your power in the game as well as on the 
power of others who have competing claims on the pie.’ (Brandenburger and 
Nalebuff, 1997:14) In order to achieve success in this strategy, Bengtsson and 
Kock (2000) believes that game theory can offer a theoretical framework for 
co-opetition. However, as this research focuses primarily on the 
appropriateness of developing co-opetition in China’s energy security 
approach, rather than the theoretical implications of co-opetition itself, a 
detailed analysis of game theory is beyond the scope of this thesis. 
Theories behind competition and cooperation being used together 
also exist in politics, but they focus on states, not companies. If companies can 
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implement co-opetition, why not states? This research considers what might 
happen if the concept of co-opetition were applied to international relations in 
general, or even more specifically, to energy security. One of the important 
reasons for choosing co-opetition to analyse energy security is that the energy 
market has similar traits to the general business world, largely due to the 
existence of common interests. Frankly speaking, the debate over whether 
co-opetition can lead to mutual benefit or success has not yet reached a 
decisive conclusion. Nonetheless, in terms of energy security, pursuing 
co-opetition can allow China to draw advantages from both competition and 
cooperation. Establishing an understanding of the different factors at work 
within co-opetition can lead to concrete tactics for approaching relations with 
the different players with whom China will inevitably engage in order to resolve 
national energy security. Chapter Two in particular will address co-opetition 
within international relations, and then attempt to demonstrate how a situation 
of co-opetition can be achieved within the field of energy security specifically. 
As Hillman and Hitt (1999) state, the establishment of any policy is 
based on an orientated strategy, and the prerequisite for the formulation of this 
strategy is that it both suits the national environment and safeguards the 
interests of the state. In this sense, this study is inspired by the recent rise of 
China – in terms of economics, global military and the environment, which are 
related and integrated into energy security – and considers the guiding 
strategies behind China’s energy security. This new global power undoubtedly 
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needs to pay close attention to securing benefits through the maintenance of 
security, whether traditional or non-traditional in nature. It is thus of global 
significance that China is currently expending great effort on energy security 
strategies.  
 
Methodology 
Various methods exist in social science, but case research will be employed in 
this thesis. As Bhattacherjee (2012:40) notes, ‘case research is an in-depth 
investigation of a problem in one or more real-life settings (case sites) over an 
extended period of time. Data may be collected using a combination of 
interviews, personal observations, and internal or external documents.’ Thus, 
as stated in the above sections, the aim of this research is to investigate the 
relations between co-opetition and traditional Chinese culture applied to 
energy security through different case analyses. Bhattachejee continues to 
explain that ‘the strength of case research is its ability to discover a wide 
variety of social, cultural and political factors potentially related to the 
phenomenon of interest that may not be known in advance.’ (Bhattacherjee, 
2012:40). Thus, data collection in this research will be based on internal and 
external documents, such as Chinese governmental documents, white papers, 
news and foreign documents. Besides this, as Porta and Keating (2008) 
explain, much research in social science research, especially in political 
science, is case- orientated which offers in-depth description of a few 
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instances of a certain phenomenon. As a result, the aim of this research is to 
use different cases to illustrate the application of co-opetition in China’s energy 
foreign policy.  
However, the choice of cases is not easy. As George and Bennett 
(2005:9) explain, ‘a crucial case is one in which a theory that passes empirical 
testing is strongly supported and one that fails is strongly impugned.’ In other 
words, choosing comparative cases is important for the findings and analysis. 
In this research, the three cases are Japan, Russia and African countries and 
the thesis will be developed through a thematic analysis under the umbrella of 
each theoretical assumption outlined in Chapter Two. Cases are selected in 
two ways. First they are considered for their comparability. Japan is an 
important rival of China in the Asian market due to the similar demand for 
energy. Therefore, competition between China and Japan is much more 
intensive than it is between China and other countries. But the situation with 
Russia is different to the situation with Japan. Competition has also existed 
between China and Russia due to having found themselves in different 
circumstances in different times. Although Russia is deemed an important 
supplier to China, the relationship is smoother. At the same time, compared 
with Japan and Russia, the fact that the Sino-African relation is also different 
with Sino-Japanese or Sino-Russian. That is because the historical 
Sino-African relations are different to historical Sino-Japanese and 
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Sino-Russian relations, because Sino-African has maintained positive 
relations since the establishment of new China.   
Second, cases are considered in terms of how they respond to the 
PARTS model, in order to demonstrate the application of co-opetition on 
energy. Generally, these three players are quite typical in the discussion of 
relations with China under the PARTS model, because of their relatively 
simple energy situations. In other words, when choosing other cases, such as 
the U.S or Middle East countries, more variables need to be considered due to 
the complex energy position, such as the influence on energy price relations. 
Thus, a diagram of the inter-relationship between these sections is shown 
below so that you may further understand how I employ the methodology, 
which is appropriate for fulfilling the aim of this research.  
Diagram 1: Inter-relationship between the analytical framework and case 
studies (Researcher’s own) 
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This thesis must be as prudent and objective as possible, in spite of the 
limitations that exist. One limitation is the evidence from government sources. 
Evidence from government sources is deemed reliable and solid, but on the 
side, the government only publishes what it allows the public to know. 
Therefore, in order to overcome this limit, I have attempted to balance Chinese 
government sources with others sources, such academic literature, journals 
and news, from both China and abroad.  
Another limitation is the choice of cases. On one hand, this is an 
energy security study - not any other study - and consequently the selection of 
cases may be different to those selected when conducting military studies, for 
example. On the other, comparative relations between two cases decide the 
orientation of the cases. That is to say, any change in conditions between two 
cases will influence the final findings and analysis.  
 
Outline of thesis 
Chapter two will present a theoretical examination of co-opetition, including an 
analysis of the nature of co-opetition and discussion of the PARTS model from 
game theory and how it applies to co-opetition. In this chapter, the concept of 
co-opetition is described as an analytical tool to the case studies in this 
research, in order to establish how the concept works for China in specific 
cases. Compared with traditional literatures, this research offers a new 
platform for energy security based on integration fuelled by interdependence. 
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Here, interdependence does not only mean making the pie bigger, but it more 
widely refers to integration of the economy, military and environment Thus, 
focus on the interdependence helps generate four assumptions. Namely, 
international organisations play an important role in interdependence in 
co-opetition; interdependence in co-opetition comes not only from military 
aspects, but other aspects too; building trust in co-opetition has become much 
more difficult due to the existence of interdependence; interdependence has 
created difficulties in dividing the pie. Furthermore, co-opetition presents a 
reasonable conceptual solution for resolving the issues identified within energy 
security through game theory. Competition is inevitable while cooperation also 
exists. This chapter also summarises another five assumptions through 
deconstructing the PARTS model of game theory. These five hypotheses are 
that: co-opetition can exist between two asymmetrical players; high-degree 
complementarity can compensate for the limitation in asymmetrical players; 
establishing commitment and reciprocity can help achieve co-opetition; tactics 
in co-opetition rely on states; co-opetition requires step-by-step supervision 
from international organisations.  
Besides this, all the assumptions will be addressed by proceeding 
from an investigation to the basis of strategy and the relations between 
co-opetition and traditional Hehe culture. Understanding the role and influence 
of Hehe culture in Chinese foreign policy can form an interpretation of the 
rationality behind China’s commitment to co-opetition. The application of Hehe 
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culture to co-opetition on energy generates a new model for China’s energy 
security approach, which comprises certain unique ‘Chinese characteristics.’  
Chapter Three begins by analysing the concrete development of 
China’s energy policies in different state leader eras. This chapter will delve 
further than the preceding chapter into investigating how co-opetition is applied 
to China’s energy polices and evaluate how these policies influence China’s 
energy security. This chapter also provides the theoretical evidence for the 
application of co-opetition in the following cases. China’s foreign energy 
policies are based on the state’s foreign policies overall; in other words, 
China’s energy policy progress is an indication of the development of foreign 
policy as a whole. Hehe culture is inextricably woven into China’s foreign 
policy stance, and therefore into the energy security strategy specifically, 
further emphasising the importance of Hehe culture in the application of 
co-opetition. 
Chapter Four is the first case study, which discusses how co-opetition 
influences China’s energy security with regard to the energy relations between 
China and Japan. First this chapter introduces Japan’s energy situation, then it 
moves on to discuss the historical development of Sino-Japanese energy 
relations. The similar requirements for energy mean that China and Japan 
cannot cooperate with each other very smoothly. Instead they are bogged 
down in intense competition. The PARTS model suggests that symmetrical 
players in the game have the same needs and therefore compete directly with 
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one another. This leads to irreconcilable conflict in energy imports and 
exploration. Although there is cooperation between China and Japan on 
energy, such as with energy reserves and emission reduction, Japan still has 
the active advantage in these projects and this lopsided cooperation cannot 
last long, even if there is some economic complementarity. The establishment 
of commitments between China and Japan is another important factor in 
deciding long-term co-opetition. Casting aside the player and added value 
factors, it is the lack of trust between the two countries that causes the 
difficulties in establishing commitments. In short, no matter what kind of tactics 
are employed, it will not be possible for a bilateral energy mechanism to exist. 
Regardless of how the two players work together, the difficulty of establishing 
co-opetition between China and Japan due to the symmetry of their resources 
and situation cannot be overcome. The case between China and Russia in 
Chapter Five is in direct contrast to that between China and Japan. Although 
co-opetition progress between the two players has been slow and drawn-out, it 
has been developing more rapidly recently, particularly during the Hu Jintao 
era. 
On one hand, this suggests that co-opetition can exist between 
Russia and China; this would be decided by their asymmetrical resources, 
high degree of complementarity in different fields, and step-by-step 
commitments. On the other hand, China is the weak partner in this dyad when 
it comes to energy, and the absolute advantage of Russia, the producer 
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country, silences China’s opportunities for negotiation. China needs to locate 
and develop complementary advantages in order to bridge this gap. In terms of 
scope, given co-opetition has existed continuously between China and Russia, 
it is feasible that either a bilateral or multilateral energy mechanism would be 
suitable for the development of Sino-Russian energy relations.  
Chapter Six presents the case study of China and Africa, and also 
demonstrates a positive example of the application of co-opetition to energy 
relations. First the chapter introduces the energy situation in Africa, then it 
analyses the historical development of Sino-African energy relations through 
different policies in different eras. The case is analysed according to the 
PARTS model, which indicates the feasibility of co-opetition between the two 
asymmetrical players, but notes the low degree of complementarity in other 
fields. The trend in Sino-African co-opetition has generally been fast and 
smooth, but not without challenges. There is a potential difficulty in the 
establishment of firm commitments, and the Chinese government is also 
forced to reconsider its concrete actions in cooperation with Africa, in particular 
to respond to accusations regarding the China energy threat and 
neo-colonialism in Africa. 
The significant Hehe culture heritage is an important factor which 
must be considered throughout all three case studies. How does Hehe culture 
feature in the co-opetition between China and different partners, and what role 
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has it played in energy co-opetition thus far? This will be reviewed in the final 
chapter, taking into consideration insights from the three case studies. 
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Chapter Two: Co-opetition within Game 
Theory and the Heritage of Chinese Hehe 
Culture 
 
As discussed in depth in Chapter One, the fact that energy supply cannot meet 
demand is the biggest energy-related challenge in the world today. The issue 
of energy becomes securitised after it is politicised, and is closely linked with 
the interest of states. In order to maintain the interest, states have to co-opetite 
with other states by integrating the military, economy and environment. Thus, 
this chapter will illustrate how the combination of competition and cooperation 
within the concept of co-opetition can promote a useful approach to energy 
security. On the one hand, co-opetition can achieve the effective integration of 
world energy, and on the other hand, it incorporates the three important fields 
of the economy, military, and environment; this reflects how energy security 
differs from traditional security. In addition, this co-opetition may hypothetically 
involve co-opetition between two countries with power asymmetry, and require 
step-by-step supervision from the international community in order to succeed. 
Furthermore, this co-opetition could well involve the integration of energy 
resources, allowing states to achieve the benefits of balance and stability 
through mutual energy supplementation. 
This chapter will first introduce the concept of co-opetition, which 
includes the definition of co-opetition in business and the reasons for following 
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a co-opetition strategy. It will then go on to present an analysis of the 
application of co-opetition within the scope of international relations, proposing 
theoretical and conditional assumptions for the successful establishment of 
co-opetition, and then comparing and investigating how co-opetition can 
integrate energy security. Taking this into account, the chapter will then put 
forward the features of co-opetition within the scope of game theory. Game 
theory provides the practice of co-opetition from the analysis of business and 
extends it to political science. In order to investigate the conditions of 
successful co-opetition, a theoretical co-opetition model based on game theory 
will be drawn up. In addition to the dimension of game theory, this chapter also 
puts forward the classical Chinese concept of Hehe culture. This philosophy 
can be seen to closely reflect the concrete realities of co-opetition as a natural 
development of traditional cultural practice and explain the unique strategic 
value of co-opetition in China’s energy security.  
2.1 The Nature of Co-opetition 
Historically, co-opetition was first applied to business management. However, 
this does not mean it cannot be put to use in other fields, including political 
science. The existence of competition and cooperation can be identified in 
political science, manifested particularly in the two extremes of peace and 
conflict. There is a clear link between the two fields in this regard; 
understanding the application of co-opetition to business is also useful for 
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analysing co-opetition in political science.  
 
2.1.1 Co-opetition in Business 
Co-opetition is a portmanteau of competition and cooperation, and the theory 
originates from management studies. According to Yami et al. (2010), the 
neologism co-opetition stemmed from two different research approaches. The 
first approach saw players engaged in a game involving both competitive and 
cooperative aspects. The second looked at the nature of opponents and rivalry 
within alliances. 
Firstly, Bengtsson and Kock (2000) write that when a company 
simultaneously cooperates with a counterpart in some activities but competes 
in others, this can be classified as co-opetition. Secondly, literature on 
alliances has also contributed to the conceptualisation of co-opetition. For 
example, Harbison and Pekar (1998) note that even within an alliance, 
competitive tensions still exist. Rivals, especially direct rivals, may draw more 
individual benefits than the common interests of the alliance through a strategy 
of co-opetition. (Khanna, 1998) That is to say, the relationships amongst 
alliances, conflicting interests and common interests exist at the same time. 
Thus, as Brandenburger and Nalebuff (1997) note, the aim of co-opetition is to 
make the common interest (pie) bigger before dividing it up. Although the 
methods of dividing the pie differ, both streams of research suggest that the 
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‘game of co-opetition involves simultaneous engagement in cooperative and 
competitive relationships.  
Further to this, Bengtsson and Kock (2000) and Walley (2007) 
classify co-opetitive relationships into three types – cooperation-dominated, 
equal, and competition-dominated – according to the different proportion of 
cooperation and competition present. Although these three different types 
derive from business studies, the classification can also be taken into account 
when analysing the behaviour of states engaging in co-opetitive relationships, 
as different proportions of competition and cooperation may result in different 
outcomes. 
Co-opetition can be readily identified in the business world and the 
strategy has been welcomed. Hamel et al. (1989) noted that even in the 1980s, 
collaboration between competitors had already become fashionable. Hamel et 
al. (1989) also explained that previously, the established principle when 
analysing business practice was to approach cooperation and competition 
independently, generally with a focus on either one or the other. However, the 
development of economy and technology has continuously increased the 
possibilities for competitors to cooperate. For instance, the invention of the 
Internet affected the competitor strategy in many different regions. The fact 
that the boundaries of industry have blurred dramatically in recent years has 
granted former competitors the chance to work together in a less competitive 
domain. (Bamford et al., 2003) 
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Meanwhile, game theory shows the potential benefits of co-opetition 
because the ambitious aim of the game is to provide a universally applicable 
theory of conflict and cooperation. (Binmore et al., 1993) In other words, 
traditionally game theory involves the two aspects of competition and 
cooperation, as does the concept of co-opetition itself.  
As Luo (2007) states, co-opetition is expected to result in a 
positive-sum outcome. Spangler (2003) defines the term positive-sum as when 
the sum of winnings and losses is greater than zero. A zero-sum situation, on 
the other hand, is when one party obtains benefits with a corresponding loss 
for the other party. (Spangler, 2003) Thus, it can be said that positive-sum 
seeks to build a win-win relationship whereas zero-sum can only create either 
win-lose or lose-lose relationships. (Chandra and Kumar, 2000) With an 
emphasis on positive-sum, co-opetition aims to generate profit for all partners 
within the game, a benefit which motivates both competitors and scholars to 
rethink the feasibility of cooperation between former rivals. (Zineldin, 2004) 
There are many inherent benefits – as well as limitations – to 
co-opetition. Firstly, as pointed out by Luo (2004), co-opetitive behaviour aims 
to make markets bigger, allowing rivals to access an even bigger pie. Ideally, 
the bigger the pie, the more generous the slices for all those engaging in 
co-opetition. However, there is a fairly high probability that one or more 
participants will take a bigger share than others. According to Dagnino and 
Padula (2002:31), diverse competitive pressures may weaken the co-opetitive 
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structure, causing partners to attain ‘mutual but not necessarily fair benefits.’ 
The issue of fairness can become a key problem when dividing up the pie. 
Nevertheless, solutions such as formal agreements before the co-opetition can 
help ease this problem. (Brandenburger and Nalebuff, 1997) In terms of 
International Relations (IR), this potential solution seems particularly suitable 
and will be considered in more detail in Section 2.2.1. 
A second benefit that rivals may obtain from co-opetition is cost 
efficiency. Stabryła (2012) notes that coordination can result in huge cost 
savings. Co-opetition enables competitors to share both costs and risks, 
reducing the high price of entering or developing a market individually. (Luo, 
2004) However, it can conversely be argued that costs often cannot be 
reduced as much as expected. One of the possible reasons for this is the cost 
of cooperation itself. Co-opetition requires partners to cooperate to make the 
pie bigger, which may involve an unanticipated outlay. Frank (2003) argues 
that there is a distinct possibility of costs rising if parameters change. For 
example, a lack of trust between rivals may dramatically increase the cost of 
cooperation. (LeTourneau, 2004) This higher cost will also bring higher risk for 
both sides. (Min et al., 2008) Zineldin (2004) reiterates that partners should not 
only consider the monetary aspects of a given venture, but also the hidden 
costs of a close relationship. 
A third major benefit of co-opetition is enlargement of the economy of 
scale, which is important in the business world but can also be feasibly 
		 52	
extended to IR and energy. (Stabryła, 2012) Gnyawali and Park (2009) argue 
that small and medium-sized enterprises engaged in co-opetition are likely to 
benefit from the economy of scale. A further benefit is potential access to 
superior technology. Co-opetition can enable competitors to obtain access to 
technology they could not afford individually by sharing the costs of 
development, such as licence fees. (Meyer, 1998) What’s more, earlier access 
to technology and information is highly beneficial to partners for reducing their 
time-to-market. (Gnyawali et al., 2006) Nevertheless, co-opetition can raise 
other risks: as Piranfar (2011) points out, partners should be very careful to 
avoid losing technological secrets and proprietary knowledge to other players. 
There are many other potential benefits and costs of co-opetition. 
Zineldin (2004) mentions that engaging in co-opetition can help enterprises 
achieve higher levels of R&D (Research and Development) and add greater 
customer value. However, higher dependence on other parties or an inferior 
co-opetitive relationship may cause unpredicted problems. Despite these risks, 
the limitations of co-opetition can generally be resolved by application of 
certain solutions, and the fact that co-opetition pursues positive-sum outcomes 
continues to attract many pioneers in the business world and, increasingly, 
further afield. As Kość (2012) notes, like enterprises in the world of business, 
countries or regions frequently simultaneously compete and cooperate. It is 
therefore a natural step to apply the concept of co-opetition to the field of 
international relations, and to energy in particular. 
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2.1.2 Co-opetition: An Inevitable Integration of World 
Resources 
Although there is no conclusive definition for all forms of co-opetition, 
co-opetition in business refers to the simultaneous existence of competition 
and cooperation within a relationship. Another take on this is that co-opetition 
is cooperation which arises out of competition when the circumstances and 
timing benefit the participants. Either way, both stress the coinciding of 
cooperation and competition. When applied to international relations, once 
again the key point of co-opetition is simultaneous cooperation and 
competition between actors such as states or regions. More specifically, in 
terms of global energy, co-opetitive strategies may be applied to the 
relationships between and across consuming and producing states. In the 
book The Oil Decade: Conflict and Cooperation in the West, Lieber (1983) 
describes the cooperation and competition prevalent in the relationship 
between energy-consuming countries from the viewpoint of international 
relations. He argues that strategies to reduce dependence on oil or compete 
over exports are ineffective strategies, as unilateralism offers few benefits 
when faced with the global energy crisis. In other words, attempting strategies 
of co-opetition can be more feasible given the circumstances.  
Within this study, co-opetition is considered to be a relationship 
involving the greatest integration of energy interests between states, touching 
on not only how countries are able to obtain and maintain immediate interests, 
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but also how long-term interests can be achieved by increasing integrated 
common interests. In short, co-opetition is seen to be a potential strategy for 
achieving energy integration. 
Examples from Russia show how co-opetition can bring about the 
integration of energy. As Turson and Abulati (2004) explain, the Russian oil 
corporation, Lukoil, obtained exploitation rights over three essential oil fields in 
Kazakhstan. According to the IEA (2010), Russian exports of crude oil have 
reached 5430 thousand barrels per day until 2010. It can be seen that this 
cooperation is a form of integration which supplies more potential for energy 
exploitation and maintenance of production levels. Primarily, although Russia 
and Kazakhstan are ostensibly rivals in the market, both Russia and 
Kazakhstan have been able to obtain more interest for themselves through 
trans-boundary cooperation.  
Another example is the interdependence of the European Union 
member states and Russia. As Elder (2009) points out, around a quarter of the 
European Union’s natural gas is imported from Russia. As much as two thirds 
of Finland ‘s total energy products are imported from Russia. (Vahtra and 
Lorentz, 2004) In other words, Russia is an important partner for Europe, and 
Europe is a major buyer for Russia. 70% of the sales of Russian energy 
resources hail from the European Union. (Leonard and Popescu, 2007) 
Russia’s energy exports are significantly influenced by countries in the 
European Union. Russian state-controlled companies have created 
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partnerships with big companies in Germany, Italy and France, such as E.ON 
and GDF. (Leonard and Popescu, 2007) However, European countries are 
actively exploring other energy markets in order to relieve the 
over-dependence on Russia’s gas. ‘The over-dependence of certain member 
countries, as well as some post-Soviet countries, on Russian natural gas 
creates doubts on energy security.’ (Bilgin, 2009:4482) According to BP 
(2012b), in 2011, Europe and Eurasia imported a total of 90.7 billion ft3 of 
energy resources, mainly from Qatar (43.4 billion ft3), Algeria (16.8 billion ft3), 
Nigeria (15.7 billion ft3) and Egypt (4.3 billion ft3). (BP, 2012b) This shows that 
Europe has been able to secure suppliers other than Russia in recent years. 
This is to the detriment of Russia, who will suffer if European Countries 
transfer their custom to other suppliers. Although European countries are 
attempting to increase and diversify their suppliers in order to reduce 
dependence on Russian energy, they still continue to import from Russia, 
which creates a condition of co-opetition. What’s more, due to the reduction 
from the European Union, Russia has had little choice but to consider 
alternative consumers, and has turned to the Asia-Pacific market. This is 
positive for both Russia and Asian countries. In other words, the only changed 
factors are the players in the game; energy can always find buyers, and a 
degree of energy integration can be achieved by co-opetition. 
Further to this, co-opetition on energy effectively compensates for the 
deficiencies on both sides. As Winstone et al. (2007) claim, energy security 
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can involve the pressures of energy demand from the dramatic rise of 
developing countries such as China and India. These two large nations are 
both developing countries. Although some developing nations are rich in 
resources, there is no guarantee that they are abundant in the skills or 
technologies necessary to exploit their own reserves. According to Larson 
(2004), many other states may decide to exchange their technology or 
financial support for energy supplies in such countries. Lam (2006) suggests 
that China should take money and technologies to Africa and exploit energy 
there. However, as Kobrin (1985) notes, even though oil-producing countries 
need oil companies to help them exploit and manage the oil reserves on their 
land, the development in those countries enables them gradually attempt to 
control and participate in the oil markets more independently. As a result of 
these concerns, both oil-producing and oil-consuming countries must be 
aware of the importance of ensuring security under these conditions.  
However, cases of technological or economic exchange for energy 
demonstrate a kind of integration, which effectively promotes complementary 
operations over resources and helps states rid themselves of the bondage of 
traditional energy concerns. Co-opetition can help achieve optimisation and 
integration of resources at both a domestic and international level. Waltz (2010) 
argues that the term integration should be used to describe the domestic 
situation of a state, and interdependence should be used for describing 
relationships between or amongst countries. By this reasoning, co-opetition 
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has provided an integrated platform for enlarging the pie due to the existence 
of interdependency Whereas the simple cases of Russia outlined above reveal 
clear cases of energy integration. Therefore this research considers 
co-opetition to be based on both interdependence and integration at both state 
and international levels. 
 
2.1.3 Co-opetition: Shaping Energy Security within the 
Economy, Military and Environment 
The factors which can influence energy security are various, but co-opetition in 
energy security integrates a range of aspects, including the economy, military 
and environment in particular. Energy security from the perspective of 
co-opetition is therefore different to traditional security. The fact that energy 
security, despite being a non-traditional type of security, interacts with these 
other types of security demonstrates that it does not exist insularly. Regardless 
of whether energy security is then considered through the lens of traditional 
security, or that of the more recently identified No-Tradational Security (NTS,) 
it has a significant and undeniable impact on national security.  
Lippmann (1943:5) defined national security explicitly: ‘A nation has 
security when it does not have to sacrifice its legitimate interests to avoid war, 
and is able, if challenged, to maintain them by war.’ Within the realist school of 
international relations, states are the only actor within the international system, 
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and thus, security is equal to national security. Morgenthau (1995) argues that 
in the condition of world anarchy, the core and fundamental goal of national 
security is survival. Historically, national security has been seen as relating 
inseparably to territory. As Herz (1962) suggests, traditional national security is 
encapsulated in the concept of territory. A state is protected inside its territory 
by physical borders that may include natural boundaries like rivers, seas, and 
mountains. Luke (1997) writes that the territory of a state significantly 
influences its power. Those states with abundant resources may attract 
aggression or occupation from other countries, and those lacking resources 
may be drawn into inevitable competition. These actions will also lead to 
territorial instability. Thus, the importance of territory to states and national 
security is vital. 
The maintenance of national security, centred on the state, is the 
emphasis and the goal of Security Studies. (Zhao, 2006) States are the carrier 
of national security, and this national security is maintained and reflected by 
the military. Combining national security with the functioning of the military is 
logically reasonable. Jin (2002) posits that the function of the military is to 
safeguard state interests and uphold national independence, as well as to 
prevent infringements on sovereignty. Internally, the military protects national 
interests, and externally, the military prevents other states from carrying out 
threatening actions. (Zhao, 2006) Traditionally, scholars in the field of security 
consider national security to be paramount, and tend to believe that conditions 
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of security can be achieved only by military support. In fact, Knorr considers 
national security to be simply an abbreviation of national military security. 
(Knorr, 1973) 
Feng et al. (2006) propose that, owing to anarchy in world politics, 
there is no eternal and absolute security for any country and the best way to 
obtain security is through the expansion of military power. Mearshimer (2001) 
is also in support of this stance, stating that as a nation depends on its military, 
it is important that the military is sufficiently large to handle threats hailing from 
other countries. Mohammed (1991) claims that the focus of national security is 
on external military threats. He believes that strengthening the military means 
directly strengthening security. The work of these many scholars points to a 
certain conclusion: in traditional security studies, there is an undeniable link 
between national security and the importance of the military. 
In fact, all securitised threats, not just those directly associated with 
the military, can be said to fall under the umbrella of national security; this 
includes energy security. What’s more, aside from whether or not it falls into a 
type of non-traditional security, a strong argument can also be made that 
energy security makes up an important part of traditional security, due to the 
link between the military and energy. Energy provides power to the military and 
can influence military expenditure 10 . Energy is the fuel for new military 
																																																								
10Silience in energy systems), Supply (accessing alternative and renewable energy sources 
available on installations), Sufficiency (providing adequate power for critical missions), and 
Sustainability (promoting support for the Army’s mission, its community, and the environment) 
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innovation and can supply the necessary power for a modern military platform. 
From another perspective, Booth and Vale (1994) suggest that states are no 
longer the target of security, but the tools to maintain the security. Following 
this, it can be asserted that states can in fact provide security for energy, 
particularly through the harnessing of state military power. 
        Some commentators still consistently argue that military security will 
always occupy the most significant position in national security, for example 
because it supplies a fundamental guarantee of territorial integrity and security 
of individuals. (Hough, 2004) However, traditional national security has long 
focused on the military, and some scholars, such as Bull (1996), claim that too 
much focus on international relations from an antagonistic military perspective 
may lead to further conflicts between countries. Ullman (1983) posits that 
considering national security only from the level of the military may create 
inaccurate hypotheses, leading states to ignore more dangerous threats 
arising from different sectors. 
It can thus be asserted that traditional literature has focused too 
much on military security and has overlooked other security types, including 
energy security. This does not mean that NTS is more important than military 
security, but new threats posed by the modern era may be beyond the scope 
of the military. (Brown, 1997) As Booth (1991) concludes, security research 
																																																																																																																																																														
are the core characteristics defining the energy security necessary for the full range of Army 
missions (Way, 2012) 
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may benefit from breaking away from the leading position of realism, turning 
the emphasis away from the military towards non-traditional threats.  
It has been argued that there is a clear division between energy 
security and military security, and that energy can be categorised solely as a 
non-military type of security, because the emphasis of military security is on a 
state’s internal security, whereas energy security is trans-boundary and entails 
external links between different state actors. (Tickner, 1994) However, taking 
into account the shortage of energy reserves, the tense balance between 
energy supply and demand, and the intense competition in the energy market, 
the importance of energy security is elevated. Arguments supporting the 
unambiguous division between military and energy security are therefore 
somewhat overstated; there is no clear-cut boundary between the two. By this 
reasoning, energy security can be considered one integral aspect of national 
security, sharing the same degree of importance as military security. 
Energy security is not only related to the military, but also to the 
economy. As the world economy continues to develop at a rapid pace, energy 
security seems to be becoming a more concrete concept, its definition 
continuously expanding. In a broad sense, according to Bielecki (2002: 237), 
energy security simply means an ‘uninterrupted supply that fully meets the 
needs of the global economy’ – at moderate prices. In addition, Barton et al. 
(2004:4) also specify that energy security entails: ‘a nation and all…citizens 
and businesses [having] access to sufficient energy resources at reasonable 
		 62	
prices for the foreseeable future, free from serious risk of major disruption of 
service.’ 
Treverton (1981) attests that energy trading is not limited to the 
pattern of simple economic transactions. Although energy indeed is closely 
related to the development of the economy, on a deeper level it is also a 
political commodity. In this sense, energy trade not only needs to obey the 
regulations of the market, but it must also be subject to the decisions of the 
state. Under the circumstances of the current recession, as energy security is 
so strongly linked to the economy, energy security is perhaps more crucial 
than ever before. States cannot development economically without sufficient 
energy supplies. Therefore, both global and individual national economies may 
be dramatically affected by energy prices and availability.  
As a result of the importance of economic interdependence, 
consideration of feasible solutions for the liberalisation of global energy 
markets is a valuable direction for the academic study of energy security. As 
Egenhofer and Legge (2001) state, in liberal markets, customers are able to 
switch between different suppliers and crucially, a competitive liberal market 
may enable customers to put some of their energy back into the market, 
potentially improving the security of energy supply for others. However, both 
energy-consuming and energy-producing countries take varying non-market 
actions to safeguard their own individual energy security, which leads to low 
information transparency and uninformed decision-making. (Stanislaw and 
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Cambridge Energy Research Associates, 2004) It is difficult to forcibly balance 
the energy market between consumers and producers. Liberal market forces 
may well supply this equilibrium. 
Further to this, crude oil is a vital and fundamental energy resource 
for most industries; any increase in the price of oil will inevitably lead to an 
increase in the cost of many other products. Countries which depend on the 
manufacturing industry may have a higher reliance on oil than other countries 
and thus, a rise in oil price is most likely to restrain their economic growth. As 
Suntum (2005) notes, essential raw materials such as crude oil are most likely 
to draw the limits of economic growth. 
The price issue is affected by the political situation in the producing 
countries. Iraq’s oil production decreased dramatically after the Iraq war in 
2003. (Kilian, 2008) As a result, OPEC countries had to increase production in 
order to stabilise the oil price. ‘We find that a 10% increase in the probability of 
war has increased spot oil prices by about $1.’ (Leigh et al., 2003:4) Stability of 
major energy-producing countries (largely a geopolitical issue) has crucial 
economic facets. 
Following the shock of the first energy crisis in the 1980s, energy 
security referred simply to ensuring reductions in levels of consumer imports of 
oil, as well as risk management of oil prices and oil imports. (Wu, 2009) Martin 
(1996) explained that, as a result of the oil supply crisis, one much-discussed 
but narrow aspect of energy security was the shortage and break-off of the oil 
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supply in the Middle East. The IEA defines energy security, referring in 
particular to oil, as the ability to obtain the energy needed to meet demand at 
the lowest possible cost. A loss of economic welfare may occur as a result of a 
change in the price and availability of energy. (Manzano and Rey, 2012) Thus, 
during this post-crisis period, the fundamental key point of energy security was 
the smooth handling of the relationship between energy supply and demand, 
largely framed by economics. 
Currently, the OPEC countries are important drivers behind decisions 
over oil prices. As the ‘world’s demand-supply balancer,’ OPEC's supply 
decisions can play an essential role in determining world oil price. (United 
States Government Accountability Office, 2005) IEA members have built up 
strategic reserves in order to handle any potential restrictions on supply by 
OPEC countries. One of the benefits of strategic reserves is the ‘avoided net 
import costs of oil. Net import costs can be simply defined as price times 
import quantity. When an oil price shock occurs, price rises and demand falls. 
Since oil demand is highly inelastic in the short run, the price rises more than 
demand falls and net import costs increase. The use of the emergency reserve 
in these circumstances reduces the price increase and the demand decrease. 
The combined effect is a reduction in net import costs.’ (Leiby and Bowman, 
2000:5) 
In addition to the price-controlling strategy of OPEC countries, threats 
to the stability of oil prices may also arise from non-OPEC countries, such as 
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Russia. Oil resources in Russia are abundant; according to the BP Energy 
Review Report, in 2001 Russia’s daily crude oil production was roughly 6.65 
million barrels. Russia’s extensive exploitation of oil threatens the monopoly of 
OPEC and may inadvertently lead to confrontation. (BP, 2012b) The existence 
of more potential suppliers brings about a reduction in price. Consequently, 
OPEC countries have no choice but to reduce their prices in order to compete. 
However, the expense of Russian exploitation is higher than costs for the 
OPEC nations, so when global oil prices drop, influencing forex conditions, it is 
more harmful to Russia. According to account data, for every one U.S. dollar 
drop in oil prices, Russia will lose at least one billion in forex income. (Bahgat, 
2003) As a result, raw competition between these two major producers will be 
harmful to both of them. 
Transportation, a key aspect of energy security that was introduced 
earlier, is not only related to military security, but also to economic security. 
Rodrigue et al. (2009:45) outline three aspects of energy which may 
significantly affect transportation. These are the level and volatility of energy 
prices, and the ‘technological and technical changes in the energy 
performance level of transport modes and terminals.’ (Rodrigue et al., 
2009:205) The most utilised energies for transportation, used throughout 
different industries, are still the three fossil fuels (oil, coal and gas). For 
example, for railroads, road freight and water transport, oil is the usual energy 
of choice. This extensive use of oil in industrial transportation leaves the 
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world’s economy excessively sensitive to fluctuations in the price of oil, as any 
significant increases in price will drive up the prices of many basic products as 
a result of increased transport costs, with further knock-on effects on the price 
of most terminal products including food, fuel, and so on. As a result, Barrel 
and Pomerantz (2004:2) argue that oil prices can be powerfully linked to major 
growth in the global economy. They state that the price of oil can usually be 
seen as ‘a trigger for inflation and recession.’ According to this statement, 
explanations for the economic recession and significant inflation that most 
countries in the world have recently been suffering could conceivably be 
added to by considering changes in oil prices. 
Environment is another dimension integrated into energy security that 
is relevant for co-opetition. For various reasons, energy is naturally associated 
with environmental security. For instance, as a result of the concern over oil 
supply, many countries have chosen to voluntarily set their own emission 
reduction goals, purportedly in order to fight climate change. A sweeping 
reduction in CO2 emissions is now widely considered necessary for the 
protection and maintenance of the environment of this planet. Arrhenius (1896) 
explains that fossil fuels can be seen as a potential significant source of 
carbon dioxide. Furthermore, Lashof and Ahuja (1990) claim that CO2 is 
responsible for 80% of global warming. Thus, a reduction in carbon dioxide 
emissions may relieve the pressure on the environment, and potentially halt 
the increasing global warming trend. However, the necessity for emission 
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reductions comes as the consumption and demand for fossil fuels increase. 
More CO2, which may cause global warming, will be emitted into the 
atmosphere. All countries can be seen to have a responsibility for reducing 
emissions. 
However, debates have arisen over whether developing or developed 
countries should take the responsibility for emission reductions. Developing 
countries maintain the stance that most of the existing pollution originated from 
the industrialisation of developed countries, and so developed countries 
should pay for this. However, the developed countries argue that all countries 
are located in the same world in the same time era, so whichever country now 
emits gas should pay for it. In other words, they hold the view that every 
emitting country has a responsibility for reduction. Eppstein et al. (2010) state 
that, after much negotiation, EU leaders have proposed reducing carbon 
emissions by at least 80-95% for the developed world by 2050. In addition, in 
2005, the United States set its own emission reduction targets at a 30% 
reduction by 2025 and a 42% reduction by 2030 (UNFCCC). China promises 
to reduce emissions by 40-50% by 2020. It can therefore be seen that, even if 
different countries have different understandings of, and concerns in term of, 
emissions reduction, the necessity for cuts and the universal concern for the 
protection of the climate have been brought onto the agenda of many different 
countries. 
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Co-opetition combines all these factors together, so that energy 
security is not only a form of NTS, but it is also not isolated from, or unrelated 
to, other aspects of national security. The military, the economy and the 
environment are all inextricably linked to energy security, and these different 
security types cross over and intermingle. 
 
2.1.4 Interdependence and Co-opetition  
Interdependence as the common trait in economy and energy determines the 
existence of co-opetition. In other words, the nature of interdependence will 
lead to inevitable and long-lasting competition between states, and as such, 
with the increase in interdependence in the globalised political economy will 
come greater and more intense competition. As competition is accepted as a 
pre-existing and inevitable condition, any analysis of co-opetition must focus 
on the feasibility of cooperation instead. In other words, competition 
undoubtedly exists within international relations, but the prevalence of 
cooperation is somewhat questionable. 
In traditional terms, security at an international level has entailed 
reinforcing a strong military in order to defend against invasion. (Tiklare and 
Thomas, 1991) As Baldwin (1997) notes, security involves flying the military 
flag. In the legacy of strategists the world over, including Clausewitz and Sun 
Tzu, classic strategy has always been focused on war. Gray (1999a:17) sees 
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strategists as concerned with ‘the use that is made of force and the threat of 
force for the end of policy.’ This kind of war-based strategy is founded upon the 
belief that competition leading to victory can secure significant benefits for a 
country. 
Waltz (2010) argues that the need for self-help incites countries into 
following more powerful countries, and that the world system is determined by 
the number of powerful countries. With changes in distribution of power, the 
balance will break down. However, resources will be re-allocated and balance 
of power once more reached. In the opinion of both Waltz and Morgenthau, 
anarchy refers to there being no common or highest authority in world politics, 
with every country consequently using any action to protect their own interest. 
(Sheehan, 1995) Within this thinking, states in the world system are 
independent and only the strength of their own power can assist them in 
obtaining their interests. 
Realists traditionally see conflict as inevitable under anarchy. War is 
brought about not only because each side pursues its own security measures, 
but because ultimately at least one side, if not all parties, are pushed to take 
the offensive. However, as Mueller (1993) states, democratic peace is one of 
the most important challenges to realism. Under the democratic peace which 
has flourished since the Second World War, the chance of an outbreak of war 
between democratic countries has become minimal, allowing for the 
emergence of policies of cooperation to tackle problems and protect interests. 
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However, Gilpin (1981) conjectures that interdependence actually refers to 
unequal attachment relations; economic interdependence establishes unequal 
power relations within the group, producing a state of vulnerability for some, 
and power and ease of manipulation for others. Many countries attempt to 
strengthen their own independence, and increase the dependence of other 
countries. From this angle, interdependence is not a source of peace, but a 
reason for conflict. 
Nevertheless, as Lindsay and Daalder (2003) stress, with the 
increase in trends of deep interdependence, countries are becoming much 
more inseparable. As a result, potential common interests and values increase. 
In order to protect these common interests, policymakers must respond to 
demands arising from the state level to the global level. Keohane and Nye 
(2011) point out that traditional concepts such as balance of power, focused on 
national security, cannot define all the new modern threats faced by countries 
worldwide. In short, the old international pattern is diminishing, and the world is 
becoming ever more interdependent. Although the world system is still 
characterised by anarchy, there is also a strong trend of interdependence. The 
two concepts are not mutually exclusive. 
Energy is trans-boundary in nature. In other words, it is located all 
around the world, and must be transported between nations and across 
borders. Transport is thus one of the most important aspects of energy security. 
As energy consumption and transportation are trans-boundary, there is a 
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strong argument that production should become a trans-boundary issue too. 
Countries can cooperate in order to achieve complementary and integrated 
operations. In other words, co-opetition can exist within this framework of 
conflicting and common interest, wherein both cooperation and competition 
inevitably occur. 
 Realism and liberalism take differing positions on the prospects for 
cooperation. In general, realists argue that it is difficult or even impossible to 
achieve true cooperation under anarchy. Waltz (2010) describes anarchy as 
the basic order of international society as it lacks a central government or 
authority. Under the condition of anarchy, realists believe cooperation is nigh 
on impossible to achieve. Firstly, states are rational actors and will always 
choose what is best for their own individual state interests. Secondly, the 
nature of conflict is never changed in the group over time (Gilpin, 1984), 
because in anarchy, states are self-regarding, not other-regarding. (Mercer, 
1995) Without central authority, states need to self-help in order to survive. 
Liberalism, on the other hand, proposes that cooperation can be achieved 
under the new world order, because increasing interdependence pushes not 
only states, but also other transactional actors, to cooperate with each other in 
order to reduce conflict. (Axelrod and Keohane, 1985; Keohane and Nye, 
2011)  
Waltz, a realist scholar, presents a slightly different argument, 
claiming that although the world is anarchic, the key target for states is 
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obtaining security, not power. Conflict is inevitable for states in order to 
strengthen security, but states may choose the path of negotiation rather than 
war, because cooperation is a way to avoid the high cost of conflict. (Waltz, 
2010) From this perspective, cooperation can be achieved in order to secure 
state interests, but how exactly this may be done, as well as the position of 
international organisations in the equation, are yet to be fully considered. 
This research does not stake a claim as to which of these schools is 
correct, if either, but does argue that both approaches have limitations which 
can be revised. It is argued herein that competition will not disappear, but that 
cooperation can be coordinated, particularly under commitments by 
international organisations, which represent a platform of state 
interdependence. In order to cope with this, four assumptions are proposed.  
First of all, International Organisations (IOs) play an important role 
due to the interdependence in co-opetition, but still cannot replace the function 
of states. In other words, IOs do not necessarily share the same functions as 
states, but they are also not to be overlooked in IR. As Held (1991) explains, 
international organisations can help states achieve security targets. That 
means the major actors in the international system are still states, which are 
easily influenced by international conditions. States face modern challenges 
from an array of factors, including, for instance, the economy, culture, 
domestic nationalism and energy. With greater interdependence, the 
effectiveness of certain political means of states is reduced, but 
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simultaneously, international organisations and NGOs may be able to offer 
solutions and platforms to cope with these challenges. (Ferguson et al., 2000) 
Mann (1997) argues that the existence and proliferation of 
transnational actors is not a sign of the decline of the status of states in world 
politics, because although states are no longer the only ones to shape 
international norms, their central authority remains significant because it 
guides and enforces principles within the state’s authority. International 
organisations in their current structure cannot replace this role. It is also 
argued that international organisations are important because states are 
unable to fully pursue their interests in the face of an anarchic structure lacking 
a central authority. (Oye, 1986b) International organisations can supply a 
platform to formally link interests and states together. Neoliberals believe that 
global regimes can weaken the negative influence of anarchy, and refute the 
pessimism of realism regarding the prospects for cooperation under greater 
interdependence. Neoliberalist thought stresses the importance of 
interdependence and institutions, placing hope in internationalism and 
international regimes, but it is conversely criticised that neoliberalism 
exaggerates the importance of economics in security. However, Milner (1991) 
states that interdependence under anarchy can help states to learn others’ 
true preferences and thus make informed choices to secure their own interests. 
This point of view posits that the result of interdependence is not necessarily 
absolute harmony, but instead further competition under a veil of cooperation. 
		 74	
Secondly, interdependence in co-opetition is not only military but also 
economical. As Keohane and Nye (2011) illustrate, the concept of complex 
interdependence considers interdependence to stem from economic 
cooperation, and claims that the importance of economic concerns has 
overtaken the traditional importance of the military. However, this research 
argues that the deepening of interdependence is not only due to greater 
economic integration, but also to other aspects, such as energy. What’s more, 
although it can be argued that the increased occurrence of cooperation means 
that the role of the military is less significant than previously, there is still no 
doubt that the military is an important factor, even within efforts towards 
cooperation itself. In Section 2.1.3, energy security was considered as a type 
of NTS, and it was concluded that energy is a factor within national security as 
a whole, interacting with and influenced by the military, the economy and the 
environment. None of these separate dimensions can be isolated and 
considered more or less important than others, as each interact and play 
different roles in the bigger picture of national security. The importance of 
economics is undeniable, but nevertheless must not be overstated; nor must 
the continuing role of the military be overlooked. For instance, in these 
interlinked dimensions, the military is often the sole tool able to maintain 
energy security in terms of clashes over sovereignty or transportation risks. 
Economic cooperation and international organisations are as yet not in a 
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position to fulfil the role of the military in supervising energy transportation or 
safeguarding sovereign resources. 
Thirdly, building trust in co-opetition has become much more difficult 
due to the existence of interdependence. International regime may be a 
breakthrough point which can neutralise disputes caused by a lack of trust in 
cooperation. Realist literature frequently discusses the constant risk of the 
‘security dilemma’11 in cooperative efforts between states. Falling into the 
security dilemma trap often forestalls any trust, and therefore any possibility of 
true cooperation. As Waltz (1979); Waltz (2010) describes, one state may take 
a series of actions to safeguard their own security, which in turn reduces the 
security of other states that are forced to formulate responsive measures. 
Buzan (1983) corroborates, stating that when one country seeks safety and 
rights, it is easy for threats to others to occur. In addition, Nye (2004) points out 
that the security dilemma will cause every individual to perform some action to 
increase their sense of security, which will lead to involvement in a competitive 
vicious cycle of security. Gray (1999b) argues that arms races, for example, 
reflect the differing interests of actors within a conflict. War is brought about 
not only because each side pursues its own security measures, but because 
																																																								
11The concept of the security dilemma was proposed by John Herz in 1950. He believed that 
anarchy creates conditions of indeterminacy about the exact intentions of individual nations, 
causing nations to fear inroads by others. Actors thus pursue more power in order to keep 
themselves safe. However, these actions lead to others feeling increased insecurity, and 
cause them to pursue more power too. This cycle increases insecurity for all actors in the 
system (Herz,1950) The security dilemma has long been shown through the ‘prisoner dilemma’ 
in game theory. Section 2.3 will cover this in more depth. 
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ultimately at least one side, if not all parties, are pushed to take the offensive. 
In addition, as Wendt (1999) explains, the limitation of this security dilemma is 
that it completely rules out peaceful international competition and true 
international cooperation amongst countries. States are obliged to compete in 
many ways, but this often prohibits cooperation, which may also be beneficial. 
That is why, for realists, the chances for successful cooperation under 
international anarchy are very low; states’ preferences tend to be for reducing 
cooperation and employing self-help to achieve self-sufficiency. 
 In addition to the security dilemma, asymmetric power also hampers 
the establishment of trust among states. (Sutter, 1995) Asymmetric power 
under an anarchical structure may limit cooperation between countries. States 
fear that with unlimited cooperation, dependence may grow to the point that a 
state loses its own power of decision, and falls under the control of another 
actor. (Li, 2009) That said it is not impossible that entering into cooperation 
could bring extra strength and benefits. However, realism assumes this to be 
an unlikely scenario. (Womack, 2004) 
Furthermore, the over-interdependence between states also makes 
trust difficult. In the event that cooperation does occur, states may be 
concerned about their growing attachment to other countries and the 
development of a closely tied commodity and service exchange. In other 
words, close interdependence may entail a certain vulnerability to influence by 
other states. (Keohane and Nye, 2011) This concern may well hinder attempts 
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at cooperation. As a result, realists such as Waltz (2010) argue that countries 
should reduce dependence and achieve conditions of self-help, believing that 
institutionalism does little to affect the security dilemma. 
 This research opposes this realist school of thought by pointing out 
that, in reality, the game of cooperation between states is not discrete and will 
not take place only once. It can be repeated ad infinitum. Repeated results in 
the long-term may turn out differently, in particular due to the existence of 
revenge. It is interesting to find that, despite its generally pessimistic outlook 
on cooperation, even realism tends to neglect the possibility of revenge. As 
Oye (1986a) mentions, three further factors can influence cooperation, namely: 
revenge structure12, the shadow of the future and the number of actors.13 
Regarding revenge in particular, Oye (1986a) believes that it may not fit 
rational behaviour models such as the prisoner dilemma, because current 
choices may be influenced by past occurrences. Ignoring revenge may cause 
errors in judgement from both realists and liberalists. In other words, repeat 
games may conjure up different scenarios, such as cooperation due to 
long-term interest, or revenge due to previous betrayal. (Hoekman and 
Kostecki, 1995) Since countries are engaging in strategies of reciprocity and 
‘tit-for-tat,’ after repeat interactions in which common interests are damaged, 
states will eventually come to find that cooperation represents the best 
long-term strategy. 																																																								
12The concept of revenge structure will be analysed in greater detail in Section 2.2.2.  
13A discussion on the numbers of actors in game theory will be presented in Section 2.2.2. 
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 However, due to restrictions on information communication and 
continued doubts, betrayal is still a distinct possibility. (Axelrod and Keohane, 
1985) Grieco (1988) mentions that the key limitation of cooperation is the 
possibility of cheating, and suggests that this can be overcome by increased 
institutionalism. The existence of effective institutions alters the possibility for 
cheating and, crucially, improves the limited information communication, which 
is a major aspect of the classic prisoner dilemma. Increased institutionalism 
can thus benefit cooperation by supplying information, reducing costs and 
placating the worries and doubts of participating partners. A responsible and 
trustworthy international regime can mitigate states’ instinct to maximise their 
interests. (Fearon, 1998) This point of view is, of course, debated fiercely 
within academia, in large part because there are many issues concerning the 
practical implementation of such a regime. 
        Besides this, Axelrod and Keohane (1985) argue that it is the 
responsibility of states to alter their behaviour and place a high cost on 
defecting, as well as enabling the monitoring of concrete actions, in order to 
make headway in global cooperation. In order to increase cooperation, Fearon 
(1998) suggests that international cooperation should be characterised by two 
sequential phases – the bargaining phase and the enforcement phase – which 
suggests that monitoring and enforcement can influence successful 
cooperation. In short, although liberals accept the assumption of anarchy, they 
consider cooperation to be a distinct possibility when real trust can be 
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established between states, believing that this trust can be forged and 
monitored by the global regime as necessary. Liberals therefore advocate the 
foundation of global regimes to build a bridge to encourage cooperation. 
Fourthly, it is argued in literature that the existence of 
interdependence will cause difficulties in dividing up common interests. As 
explained by Grieco (1988), realism deems anarchy the fundamental trait of 
global relations, leading states to suffer from constant insecurity and 
preoccupation with the distribution of interests. Another key argument between 
realism and liberalism is that of relative gains versus absolute gains, which is 
an oft-mentioned issue in terms of the prospects for cooperation. However, 
relative and absolute gains should not become obstacles in efforts to develop 
institutionalism. Neoliberalism, for example, does not overlook the attraction of 
relative gain, but instead strives for absolute gain where possible as this 
boosts the prospects for institutionalism by allowing rival parties to both benefit. 
(Jervis, 1999) Keohane (2005) takes into account rational choice, claiming that 
states are rational actors, and aim to obtain the most interests with the least 
cost. States care about their own interests, and do not care about the interests 
of others. 
However, realists hold that states pay scant attention to participation 
and positive-sum outcomes, but instead pay attention to which state is in a 
position to benefit more. Thus, the interests of other states are important in 
terms of relative gain. As Grieco (1988) mentions, states will cheat if 
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necessary during cooperation in order to guarantee that their partners do not 
gain more than they do in relative terms. This is due to the principle that a 
partner today may become the enemy tomorrow. Relative gain may translate 
into relative power, and this may change the states’ behaviour and the overall 
balance of power. Waltz (2010) also argues that relative gain is an important 
issue for states; in other words, states will be unsatisfied with absolute gains if 
other states are also gaining benefits – it is crucial to secure a relatively higher 
gain than competitors in order to keep ahead and avoid risk. States will 
therefore pay close attention to partners’ benefits, significantly damaging the 
prospects for cooperation. 
 For the sake of cooperation, it would be crucial for states to make an 
effort to shift their focus from relative gains and the power asymmetry of the 
sides engaged in cooperation, in order to gain benefits. However, as Krasner 
(1991) states, strong powers can dictate who may participate in the game, and 
who may be able to change the rules of the game, or even the results, at whim. 
As such, the distribution of power plays a key role in the success of 
international cooperation. According to Keohane et al. (1989), the distribution 
of wealth and power create conditions of extreme asymmetry, and as such, it 
is difficult for some parties to obtain the same interests without paying different 
costs relative to their power. In fact, strong states may force smaller or weaker 
states to make policy adjustments to suit their own interests. (Gruber, 2000) A 
strong international regime may go some way to reducing this issue, 
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particularly benefiting small and weak states. 
 These two classic schools of international relations theory analyse 
the chances for cooperation very differently. Whilst both sides recognise that 
there is great potential for states to cheat or defect during cooperation, 
liberalism sees this as a challenge to be overcome by global regimes. Realism, 
however, considers that the unchanging state of anarchy and the lack of a 
central authority mean that cooperation will consistently suffer. Current 
literature debates the constraints of global regimes and the discussion over 
responsibility, but also must take into consideration the specifics of countries’ 
internal situations, which are unequal and may limit development 
opportunities.  
 In sum, the nature of co-opetition surrounding energy is replete with 
the integration of world resources and shaped by the economy, military and 
environment. Energy security from the perspective of co-opetition therefore 
goes over and above NTS. In addition, economic integration is not the only 
form of interdependence; interdependence is also growing in other dimensions, 
including energy. Furthermore, international organisations have not surpassed 
states in terms of importance, but maintain their own specific role and can 
assist states in reducing conflict and obtaining greater interests, in addition to 
helping redress the balance of power asymmetry in cooperative efforts. 
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2.2 Co-opetition within Game Theory 
Research into game theory and the strategy of decision-making has its origins 
in the book Theory of Games and Economic Behavior by von Neumann and 
Morgenstern (2007), first published in 1944. This book outlines how game 
theory can use mathematical methods to analyse the optimal strategies of 
players with conflicting interests when engaging in competitive activity. Game 
theory therefore provides a model for balanced decision-making, as well as 
possible setbacks, when two or more individual rational actors directly interact. 
Game theory has been defined as an interactive decision theory. (Durlauf and 
Blume, 2008) 
 Game theory was initially employed to analyse conflicts. For 
example, Schelling (1980) uses game theory to explain conflicts in 
international relations, expounding upon the function of deterrence in state 
interaction, with a particular focus on how to use the military as a credible 
deterrent. Schelling (1980:21) had previously compared conflict within 
international relations to ‘when two trucks loaded with dynamite meet on a 
road wide enough for one.’ Nonetheless, he does not deny the possibility of 
rational cooperation, recognising that international politics need not be a 
zero-sum game, as many international rivals in fact share some common 
interests, which may be used as a bargaining chip should the parties be 
prevailed upon to coordinate their strategic cooperation. Brams and Bramj 
(1985) also used game theory to analyse conflicts between global 
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superpowers. Whilst such conflicts may appear to be impulsive, game theory 
reveals that they are generally based upon rational decisions working for 
states’ own interests. Scholars working with game theory may be able to 
provide suggestions for national strategy in terms of both conflict and 
cooperation, although liberal and realist viewpoints may differ on the most 
appropriate analysis of circumstances. Both realism and liberalism are based 
on rationalism and rational choice. (Wendt, 1999) Besides this, states are 
characterised as a unified actor engaging in rational behaviour, working for the 
maximisation of self-interest within the existing structure and system. (Waltz, 
1979; Keohane, 2005; Waltz, 2010) 
 Thus, this study also employs game theory as a method for 
analysing co-opetitive strategy, which involves competition, the traditional 
focus of game theory. Only through interactively understanding each other’s 
policies, can states’ own strategies be adjusted to match the future direction of 
development. Sun Tzu’s Art of War advises that ‘If you know the enemy and 
know yourself, you need not fear the result of a hundred battles. If you know 
yourself but not the enemy, for every victory gained you will also suffer a 
defeat. If you know neither the enemy nor yourself, you will succumb in every 
battle.’ (Sun Tzu, 2009:18)  
 As Fan (2011) mentions, there are five key aspects to take into 
consideration within game theory. The first aspect is the player. In some 
literature, such as Binmore et al. (1993), players are also called gamesters, 
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and game theory is occasionally referred to as gamester theory. Players are 
the actors that make decisions and decide how to play the game in order to 
obtain the largest interest. Furthermore, the player can be two individuals or 
groups. Importantly, the players make their decisions based on rationality. The 
second aspect is information. Information refers to the knowledge of the 
players in the game, garnered through understanding and observation. 
Information is of utmost importance to the participants, and so they must 
observe the behaviour of the other players in order to obtain the information 
necessary for them to make the most optimal strategy. The third aspect is 
tactics, which refers to the set of actions that players choose to respond to the 
actions of other players in the game, and dictates the timing of these actions in 
order to obtain the greatest benefit. However, as Armstrong and Clark (1997) 
affirms, it is difficult to predict the specific tactics in co-opetition. This indicates 
that in the following cases of tactics, it is difficult to recognise a specific 
strategy deployed by one state on another. The fourth aspect is known as 
payoff, which refers to the utility received by players under a certain series of 
tactics. The final aspect is equilibrium, which represents the best strategy for 
all players. The following sections take these aspects into account in the 
discussion of co-opetition, and employ them in the creation of a game theory 
model to apply to cases of co-opetition. 
 Doubts are often raised as to whether mathematical models can be 
applied to analysis in the field of IR or political science. Game theory, despite 
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representing a branch of mathematics, has been widely used in economics 
and other disciplines including IR. (Barron, 2007) In fact, game theory is first 
and foremost a logical theory. As Wang (2011) explains, the goal of game 
theory is to find optimal solutions, rather than simple mathematical solutions. 
In this paper, game theory is used as a tool to analyse the problem at hand, to 
simplify the problem and analyse the outcome of co-opetitive decisions and 
strategies with more clarity and precision. In other words, this study is not 
heavily mathematical in its analysis. 
 
2.2.1 Conditions of Co-opetition within Game Theory 
Game theory is always a good measurement of co-opetition. There are three 
major pre-conditions for co-opetition in game theory. First of all, perhaps the 
most crucial pre-condition for co-opetition is the presence of both common and 
conflicting interests. Bengtsson and Kock (2000) explain that the relationships 
present in co-opetition may be rather complex as they involve two different 
types of interaction. They go on to elaborate that co-opetitive partners have to 
be simultaneously friendly (due to common interests) and hostile (due to 
conflicting interests). Within co-opetition, common interests between rivals 
generally represent the shared desire to make the pie bigger, whereas 
conflicting interests arise as a result of differing judgements regarding division 
of the pie. Common and conflicting interests are a pre-condition for the 
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existence of a relationship of co-opetition. In terms of international relations, 
therefore, states hoping to engage in co-opetitive relations should not only be 
aware of competing interests, but must also identify potential common 
interests or mutual objectives.  
 The key issue of energy security identified by this research is that 
supply cannot meet increasing demand. States are thus forced to attempt to 
reduce domestic usage whilst simultaneously increasing imports from 
elsewhere. This research recognises that energy can be deemed either public 
goods, or private goods. The discussion of public goods started in 16th century 
Britain. Two requirements decide what can be deemed a public good. The first 
is that the good in question can be enjoyed by everyone, and the second one 
is that it has a certain lifespan of usage.  
 The Nash equilibrium of Dutta’s public goods model is C1*=C2*=!!, 
wherein C1 refers to the resources that player 1 can use, C2 refers to the 
resources that player 2 can use, and y stands for the total amount of public 
goods. As Dutta (1999) explains, in the first period, player 1 can share !! and 
player 2 also can share !!. The remainder of !! is left over for the following 
period, meaning that player 1 can share !!, as can player 2. In the energy 
game, if there are only two players, the best strategy for players to take 
regarding a disputed area of energy reserves would be joint exploration, where 
each player can obtain !! of the total amount. Dutta also proposes another 
game with more than two players, and concludes that C1=C2=…=CN= !!!. An 
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increase in N reduces what is left for everyone to share. In other words, in new 
energy exploration, reducing the players leads to greater gains. 
 This analysis is from the perspective of energy as a public good, 
wherein reducing the number of players increases the available interests for 
participating players. If public goods are considered from the angle of costs 
needing to be borne by players, any initiative by one state can bring about 
benefit for others. However, this requires the state launching this initiative to 
bear any costs unilaterally and this is an unlikely choice for a state to make. 
(Olson and Zeckhauser, 1966) In terms of energy, domestic tactics to prevent 
a state from having to make this first move could include controlling levels of 
demand and building strategic fuel reserves. However, controlling demand has 
knock-on effects on economic development, which domestic consumers will 
have to face, and some methods of control, such as imposition of fuel duties, 
directly affect the consumer. The following Table 2 can be drawn for energy as 
a public good: 
 
       Table 2: Payoff Matrices for Energy as a Public Good (2b>c>b, * Nash 
equilibrium) 
 B (Action) B (Inaction) 
A (Action) (2b-c, 2b-c) (b-c, b) 
A (Inaction) (b, b-c) (0,0)* 
 
(1) If Player A chooses, for example, to impose a fuel tax, then they 
will reduce import levels from outside and must pay c for the cost of this 
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change. A has taken the initiative and is faced with cost c, but also reaps the 
relative gain represented by benefit b, as does player B who has taken no 
action of their own. Therefore player B is free riding. 
(2) If both Player A and B impose domestic fuel tax and thus reduce 
imports, this will have a double effect on their relative gains, represented by 
figure 2b. However, both took action and thus both must pay cost c. 
(3) If neither player A nor B take any domestic action, both have no 
choice but to accept the levels and rates of import from a producer. Neither 
contribute towards public goods and neither gain benefit. 
       Thus it can be seen that due to high levels of interdependence in terms 
of energy, consumers can benefit from taking action themselves or from the 
action of others. In the similar case of building strategic reserves, for example, 
if A takes the initiative to build up a reserve, it will obtain result b-c, whereas 
player B will be able to take gain b whilst sitting idle. Thus, players choosing to 
take action must decide whether the action is valuable enough to merit 
rewarding other players with the fruits of their own labour. In the case of overt 
information transfer, the least costly choice for both players is inaction. 
However, this choice will not make any contribution to relieving issues of 
energy security. 
 However, if energy is considered to be a private good, the situation 
will be different. Take offshore resource exploration as an example. In this 
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case, other states cannot benefit from the action of others, and thus both will 
choose action in order to make gains, as shown in the model below.  
 
Table 3: Payoff Matrices for Energy as a Private Good (2C>b>C>0, * 
Nash equilibrium) 
 B (Action) B (Inaction) 
A (Action) (b-2c, b-2c)* (b-c, -c) 
A (Inaction) (-c, b-c) (0,0) 
 
(1) If both A and B choose to take action, they will both gain benefit b, 
but must pay double the cost, represented by the figure 2c. Both obtain b-2C. 
(2) If any one player takes action, but the other does not, the positive 
player will gain the outcome of b-c, and the inactive one will bear the cost of -c 
with no benefit.  
(3) If neither takes action, they will obtain nothing. 
 In sum, co-opetition within international relations, and specifically in 
terms of energy security, is decided largely by the conditions under which it 
functions. If energy is seen as a public good, this has a different outcome than 
when it is seen as a private good. 
 A second condition for co-opetition is complementarity, which can 
take many forms, such as complementary knowledge, technologies, skills or 
contacts. Players in a game of co-opetition benefit from possessing different 
but complementary resources. Brandenburger and Nalebuff (1998) conclude 
that co-opetition which best results in the enlarging of markets occurs between 
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complementors. Lewis (1992) is also convinced that complementary attributes 
and needs are one of the most important factors dictating the success of 
co-opetition. In addition, Akdoğan and Cingšz (2012) claim that a trusting 
environment can be built more easily if rivals enjoy complementary resources. 
Luo (2004) remarks that co-opetitive partners with different resources can 
obtain more benefits by complementing their own resources with those of their 
counterpart. Thus, in terms of international relations, states or regions wishing 
to enter a co-opetitive relationship would do well to possess different but 
complementary resources. Furthermore, complementarity determines added 
value in co-opetition, which will be discussed in greater depth subsequently. 
 Another clear requirement for co-opetition is the establishment of 
trust. In the context of co-opetition, trust can be seen as the most essential 
factor in a relationship between rivals. (Akdoğan and Cingšz, 2012) Devetag 
(2008) believes that trust within co-opetition is mainly related to an actor’s 
expectations of their counterpart’s compliance with agreements. Perry et al. 
(2004:952) offer a corroborating viewpoint: ‘trust is positively related to 
commitment in horizontal alliances’ and ‘the relationship between 
technological uncertainty and commitment is less negative when trust is high 
than when trust is low.’ Therefore, in order for successful co-opetitive 
relationships to be forged within international relations, a pre-condition of trust 
between states or rivals is absolutely crucial. It is also argued that the 
establishment of energy regimes can coordinate the relations among members 
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and achieve trust. Regimes can be defined as ‘sets of implicit or explicit 
principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which actors’ 
expectations converge in a given area of international relations.’ (Krasner, 
1982: 186) 
In the international system, interdependence decides the existence of 
common interests. However, Keohane (2005) argues that the existence of 
common interests does not mean that cooperation will necessarily occur, but 
only that it is a possible outcome. Whether cooperation ultimately does occur 
depends on the involvement and effectiveness of global regimes. Waltz (2000), 
on the other hand, believes that the survival of states relies on their own power, 
but that international regimes can also provide a degree of benefit. Despite the 
emphasis on the power of the state, the establishment of international regimes 
is not opposed; rather, international regimes are seen as simply a tool allowing 
the state to obtain more interest in the international system. (Xu, 2008)  
 Under the conditions of international anarchy, states face the 
dilemma of whether to participate in international regimes and thus allow the 
regimes to subsequently supervise the actions of the state. One approach to 
this is the bargaining model, where rational states calculate the cost, gains and 
external threats of their decision. (Fudenberg and Tirole, 1991) A second 
approach is that states are persuaded by the principles of the regime itself and 
deem it a natural choice to participate in the regime. (Risse et al., 1999) There 
is no obvious contradiction within these two different approaches; in fact, they 
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are complementary, because states can choose to participate to different 
degrees in different regimes in different time periods, depending on their 
analysis of the cost and benefit of doing so. (Checkel and Advanced Research 
on the Europeanisation of the Nation-State, 1999) Two rules of the game 
theory model, namely reciprocity and commitment, require the supervision of 
international regimes. 
 
2.2.2 Co-opetition within a Model of Game Theory 
This research will centre around a model of co-opetition based on the game 
theory approach. In terms of literature on competition and cooperation, it is 
difficult to steer clear of game theory. Werhane et al. (1997) explain that game 
theory is system-level researchwhich relies on calculating outcomes through 
analysis of rational choice in situations of interdependence. In other words, 
when personal choice depends on the choice of others, human behaviour can 
be explained, predicted and evaluated through this approach. Under the 
established reality of interdependence, any individual choice is relative and 
individuals must consider a range of alternative possibilities before making 
their choice. Game theory purports to tell us why these choices are made and 
how the greatest interest can be gained through understanding of these 
choices. 
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 As explained in Chapter One, the fundamental problem of energy 
security is that increasing world energy demand cannot meet supply. This has 
resulted in a series of problems, such as intense competition in the energy 
market, including over imports and new exploration of offshore resources; 
difficulties in coordinating the relations between, and behaviour of, consumers 
and producers in the global energy regime; and controlling and limiting 
domestic usage. The function of co-opetition in the global energy regime would 
be to attempt the resolution and relief of these tense issues. This research 
makes use of game theory to analyse the fundamental problems and generate 
effective and appropriate national strategies, reducing risk and loss as far as 
possible whilst simultaneously reinforcing security and increasing income. In 
other words, building a model of co-opetition may prove to be a helpful way in 
which to analyse and develop energy-related strategy. This strategy is based 
on a theoretical model; it should therefore not only obey fixed and existing 
assumptions, but also take into account the fact that employing a theoretical 
strategy in practice may involve unforeseen variables.   
 Brandenburger and Nalebuff (1998) outline five important factors 
which can decide co-opetition, namely players, added value, roles, tactics, and 
scope (PARTS). This research connected these five elements and game 
theory’s five key aspects together in order to analyse co-opetition within game 
theory and to demonstrate another five assumptions of successful co-opetition 
such as two states with power asymmetry, a high degree of complementarity, 
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step-by-step reciprocity and commitment, and monitoring by international 
regimes. 
Players  
It is difficult to assert exactly how many players are needed to achieve stable 
cooperation within a game, because cooperation can be achieved within both 
infinite and finite conditions. This research identifies an optimum of two players 
due to two reasons. Firstly, in terms of numbers, the more participants 
engaged in a game, the greater the cost and likelihood of failure. For example, 
each player will strive for more interest and decreased responsibility. Waltz 
(2010) mentions the existence of the free rider, who gains benefit without 
sufficient input. With fewer participating units, or actors, the likelihood of free 
riding decreases, and the system will be more stable. By this logic, two should 
be the most stable cooperative partnership. Further to this, more actors means 
more chance for betrayal. Oye (1986b) notes that with more players in the 
game, the opportunity for successful cooperation decreases, because each 
member must identify and recognise opportunities for the advancement of 
mutual interest. Once interests are identified, actors must alter their behaviour 
in order to adjust and coordinate, increasing their costs of participation. Milner 
(1992) cites Keohane’s analysis of reciprocity, which posits that there are three 
key aspects: recognition of a defector, revenge upon the defector, and 
justification for the revenge. However, with more players, it is difficult to fulfil 
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each of these aspects and create true reciprocity, meaning it is difficult to 
sanction any defectors, or even identify their defection. 
Furthermore, there is another important precondition of the game: 
players are considered to be rational actors, and their performance is fixed. 
The behaviour of actors will not change easily and serves to rationally obtain 
the greatest interests. However, changes in environment and information 
brought about by an increased number of actors are likely to lead to more 
unpredictable and changeable behaviour from the participating actors. 
(Morrow, 1994) As a result, finite is better than infinite in the game. 
The second reason is based on differences in power. Players in a 
game may be symmetrical or asymmetrical. Firstly, a game involving 
asymmetrical powers is known as the Dictator Game (DG). According to Güth 
and Huck (2002), two basic conditions must be met to create the DG scenario: 
firstly, the sponsor A has an absolute decision-making power over the 
allocation of the cake; secondly, even if respondents B is unwilling to accept 
this assignment, it will not affect the specific implementation of the programme. 
That is to say, if A proposes to allocate the cake to x, then B will receive 1-x, 
and B does not have the right to vote or influence this matter. 
However, the key issue which needs to be dealt with in DG is how to 
appease the respondents, and pacify B’s emotions regarding this unfair game. 
If left with negative perceptions of the game, a substantial proportion of 
respondents would be willing to reject future offers, even positive ones. 
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(Kahneman et al., 1986) In fact, maximising profit does not always reach 
Pareto optimality due to the pressure of reputation and long-term stable 
development. This rationality can significantly influence the choices and 
actions of less powerful respondents. In other words, the understanding on 
relative gains and absolute gains by the player will influence the game.  
 It has been stated that two players is the optimum choice for the 
game of co-opetition; these two actors should not be chosen at random. 
Instead, the added value of each player should be taken into account. In other 
words, what power do these two players have? Potential cooperation may 
occur between states at equal levels, or between those with large asymmetry. 
For example, if state P is at level xP, and another state, Q, is at xQ (Q>P+1), 
the two states are relatively evenly matched and as such, relative gains take 
on greater importance. However, if for example state Q is at (Q>P+5), the 
large asymmetry between the states means that Q is able to consider merely 
absolute gain. This can be shown in the tables 4 below. If it is assumed that 
the balance between the states is (Q>P+1): 
         Table 4: Payoff Matrices for Asymmetrical Players 
 
   Q C(Cooperation)      Q D (Defector) 
P C (Cooperation) (4,5) (1,6) 
P D (Defector)  (5,1) (2,2) 
 
(1) Should both players chose cooperation, Q is able to obtain more 
interest than P due to its relative power. That is to say, the relative gain that Q 
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can give P is +1. However, due to the balance q>p+1, any interest that Q can 
obtain will not influence P’s interest.  
(2) If any player chooses to defect, that player will gain greater 
interest than if it cooperates. For example, if the strategy of Q is to defect, 
whereas P opts to cooperate, then the relative outcome for P is -5. Over a long 
time frame, this could greatly influence the interests of P. However, both states 
are able to adjust their strategy over long, repeated games and it is not always 
clear which state, if any, will choose to defect. 
(3) If both states choose to defect, although the absolute gain for 
both is 2, the relative gain for both is 0. This does not influence their relative 
interests. 
In conclusion, in the scenario that (Q>P+1), Q’s potential relative 
gains are not influenced, whereas those of P may be depending on the actions 
taken. No matter what action P takes, Q will seek the largest absolute gain, 
rather than consider relative gain. That is to say, in this kind of game, the 
chances for cooperation are higher than other scenarios, as one player is in a 
position to overlook relative gains. 
        If it is assumed that Q=P or Q=P+1, then it is as shown in Table 5: 
         Table 5: Payoff Matrices for Symmetrical Players 
   Q C (Cooperation)     Q D (Defect) 
P C (Cooperation) (4,4) (1,5) 
P D (Defector) (5,1) (2,2) 
(1) If both Q and P opt for cooperation, both achieve absolute gains of 
4 as the interest. As Q=P, development may be of negative influence on P.  
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(2) If either Q or P choose to defect, the other player can only gain 1. 
In other words, the defector obtains a far greater interest. 
(3) If both defect, the absolute gain is 2 and the relative gain is 0.  
Consequently, P, as a strong country compared with Q, will opt for 
defection over cooperation and this will cause the failure of the cooperation. As 
a result, if these two countries are asymmetrical in terms of power, the 
stronger country will be in the leading position and the weak country will have 
to comply with the strong one, as the cost of defection is significantly higher. 
This is likely to lead to increased cooperation due to the cost of defecting. (Wu, 
2007) As such, a situation of co-opetition may come about between two strong 
countries in coordination, both able to simultaneously cooperate and compete, 
whereas between a strong and a weak country, it is difficult to maintain a 
significant level of competition.  
Secondly, if the two players possess the same resources, or they 
have the same requirements, this dictates the concrete operation of the game. 
The players become oligarchs and the game transfers to the oligopoly game 
type. Price and production need to stay relatively stable; small adjustments 
must be made to production based on needs, if possible, in order to keep 
prices stable. (Meister, 1999) The Cartel Model is an appropriate example to 
demonstrate this kind of relationship. Within the Cartel Model, it is 
acknowledged that the goal of a cartel is to enlarge the entire interest, 
including that of all the players. OPEC is generally used as the most obvious 
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example of a cartel, which is used to analyse whether the members can make, 
and comply with, their own commitments on oil production quotas. 
Two players from within OPEC – Venezuela and Saudi Arabia – can 
be considered as an example. According to Dutta (1999), assuming the 
production of Venezuela is VA while that of Saudi Arabia is SA, the discount 
rate is δ, and high demand is p. He draws the conclusion that δ≥ !!!!". SA will 
not break commitment on quotas if p>1. However, if p<1, it would be difficult 
for betrayal on quotas to be prevented within OPEC. In fact, after the 1990s, 
consumer countries turned more and more to the development of new 
alternative energy in order to reduce the high dependence on oil and, in 
addition, new oil exploration commenced in non-OPEC countries. As a result, 
p has tended to be smaller than 1, which means that SA has the motivation to 
increase production to obtain more interest. In terms of VA’s discount rate, if 
δ≥ !"!"!!!, VA will not break commitment on quotas, and the result is that the 
smaller p is, the higher the likelihood of betrayal on the commitment. This 
shows that in energy cooperation, targeting a smaller producer may be easier 
for consumer countries than selecting a more powerful, strong one. In other 
words, due to the relative flexibility of weak countries on oil quotas, 
cooperative opportunities may be advanced and more imports secured.  
However, this begs the question as to whether joining a cartel is of 
real benefit to individual producers, and also whether cartels can exist for long 
periods of time. The example of OPEC suggests that there are two reasons 
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why cartels continue to exist successfully; these are regional concentration 
and shared high production quality. Imbalanced energy allocation decides the 
possibilities of regional concentration, and high quality dictates whether 
customers will choose to continue cooperation. The IEA considers the four 
factors of energy security, economic development, environmental awareness 
and engagement worldwide to investigate whether these cartels can be more 
resilient than regional organisations with regard to energy security. (IEA, 2012) 
If there are two players in the game and they have symmetrical power, 
cooperation cannot continue if both take a ‘tough’ attitude rather than 
capitulate. In the case that the power of the two players is symmetrical, Dutta 
(1999:130) proposes the ‘Chicken Game’: d>b>0>a, and P is the odds that 
player 2 will choose the tough approach. He summarised that P= !!!!!!!!, and 
that each player has P= !!!!!!!!. In other words, in a symmetrical game, all the 
players have to choose the same strategies, make the same decisions, and 
earn the same profit. That is to say, with both players choosing the tough 
approach, cooperation will not take place and conflict may erupt.   
      Table 6: Payoff Matrices of the Chicken Game (Dutta, 1999) 
 Tough Capitulate 
Tough (a, a) (d, 0) 
Capitulate (0, d) (b, b) 
However, Schelling proposes a different result: one player will offload a wheel 
and shout I cannot turn to the other player. The other player will turn when he 
receives this information. (Dodge, 2012) That is to say, one player will cheat 
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the other. The way in which cheating influences the outcome of the energy 
game will be analysed in the case study.  
Why, then, are two asymmetrical players better than finite players in 
the game? Considering the example of the three alternatives for Russian Far 
East oil, firstly, Russia could have built an oil transfer pipeline from Angarsk to 
Daqing (China), or Angarsk to Nakhodka (facing Japan’s eastern coast). The 
final choice – chosen by Russia – was Tayshet to Nakhodka. This third plan 
involved the most expensive and lengthy construction, so why was this the 
favoured choice? Although China, Japan and Russia display marked 
interdependence, the power balance is asymmetrical, due to the fact that they 
obtain different resources in the game. According to Keohane and Nye (1989), 
smaller states will often depend on each other as a secondary power resource. 
Russia is a producer state, leaving the consumers China and Japan 
to compete. In this case, Russia is in a leading position and Japan and China 
must ultimately accept the decisions of Russia. Russia was not willing to lose 
potential considerable and stable market demand in China, but neither could it 
fail to supply Japan. Therefore, a pipeline was built from Tayshet (Russia) to 
Nakhodka (Russian coast), adding a 64km branch to Mohe (China). As 
Labeckaya (2003) explains, Russia first considered its own interests before 
making a decision. By choosing this pipeline, it is now in a position to supply oil 
to China, Japan, Korea and even further afield to Pacific nations and even the 
USA. Building a pipeline through China would be far more risky and insecure, 
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with fewer potential benefits. Although building from Tayshet to Nakhodka is a 
more costly option, it will ultimately bring far greater benefits. By taking into 
account a larger number of actors (including potential future customers), 
Russia’s cooperation with Japan/China became less predictable. In the game, 
if China had the same power resource as Russia, the result would be different, 
or if there were only China and Russia in the game, the result would also 
change. Due to the existence of long-term absolute gain, Russia chose to build 
a branch to China to appease China, in order to reduce the revenge in future 
games. This generates the first hypothesis: two asymmetrical players can 
achieve co-opetition more easily than symmetrical players, but the more 
players that join the game, the less stable the game will be. 
     Table 7: Three Alternatives for Russian Far East Oil (CNPC, 2013) 
 Angarsk-Daqing 
(China) 
Angarsk-Nakhodka Tayshet-Nakhodka 
Branch:Skovorodino 
to Mohe (China) 
Length (km) 2400 5000 8000 
Annual oil 
delivery 
2000(2005-2010) 
3000 (after 2010) 
5000 8000 
Construction 
cost($100 
million) 
20 36-50 110-170 
Project start 
time 
2003    2004 or 2005 First stage 2006 
Second stage 2008 
Project end 
time  
2005    2008 or 2010 First stage: 2008 
Second stage: 2011 
 
Added Value 
Added value can be considered as the degree of complementarity between 
participants in the game. According to the formula P=(x+y+Rxy), P represents 
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the common interests of the player, the degree of complementarity is 
represented by R, and the separate profits that player A and B can obtain are x 
and y respectively. If x and y are fixed, the only possible method to increase 
the two partners’ common interest (P) – to ‘make the pie bigger’ – is by 
increasing R. In other words, the degree of complementarity must be 
reinforced to increase the overall interest brought to both sides. That is to say, 
the lower the complementarity degree, the less common interest is made. That 
is to say, in terms of the energy game, one supplier and one customer is better 
than two customers together. The second hypothesis is therefore that high 
complementarity can boost the achievement of co-opetition.  
Rules 
Commitment and reciprocity, or the establishment thereof, comprise the two 
major strategies in a repeat game for overcoming the security dilemma. There 
is no meaning attached to binding commitments in a one-player game, but 
such commitments have value when the number of players is increased to two. 
(Fudenberg and Tirole, 1991:75) That is because, based on binding 
commitments, ‘by committing himself to a given sequence of actions a player 
may be able to alter the play of his opponents.’ Commitments can also provide 
a timeframe for the carrying out of actions at certain points. 
        In the energy game, due to the particularity of energy and a lack of 
trust, it is always difficult to sustain cooperation over a long period of time. As a 
result, repeat game was proposed. In the case of a repeated game, 
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participants can receive information through observing the other party’s 
strategy and the results of the repeated games. (Fudenberg and Tirole, 1991) 
As a result, with a repeated game, the possibility of cooperation will increase. 
In the first game, the players will only consider the absolute gains that they can 
receive, while in repeated games, the parties will be concerned more with the 
overall effect or average earnings of the game. (Bó and Fréchette, 2009) 
Consequently, in a repeated game, a ‘tit-for-tat’ strategy can be employed to 
establish mutual trust. Within the confines of a repeated game, such as an 
energy mechanism, if country A takes action choosing betrayal, country B can 
apply certain sanctions to A (and vice versa). 
In other words, establishing binding commitments within a regime can 
be considered a useful method to help maintain cooperative relations. 
Commitments can include three different types, namely affective commitments, 
continuance commitments and normative commitments. (Meyer and Allen, 
1991) In terms of the energy game, affective commitment appears more like a 
desire; it represents the fundamental emotion and drive behind states 
choosing to cooperate with one another. Continuance commitment plays the 
role of a need, which can keep cooperation going for a long time. Normative 
commitment represents obligation, which is influenced by the external 
environment and reputation. (Zhan and Jin, 2007)  
The second rule is reciprocity. Reciprocity can provide a balance 
point between the public goods game and the private goods game. It can 
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coordinate interests and reduce the costs of monitoring and sanctions. 
Furthermore, state cooperation and reciprocity can increase trust over time 
and enhance the efficacy of institutionalism. That is to say, co-opetition 
benefits from rules being monitored by institutions, and tactics of co-opetition 
depend on specific conditions and reciprocal action. According to Axelrod and 
Keohane (1985), under the existence of conflicting and complementary 
interest, states have the motivation to produce reciprocity, and this strategy of 
reciprocity can obtain more gains than other strategies. In addition, reciprocity 
does not rely on the existence of a central authority and is therefore a 
cooperative strategy that suits the condition of international anarchy. (Keohane, 
1986) In other words, if state A breaks its commitments in the international 
regime, the remaining states will take actions of revenge, causing the gains of 
state A to decrease. Thus, reciprocity can reduce expected yields, and so 
players must consider carefully before making the decision to break 
commitments. In other words, states in the regime do not need to be 
supervised by a third party. However, the minimum pre-condition of reciprocity 
is of course bilateralism; reciprocity is irrelevant for unilateral decision-making. 
Reciprocity loses its strength in a pure two-player game. In terms of this 
limitation, Hass’s “tactical linkage” strategy intends to make up for this. The 
objective of tactical linkage is ‘simply to obtain additional bargaining leverage, 
to extract a quid pro quo not obtainable if the discussion remains confined to a 
single issue.’ (Haas, 1980:372) This linkage will change the allocation of 
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interests and the expected yields at the beginning of the game. Thus, as the 
assumption seven proposes, establishing commitments is a way to maintain 
long-term co-opetition, and that reciprocity can improve the establishment of 
trust.  
Tactics 
Good tactics can alter players’ perceptions14 and change the result of the 
game. (Brandenburger and Nalebuff, 1998) Within situations of co-opetition, 
different players have different positions and standpoints which dictate their 
respective tactics. For example, in terms of energy security, some states are 
net producers and others are net consumers, which can bring about different 
tactics within the game. 
In this research, it is assumed that the energy game is based on 
bounded rationality 15 , meaning that the equilibrium can be changed by 
adjustments in a repeat game. (Hammerstein and Selten, 1995:932) In many 
ways similarity can be drawn with Darwin’s evolutionary theory; the result of 
the game occurs through adjustments and natural selection. In fact, a related 
line of argument can be seen in Smith and Price (1973:73): ‘In biology 
strategies are considered to be inherited behaviour which control the 
																																																								
14 Perceptions play a central role in negotiations. Buyers and sellers often have different views 
of the pie; sellers portray what they have to offer as valuable, while buyers remain sceptical. 
(Brandenburger and Nalebuff, 1998)  
15  This research selects bounded rationality, rather than absolute rationality, because 
although states can be seen as rational actors acting in their own best interests, they cannot 
guarantee not to make any mistakes. In addition, both the current international situation and 
historical issues will also influence the choice of strategy. 
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individual’s behaviour.’ Game strategy, which follows this sense is defined as 
an evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS). In brief, an ESS is a strategy whereby, 
if most of the members of a population adopt it, there is no ‘mutant’ strategy 
that would give higher reproductive fitness. However, an evolutionarily stable 
strategy needs a large sample to prove the veracity of this assumption. (Neill, 
2004)  
Different tactics depend on specific situations and the information 
content in the game; as a result, it is difficult to outline the specific tactics of 
co-opetition. However, differences in tactics deepen when the number of 
players is increased. If there are two players in a game, the game tactics for A 
are represented by x, and for player B, they are represented by 1-x. Then the 
expected utility of A and B are namely u1 = x * a + (1-x) * b, u2 = x * c + (1-x) * 
d, and the average expected return for this group is u- = x * u1 + (1-x) * 
u2.(Hammerstein and Selten, 1995) Therefore, according to the theory of 
evolution, the player with lower tactical utility will be forced to change their 
strategies in order to survive. The case study chapters of this research will 
need to fully consider the existence of ESS, as well as which external aspects 
influence choices, such as historical factors and current developments. Thus, 
the fourth hypothesis states that tactics are decided by the situation that the 
states find themselves in, as well as the player the state is facing.  
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Scope 
Scope (i.e. anticipation for the future) in the game includes two parts, firstly the 
common interest, and secondly the expected yield. Increasing common 
interest is the goal of co-opetition. The existence of common interest can be 
explained by the degree of complementarity and the Game of the Battle of the 
Sexes (BoS)16. In this game, finding the common interest can lay the grounds 
for the payoff, and both the parties can enjoy a fair arrangement. Whichever 
player has an insight into the opportunities first can gain the priority and 
therefore the upper hand. Arriving late to the play is an obvious limitation for an 
actor. 
In addition, games of common interest can be referred to ‘as stage 
games when there is a payoff vector that strongly Pareto dominates all other 
feasible payoffs.’ (Fudenberg and Tirole, 1991:387) They go on to point out 
that there are other forms of equilibrium in addition to the unique 
Pareto-optimal payoff. That is to say, pursuing Pareto-dominant payoff is not 
the inevitable starting strategy of players when stating a game. 
																																																								
16 BoS assumes that a couple have agreed to meet this evening, but cannot recall if they will 
be attending the opera or a football match. The payoff matrix is shown as follows. If both of 
them choose the same entertainment, they can gain more than separating from each other. 
(Fudenberg Tirole,1991)  
                       Table 8: Payoff Matrices of BoS 
 Opera Football 
Opera  (3,2) (0,0) 
Football (0,0) (2,3) 
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Secondly, in terms of long-term scope, absolute gain must be 
considered. Bargaining is inevitable, because bargaining decides whether 
players can gain more in the game. As Flatau (2002) notes, the nature of the 
bargaining model is actually from Stahl and Rubinstein’s original model of 
bargaining. The Stahl model focuses more on the finite-horizon version of the 
same game (Ståhl, 1972), which depends on the length of the game and which 
player made the last offer. Fudenberg and Tirole (1991) point out that, 
Rubinstein’s paper extends the work of Ståhl and brings bargaining into the 
infinite-horizon game. In Rubinstein’s model, bargaining is framed without 
finite time limits, and takes place under the conditions of entity information. 
Both sides take turns in bargaining. This model is applied to understand how 
two players can agree to share a pie of size 1 and maintain an acceptable 
equilibrium. (Rubinstein, 1982) Furthermore, Binmore et al. (1986) assert that 
bargaining ability is related to the preferences of the players. More patience 
brings stronger bargaining capability. In addition, risk aversion also affects 
bargaining capability, and players with a lower degree of risk aversion have a 
stronger bargaining ability. In other words, in the face of the same risks, the 
preferences of individual players may affect their ability to bargain and 
therefore the ultimate gains they are able to obtain. 
An important and limiting condition in this game is that both players 
have a monopoly of some kind, such as being an energy producer or an 
energy consumer, but in fact, not every player can fulfil this requirement. In the 
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energy game, this is even a rarity; there are far fewer monopoly producers 
than consumers. In the ‘strike model’, Hicks (1963) shows that increasing 
opportunity costs can cause an imbalance in equilibrium. That is to say, in 
bargaining, the occurrence of a strike can change the expected yield. However, 
this transformation will not inevitably happen. The limitation of the strike model 
is the assumption that the players have access to full information, whereas in 
fact, it is often the lack of complete information, which dictates the differing 
attitudes of players towards threats. (Cahuc et al., 2014) 
Scope refers to the future that players desire; it shows concrete 
allocation of interests. This research assumes that future scope is predictable 
and can be coordinated. The following Table 9 shows the outcome after this 
coordination, which corresponds with BoS. In the conditions of scope being 
coordinated, there is no leading strategy, but instead two choices of Nash 
equilibrium. So any player’s performance will support the Nash equilibrium. In 
addition, it can be found that strong countries tend to consider relative gains, 
and weaker countries focus on absolute gains. (Hasenclever et al., 1997) In 
order for any one state to obtain its preferred scenario, it is important to select 
a partner that matches one’s own aims for future scope. This can create a 
scenario of ‘added value.’  
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          Table 9: Payoff Matrices of BoS with Coordination  
   B (Cooperation)     B (Defection) 
A (Cooperation)         (5,3)** (0,1) 
A (Defection) (1,0) (3,5)** 
 
In conclusion, co-opetition is most likely to exist between two countries with 
power asymmetry and high complementarity, decided by commitment and 
reciprocity. Furthermore, co-opetition will work best when it is consistently 
supervised by international institutions or regimes. In short, co-opetition can be 
achieved, but only under certain conditions.  
 
2.3 Supplementing the Deficiencies of Co-opetition: 
Chinese Hehe Culture 
The analysis of co-opetition has demonstrated that co-opetitive relations can 
be reached in IR if three conditions are met: common interests, 
complementarity and trust. However, there remain many factors in co-opetition 
which require greater consideration. For example, looking at Figure 4 below, it 
can be seen that the proportion of cooperation and competition within 
co-opetition may differ due to the proportion of conflicting and common 
interests present. C1>C2 represents cooperation in the leading position over 
competition; C2>C1 shows competition in the leading position, and C1=C2 
represents cooperation and competition in balance. Co-opetition can exist as 
long as C1 and C2 exist, regardless of whether C1 or C2 is larger. The pure 
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concept of co-opetition does not dictate whether cooperation or competition 
should take a leading role. However, a traditional Chinese philosophical 
thought – Hehe culture – argues that C1 (cooperation) being greater than C2 
(competition) is the preferred profile of co-opetition, as excessive competition 
could cause cooperation to disappear. The tenth assumption here admits that 
the deficiencies in the concept of co-opetition can be supplemented by the 
classical Chinese concept of Hehe culture, which traditionally attempted to 
promote the precept of ‘harmony by sameness’, as will be explained in further 
detail below. This culture could represent a manner in which to balance 
competition and cooperation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4: Balance between Competition and Cooperation (A and B: 
States/ C1: Common interest /C2: Conflicting interest)(Researcher’s 
own)  
A	 B	C2	
B	A	
C1	
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2.3.1 The Concept of Hehe Culture 
The term Hehe (~t) is made up of two different Chinese characters which 
were first inscribed on bones and tortoise shells during the Shang Dynasty and 
the Spring and Autumn Period in China. These two he have the same 
pronunciation in Chinese but different meanings. The first he (~) can mean 
harmony, neutralisation and peace, and the second ‘he’ (t) refers to unity, 
integration, fusion and co-operation.  
Hehe culture was proposed and further developed by the Chinese 
scholar Zhang Liwen. Zhang (2004) points out that since the dawn of human 
history, people have always had to face different challenges and conflicts. He 
sums up four basic kinds of conflicts, namely human and environment, human 
and society, human and human, and human and sprit. Zhang proposed the 
idea of Hehe to address these separate challenges, dividing the concept into 
five principles. Firstly: hesheng (~Ĝ) which means that every group, culture 
or country should learn from each other rather than simply seeking out each 
other’s limitations. In this way, each actor can develop together. The second 
principle is hechu (~). This is similar to hesheng, but focuses more on how 
to resolve conflicts arising between actors. The third principle is heli (~į) 
which stresses that different cultures and groups have different values and 
traditions; one cannot force one’s own opinion on others, and must instead 
allow them to develop freely. This concept also calls for the prevention of 
hegemony in this vein. The fourth is heda (~ų) which means aiming to 
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develop together. Both developing and developed countries should aim to 
reach the final target of common and harmonious development. Finally, he’ai 
(~ĕ) means that each actor must love other actors; love amongst people 
should not involve prejudice. It can be found that Hehe culture contains 
concepts of building mutual trust, accepting and even complementing the 
development of others. These are the inevitable requirements for the 
development and co-existence of all parties.  
 
2.3.2 Philosophical Connotations of Hehe Culture 
In fact, the two he characters (~ / t ), meaning harmony and unity 
respectively, feature heavily in traditional Chinese philosophy. As Ferguson 
and Dellios (2010) mention, the culture of harmony is implicit cross the most 
early Confucian doctrinal texts. Until today, the harmony culture entails peace, 
cooperation and commonality but with differences. In other words, peace is the 
major target to be achieved, and cooperation is the tool; commonality but 
differences refers to highly interdependent states living in the same world, but 
with the differences between individual actors still being taken into account, 
each playing different roles in the international world. These two characters 
embrace the broad and profound Chinese culture and spirit. There are three 
major and guiding traditional ways of thinking in terms of Hehe culture. 
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 First of all, Hehe culture represents the natural order in traditional 
philosophy. Chinese culture accepts dialectical logic and considers nature to 
be the unity of yin and yang. (Yang, 2005) As Zhang (2006:455) mentions, 
traditional thought stresses the adage unity between man and nature (&t
, tian ren he yi). In addition to peace and harmony, people and nature should 
unify for the sake of their co-existence. (JI, 2008) This does not mean 
abandoning differences to become the same, but instead co-existing alongside 
one another as a harmonious whole. This kind of harmonious co-existence 
should be established amongst humans. In fact, Confucians also firmly believe 
that humans should extend this co-existence to nature too. Dong Zhongshu, a 
Confucian philosopher of the Western Han Dynasty, stated that human, 
heaven and nature are the three basic elements behind the growth and 
existence of everything, and they must work together. (Zuo, 2003) In addition, 
Needham (1959) discusses how, in ancient China, tian () was seen as a 
non-human with the power of creation. Every last thing created and in 
existence has its own internal properties, and all entities must exist through 
consistent co-operation. 
Unity between man and nature not only stresses the harmonious 
co-existence between human and nature, but also illustrates inclusiveness and 
the acceptance of difference. All entities, despite differences, form a large 
whole. All rivers run into sea; the sea is spacious because it contains so much, 
but the rivers are separate too. (Chuang-Tzu, 1999) As Jiang (2010) notes, the 
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spirit of Hehe can be achieved by recognition of differences, modesty and 
acceptance. By accepting and working with differences, the balance of power 
can be kept and peace maintained. 
 In brief, this concept can be summed up as harmony but not the 
sameness. As Zhang (2012a) states, this is the fundamental guiding concept 
of Hehe culture. It can be found that Hehe includes the concept of accepting 
difference: diversity and unification, despite their apparent contradiction, can 
mutually and simultaneously exist. As Xing (1997) states, ancient 
philosophical ideologies do not deny contradictions and necessary struggles in 
life. He believes that it is possible to achieve harmony and co-operation 
through recognition and acceptance of apparent contradictions. From that 
point, Hehe culture can help us to correctly grasp contradictions and learn to 
transform this into co-operation. Zhang (2011) argues that harmony but not the 
sameness provides the cultural foundation for Chinese co-opetition theory. In 
fact, it is similar in approach to universalism in Western culture. It calls for 
more attention to be paid to the common good and interests, rather than 
focusing solely on one’s own business. (Chen, 2011) 
 Secondly, Hehe culture is a doctrine and ruler approach. It 
advocates the idea of peace and harmony, stresses the importance of morality, 
and promotes the functions of education and internationalism. (Deng and lv, 
2006) The first way of thinking – peace is precious – refers to the concept of 
harmony. As written in the Dao De Jing written by Lao-Tzu (2008:43) as early 
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as 2500 years ago: ‘The softest thing in the world dashes against and 
overcomes the hardest’ (
ňôƚƝ
ň, tian xia zhi zhi rou, chi 
cheng tian xia zhi zhi jian). Water is the softest substance in the world, but its 
constant dripping can wear away a hard stone. Many consider ‘soft’ in this 
situation to refer to peace and harmony. Thus, a spirit of harmony can even 
conquer the unyielding and lead to peace. 
In addition to this, Lao-Tzu analysed he (~) from the perspective of 
yin and yang. Lao-Tzu (2008:42) notes that, ‘All things leave behind them the 
obscurity [out of which they have come], and go forward to embrace the 
brightness [into which they have emerged], while they are harmonised by the 
breath of vacancy’ (ĖŤƋŀÌƊKĄ+~, wan wu fu yin er bao yang, 
chong qi yi wei he). This reference is reflected in Zhang’s principle of hesheng 
in Hehe culture. (Xiao and Lei, 2005) This conceptualisation stresses the 
importance of phases of yin (obscurity) and yang (brightness), and can be 
understood as co-ordinating development, and encouraging harmony with 
nature and even within human society.  
 Confucius also explains the value of harmony: ‘of the things brought 
about by the rites, harmony is the most valuable’ (Ĩĝ~ŧ, li zhi yong, 
he wei gui). (Confucius, 1998:I) The original meaning of this phrase described 
the importance of rites in building a harmonious relationship between slave 
and slaveholder. In other words, harmony is precious above all and can 
maintain prolonged stability. The importance of rites (Ĩ, li), also translated as 
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morals, is significantly important for the achievement of harmony. He can also 
be achieved through ren () , benevolence). Ren is the key concept of 
Confucianism, which advocates a harmonious co-existence through moral 
character. As Confucius (1998:VI) states: ‘Now the man of perfect virtue, 
wishing to be established himself, seeks also to establish others; wishing to be 
enlarged himself, he seeks also to enlarge others’ ()Ŀ, «ûįŀį&, «
ûųŀų&, fu ren zhe, ji yu li er li ren, ji yu da er da ren). In other words, a 
good person should learn to share and help others, which ultimately is 
beneficial to them. In addition, Confucius(1998:XV) states that ‘What you do 
not want done to yourself, do not do to others’ («Èû, ]á& ji suo bu yu, 
wu shi yu ren); that is to say, something which may destroy one’s own interests 
must not be imposed upon others. Only in this way, can both sides build a 
foundation of trust and co-operation, and can peace exist amongst them. 
However, the precept ‘What you do not want done to yourself, do not do to 
others’ is arguably not suitable for the energy game, especially under the 
guidance of an international regime. This is because the potential threat of 
revenge or reciprocation is an important deterrent against betrayal, and if this 
deterrent is softened, it may cause aggression from some players which 
ultimately breaks down cooperation. 
 In addition, the philosopher Chuang-Tuz (1999) considers harmony 
to be the most precious thing in the world and the only virtue which can 
maintain world peace. Mencius (2005) emphasises that rulers can obtain the 
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public’s support by not killing (ð&Ŀņ, wei bu shi sha ren zhe 
neng yi zhi); that is to say, through use of virtue and reasonable morals, peace 
and even national security can be achieved. Ancient China’s rulers considered 
reputation to be of utmost importance and believed that moral virtue could lead 
to admiration. Xun-Tuz (1999) states that there are three kinds of rulers: one 
type wins people over through virtue, the second rules the people with their 
voice, and the third rules people through arrogance and domination. Only the 
first can achieve long-term stable rule. All of these traditional philosophical 
thoughts have created a firm belief in the vital importance of harmony. 
  Although Chinese culture has long embraced peace and harmony, 
that is not to say that the military and war are unimportant. Sun Tzu states that 
as war is significant for a country and relates to the death of people and the 
future of the country, it should be clearly considered (FĿÿĜ
"Žq, bing zhe, guo zhi da shi, si sheng zhi di, cun wang 
zhi dao, bu ke bu cha ye). (Sun-Tzu, 1971) In other words, in ancient China, 
the strategist also had to recognise the importance of the military and how to 
wield it reasonably to directly influence the fortunes of the country. This 
definition is still followed today, and the modern Chinese government 
advocates peaceful development. Thus, the military is important, but the 
Chinese nation states that it hopes to avoid war in its quest for peaceful 
existence. 
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  Thirdly, Hehe culture is an important idealist component of Chinese 
foreign policy. Hehe culture does not deny the importance of power, but it 
stresses more how power can be restrained and controlled for the sake of 
harmony and peaceful foreign policy. He (harmony) is considered the start and 
end point of Chinese foreign policy, the stated aim of which is to pursue a 
natural and moral manner of seeking development and cooperation with other 
states. Chinese foreign policy advocates peaceful co-existence and 
independence in order to best achieve harmonious and common development. 
These applications will be shown in chapter three in the Chinese energy policy 
section. Furthermore, he (unity) is another basic principle for building a 
harmonious foreign policy which holds that co-existence can be achieved 
through unity despite the range of different races, cultures and religions, which 
must be respected across states. (Wang, 2009)  
 Chinese Hehe culture ties together Confucianism and Taoism and 
fully embodies the Chinese core value of ‘harmony but sameness.’ That is to 
say, in the globalised world, countries need to respect each other’s 
sovereignty and territory and tolerate the differences between religions, 
cultures and ideologies. Only in this way can countries negotiate on global 
issues, like energy. In fact, the Chinese government has already been 
incorporating Hehe culture into its foreign policy practice.  
 To sum up, this research has proposed the conditions under which 
co-opetition can be achieved in international relations, namely, two players 
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with power asymmetry, ruled and monitored by the international regime, with 
reciprocal interaction and commitment to build trust to enhance future scope 
for cooperation. In order to build this theoretical model, this research first 
analysed traditional disputes of conflict and cooperation as argued by the 
schools of realism and liberalism, in particular those concerning the 
importance of international organisations and interdependence between states. 
Based on the conclusions of this discussion, a theoretical model of co-opetition 
was generated in line with these assumptions. 
Despite identifying a theoretical model for co-opetition, it was noted 
that maintaining a balance between competition and co-operation is a difficult 
challenge, and it was proposed that Chinese Hehe culture can remedy this 
limitation. Hehe culture involves the idea of ‘harmony but sameness’, which is 
reflected not only in traditional philosophy but also in modern Chinese 
policymakers’ approaches. From a Chinese viewpoint, competition for energy 
is purely to meet the needs of the country; hegemony is a hat that others have 
placed on China. Some scholars, such as Pomfret (2008), think that China’s 
development should be seen as a challenge for other countries rather than a 
threat per se. 
Nevertheless, with the development of Chinese national power, the 
influence of China in the world is growing ever larger. Hehe culture has given a 
unique character to co-opetition in China, because it provided a supplementary 
boost for cooperation and subsequently the establishment of a balanced 
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co-opetitive relationship. Consequently, Hehe culture sufficiently reflected the 
differences amongst countries and made co-opetition for energy more stable. 
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Chapter Three: The Application of 
Co-opetition to China’s Energy Policy 
 
Chapter Two clearly demonstrates that the concept of co-opetition can provide 
a better understanding of energy security, and lays down certain conditions for 
the successful introduction of a co-opetitive relationship through analysis 
based on game theory. As the chapter indicates, co-opetition works best 
between two countries with asymmetrical power, and would require 
step-by-step supervision globally in order to succeed. In addition, traditional 
Chinese Hehe culture remedies the imbalance in co-opetition when dealing 
with energy security, and writes co-opetition in Chinese characters. 
This chapter will analyse the specifics of China’s foreign energy 
policy in order to demonstrate how the strategy of co-opetition has been 
applied to China’s energy policy since the establishment of ‘New China’ in 
1949 until the present day. However, China’s National Energy Administration 
was officially established as late as 2008, and the short-lived Ministry of 
Energy existed only from 1988 until its dismantlement in 1993 (Zhao, 2001); 
there had previously been no single agency responsible for systematically 
managing China’s energy affairs and energy security. Although energy was a 
fundamental state issue, it typically did not exist as a separate industry and 
was difficult to categorise within the industrial sector. (Lin, 2012) The most 
appropriate way to consider the application of co-opetition to China’s energy 
policy prior to the development of the National Energy Administration was thus 
		 124	
to consider co-opetition within national foreign policy. The overall foreign policy 
of a state can often be divided into more specific sectors, including energy. 
The focus of this research is on co-opetition within China’s energy policies, but 
in this regard it is valuable to trace back to the root of China’s modern foreign 
policy in order to discuss the development and background ‘push factors 
affecting foreign energy policy. 
This chapter will therefore combine a brief study of the essence of 
China’s foreign policy with a more specific look at China’s energy policy, and 
will be divided into three broad parts. The first part will reveal the trends of 
China’s energy policy through the lens of modern foreign policy approaches. 
The concept of Hehe culture proposed in Chapter Two is an important element 
in this part: although the various eras of Chinese leadership have expounded 
different approaches depending on diverse political conditions and 
requirements, the harmony and unity espoused by Hehe culture have 
remained core traditional philosophical values, and have provided a 
starting-point for China to handle foreign relations with other states. Following 
this discussion of Chinese foreign policy, the chapter will move on to analyse 
the development of China’s energy policy, which has been showing a clear 
trend in moving away from self-sufficiency towards co-opetition. Finally, three 
specific applications of co-opetition within Chinese energy policy will be 
analysed in depth: energy supply, energy reserves and emission reduction. 
Looking at the government’s action plan and energy white papers, this section 
		 125	
will cover policies on various related aspects such as energy supply and 
exploitation, the establishment of energy reserves, technological exchange, 
cooperation over clean energy sources, the development of new energy 
sources, and emissions reduction. 
 
3.1 The Development of Co-opetition Reflected in 
China’s Foreign Policy 
Judging from the pervasive trends of China’s foreign policy since 1949, it 
seems that the idea of co-opetition has run through each era and represents a 
logical choice for China’s foreign policymakers. It is possible to divide New 
China’s foreign policy into different periods which reflect China’s adjustment to 
domestic requirements for development and changes in international 
circumstances; one such division is the six periods of China’s Diplomacy17 put 
forward by Wang Yizhou. However, the Chinese government is a one-party 
government, and it is the top party elites who engage in the formulation of 
overarching strategies. In other words, policy selection and formation remain in 
the hands of a group of governmental elites, whose decisions navigate the 
future direction of China’s international relations and national development. 
Feng (2007) therefore suggests that, rather than dividing foreign policy into 
arbitrary periods, discussing the beliefs of individual Chinese leaders is more 																																																								
17The six periods of China’s foreign policy are: 1949-1955, 1956-1966, 1966-1976, 1976-1992, 
1992-2002, and 2002-2012. (Wang, 2013a)  
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useful for a comprehensive and complete understanding of Chinese policy 
behaviour. In addition, as Cheng and Zhang (1999) indicate, each Chinese 
leadership has established its own model in respective eras, in effect dividing 
the history of Chinese foreign policy into different periods with different guiding 
ideologies. Discussing the proposed strategies of individual leaders can 
provide greater understanding of how co-opetition works within Chinese 
foreign policy. This research will thus analyse the foreign policy and aspects of 
co-opetition featuring in policies under the various state leaders. The following 
section will expand upon the development and differing approaches of foreign 
policy in the chronological eras of respective Chinese leaders in order to 
consider the development of co-opetition. 
 
3.1.1 China’s Foreign Policy in Different Eras  
Various policies have existed in the different eras of leadership since the 
founding of China in 1949, but each leader can be associated with at least one 
major approach to foreign policy. Table 10 shows these different major 
approaches, which are explained individually below. Importantly, these major 
approaches can be seen to incorporate the comprehensive manifestation of 
co-opetition in China’s foreign policy over the long-term. 
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Table 10: Guiding Approaches of Different Leaders (Researcher’s own) 
 
 Mao Zedong18 Deng Xiaoping Jiang Zemin Hu Jintao 
Major 
Approach 
Five Principles 
of Peaceful 
Co-existence
19 
1.Building a 
cooperative 
pattern 
 
2.Peaceful 
development 
Harmony but 
not sameness 
1. Peaceful 
Rise 
 
2.Harmonious 
Society 
 
 
Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence: Mao Zedong 
The Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence, introduced by Mao Zedong, 
represented the first major contribution to co-opetition in Chinese foreign policy. 
In Mao’s era, a range of different foreign policies were rolled out, including the 
‘set up a separate kitchen20,’ ‘lean to one side21,’ and ‘three world’22 policies, 
each of which responded to the challenges of different international issues. 
(Wei, 2013) But the Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence was instead a 
guiding ideology which ran consistently through Mao’s foreign policy approach, 
and which has continued to significantly influence foreign policy to this day. 																																																								
18 Mao Zedong is also rendered as Mao Tse-tung. 
19 The Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence were conceived by Zhou Enlai and drafted by 
Mao Zedong, and include mutual respect for territorial integrity and sovereignty, mutual 
non-aggression, non-interference in each other’s internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit, 
and peaceful co-existence. (Xinhua News Agency, 2004) 
20‘Set up a separate kitchen’ is a Mao policy that was proposed in the early stage of New 
China. It means the New China government will build new relations with other states and will 
not admit all the relations built with the Chinese Nationalist Party before 1949. (Zhou,1952)  
21The ‘lean to one side’ policy was proposed by Mao Zedong and this policy indicated that 
China stands in the camp of Soviet Union at the beginning of the establishment of new China. 
Ibid.  
22The ‘Three Worlds’ refers to the Cold War superpowers, their allies, and non-aligned 
countries.(Mao,1994) 
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The Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence were officially 
established in June 1954 as a joint declaration with the governments of India 
and Burma. However, in the ‘Proclamation of the Central People’s 
Government of the PRC’ in 1949, Mao (1949a:para.2) had already declared 
that the ‘Chinese government is willing to establish diplomatic relations with 
any foreign government that is willing to observe the principles of equality, 
mutual benefit, and mutual respect of territorial integrity and sovereignty,’ a 
statement that is widely seen as the predecessor to the Five Principles of 
Peaceful Co-existence.    
 Mao believed that all countries, no matter how big or small, rich or 
poor, strong or weak, should respect all others. (Mao, 1949b) This principle of 
mutual respect was consistently deemed the most important core principle out 
of the five. (Office of Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of 
China, 2014a) This reflects Mao’s belief that states are the major actors in 
international society, and that other actors cannot supersede their position. It is 
important to note that this idea ties in with Hehe culture, as every country has 
the right to choose different social systems and development models; no 
country can rightfully impose their culture, religion, or social system on others. 
(People's Daily, 2014) In other words, this policy is designed to recognise and 
respect differences in order to reflect Hehe culture. Adherence to the Five 
Principles of Peaceful Co-existence supplies the fundamental conditions for 
co-opetition. 
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Nevertheless, although the Five Principles represented the ostensible 
main approach to foreign policy during Mao’s era, the actual success of the 
policy was limited in its reach. The Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence 
supplied a platform for co-opetition, but there was not enough substantive 
development of the approach during Mao’s era (particularly 1950-1970), as he 
put far greater emphasis on domestic class struggle. (Wang, 2013a) 
 One major impediment to efforts towards co-opetition during this era 
was the emergence in the late 1950s of the slogan ‘zi li geng sheng’23 (ŇUê
Ĝ , self-reliance), an extension of China’s quest for independence and 
self-sufficiency. Breslin (1998) argues that China’s relative isolation in the era 
of Mao can be seen as a result of Mao’s policy of self-reliance, brought in due 
to Mao’s suspicion and doubts concerning commercial trade with other 
countries, even those in the socialist bloc. However, according to Yahuda 
(1983) the slogan has been haphazardly applied by scholars to describe a 
variety of different policies from virtual autarky to the importing of a wide range 
of agriculture products and industrial plants.  
In 1945, Mao declared that ‘we stand for self-reliance. We hope for 
foreign aid but cannot be dependent on it; we depend on our own efforts, on 
the creative power of the whole army and the entire people.’ (Mao, 1977d: 719) 
From this statement, it can be seen that the original goal behind the slogan 
																																																								
23 Zi li geng sheng was formally proposed in 1958 in the report to enact the Second Five Year 
Plan. This concept represented an important aspect of Mao’s thinking at the time and played 
an instrumental role in domestic and foreign policies in the 1950s to 1960s. (Wang,2001) 
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was to avoid dependence and raise national dignity. At the heart of Mao’s 
concept of self-reliance was the struggle for third world countries to achieve 
national liberation, and for apparently militarily inferior developing countries to 
achieve independence from external powers. (Mao, 1994) Although Mao’s 
approach is widely touted by the Chinese to have ensured China’s survival and 
secured its emergence as a great power, China’s support for the revolutionary 
struggles of others has been marginal and largely conditional on China’s 
relations with other countries. Mao’s idea of self-reliance may be said to focus 
excessively on conflictual elements of global superpower politics (Yan, 2009), 
leading to difficulties in establishing policies based on a cooperative pattern. 
What’s more, with hindsight, the slogan now appears to be somewhat 
unrealistic. Particularly in terms of energy, it would be impossible to relieve 
uncertainty in China’s energy security by blindly pursuing self-reliance. 
Co-opetitive efforts seem to have been relatively feeble during this 
stage of China’s foreign policy development, and one reason for this was that 
China was too weak to establish common ground with others on a consistent 
basis. Mao therefore stressed self-reliance and increasing domestic strength. 
In the early Mao era from 1949 to 1955, 22 countries established formal 
relations with China, and most of them were poor African countries. (Wang, 
2013a) Further to this, 24 more so-called poor brothers in Africa established 
relations with China between 1956 to 1966. (Wang, 2013a) This hints at the 
good relations between China and African countries in case three that follows. 
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Why was it only under-developed countries that wished to cooperate with 
China to begin with? Of course, other aspects of the international dynamic at 
the time, such as China’s rupture with the Soviet Union from the late 1950s, 
played a part in China’s increasingly closer relations with countries such as 
those on the African continent. External pressure could have motivated China 
to cement closer cooperative relations with others. But during this time period, 
China was a developing country, and was therefore able to cooperate as an 
equal with other developing countries. Now that China has developed so 
rapidly, the gap in developmental levels compared to African countries has 
grown, which may pose challenges for successful co-opetition in the future. 
This possibility will be discussed at greater length in the case study in Chapter 
Six, exploring the application of co-opetition with African countries to China’s 
energy security. 
The Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence, although put forward 
by Mao, did not develop particularly well during Mao’s era and adversely 
affected the possibilities for co-opetition. However, subsequent Chinese 
leaders have continued to advocate this standpoint and develop it more 
effectively. For example, Deng Xiaoping stated that China should improve and 
cultivate relations with developed countries beyond the scope of differences in 
social systems and ideologies. (Deng, 1993b) Later, Jiang Zemin reiterated 
that China needs a lasting peaceful environment in which to cooperate and 
respect others based on Mao’s Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence. (Jiang, 
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1995a) Recently, President Xi Jinping delivered a keynote speech at a 
conference marking the 60th anniversary of the Five Principles of Peaceful 
Coexistence in 2014, in which he stated that the Five Principles of Peaceful 
Co-existence are not outdated and remain as relevant as ever. (Fu, 2014) 
According to the speech addressed by President Xi (2014:para.5), ‘these five 
principles, as an integrated, interconnected and indivisible concept, capture 
the essence of today's international relations, and can apply to relations 
amongst all countries regardless of their social system, stage of development 
or size.’ This indicates the Chinese government’s stance that the Five 
Principles of Peaceful Co-existence are welcomed not only in cooperative 
relations between China and other countries, but also between other countries. 
In fact, in 1970, key concepts of the Five Principles were incorporated into a 
United Nations declaration on international law (United Nations, 1970), 
suggesting that China’s foreign policy ideology is accepted by international 
society. 
        Furthermore, according to the Five Principles of Peaceful 
Co-existence, a zero-sum approach to international relations cannot assist 
development; what is needed is cooperation. (Fu, 2014) In the press release, 
President Xi declares that ‘we should champion a new vision of win-win 
outcomes for all and reject the obsolete notion of zero-sum game or winner 
taking all. Countries should respect others’ interests while pursuing their own 
and advance common interests of all.’ (Fu, 2014:para.6) These notions of 
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respect and common interest derive from the Five Principles of Peaceful 
Co-existence and clearly remain a crucial element of China’s overall foreign 
policy strategy today. 
In conclusion, due to China’s internal affairs and emphasis on class 
struggle and self-reliance, as well as contributing international factors, the Five 
Principles of Peaceful Co-existence did not develop concretely in the era of 
Mao Zedong. Rather, the most important contribution in this era was that 
Mao’s Five Principles sowed the seeds of co-opetition. The Five Principles of 
Peaceful Coexistence are replete with the essence of Hehe culture, and reflect 
an embryonic conceptualisation of co-opetition. 
Cooperative Pattern and Peaceful Development: Deng Xiaoping 
Deng Xiaoping was the second paramount leader of China, and his policies 
can be seen as a comprehensive expression of co-opetition. Establishing a 
co-operative pattern and achieving peaceful development were important aims 
in the era of Deng Xiaoping. Deng (1993a) asserted that independence is the 
root and peaceful development is the topic. In other words, ensuring 
independence is an inevitable prerequisite for building peaceful international 
relations. Deng Xiaoping re-addressed the importance of self-reliance, 
maintaining that territory and sovereignty are sacrosanct, and that no state 
should interfere with other states. However, Deng placed far greater emphasis 
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on cooperation (Marti, 2014), thus contributing greatly to the development of 
co-opetition in China’s foreign policy. 
   Deng famously stated that China should ‘hide our capacities and 
bide our time’ (Ɩ=Hç, tao guang yang hui) whilst seeking common points 
and respecting differences. (China News, 2012:para.5) Deng saw that this 
would be most conducive to peace and could avoid the outbreak of conflict or 
war. Friedberg (2011) points out that, ‘hide our capabilities and bide our time’ 
is part of a slightly longer 24 character strategy24 which brought about a new 
strategic directive to confront U.S. hegemonists and U.S. allies. However, if 
capabilities are kept hidden, other players in the game may not recognise 
accurate information and within the understanding of ESS, this lack of 
complete information can lead to misunderstanding. As a result, Deng had to 
tread carefully in order to focus on developing cooperation and skilfully 
sheltering from competition. 
Furthermore, Deng (1993b) consistently believed that the most 
important issues in the world were peace and development. If peace could not 
be guaranteed, development would struggle to occur. In terms of peace, Deng 
saw that a leader needed to consider a country’s long-term interests, but must 
also respect other countries’ interests. (CCCPC Party Literature Research 
Office, 2004) In other words, differences in ideology amongst countries should 
not be paid attention to, and instead leaders should see every country as equal 																																																								
24Observe calmly; secure our position; cope with affairs calmly; hide our capacities and bide 
our time; be good at maintaining a low profile; and never claim leadership (China News, 2012) 
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and independent in essence. In this sense, Deng had identified one of the key 
foundations for establishing long-term cooperation. This approach coordinated 
the idea of harmony but not the sameness mentioned in the Hehe culture of 
traditional Chinese philosophy. 
In addition, Deng Xiaoping also predicted the scope of co-opetition in 
China’s foreign policy. ‘Setting aside differences and pursuing joint 
development.’ push China must affirm sovereignty, any unresolved territorial 
conflicts should be temporarily put aside in order to promote co-operative 
developmental efforts. (Office of Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's 
Republic of China, 2014b:para.1) This did not mean that sovereignty was 
ceded, but rather that competition would be shelved at detrimental times in 
favour of cooperation. Carrying out joint development projects in disputed 
territories would also help establish mutual understanding through cooperation, 
and create conditions to rationally solve sovereignty issues Deng saw that joint 
development can increase opportunities for cooperation, and can help build a 
bigger pie for all parties.  
        The major foreign policy approaches espoused by Deng Xiaoping – 
establishing a co-operative pattern and achieving peaceful development – 
paved the way for the success of co-opetition. It could be said that whereas 
Mao Zedong sowed the seeds for co-opetition in China’s foreign policy, it was 
Deng Xiaoping who fertilised and nurtured the seeds. 
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Harmony but not Sameness: Jiang Zemin 
Harmony but not sameness is the major approach to China’s foreign policy 
that Jiang Zemin promoted. This approach is a direct reflection of Hehe culture 
and readdresses the conditions needed to achieve long-term cooperation. As 
Zhang and Cheng (1999) state, both the approaches of Mao Zedong and Deng 
Xiaoping significantly influenced the evolution of China’s foreign relations 
strategy, which inevitably brought about far-reaching influence over their 
successor, Jiang Zemin. The following speech is selected from Jiang Zemin at 
George Bush Presidential Library in 2002: 
In human relationships, a gentleman seeks harmony but not 
uniformity. That is to say, harmony but not sameness; reserving 
differences without coming into conflict. Harmony promotes 
co-existence and co-prosperity; whereas differences foster mutual 
complementation and mutual support. Harmony without sameness is 
an important principle in the development of all social affairs and 
relationships and in guiding people’s conduct and behaviour. Indeed, it 
is the essential factor of the harmonious development of all 
civilisations. (Jiang, 2002:para.14)  
The above speech shows that President Jiang followed the principle of 
harmony but not sameness. He believed that the world is blessed with great 
variety, and that states can co-exist best through harmonious cooperation 
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despite their differences. Jiang also noted the importance of interdependence 
in foreign policy. States in the world are increasingly interdependent and 
have little choice but to co-exist with others. According to Jiang (1995a), no 
state can function alone in today’s modern world system. Under such 
conditions, Hehe culture is ever more appropriate for China’s modern policy. 
Alongside harmony but not sameness, Jiang proposed the concept of 
Comprehensive National Security, which requires the Chinese government to 
monitor the military and also develop politics, the economy and technology 
together. (Hou, 2000) This mirrors the nature of co-opetition, which integrates 
the economy, military and environment. The Chinese government places great 
emphasis on the importance of NTS. In the process of achieving 
comprehensive security, a state should build mutual trust, mutual benefit, 
equality and cooperative values in order to establish cooperation. As Lu (2003) 
explains, comprehensive security requires international society to observe 
security issues from a much broader angle, making allowances for the fact that 
core national interests and values differ from country to country. 
 Jiang (2010) believes in the traditional Chinese thinking that all 
things should cooperate harmoniously and develop together through 
embracing differences. Only by considering the interests of others and 
allowing all stakeholders to obtain profit can harmony be achieved. Thus, 
Jiang (2010) consistently states that in terms of the issue of global security, 
China should consider its own position and the position of others to develop a 
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new strategy. In this way, China could contribute its own power to protect 
public goods and become a responsible power. Jiang (1995b) also noted that 
China’s Reform and Opening Up and modernisation require a long-term 
peaceful international environment, which involves every country respecting 
each other. He continues to argue that, as such, the world needs China, and 
that the world’s peaceful development requires China’s prosperity and stability.  
In conclusion, Jiang Zemin focused on developing co-opetition by 
emphasising the idea of harmony but not sameness, as well as sparking 
specific suggestions for achieving co-opetition through the pursuit of NTS. 
Jiang’s approach therefore also helped develop and nurture China’s 
commitment to co-opetition in foreign policy. 
 
Peaceful Rise and Harmonious Society: Hu Jintao 
In the 10 years of Hu Jintao’s era, China witnessed unprecedented economic 
development. According to data from The Wall Street Journal, China’s average 
annual economic growth rate was over 10% during this time; this rapid 
economic growth also made China the world’s second largest economy after 
the USA. (Orlik, 2012) This monumental development can be seen as the 
consequence of China reaping what had been sowed long before. As Wenzel 
(2011) explains, the policies of Hu Jintao’s era are driven by the Tenth Five 
Year Plan, a series of economic initiatives which were established under Deng 
Xiaoping. 
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 However, China’s development can also be attributed to enhanced 
efforts at international cooperation by Hu Jintao. In his keynote speech at the 
Bo’ao Forum of Asia (BFA) 2004 Annual Conference, Hu Jintao admitted the 
importance of cooperation in the economic development progress, as the 
development of China’s economy has injected fresh vigour into the Asian 
region. China has therefore benefitted extensively from various Asia-based 
cooperation mechanisms. The future target will be to promote more bilateral 
level cooperation in the Asia region. (Hu, 2004a) 
       Within Hu Jintao’s foreign policy, China’s Peaceful Rise and the 
construction of a Harmonious Society are two related major approaches which 
heavily feature the principles of co-opetition. Both of these approaches involve 
peace and harmony, which are a reflection of China’s traditional Hehe culture, 
and both provide wide scope for developing co-opetition.  
In terms of the Peaceful Rise, Hu (2003) gave a speech at the 110th 
anniversary of the birth of Mao Zedong in 2003, in which he declared that the 
Chinese Communist Party will insist on continuing to follow the socialist road 
with Chinese characteristics, leading to the great revival of the Chinese nation. 
Adherence to this road requires the implementation of a concept entitled the 
Peaceful Rise, which consists of maintaining cordial relations with other 
countries based on the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, and actively 
carrying out exchanges and cooperation with other countries on the basis of 
equality and mutual benefit, in order to make a greater contribution to global 
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and national peace and development. The peaceful development of China can 
help maintain world peace, and the win-win conditions available under 
harmonious circumstances are the basic prerequisite for both China’s own 
revival and its continued contribution to the world. (Zhao and Xiao, 2010) 
Needless to say, Hu’s approach has been largely shaped by the viewpoints of 
China’s former leaders and elite, whilst also delivering a new contribution to 
guiding China’s foreign policy under the auspices of co-opetition. 
With regards to Harmonious Society, in 2004 the Sixteenth Chinese 
Communist Party Central Committee held its Fourth Plenum (Plenary Session), 
in which it explicitly put forward the concept of building a harmonious socialist 
society. (CCTV, 2004) Since then, the word harmony has appeared throughout 
the Communist Party’s official reports and literature. Whilst it began as a 
template for domestic stability, Hu soon brought this concept into the field of 
foreign policy by formally proposing the construction of a harmonious world at 
the Asia-Africa Summit in 2005. He elaborated that China’s foreign policy aims 
to safeguard world peace and promote common development; furthermore, 
China remains a developing country, and so, in the process of building a 
harmonious world, enhancing solidarity and cooperation with developing 
countries is one of the cornerstones of China’s diplomacy. Further to this, Hu 
(2005) made a speech at the 60th anniversary summit of the founding of the 
United Nations, entitled Build towards a Harmonious World of Lasting Peace 
and Common Prosperity. In this speech, he proposed that countries should 
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aim to keep a tolerant spirit and build a world based on harmony. From August 
2006, building a harmonious society became China’s formal guiding foreign 
policy principle. During the Central Foreign Affairs Work Conference, Hu 
(2006a) proposed six ways in which China must persist in its goals; one of 
these was the construction of a harmonious world. In fact, these two major 
guidelines of Hu’s foreign policy are closely related: promoting and maintaining 
the construction of a harmonious world is an inevitable background 
requirement and condition for the achievement of peaceful development. 
Despite this, Scobell (2004:V) argues that, ‘China’s strategic 
disposition cannot accurately be characterised as either pacifist or bellicose.’ 
That is to say, it is still difficult to build a relationship of long-term trust. 
Although it is difficult for outsider to judge whether China truly favours peaceful 
cooperation or tense competition, it can be stated that the concept of 
co-opetition provides an excellent explanation of China’s seemingly equivocal 
strategic disposition. The balance towards greater competition or greater 
cooperation would depend on the situation in which China finds itself. 
China currently continues to reiterate how important it is to make 
competition and cooperation work together. The Chinese government has 
begun to change the way that competition is viewed, rejecting it as a pure 
threat and instead framing it as a counterbalance to cooperation within the 
practice of co-opetition. For instance, at the summit of the Shanghai 
Cooperation Organisation (SCO) in 2009, Hu Jintao declared that China would 
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‘honour its commitment and continue to support the multilateral and bilateral 
project cooperation within the SCO framework. To that end, China will provide 
US$10 billion of credit to support the efforts of SCO member states of 
addressing the international financial crisis. (Office of Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs of the People's Republic of China, 2009) This indicates that the 
Chinese government has started to pay attention to relations amongst 
countries and has offered a cooperative assistance even with neighbouring 
competitors. 
 Hu Jintao asserts that the peaceful rise of China can help maintain 
world peace, and that the win-win conditions available under harmonious 
circumstances are the basic requirement for China’s revival and China’s 
continued contribution to the world. (Xiao and Lei, 2005) China’s peaceful rise 
provides a degree of evidence to demonstrate that China hopes to peacefully 
engage in cooperation with other countries. 
 In conclusion, after analysing Mao Zedong’s Five Principles of 
Peaceful Coexistence, Deng Xiaoping’s Cooperative Pattern and Peaceful 
Development, Jiang Zemin’s Harmony but not Sameness, and Hu Jintao’s 
Peaceful Rise and Harmonious Society, it can be found that China’s 
contemporary foreign policy reflects the essence of the ancient Hehe culture, 
and has done so in a continuous, unbroken line from leader to leader. This 
reflects Chinese leaders’ wish to make efforts towards peaceful cooperation 
without compromising on differences. China’s major diplomatic guidelines and 
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approaches have been slightly modified over the different leadership periods, 
in order to adapt to new global realities, but it is possible to see in these 
modifications the evolution and development of the concept of co-opetition 
within China’s foreign policy. 
 
3.1.2 Common Vision, Different Approaches 
In spite of the various modifications to Chinese foreign policy, it is clear to see 
that the overall guiding influence has not changed over time; the pursuit of 
co-opetition has been a stated aim of the PRC ever since its founding and this 
can be attributed to the commitment to Hehe culture. Chinese Hehe culture 
plays an important role in promoting both national unity and international 
peace. (Xing, 1997) From Mao’s era to the Hu’s era, there has been a 
continuous line of leaders declaring peace and harmony as the core 
coordinating ideologies behind policy stances. In fact, as early as 1949, Mao 
(1949a) declared that China will never seek hegemony. In 1974, when Mao 
met with Kenneth Kaunda, the President of Zambia, he put forward his theory 
of the Three Worlds and reemphasised China’s opposition to hegemony and 
aims to closely align with Asian and African states. (Jiang, 2014) As Li (2006a) 
concludes, the foundation and key source behind today’s Peaceful Rise 
appeared from the beginning to end of Mao Zedong’s foreign policy. 
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In Deng’s era, during the Third Plenary Session of the Eleventh 
Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, it was concluded that the 
outbreak of a large-scale war would be unlikely for the foreseeable future. As 
such, promotion of peace and development should take priority over preparing 
for war around the world. (Xinhua News Agency, 1978) It was during the Deng 
era that Chinese foreign policy began to stress the need to seek common 
points whilst putting differences aside. According to Deng (1993b), China had 
to take a radically different stance to that of the Soviet Union at the time. 
Rather than confronting capitalist countries, undertaking class struggle, and 
secluding the country from outside influences, China would work to promote a 
socially productive, peaceful world. Since this time, Chinese foreign policy 
modifications have all been made in the name of continuing down the path to 
achieving this global ambition. 
Since the period of Jiang Zemin to that of Hu Jintao, the importance 
of peace has been more widely explored and debated, culminating in the 
formation of the Peaceful Rise concept. According to formal documents of the 
CPC (2004), the strategic thought behind China’s Peaceful Rise has important 
theoretical significance and practical value, representing a significant 
innovation to Chinese foreign policy and symbolising China’s international goal 
to transform from self-sufficiency and introverted policies to extroversion and 
interaction with the global community. Co-opetitive policies are justified and 
appropriate in the pursuit of these goals. 
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        In sum, it can be said that China’s leaders have demonstrated a 
long-running common vision regarding the overall aims of China’s foreign 
policy – the use of co-opetition in order to bring about benefits for all. Yet as 
competition is an inevitable aspect of global relations, China has been 
focusing on how to maintain cooperation within this competitive framework. 
China’s leaders have shown different approaches to this over time, despite 
their overall common vision. 
The first difference is visible in cooperation tactics. For example, in 
the earliest years of the Mao era, it was believed that standing alone without 
the support of either the Soviet Union or the United States was unwise, and 
that finding a friendly neighbour in the Soviet Union could assist development 
and create a win-win situation for both. As a result, Mao (1994) explained that 
alliance was considered the best choice, and so in 1949, China signed the 
Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance, marking the 
foundation of a formal alliance between the Soviet Union and China. 
However, after ideological differences created a rift between the two 
neighbours, Deng Xiaoping and his successors instead opted for a stance of 
non-alignment. Although peaceful cooperation was still a must, China would 
not align with any Cold War superpower or third party nation, but instead 
maintain a neutral position. In his speech entitled We must safeguard world 
peace and ensure domestic development in 1984, Deng stated: 
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China’s foreign policy is independent and truly non-aligned. We will not 
play the ‘United States card’ or the ‘Soviet Union card.’ Nor will we 
allow others to play the ‘China card.’ The aim of our foreign policy is 
world peace. Always bearing that aim in mind, we are wholeheartedly 
devoting ourselves to the modernisation programme to develop our 
country and to build socialism with Chinese characteristics. (Deng, 
1993b:217)  
 
This quotation reflects China’s complete transformation from having a close 
alliance with the Soviet Union to being a neutral, non-aligned state aiming to 
cooperate widely with others, which remains China’s stance today. However, 
the very first overseas visit paid by China’s new president, Xi Jinping, was to 
Russia, prompting questions over whether China is remaining entirely neutral. 
Chen Yurong, the Secretary-General of the Shanghai Cooperation 
Organisation Research Centre quickly responded that the relationship 
between China and Russia is non-aligned and not related to any third country, 
and that questions regarding the relationship between the two come about as 
a legacy from the Cold War mentality. (Xinhua News Agency, 2013b) In fact, 
constructive strategic cooperation between the two influential countries of 
China and Russia is an important foundation for world peace and stability, and 
aims to steer the international political and economic order in the direction of 
win-win development. The evolution of the relationship between China and 
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Russia is evidence of the different approaches of Chinese leaders towards 
methods of cooperation. 
       A second difference in foreign policy approaches regards China’s 
partners. In Mao’s era, cooperative partners were mainly limited to the Soviet 
Union, other socialist countries in Eastern Europe, and some third world 
countries. Mao (1994) proposed three principles of foreign policy: firstly, create 
solidarity between all the countries in the socialist camp; secondly, build 
relations with certain Asian, African, Latin American and Nordic countries; and 
thirdly, do not strive to establish diplomatic relations with major Western 
countries. It can be said that cooperation policies at that time were selective 
and limited. 
However, during the era of Deng Xiaoping, the scope for cooperative 
partners was enlarged. Upon the proposal of his Opening and Reform policies, 
Deng (1993b) declared that building friendly relations and positive cooperation 
was no longer limited to socialist or developing countries, but also extended to 
developed countries. Furthermore, this position has been retained to this day. 
For example, in his report at the 18th National Congress of China, Hu Jintao 
stated:  
We call for promoting equality, mutual trust, inclusiveness, mutual 
learning and mutually beneficial cooperation in international relations 
and making joint efforts to uphold international fairness and 
justice.....Countries should establish a new type of global development 
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partnership that is more equitable and balanced, stick together in 
times of difficulty, both share rights and shoulder obligations, and 
boost the common interests of mankind (CPC, 2012:XI). 
 
This report reflects rigorous aims for global cooperation, but does not draw 
divisions between countries. In other words, Chinese foreign policy has moved 
on from focusing on limiting cooperation to a select number and type of partner, 
to considering how to build mutual trust and confidence and promote a 
cooperative atmosphere on a global scale. 
A third difference between the approaches is a different emphasis. 
Different political conditions through the years have created new conditions 
and challenges for China’s declared foreign policy stances. For example, in 
terms of self-reliance, Mao mentioned in 1945, China must intensify the feeling 
of national self-respect and faith in themselves, but without boycotting 
foreigners. Besides this, Mao strongly felt that China’s development depended 
on the people of China themselves, and that only the power of people can 
bring about historical developments. (Mao, 1977b) He consistently stressed 
that although China may desire the assistance of foreign powers, it must not 
depend on others but instead depend on the creativity and development of the 
Chinese people. Although such a declaration inevitably led to issues of 
isolation, the Chinese government invested a great deal during Mao’s rule to 
exploit domestic resources in order to reduce any dependence on foreign 
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imports. This approach had a huge knock-on effect on the early years of 
China’s energy policy, which, as will be explained in greater detail 
subsequently, tended towards total self-sufficiency rather than cooperative 
efforts. 
However, Deng Xiaoping took a markedly different approach. 
Although he did believe that China need to employ its own creative power, it 
was vital for China to accept help from foreign powers with more advanced 
experience and technology. (Deng, 1993b) As a result, China under Deng’s 
guidance became much more open to cooperation with foreign nations and 
companies, and began to build up more and more interdependent relations. 
Nevertheless, increased cooperation did not mean giving up independence; 
China was still able to make decisions away from the influence of other powers, 
yet gained the benefit of a peaceful background within which to develop, in 
common with others.  
Although each leader’s approach has a slightly different manifestation, 
the same overriding vision has existed throughout. The objective of 
establishing long-term and lasting co-opetition through promoting peaceful 
coexistence has never changed. Vice Foreign Minister Zhijun Zhang 
(2012c:para.4) declares that China would adhere ‘to the independent foreign 
policy of peace and the path of peaceful development, to the win-win strategy 
of opening up and friendship and cooperation with all countries on the basis of 
the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence and to the construction of a 
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harmonious world of lasting peace and common prosperity.’ In other words, 
modern China seeks commonalities whilst putting aside differences, an exact 
reflection of the principles of traditional Hehe culture, and of the balance 
between competition and cooperation found within the concept of co-opetition. 
Thus, China’s contemporary foreign policy has generated a consistent 
framework of global co-opetition, and has reflected the essence of Hehe 
culture, in a continuous, unbroken line from leader to leader. This reflects 
Chinese leaders’ wishes to make efforts for peaceful co-opetition without 
compromising on differences.  
Consequently, China’s long-term foreign policy framework and 
guiding ideology have created a preference for the application of co-opetition, 
which will in turn succeed best under the conditions laid out in Chapter Two. 
The following section will look more specifically at China’s energy policy in 
order to draw out evidence of co-opetition. 
 
3.2 Transformation of China’s Energy Policy: From 
Self-Sufficiency to Co-opetition 
Section 3.1 considered the major approaches of China’s foreign policy in the 
modern era. Foreign energy policy is for the most part heavily influenced by a 
state’s overall foreign policy. The specific case of energy-related foreign policy 
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can thus be seen as a microcosm of the wider picture of China’s foreign policy 
as a whole.  
Of course, it is debated whether the co-opetition that is so marked in 
China’s foreign policy approach also appears within the energy sector. But, 
there is no doubt at all. In fact, co-opetition in foreign energy policy is a step up 
from slight attempts at cooperation to intense cooperation. Due to the 
particularity and interdependent nature of global energy issues, China’s 
determined transformation from absolute self-sufficiency to win-win 
co-opetition is particularly evident in energy policy. This section will discuss 
why this transformation occurred and how it influences co-opetition over 
energy. 
In general, the transformation of energy policy from absolute 
self-sufficiency to win-win co-opetition has been determined by different 
leaders’ approaches in different eras, as well as by the specific energy 
requirements at the time. In other words, China’s energy diplomacy is one 
particular facet of the entire foreign policy, thus embodying the formulation and 
implementation of the decisions of respective Chinese governments over 
different leadership periods. It can be understood that energy self-sufficiency is 
the result of a desire for self-reliance, and that current trends towards 
co-opetition reflect the need for cooperation to balance China’s energy security. 
As such, different solutions have been called for at various times to respond to 
different challenges and issues. Thus, the changes to, and development of, 
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China’s diplomatic guidelines have determined the specified direction of 
energy policy. 
       Primarily, from the establishment of the PRC in 1949 until 1978, when 
Opening Up and Reform policies began to take hold, China’s policy towards 
energy called for absolute self-sufficiency. As a result of Mao’s commitment to 
self-reliance, international cooperation in any field was rare during this time. 
What’s more, due to the split with the Soviet Union, and the country’s own 
relatively isolated position, China had little choice but to depend on itself for 
fuel resources. (Wang, 2013a) Nonetheless, China’s objective of energy 
self-sufficiency during this period was largely due to the overall trend for 
self-reliance, and did not mean that cooperation with other countries over 
energy was frowned upon per se. In fact, in some ways, China’s quest to 
secure energy resources during this period led to greater opportunities for 
co-opetition at later times. 
        For instance, due to Mao’s approach to enhancing and accelerating 
industrial construction, as proposed in the First Five Year Plan (Li, 1955), there 
was a huge demand for energy, just as China was unwaveringly promoting 
self-reliance. As a result, the race was on to locate domestic energy sources to 
fuel this industrial push. The discovery of the Daqing 25  oilfield in 1959 
fundamentally solved China’s initial energy requirements for industrialisation. 																																																								
25Daqing is an oilfield which was discovered by Li Siguang in 1959. Formal output began in 
1960. Daqing is one of the oldest and most prolific oilfields in China, constituting 21% of 
China's overall production up to 2009. (China National Petroleum Co. 2010)  
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(China National Petroleum Co., 2010) In order to promote industrialisation, 
Mao proposed the slogan in industry learn from Daqing, to promote 
self-reliance. (Li, 1994) The concentrated development of the Daqing oilfield 
has now, however, potentially provided a cooperative opportunity for China. 
Daqing is the door to a branch of the Sino-Russian Far East oil pipeline, which 
will transport 15 million tonnes of crude oil from Russia to China annually 
between 2011 and 2030. (Xinhua News Agency, 2011a) In other words, 
without the discovery and development of the Daqing oilfield due to 
commitment to self-sufficiency, the modern-day cooperation might not have 
occurred and China might not be in a position to obtain greater oil imports from 
Russia. After the First Five Year Plan, China did not relinquish the focus on oil 
due to the importance of industrialisation. The Second Five Year Plan also 
emphasised further improvement of the oil sector, particularly in Xinjiang. 
(Zhou, 1956) 
 A further example of how China’s initial self-reliance has assisted 
future co-opetition is the development of nuclear energy. In fact, China’s use of 
nuclear energy began with successful research into the development of the 
atomic bomb, which naturally met with great controversy internationally. 
Although the development of nuclear weapons derived from Mao’s objective of 
total self-reliance and independence, in fact the existence of the atomic bomb 
led to future opportunities for co-opetition.  
		 154	
In particular, the development of nuclear weaponry in China brought 
about greater contact with Western nations, because it increased China’s 
global reputation. This was, in fact, exactly what Mao wanted. He proposed 
developing nuclear energy to illustrate the increasing reputation of China and 
throw off the ‘sick man of East Asia’ hat. At the Enlarged Meeting of the Military 
Commission of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China in 
1958, Mao mentioned developing the atomic bomb to avoid being bullied and 
to improve China’s own reputation in the world. (Mao, 1957) Although he 
stated that China should eschew first use in war, because the bomb would 
bring about large-scale damage. (Mao, 1977c) Developing nuclear energy 
increased the country’s global prestige and directly triggered cooperation with 
developed countries. For example, the first developed country to establish 
relations with China in 1964 was France. France’s president at the time, 
Charles de Gaulle, argued that ‘a fact of considerable significance is at work 
and is reshaping the world: China's very deep transformation puts her in a 
position to have a global leading role.’ (Gosset, 2009:para.1)  
Further to this, early explorations of nuclear power have become 
increasingly important as China and the world moves away from fossil fuels in 
order to relieve strained energy supplies and environmental pressure. At the 
2014 APEC meeting, President Xi claimed that China intends to ‘achieve the 
peaking of CO2 emissions around 2030 and to make best efforts to peak early 
and intends to increase the share of non-fossil fuels in primary energy 
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consumption to around 20% by 2030.’ (Romm, 2015:178) In order to cope with 
this target, National Energy Administration Director Wu Xinxiong has stated 
that China aims to become a world leader in nuclear power by 2020 through 
industrial upgrades. In this sense, the early development of nuclear energy in 
order to achieve self-reliance and independence has now become a boon to 
China’s attempts to reduce emissions and introduce green energy. 
There was not a systematic plan for the development of energy until 
Deng’s era. The systematisation, standardisation and rationalisation of 
energy-related issues only began to take place as the Opening Up and Reform 
gathered momentum. (Bao, 2009) Due to the new policy of economic reform, 
China needed to access modern technology from abroad, and also needed to 
cooperate with others to relieve tense relations. At this time, plans for foreign 
energy policy began to be developed.  
The first conference focusing specifically on national energy policy 
took place in Hangzhou in 1979, and marked the beginning of a new stage for 
energy policy in China. (Bao, 2009) This meeting concluded that China’s 
economic recovery and continued development would lead to an inevitable 
increased demand for energy resources, putting China’s supplies into crisis. 
The meeting also noted that China’s energy structure relied overwhelmingly on 
coal, and debated ways to re-address the balance. Various ways were put 
forward to resolve these challenges, namely conserving energy supplies and 
increasing the development of new energy sources. (Tu, 1980) The meeting 
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carried out systematic energy policy research and laid the groundwork for 
continued development. 
In 1999, the organisation BCIM26 was established, with the aim of 
promoting cooperation (including energy cooperation) amongst member 
countries. (Rahman, 2013) This was a sign that China was beginning to 
actively adopt a preference for co-opetition. Even clearer indications that 
China was beginning to lean toward active co-opetition in energy policy came 
in 2005. As Speed (2009) explains, China’s energy surplus finally ran dry in 
2001; meanwhile, the unstable situation in the Middle East further threatened 
the security of China’s energy supplies. What’s more, the growing pressure for 
emission reduction also made changes to the existing energy policy imperative. 
At the 19th meeting of the Standing Committee of the Tenth National People’s 
Congress in 2005, the Vice-Prime Minister Zeng Peiyan mentioned that from 
the year 2003, supplies of coal, electricity and petroleum had all been reported 
to be reaching a state of emergency, causing the Chinese government to 
rapidly and seriously consider necessary changes to China’s energy policy. 
(Zeng, 2005) Hou (2005) also mentioned that the new 11th Five Year Plan, 
covering the period from 2006-2010, differed from the 10th Five Year Plan 
(2001-2005), in that the main concern in the earlier plan had been energy 
supply, but the focus of the new plan was on energy efficiency and saving. 
																																																								
26 A sub-regional organisation of Asian nations including Bangladesh, China, India and 
Myanmar, which aims for greater integration of trade and investment between the four 
countries. 
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Furthermore, the new plan aimed to combine the functions of domestic and 
foreign markets in order to make adjustments to energy supply.  
In addition, at the 16th Party Congress in the same year, Hu Jintao 
took power from Jiang Zemin, and under his leadership, policies on energy 
began to change. President Hu stated that, in terms of energy security, the 
new energy strategy for China would be to maintain and protect a stable 
energy environment, which requires cooperation with others and respect for 
their differences. (Hu, 2006b) China joined various international cooperatives, 
such as the IEF (International Energy Forum), WEC (World Energy Council) 
and APEC (Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation), as well as acting as an 
observer nation of the Energy Charter Treaty, maintaining a positive 
relationship with the IEA (International Energy Agency), and establishing 
bilateral dialogue mechanisms with the USA, Japan, European Union, India 
and other countries. (Ma, 2006a) 
       At the 17th Party Congress in 2007, the Chinese government proposed 
that China should gain new competitive advantages by actively entering into 
global cooperation and competition. (Xinhua News Agency, 2007a) The voices 
calling for adjustments to China’s strategy of cooperation thus became 
progressively louder during the implementation of the 11th Five Year Plan. 
According to the white paper of the 11th Five Year Plan the key goal regarding 
energy was to achieve energy diversity and improve the use of coal in order to 
reduce emissions. (Information Office of the State Council Of the People's 
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Republic of China, 2006a) More generally, insisting on relationships of equal 
cooperation, respecting others, and finding common interests are highlighted 
as the key ways in which to achieve win-win policies. An example of this kind 
of stance was reflected in the Five Country Energy Ministers Meeting27 in 
2006. Chen (2006) points out that the total consumption of these five nations 
made up 42.5% of the world total in 2005; the energy ministers agreed to work 
on cooperating together in terms of energy conservation and efficiency, and to 
ensure increased transparency of data. In other words, China is working 
positively towards cooperation with developed countries, which could 
significantly benefit China’s energy development. In addition, at the beginning 
of 2010, the establishment of a dedicated energy committee indicated the 
enhancement of trans-departmental integration on energy issues, representing 
an effective reform to meet China’s current energy policy needs. (Cheng and 
Yu, 2013) The pressing energy issues have required China to allocate more 
resources to handling energy policy and research. 
       The 12th Five Year Plan (2011-2015) showed new developments 
compared to the 11th Five Year Plan. Cooperation was still the theme of the 
energy-related foreign policy, but with an increased emphasis on saving 
energy and protecting the environment, in order to bolster sustainable 
development. The stated key target of cooperative policies is to go out and let 
the advanced in. (Information Office of the State Council of the People's 																																																								
27Energy chiefs of China, India, Japan, the Republic of Korea and the United States met in 
Beijing in 2006. 
		 159	
Republic of China, 2013a) This target calls for cooperation on the development 
of new clean energy and increased emission reductions to lessen the 
dependence on traditional energy. 
In conclusion, the modification and evolution of China’s energy 
policies over time have come about as a result of both the different 
preferences and guiding ideologies of its leadership and the differing domestic 
and international conditions throughout time. The rapid increase in energy 
demand as a result of the transformation of China’s economic structure, the 
enormous international pressure to consider environmental needs, and the 
high requirements of integrating into the global world have all created new 
challenges and conditions for China’s energy policy. China’s energy policy has 
been transformed over time; it is now actively geared towards co-opetitive 
relations in a variety of different aspects. The following section will consider 
three such aspects – energy supply, energy reserves, and emissions 
reductions – illustrating the application of co-opetition to each in turn.  
 
3.3 The Application of Co-opetition to Energy Policy  
With the constant improvement of cooperative policies, co-opetition in China’s 
foreign energy policy is becoming increasingly clear. Throughout Mao’s Five 
Principles of Peaceful Co-existence, Deng’s Cooperative Pattern, Jiang’s 
Harmony but not Sameness, and Hu’s Peaceful Rise and Harmonious Society, 
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it can be seen that Hehe has been a constant guiding principle of foreign policy 
for every generation of Chinese leadership. China’s developmental needs 
require peace, and so it need not be assumed that China’s rise comes as a 
threat. As for energy policy, China has moved from absolute self-sufficiency to 
co-opetition, which also reflects China’s need for cooperation to allow 
continued development. This development can be assured in part by 
competition, and in part by cooperation.  
China’s energy security follows the global trend: supply cannot meet 
demand. In addition, with the country’s increased global reputation and intense 
pressure from other states, China has to recognise aspects of Strategic 
Petroleum Reserve (SPR) and environmental protection. Certain energy 
organisations, such as the IEA, require SPR. China’s objectives to be a 
responsible global power also requires the burden of certain responsibilities of 
environmental protection.  
As discussed at length in Chapter Two, energy security is an 
important aspect of NTS, as it links the military, economic and environmental 
sectors together. The development of the economy is the key driver behind 
co-opetition in energy, but the military and the environment are also crucial, as 
they respectively provide insurance and shape the future direction of policy. 
Consequently, the Chinese government has paid significant attention to 
co-opetition in this field. In this section, the three aspects of energy supply, 
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SPR, and emissions reduction will be explored to demonstrate the exact 
application of co-opetition to China’s energy security.  
 
3.3.1 Co-opetition and Energy Supply 
Energy supply entails many aspects, including importing energy, the 
transportation of energy, and the exploration and development of new or 
alternative energy supplies. As a result, the opportunities for co-opetition are 
numerous. However, the struggle to secure energy supplies inevitably draws 
countries into a situation of competition, creating a tense backdrop for any 
attempts at cooperation. For example, as Basu (2005) elaborates, the Indian 
Oil and Natural Gas Corporation (ONGC) overseas arm ONGC Videsh Ltd 
(OVL) has competed with Chinese firms for oil properties in West Africa, 
Central Asia and Latin America in recent years. As a result of constant 
competition, the effort needed to maintain cooperative links is also on the 
increase. Faced with this complex situation of intense competition mixed with 
abundant opportunities for cooperation, China is forced to adapt policies to 
remain up-to-date. Obviously, policies of self-sufficiency and self-reliance 
absolutely cannot exist anymore, and the commitment to mutual benefit and 
reciprocity, which have been integral elements of Chinese foreign policy over 
the eras, is being emphasised more than ever. 
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In 2003, the Chinese government published a white paper outlining 
issues related to energy resources which can be seen as a rudimentary form 
of an energy white paper. As noted in the paper, and reiterated in the 11th Five 
Year Plan, China’s economic structure and development relies heavily on coal. 
With the rapid development of industry, China’s current coal supply is unable 
to meet increasing needs. (Information Office of the State Council of the 
People's Republic of China, 2003) Further to this, serious pollution is being 
caused by the burning of coal. China therefore needs to not only increase coal 
mining efficiency to supply a greater demand, but also upgrade the coal 
purification process in order to burn cleaner coal and reduce pollution. As a 
result, China is actively seeking cooperation on researching and developing 
mineral resources. The government white paper declares that China will adopt 
a policy of openness towards the outside world, and, on the basis of mutual 
benefit, will actively participate in international cooperation in the field of 
mineral resources, promoting increased information, communication and 
technology flows in both the domestic and international market. The 11th Five 
Year Plan also reiterates the need for cooperation with international 
organisations. 
 These official documents illustrate that the Chinese government has 
identified the importance of cooperation to build mutual benefit and reciprocity, 
which in turn has led to further cooperation – in other words, through initial 
cooperative moves, a virtuous circle can be set in motion. As the paper 
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China’s Energy Conditions and Policies of 2007 lays out (Information Office of 
the State Council of the People's Republic of China (2007:II), one of the 
objectives of China’s energy strategy is cooperation for mutual benefit: 
 
China works sincerely and pragmatically with international energy 
organisations and other countries on the basis of equality, mutual 
benefit and win-win to improve mechanisms, expands the fields of 
cooperation and safeguard international energy security and stability. 
 
However, this quotation also reflects the Chinese government’s desire and 
sincerity to join and positively participate in the work of international 
organisations, helping China to become a responsible global power actively 
undertaking international duties. 
    Further to this, in order to guarantee cooperation and ensure the 
equality of cooperative partners, one significant element of the 11th Five Year 
Plan was that signs of the importance of legal protection for promoting 
successful cooperation are beginning to appear. According to the Information 
Office of the State Council of the People's Republic of China (2007:II): 
 
China has made active efforts to improve laws and policies related to 
its opening-up, promulgating in succession the Law on Sino-foreign 
Equity Joint Ventures, Law on Sino-foreign Cooperative Joint Ventures 
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and Law on Foreign Capital Enterprises to create a fair and open 
environment for foreign investment. 
 
Besides this, in order to create an equal and successful environment for 
cooperation, it is vital to ‘work together to maintain energy security. A fair and 
rational international energy management mechanism is a prerequisite for a 
stable global energy market.’ (Information Office of the State Council of the 
People’s Republic of China, 2012b:IX) In other words, protecting the stability of 
the global energy market means a stable energy supply for China and all other 
countries. The 11th Five Year Plan demonstrates that plans have been laid for 
the foundations of cooperation and follow-up guarantees, but what specific 
actions has China taken in order to achieve co-opetition in energy supply?  
Firstly, in terms of enhancing the energy supply imports, China has 
proposed strengthening dialogues and exchanges with producing countries. 
According to the white paper China’s Energy Policy 2012 (Information Office of 
the State Council of the People’s Republic of China, 2012b:IX), ‘strengthening 
dialogue and communication among energy exporting, consuming and 
transiting countries is the foundation of international energy cooperation.’ For 
instance, China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) and India’s Oil and 
Natural Gas Corporation (ONGC) worked together to win a bid to acquire 37% 
of Petro-Canada’s stake. This deal involved cooperative communication 
between these energy giants. However, it must be noted that China’s current 
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participation in international energy cooperation is limited to general and 
interactive roles. That is to say, the degree of global energy cooperation 
between China and other countries is relatively low, despite China’s general 
presence in many relevant international organisations and China’s promotion 
of greater global cooperation. China plays an important role in the Asia-Pacific, 
due to its role in APEC and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), but 
conversely plays a rather sparse role in the global arena. As a result, 
according to the Office of National Energy Administration (2006) China should 
aim to deepen cooperation at the global level, including within international 
energy agencies, at a regional level and through the expansion of international 
cooperation. 
Secondly, in terms of exploration of new energy supplies, the 
Chinese government aims to take on common responsibilities with partner 
countries such that both or all parties exchange technology, and define 
principles and agreements to guarantee the success of joint exploration: 
 
Carrying out effective energy cooperation. Upholding the principles of 
reciprocity, mutual benefit and common development, the various 
countries should ensure mutually beneficial cooperation in 
international energy resources exploration, enrich and improve 
cooperative mechanisms and methods, increase the international 
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energy supply, and diversify supply channels. (Information Office of 
the State Council of the People’s Republic of China, 2012b:IX)  
 
It is important to note that according to this statement, whilst carrying out 
effective actions for energy cooperation, China intends to uphold the principles 
of reciprocity, mutual benefit and common interest, which are precisely the 
rules for achieving successful co-opetition as identified in the framework of 
game theory.  
According to the Xinhua News Agency (2013a), China wishes to 
establish cooperation with the U.S. in aspects such as energy technology and 
energy risk evaluation, in order to obtain more benefit under the foundation of 
reciprocity and mutual benefit. Further to this, as stated in a speech at the BFA 
annual meeting in 2005, China is looking for external sources of energy to 
supplement domestic energy and will maintain the principles of reciprocity and 
mutual benefit to develop strategic partnerships with countries such as 
Australia. (Ma, 2005) But China will not only cooperate with developed 
countries; it has also proposed cooperation with developing countries. In the 
energy white paper in 2012, the Chinese government makes specific reference 
to the intention to ‘actively provide and transfer clean and highly efficient 
energy technology to developing and underdeveloped countries and together 
promote green development globally on the condition that intellectual property 
rights are protected.’ (Information Office of the State Council of the People’s 
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Republic of China, 2012b:IX) Besides this, it continues to notes that, the 
Chinese government thus shows a responsible manner to others, appealing 
for the international community to strive hand in hand to help the 
least-developed countries eliminate energy poverty, increase energy services 
and promote sustainable development. 
The third co-opetitive policy of energy supply is concerned with 
increasing energy diversity, mainly finding alternative energy to reduce 
over-reliance on fossil fuel. According to a joint statement given at the Five 
Country Energy Ministers Meeting, the five countries maintained a common 
interest and faced the same basic challenges and problems. (Ma, 2006a) 
Consequently, the five countries (China, India, Japan, South Korea, and the 
United States) stated that they should resolve to strengthen mutually beneficial 
cooperation, jointly promote and vigorously develop alternative fuel sources 
and improve energy efficiency, in order to reduce excessive dependence on 
renewable fossil fuels. The statement also endorses the strengthening of 
technical cooperation, as well as noting the importance of environmental 
protection. Importantly, a specific energy cooperation scheme was proposed 
at the meeting, including aspects of energy supply. Three deeper points from 
this statement merit closer discussion in terms of China’s energy supply. 
The first point is the objective to improve and enhance the supply of 
energy, including joint support of energy exploration with third parties not 
participating in the meeting. During the visit of the new Chinese president Xi 
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Jinping to Russia, a joint statement declared that China and Russia have 
agreed to build a strong relationship on energy, including oil, natural gas, coal, 
electricity and new energy sources. (Xinhua News Agency, 2013c) Russia will 
increase oil exports to China, and the top Russian crude producer Rosneft also 
signed a generous package of deals with China, which plans to increase oil 
export supply by 34 to 50 million tonnes by 2018. (Wang, 2013b)  
The second key point is to popularise cooperation on alternative 
energy and welcome related investments. From the 1999 white paper China’s 
New and Renewable Energy, the Chinese government began to pay attention 
to cooperation on alternative energy sources to ensure a more secure energy 
supply. (Information Office of the State Council of the People's Republic of 
China, 1999:132) Following this resolve to allow greater foreign investment in 
alternative power sources, China allowed the U.S. Westlinghouse Electric Co. 
to build four nuclear power units in China. As Chen (2006) explains, deals 
such as this can be seen as China offering an olive branch to foreign countries 
in terms of energy policy, demonstrating real ongoing cooperative efforts. In 
turn, Chinese firms sell finished solar cells and modules to the USA. A 
US-based company sold its ultracapacitors to many countries including China; 
Chinese wind energy companies have started to work with European and U.S. 
OEMs. In 2011, more than US$923 million’s worth of wind energy goods and 
services were exchanged between China and the U.S. (Schario, 2013) In other 
words, competitors in the energy market have joined together to bring benefit 
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to one another. (Wood, 2012) China’s sincere intention of cooperation over 
alternative energy and technology for the sake of mutual benefit is evident to 
see. 
Thirdly, increasing joint protection of energy transportation is a 
co-opetitive action that the Chinese government strongly advocates to improve 
the security of energy supply. China’s energy policy white paper of 2012, 
clearly elaborates that ‘the international community should work collaboratively 
to maintain stability in oil producing and exporting countries, especially those 
in the Middle East, to ensure the security of international energy transport 
routes and avoid geopolitical conflicts that affect the world's energy supply.’ 
(Information Office of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China, 
2012b;IX)  
        In conclusion, in order to meet demands, a major energy policy 
objective for China is to ensure and increase energy supply. China has 
enacted different policies and supervises regulation on co-opetition to protect 
the success of co-opetition with other countries on energy supply on the 
steadfast basis of establishing mutual benefit and reciprocity. 
 
3.3.2 Co-opetition and Energy Reserves 
Co-opetition in terms of China’s energy reserve policy has gone from 
non-existent to prevalent, from single- to multi-actor, and from a single fuel 
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source to a variety. Although there is no specific formal white paper concerning 
energy reserves or conservation in China, an understanding of the importance 
of maintaining reserves is visible throughout other documents. According to 
the IEA (2012c:535), ‘in order to prevent and mitigate damage caused by oil 
supply disruptions, China has been steadily moving forward with the building 
of an oil stock reserve system since 2001.’ In other words, China has being 
paying more attention to the importance of energy reserves in recent years.  
According to the Information Office of the State Information Office of 
the State Council Of the People's Republic of China (2001), the Chinese 
government first proposed the construction of a strategic petroleum reserve 
system in the 10th Five Year Plan, in order to protect energy security. The SPR 
is now an important constituent of the national energy security system; in the 
case of oil supply disruptions or other accidents which would affect the oil 
supply, tapping emergency strategic reserves can guarantee the continued 
stability of the national economy and development. The construction of the 
SPR involved drawing lessons from advanced foreign countries with greater 
experience; the Deputy Director of the National Development and Reform 
Commission (NDRC), Zhang (2009) specifically stated that China should learn 
from other countries’ experiences. In 2003, China officially launched the base 
construction of SPR in four places and planned to build another eight after 
2009. Once all the planned localities are finished, the SPR should be able to 
achieve 90-100 days standby capacity. 
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During the Five Country Energy Ministers Meeting, cooperation on 
building energy reserves was also proposed, in particular oil reserves. As Ma 
(2006a) points out, China’s reserve system is still in the primary stages, and 
China requires cooperation with others in order to build an advanced oil 
reserve system. In an interview in 2009, Zhang Guobao, the Deputy Director of 
the National Development and Reform Commission, responded to the 
question ‘why are other countries, such as the United States, raising concerns 
that Chinese fuel reservation will influence fluctuation in the international oil 
price?’ Zhang stated that the proportion of China’s energy in the world still 
remains relatively small, and trade of crude oil reaches only 6%; it is unlikely 
that China’s reservation of oil could influence the international market. (Zhang, 
2009) Both the question and Zhang’s answer demonstrate the 
misunderstanding from other countries regarding China’s energy strategy. 
However, as Nieh (2006:24) suggests, ‘the opportunity to cooperate with other 
states in developing and maintaining energy security policies could permit 
China to improve its reputation as a positive player in international politics. 
Alternatively, a rigid and unilateral stockpiling regime in the spirit of ‘equity oil’ 
would decrease the fluidity of the oil market and hamper China’s charm 
offensive on the West.’ In other words, competition is constantly looming, 
misunderstanding is highly possible, and China still has a long way to go to 
maintain a successful cooperative approach. 
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Secondly, the SPR has gone from a single-actor to a multi-actor level. 
In the early stages of the SPR, the solitary actor involved has been the 
Chinese government. The government has been researching and exploring 
possibilities for the creation of reserves. As Jin (2010) analyses, China would 
need close to 500 mb of energy reserves to represent three months’ 
consumption. In the current first phase, the four completed reserves bases can 
hold roughly 200 mb. It is expected that reserves will reach the required three 
month supply by 2020. Figure 5 below shows the specific development of 
China’s SPR. The blue segment of the columns represents the first phase of 
establishing the reserves. The pink is the second phase and green is the third. 
It can be seen that the three month requirement of 500 mb is expected to be 
completed before the year 2020. However, the capacity for the third phase is 
higher than the first two phases, which took many years to build. This chart 
therefore demonstrates the ambitious recent development of China’s energy 
reservation system. 
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       Figure 5: China’s SPR Capacity from 2006 to 2016 (IEA, 2012b:9) 
In the 11th Five Year Plan, the government proposed the rapid construction of 
government reserves, but noted too that enterprises should also establish 
compulsory reserves. In other words, the government has begun to encourage 
the development of commercial oil reserves, in order to gradually accumulate 
a comprehensive petroleum reserve system. (Information Office of the State 
Council Of the People's Republic of China, 2006a)  
Thirdly, the SPR has moved from a single fuel concentration to a 
variety of fuel types. To begin with, China’s energy reserve policies focused on 
oil only, but now it has become more and more diversified, including natural 
gas, nuclear power, new energy, and a variety of storage needs. However, as 
China’s technological development is still not fully matured, these policies 
require the help and advanced experience of developed countries. As People's 
Daily (2011) reports , during the visit of a Chinese trade delegation to the 
United States in 2011, the two countries signed a number of agreements, 
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covering nuclear energy, wind energy, solar energy and hydropower, totalling 
more than US$23 billion. In addition, the United States promised to help China 
develop new and advanced energy through technology exchange, which will 
also prove beneficial for energy reservation. 
Fourthly, active cooperation on energy reserves involves participation 
in regional and international energy reservation organisations in order to 
improve cooperation, reputation and trust through a multilateral approach. For 
instance, as Nieh (2006) illustrates, a proposal for regional joint stockpiling 
programs received much attention at ASEAN, ASEAN +3 and APEC meetings. 
In conclusion, in order for China’s SPR system to get off the ground 
effectively, it will inevitably require a co-opetitive approach both domestically 
and in terms of foreign policy. In particular, China needs to learn from the 
experience of other countries and also cooperate within the framework of 
international organisations, in order to accelerate the construction of the 
reserve system and shore up energy security.  
 
3.3.3 Co-opetition and Emissions Reduction 
A 2003 government white paper entitled The Development of China’s Mineral 
Programs, clearly reaffirmed the need for environmentally-friendly energy 
policies, but did not go further than proposing treatment after pollution has 
already occurred. (Information Office of the State Council of the People's 
		 175	
Republic of China, 2003) This is telling in terms of the Chinese government’s 
approach to environmental protection, demonstrating that the government at 
the time did not yet seriously recognise the importance of the clean burning of 
coal and reducing emissions. However, emissions reduction became a more 
central focus during the 11th Five Year Plan. In the white paper China’s Energy 
Conditions and Policies, the government proposed that energy exploitation 
should be in harmony with the environment, and made a clear target for 
emission reduction, aiming to: ‘achieve the goal of basically curbing the trend 
of ecological deterioration, reducing total emissions of major pollutants by 10 
percent, and gain visible results in the control of greenhouse gas emissions 
during its 11th Five-Year Plan period.’ (Information Office of the State Council 
of the People's Republic of China, 2007:V)  
Co-opetition can mainly be applied to emissions reductions in terms 
of two main points, namely the exchange of advanced technology, including 
developing new clean energy and technology for the reduction of pollution; and 
co-opetition on reduction responsibilities. Firstly, regarding the exchange of 
technology relating to emissions reduction, the Kyoto Protocol outlined the 
Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) which establishes links by allowing 
developed countries to invest in developing countries and supply technological 
and financial support. Joining the Kyoto Protocol provides China with excellent 
opportunities for development and so signing up to optional reduction is a wise 
choice. As Heggelund (2007) points out, the Kyoto Protocol can provide a 
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good learning opportunity to teach China when and how to reduce emissions, 
because developed countries will be able to impart their knowledge from 
experience. It is therefore favourable for China to voluntarily adopt optional 
reduction obligations in the Kyoto Protocol for the sake of future opportunity 
and development. 
In addition, as outlined by the Information Office of the State Council 
of the People's Republic of China (2011b), strengthening exchanges and 
cooperation with relevant international organisations and foreign governments 
in the field of energy conservation and environmental protection can help 
China to actively draw on lessons from other countries’ successful experiences, 
in order to protect the environment and build opportunities for China. The 
Chinese government has therefore taken real notice of the benefit of 
co-opetition and mutual cooperation. According to the Work Plan for 
Greenhouse Gas Emission Control during the 12th Five-Year Plan Period, 
China will strengthen the continued construction of international exchange and 
dialogue in the field of emissions reduction, and actively carry out 
multi-channel project cooperation, as well as conducting pragmatic 
cooperation in scientific research, technological development and capacity 
building, and actively introducing, digesting and absorbing advanced foreign 
technology and successful international experience. (Information Office of the 
State Council of the People's Republic of China, 2011d) In turn, this paper also 
mentions that China should work to actively support African countries, small 
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island states and other less well-off countries, thus further reinforcing the 
response to emissions reduction needs and implementing introduce and go 
global policies, by promoting low-carbon cooperation with other developing 
countries. Further to the Copenhagen Summit, according to the Information 
Office of the State Information Office of the State Council of the People's 
Republic of China (2011c:V): 
 
In 2010, China took an active part in the negotiations and 
consultations at the Cancun Conference, adhered to the principles of 
maintaining openness and transparency, extensive participation and 
consensus through consultations, proposed constructive plans on 
various issues and made important contributions to help the 
conference achieve practical results and put the talks back on track. 
 
In sum, it can be seen that China has been working to show a spirit of 
determination for cooperation over the issue of emissions reduction, including 
actively participating in related multilateral summits and making efforts to meet 
reduction demands ahead of the compulsory schedule. 
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3.4 Conclusion 
This chapter has mainly introduced the ways in which co-opetitive approaches 
have been applied over time to the major approaches of China’s foreign policy 
as well as to energy policy in particular, and has introduced three elements of 
China’s energy policy where co-opetitive policies can be seen in practice.  
Abundant approaches are proposed to handle issues of energy 
security, but this thesis looks specifically at foreign policy-related approaches. 
As such, this chapter firstly discussed the guiding ideologies of foreign policy 
within modern China’s different generations of leadership, explaining how a 
co-opetitive approach and China’s traditional Hehe culture, which aim to 
uphold unity, peace, and harmony, have been an unwavering theme of 
Chinese foreign policy ever since the founding of the PRC. Hehe culture can 
be seen as a theoretical predecessor to the concept of co-opetition; the 
guidance of Hehe culture means that Chinese foreign policy has entailed 
aspects of co-opetition, whether implicitly or explicitly, throughout the different 
leadership eras. Thus, China’s foreign policy – from the era of Mao Zedong to 
the era of Hu Jintao – has always shown a preference for a peaceful rise and 
for harmonious development, although these have only become explicitly 
stated aims in recent years. 
In terms of China’s energy-related foreign policy, in the era of Mao 
Zedong, China pursued a stance of self-reliance, although this was largely 
influenced by the political circumstances of the time. In fact, China’s long-term 
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self-sufficiency and plentiful resources meant that self-reliance was a viable 
option under the domestic and international circumstances during Mao’s era. 
However, after Opening Up and Reform, the rapid and massive economic 
development increased energy consumption levels to the point that domestic 
supply could no longer meet demand, and China had no choice but to 
introduce and go global. The non-stop development of China has brought 
about a raft of new challenges which require China to cooperate with 
developed countries and absorb advanced foreign technology in order to 
construct a Green China – a China which conserves energy and protects its 
environment.  
However, due to the finite and unequal distribution of energy, 
competition to secure energy reserves is continually increasing. It is admittedly 
difficult to seek cooperation under such conditions. Nevertheless, the Chinese 
government still promulgates a series of policies to intensify cooperation, 
including the formulation of corresponding laws and regulations. It could even 
be said that the tense environment of energy competition has created a 
situation in which efforts to cooperate must be codified and more carefully 
considered for feasibility and practicality, which may be overlooked without the 
pressure of competition. 
This chapter also illustrates the application of co-opetition to China’s 
energy supply, energy reserves and emissions reduction policies. China’s 
efforts to apply co-opetition to energy policy aim to bring about mutual benefits 
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for China and its partners, make up shortfalls in energy supplies and 
technological experience and know-how, and adhere to the principle of 
international cooperation in order to constantly deepen and strengthen a 
positive co-opetitive stance. However, due to differing circumstances and 
conditions, co-opetition between China and other countries or regions has 
achieved different degrees of progress. The following three chapters will 
discuss in turn the specific application of co-opetition to China’s energy 
relations with Japan, Russia, and Africa. 
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Chapter Four: A Case Study of Sino-Japanese 
Co-opetition on Energy 
 
As discussed in Chapter Three, co-opetition has played an important role in 
China’s energy policy since the beginning of New China, with elements of 
co-opetition running through the various eras of leadership. Although attempts 
at cooperation were relatively weak in Mao’s era, this did not mean that the 
Chinese government had abandoned a commitment to co-opetition. The Five 
Principles of Peaceful Coexistence gave China the impetus to cooperate, and 
indeed a certain degree of cooperation did exist between China and African 
countries. However, during this period, cooperation with the rest of the world 
was extremely limited, largely due to Mao Zedong’s interpretation of the 
international and domestic zeitgeist. However, with origins in traditional 
Chinese Hehe culture, China’s commitment to peaceful coexistence and 
cooperation has never wavered, and in successive post-Mao leaderships, 
greater efforts have been dedicated to achieving these objectives in foreign 
policy. China’s foreign policy and energy policy are closely related, and 
following the trends in foreign policy, energy policy likewise transitioned from 
self-sufficiency to co-opetition.  
Chinese energy policy has been influenced both by these foreign 
policy trends, and by the philosophy of Hehe culture, with an ever-increasing 
effort towards co-opetition. Energy is also a significant aspect of NTS due to its 
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important connection to the military, economy and environment, and this 
significance has caused energy to be one of the major arenas of 
interdependence and cooperation between states in the 21st century. And yet, 
Sino-Japanese energy relations appear to be bucking these trends. 
Although energy could represent a key area for cooperation to 
improve Sino-Japanese relations, it has instead become a sticking point 
between the two countries. The Chinese government ostensibly centres its 
analyses of Sino-Japanese energy cooperation on Chinese national policy, in 
order to best foster successful bilateral cooperation with Japan and establish 
multilateral channels of communication. However, although Deng Xiaoping set 
in motion the idea of setting aside territorial disputes in order to focus on joint 
development, the conflict over the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands has become a 
major point of contention. The Chinese government claims that in 2012 the 
Japanese asserted undisguised nationalism in its claims over the islands 
(Information Office of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China, 
2012a), and this has cast a shadow over the two countries’ mutual relations, 
and thereby, over their potential for co-opetition on energy. 
As China has long been an energy-exporting country, scant attention 
had previously been paid to energy relations with Japan, and there is still little 
profound analysis. Some studies, such as Li (2005), offer an overview of the 
historical developments in Sino-Japanese relations, summing up the 
background of shared energy cooperation. However, research such as this 
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fails to draw the larger picture and pinpoint the intentions behind the 
development of cooperation. In this chapter, the framework of game theory will 
help to identify the motivations behind co-opetition on Sino-Japanese energy.  
Some analysts, such as Townsend and King (2007), have taken a 
sceptical attitude towards Sino-Japanese energy cooperation, believing that 
China will harness its geopolitical advantages in Central Asia rather than 
attempt to build a close co-opetitive relationship with Japan. China has a 
strong political influence in Central Asia and may be able to secure and even 
monopolise the area’s oil and gas resources. For their part, many Japanese 
scholars, including Yoshimatsu (2011), believe that China lacks the capacity to 
take a leading role in establishing multilateral energy mechanisms, as China is 
yet to achieve real success in spurring regional energy cooperation. The 
current best potential for multilateral energy cooperation including both China 
and Japan seems to lie in ASEAN+3 and the East Asian Regional Energy 
Community, where Japan takes a leading role. This chapter will argue that 
China can show itself to be an important actor in multilateral energy 
cooperation through the conditions of mutual benefit and peaceful coexistence 
as espoused by traditional Hehe culture. 
According to existing research, the Sino-Japanese energy 
relationship is characterised far more by competition than cooperation. China 
and Japan’s thorny historical relationship, and their current insatiable thirst for 
energy add to the complexity of Sino-Japanese co-opetition. What is more, the 
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two countries are located in the same geographical area, fighting over the 
same sources of energy procurement. In spite of this tense competition, it 
cannot be said that there is no possibility whatsoever for greater cooperation. 
In particular, resolving territorial controversy in the East China Sea would 
represent an important step on the road to building a closer relationship in the 
future. But what would this mean for energy relations? Can co-opetition ever 
really exist in Sino-Japanese energy relations? Or will it be a zero sum game 
through and through? 
This chapter will divide analysis of Sino-Japanese energy co-opetition 
into two sections. Firstly, the background of Sino-Japanese co-opetition will be 
analysed in greater detail, including Japan’s energy challenges and current 
and historical Sino-Japanese energy co-opetition. Historical relations will be 
discussed because Hehe culture was not shaped in one day but instead 
developed historically through Chinese philosophy. It is reflected in different 
eras and in leaders’ thoughts and strategies. As a result, the insights from 
Chapter Three regarding the differing approaches of successive Chinese 
leadership will also be important in this section, as these background 
considerations can shed light on the decisions of the Chinese government and 
help determine whether the two nations’ energy relations can only be seen as 
a zero-sum game. This section will also interject previous and ongoing projects 
and summits, as well as current discourse, into the discussion of 
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Sino-Japanese energy relations in order to better understand the progress of 
co-opetition. 
The second section will analyse Sino-Japanese energy co-opetition 
according to the PARTS model of game theory, through different actions on 
energy exploration, supply, reservation and environment protection; the four 
aspects which represent the primary threats to China’s energy security.  
 
4.1 Sino-Japanese Energy Co-opetition: A Zero-Sum 
Game?  
In recent years, Russian oil pipelines to the East China Sea oil fields have 
fuelled a growing trend in energy importing and consumption in Asian 
countries, leading to increasingly tense competition between energy-hungry 
nations including China and Japan. In addition, territorial disputes in the East 
China Sea have reached fever pitch, and this seems to be rapidly transforming 
Sino-Japanese relations into a pure zero-sum game. Although the 
Sino-Japanese fight for energy is a normal manifestation of energy market 
competition, China and Japan are regional neighbours using the same 
suppliers and both burdened with significant energy requirements. If there is 
any significant or even minor disruption to the market balance, the foreign 
relations between the two countries are likely to suffer greatly as a result. In 
order to avoid this outcome, China and Japan have a common responsibility to 
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engage in cooperation rather than intensifying competition, thereby ensuring a 
stable supply of energy for both countries. Analysing and addressing the 
underlying roots of China and Japan’s testy relationship may be of assistance 
in attempts to establish greater cooperation. The first aspect to consider is the 
background of Japan’s energy conditions.  
4.1.1 Japan’s Energy Conditions 
The current state of Japan’s energy conditions is decidedly pessimistic. As of 
2012, proven oil reserves in the Asia-Pacific area comprised only 2.5% of 
global proven reserves. Reserves in Australia, Brunei, China, India, Indonesia, 
Malaysia, Thailand and Vietnam make up 2.4%, with all remaining Asia-Pacific 
countries – including Japan – accounting for a mere 0.1% of the world’s total. 
(BP, 2013b) However, as shown in Figure 6 of the structure of Japan’s energy 
supply, oil represents the largest majority of total Japanese primary energy 
supply. Japan thus inevitably relies on imports to meet this demand for oil. In 
fact, Japan does not import only oil, but needs to import other fossil fuels. As it 
stands, Japan is currently the world’s leading importer of liquefied natural gas, 
the second largest importer of coal, and the third largest net oil importer. (U.S. 
Energy Information Administration, 2013a) Due to a decline in available local 
resources, Japan is left only with the option to accelerate efforts of energy 
diversification and exploration of renewable resources to resolve its energy 
dilemma. 
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Figure 6: Japan’s Total Primary Energy Supply from 1973 to 2011 (IEA, 
2013a:4) 
As Figure 6 shows, there was a dip in the use of primary energy in 2009. 
According to a report from the Japanese Statistics Bureau, the decrease in 
total energy consumption was mainly caused by a serious economic downturn 
in 2009. (Statistics Bureau of Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications, 
2014) This reveals how closely energy is related to the economy. Since 2009, 
the use of energy has picked up again, though the increase in oil use has been 
relatively slow, whereas renewable energy usage increased fairly steeply. This 
reflects the Japanese government’s focus on alternative energy and 
independent research and development (R&D). (Ministry of Economy Trade 
and Industry of Japan, 2006) These trends may afford greater opportunities for 
Sino-Japanese cooperation on renewable energy. 
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In addition, Figure 6 reveals the steep drop in use of nuclear energy 
from 2011, triggered by the Fukushima incident of March 201128. According to 
a BP report, nuclear energy in the Asia-Pacific area made up 13.9% of the 
world total, but Japan accounted for only 0.7% in 2012. (BP, 2013b) This figure 
dropped dramatically by 89% from 2011 to 2012. According to a report by the 
U.S. Energy Information Administration (2013a), before the 2011 earthquake 
and tsunami leading to the Fukushima disaster, Japan was the third largest 
consumer of nuclear power in the world market, with nuclear power accounting 
for 13% of total energy consumption in Japan, but after the earthquake, this fell 
to 7%. The accident at Fukushima has sharply raised the Japanese 
government’s awareness of the importance of energy diversification, and with 
concerns regarding the safety of nuclear power, the proportion of oil and 
natural gas consumed increased. Oil had always remained Japan’s primary 
energy source, at 43% of the total in 2011, but this had dropped from 80% in 
1970. After the Fukushima incident, oil consumption began to rebound. (U.S. 
Energy Information Administration, 2013a)  
																																																								
28 ‘March 2011, a 9.0 magnitude earthquake struck off the coast of Sendai, Japan, triggering a 
large tsunami. The earthquake and ensuing damage resulted in an immediate shutdown of 
about 10 GW of nuclear electric generating capacity. Between the 2011 Fukushima disaster 
and May 2012, Japan lost all of its nuclear capacity as a result of scheduled maintenance and 
lack of government approvals to return to operation. Two nuclear reactors were 
re-commissioned in July 2012 and represented the only source of nuclear power in the country 
for more than one year. However, these two reactors were removed from service again in 
September 2013, eliminating the country's nuclear capacity for a second time in more than 40 
years.’ (U.S. Energy Information Administration, 2013a)  
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The disaster at Fukushima pushed Japan towards greater efforts at 
exploring renewable energy alternatives as well as increasing imports of oil 
and natural gas. As Watanabe and Suga (2014) mention, the Japanese Prime 
Minister Shinzo Abe is keen to promote the low carbon industry not only in the 
domestic market, but also abroad, in order to assist Japan’s transition to 
greater renewable energy usage. Nevertheless, after the Fukushima disaster, 
the import of oil and natural gas began to increase once more in 2012, to 
provide direct fuel for burning in power plants to replace the nuclear plants. 
(Dunn and Eshbaugh, 2013) Will this trend add to the intensity of 
Sino-Japanese energy competition in overseas markets? 
 
4.1.2 The Historical Development of Sino-Japanese Energy 
Co-opetition 
The preceding section outlines the rather grim state of Japan’s current 
domestic energy conditions. In terms of energy relations with China, the 
biggest difficulty is the historical flux of the relationship, which continues to 
influence progress today. Sino-Japanese energy relations can be divided into 
five key stages, namely the period of Japanese imperialist plunder of Chinese 
energy resources (1894-1945); the period of Sino-Japanese cooperation 
without action in Mao’s era (1945-1972); the Sino-Japanese cooperation under 
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mutual benefit in Deng’s era (1973-1993); and the period of co-opetition in the 
energy game under Jiang (1993-2003) and Hu (2003-2013). 
In the period of the Japanese imperialist plunder of Chinese energy, 
there was no subtle interplay of competition and cooperation. Rather, from 
1894 to 1945, the Chinese were subjected to the imperialist ambitions of the 
powerful Japanese, as Japan sought materials and energy from its 
resource-rich but weakened neighbour to support its own national 
development. After the Meiji Restoration in 1868, Japan’s strength enhanced 
significantly (Gluck, 1997), and Japan’s expansionist strategy led it to seek 
resources in China. Japan was able to invade China with little resistance, as 
China had been weakened by the domestic and international failures of the 
Qing dynasty regime. (Ni and Van, 2005) The Sino-Japanese War of 
1894-1895 marked the beginning of this difficult period; in the following 50 
years, Japan was able to extract a great deal of resources from China. For 
instance, from the Fushun Colliery alone, 227 million tonnes of coal were 
transported to Japan. (Wang, 1995) In short, during this stage of 
Sino-Japanese energy relations, there was not even a modicum of competition, 
let alone cooperation. 
However, from 1945 onwards, after Japan surrendered in the Second 
World War, the situation completely changed. From 1945 to 1949, China was 
engaged in civil war between the Chinese Communist Party and the Chinese 
Nationalist Party. Foreign relations with other countries were almost 
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universally neglected during this time. The period following the Communist 
victory in 1949 until 1978 was the era of Mao Zedong. Although Mao proposed 
the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, cooperation with Japan was not 
formal and diplomatic relations had not been established, showing that their 
acrimonious history still continued to cast a dark shadow over Sino-Japanese 
relations. The Chinese leadership refused to overlook the issue of Japanese 
war guilt. (Ferguson, 2008) Yet Sino-Japanese cooperation during this era was 
not as strained as some may think. Rather, cooperation instead followed the 
principle that Mao proclaimed in the 1950s: ăƈ<Ő+ă6 – people take 
the lead and the government are led by the people. (Geng, 2010:64) In other 
words, cooperative efforts were mostly not yet at an official level, and most 
cooperative efforts were non-governmental until late in Mao’s era. For instance, 
from the 1950s, China and Japan signed non-governmental energy 
cooperation treaties. However, due to the embargos set against Japan as a 
consequence of the Second World War, there was little realistic scope for 
cooperation at this time. (Du, 2005; Burns, 2000) Nonetheless, despite the 
circumstances and the difficult history shared by the two countries, China still 
held on to the wish for peaceful coexistence espoused in Hehe culture, and 
non-official cooperation continued throughout this period. 
The third period was from 1972 to 1993. The successful cooperation 
during this period benefitted from the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence 
and especially from Deng Xiaoping’s policy of constructing cooperative 
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relations. In 1972, China and Japan signed a joint communiqué to formally 
re-establish diplomatic relations, a move which also signified the beginning of 
formal Sino-Japanese energy cooperation. The communiqué reads:  
 
The Government of Japan and the Government of the People’s 
Republic of China agree to establish relations of perpetual peace and 
friendship between the two countries on the basis of the principles of 
mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual 
non-aggression, non-interference in each other's internal affairs, 
equality and mutual benefit and peaceful co-existence.(Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs of Japan, 1972:para.12) 
 
This statement demonstrates that Sino-Japanese cooperation was based on 
the tenets outlined in the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence and also 
sealed the existence of Hehe culture. From this point onwards, official 
cooperation began to shows signs of progress. The Japanese government 
began to focus on the necessity of energy source diversification after the first 
Middle Eastern oil crisis in 1973. At the time, China’s energy production was 
increasing year on year (Suzuki, 2000), and as a result the proportion of oil 
Japan imported from China soared from 4.3% in 1973 to 41.3% in 1976, a 
nearly tenfold increase. (Tian, 2002) Tian (2002) continually points out, the 
Daqing oilfield was responsible for most of the oil output to Japan. The Bank of 
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Japan supplied three batches of energy loans to China from 1979 to 1993, 
making up a total value of 1.7 trillion yen. 
In addition to financial aid, Japan also supplied the technology and 
equipment to assist China’s exploration projects. As Emmers (2009) explains, 
Chinese crude oil was exported to Japan in exchange for advanced 
technologies. For instance, the Japanese Chiyoda Corporation provided a 
series of equipment, which could supply 400 million cubic metres of oil a day. 
(Tian, 2002) These projects helped to strengthen bilateral cooperation and 
also went some way to solving both China and Japan’s urgent energy 
requirements. China was in need of technology and capital to spur 
development, whilst Japan needed diversified sources of energy to reduce 
reliance on the Middle East and meet increasing demand. Cooperation during 
this period was therefore mutually beneficial as Japan’s financial support 
helped resolve funding issues for the development of Chinese energy 
resources, whereas China’s energy exports helped relieve the pressure of 
Japan’s growing energy shortage. This evidence supports assumption two 
29and indicates that the interdependence between China and Japan focuses 
not only on technology, but also on the economy.  
In the era of Deng Xiaoping, Sino-Japanese energy cooperation 
continued to flourish due to Deng’s cooperative pattern policy. Sino-Japanese 
combined energy output and financial support and there was increasing 																																																								
29 Assumption Two:	The interdependence in co-opetition not only comes from military, but 
also other aspects.( Details have been examined in section 2.1.3) 
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interest in cooperation on energy on both sides. The two countries attempted 
to organise conferences and bilateral negotiation mechanisms to continue 
promoting successful cooperation. In October 1978, Deng Xiaoping signed the 
Sino-Japanese Peace Treaty30 with the then Japanese Prime Minister Fukuda 
Takeo. (Wang, 2000) In addition, Deng Xiaoping also proposed the shelving 
disputes and carrying out development in the treaty. That is to say, from Deng 
Xiaoping’s perspective, joint development was a wise approach because it 
would be far too difficult to resolve long-term controversies between nations, 
particularly at a time when China was struggling with internal development. 
It is true that the two sides maintain different views on this question... 
It does not matter if this question is shelved for some time, say, ten 
years. Our generation is not wise enough to find common language 
on this question. Our next generation will certainly be wiser. They will 
certainly find a solution acceptable to all. (Deng, 1989:171) 
In other words, even if there were outstanding territorial disputes which were 
yet to reach resolution, Deng believed it to be more advantageous to shelve 
disputes for the short-term and engage in joint developmental projects instead. 
Joint development would also lead to increased mutual understanding and 
respect, and therefore help oil the wheels of efforts to resolve territorial and 
sovereignty disputes. (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of 																																																								
30The full name of the treaty is Treaty of Peace and Friendship between Japan and the 
People's Republic of China. 
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China, 2014e)  
The Joint Communiqué of 1972 clearly pointed out that both sides 
should respect sovereignty and territorial integrity. The Chinese government 
claims that Japan has failed to honour this agreement by claiming sovereignty 
over the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands, and cites the Potsdam Declaration of 1945. 
Principle 8 of the declaration stated: ‘the terms of the Cairo Declaration shall 
be carried out and Japanese sovereignty shall be limited to the islands of 
Honshu, Hokkaido, Kyushu, Shikoku, and such minor islands as we determine.’ 
(Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 1966) The Chinese government points 
out that the Japanese government promised to obey the Potsdam Declaration 
in the Joint Communiqué, and that the declaration does not include the 
Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands. In 1992, China officially asserted its claim by passing 
the Law on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone, which explicitly specifies 
that the islands are China’s territory. The Japanese government uses a 
different understanding of international law, including the continuity of the 
continental shelf to lay claim to the islands. (Pan, 2007) The beginning of 
tension over the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands can shed some light on why joint 
cooperation, particularly direct energy importing and exporting, was initially 
successful but progress has since stalled, especially in terms of joint 
exploration. Does this demonstrate that long-term energy cooperation needs 
to be established on the basis of mutual political trust? Certainly, it seems that 
it is difficult for bilateral treaties to be kept without international supervision. All 
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the discussions referred to above support both assumption three31 and four32. 
That is to say, building trust between China and Japan is difficult and it is 
difficult to divide the pie (interest) in the co-opetition.   
Furthermore, it would appear that cooperative relations run the risk of 
becoming brittle if based on economic interests alone, without other common 
interests or shared objectives. As Guo (2008) argues, energy cooperation 
between China and Japan is driven almost entirely by economic interests; this 
kind of cooperation is particularly vulnerable and may be easily destroyed 
when conditions change. Tretiak (1978) also claims that the aim of budding 
Sino-Japanese cooperation was mostly not for political purposes per se, but 
rather for the sake of long-term bilateral trade. (particularly between 1978 and 
1985) 
Indeed, the situation did change in 1993 and cooperative efforts were 
quickly replaced with competition. By this time, China’s energy structure had 
changed; China became a net energy importer in 1993 and was unable to 
continue exports to Japan. The fourth period of Sino-Japanese energy 
cooperation, during the era of Jiang Zemin, began at this point and lasted until 
2003. Under Jiang, the focus of co-opetition was harmony but not sameness, 
and based on this policy, the Chinese government made moves to accept 
differences with the Japanese government and achieve cooperative common 																																																								31 Assumption Three: Building trust in co-opetition is much more difficult due to the existence 
of interdependence. (Details have been examined in section 2.1.3) 
32 Assumption Four: Dividing the interest is difficult due to the interdependence (Details have 
been examined in section 2.1.3) 
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development. In 1998, Jiang visited Japan, and the two governments signed 
the Japan-China Joint Declaration on Building a Partnership of Friendship and 
Cooperation for Peace and Development. (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 
1998a) Some scholars such as Sato (2001) believe that the declaration was a 
last-ditch attempt, and that the true intention behind the signing of the joint 
declaration was the Chinese leadership’s desire to establish some measures 
to stop the downward trend of Sino-Japanese relations.  
Nevertheless, there are three points of note in the declaration. Firstly, 
with deeper interdependence, the Five Principles of Ppeaceful Coexistence 
remained crucial: ‘both sides reaffirmed the principles of mutual respect for 
sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual non-aggression, non-interference in 
each other’s internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit and peaceful 
co-existence.’ (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 1998a:I)  
Secondly, the emergence of cooperative organisations brought a new 
perspective to Sino-Japanese co-opetition. As stated in the declaration, ‘both 
sides believe that stable relations amongst the major nations of the 
Asia-Pacific region are extremely important for the peace and stability of this 
region. Both sides shared the view that they would actively participate in all 
multilateral activities in this region, such as the ASEAN Regional Forum, 
promote coordination and cooperation, and support all measures for 
enhancing understanding and strengthening confidence.’ (Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs of Japan (1998a:II)  
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Thirdly, in the Joint Press announcement of the Joint Declaration, 
energy was especially mentioned: ‘Both sides… shared the view that they will 
further promote cooperation in such areas as the promotion of energy related 
infrastructure development including power plants, the energy conservation 
policy and measures, and the development and use of clean energy…’ 
(Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 1998b:I) This shows that Sino-Japanese 
energy cooperation has reached a turning point towards energy reservation 
and the development of clean alternative energies. However, long-term 
cooperation seems to still be limited to Japanese aid and development rather 
than joint cooperation to handle issues of supply, such as competition over the 
Russian energy market. Thus, all the complicated co-opetition between China 
and Japan illustrates that interdependence on economy is much more stable 
than it is on other aspects, such as technology.  
Then, in the era of Jiang, pure energy cooperation between China 
and Japan for the purpose of economic development ended, but within the 
vision of peaceful coexistence, mutual benefit and common development, 
Sino-Japanese cooperation on energy turned in a new direction, towards 
exploration of new energy and energy storage. 
The final stage has been since 2003. During this period, 
Sino-Japanese energy cooperation has been increased and upgraded. A 
series of multilateral energy cooperation projects have been commenced. For 
example, beginning in 2003, China and Japan signed a series of documents 
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concerning multilateral energy cooperation such as the Joint Declaration on 
the Promotion of Tripartite Cooperation between Japan, the People’s Republic 
of China and the Republic of Korea, signed within the auspices of ASEAN+3, 
in which it was proposed that in terms of cooperation in energy, ‘The three 
countries will expand their mutually beneficial cooperation in the field of energy 
and work together to strengthen regional and global energy security.’ (Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 2003:III)  
The important point here is that these three countries have 
recognised the importance of regional energy security. Any changes in 
relations between the three countries will influence regional or even global 
energy security. In a second trilateral summit meeting in 2009, the three 
countries’ joint declaration states that they will: ‘work closely together and 
spearhead cooperative efforts in international frameworks for energy 
cooperation, aiming to promote sustainable development through deployment 
of clean energy and improvement of energy efficiency.’ (Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs of the People's Republic of China, 2009:para.11) It is clear that the 
focus here is still on new alternative energy and energy saving. Then, in the 
third trilateral summit meeting, which took place in 2010, the countries 
continued to address cooperation on energy, particularly energy efficiency 
(Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 2010), and at a later fifth summit, the 
three parties once again faithfully discussed cooperation on renewable energy, 
concluding that they had reached energy-saving achievements proposed in 
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their second summit, and mentioning that they have supported ‘six programs 
in two phases, covering areas from sewage treatment, new materials and 
disaster prevention to climate change and energy-saving technologies.’ 
(Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 2012:IV) 
In addition, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (2004:para.57) 
reports that in 2004, in the ASEAN+3 energy ministers ‘meeting, proposals 
were made to emphasise strengthening energy cooperation between member 
states. The Qingdao Initiative, a declaration to strengthen energy cooperation, 
was released in the third Asian Cooperation Dialogue (ACD) Foreign Ministers’ 
Meeting of 2004. (Hu, 2004b) In this initiative, the first official documents 
between China and Japan regarding the maintenance of energy security 
through balancing supply and demand were signed. The initiative especially 
emphasises the importance of the Asian energy market, and outlines that 
energy security should be achieved not only through candid dialogue and 
pursuit of mutual benefits, but also as an important aspect of regional and 
global cooperation. (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 2004)  
In 2007, during the first Sino-Japanese Ministerial Energy 
Cooperation Dialogue, China and Japan signed the Joint Declaration on 
Strengthening Bilateral Cooperation of Energy Departments. Both sides stated 
the importance of enhancing cooperation on energy-saving measures and 
alternative and renewable energy, based on the principle of mutual benefit. 
Further to this, the Cebu Declaration on East Asian Energy Security from the 
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Second East Asia summit re-asserts the importance of energy efficiency and 
renewable energy, and especially highlights the importance of collective 
commitment to ensure energy security at the regional level. (Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs of Japan, 2007) The Singapore Declaration on Climate Change, 
Energy and the Environment from the Third Summit aims to develop clean 
energy to reduce emissions, and improve energy efficiency in order to reduce 
the intensification of energy usage. (Office of Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the 
People's Republic of China, 2007) A few years later, the Fukui Declaration on 
Low Carbon Paths to Energy Security: Cooperative Energy Solutions for A 
Sustainable Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation was published at the ninth 
meeting of APEC Energy Ministers in 2010, a meeting in which the APEC 
members discussed the development of energy security in the Asia-Pacific 
area. 
Encouragingly, these cooperative measures have continued up to the 
present day. According to the National Energy Administration of the People's 
Republic of China (2014b) the latest energy ministry meeting of APEC in 2014 
discussed the establishment of a new energy security system, which would 
advocate an open, inclusive, cooperative and sustainable Asia-Pacific energy 
security concept through enhancing the synthesised exploration of crude oil 
and natural gas as well as cooperating on new renewable energy. This kind of 
flexible, inclusive cooperation allows for different conditions in different APEC 
countries, and thus matches the Chinese traditional concept of harmony 
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despite differences. Only by admitting and working around differences can 
states achieve long-term peaceful cooperation and co-existence. 
It can be found that Sino-Japanese cooperation mostly fits the 
framework of multilateral dialogue and organisations, rather than real bilateral 
cooperation, with the sole exception of the Sino-Japanese Ministerial Energy 
Cooperation Dialogue. Over time, the Chinese perspective has been a 
willingness to cooperate with Japan under the tenets of the Five Principles of 
Peaceful Coexistence in Mao’s era through to Hu’s harmonious society and 
peaceful rise. Hehe culture has never been abandoned during this time, 
despite certain rocky stages in the history of the two countries’ cooperation. 
This supports assumption one33 and shows that international organisation 
between two players can push co-opetition, but still cannot replace the role of 
countries.  
However, it seems that one fundamental flaw in bilateral cooperation 
between Japan and China is that efforts have been based on economic 
cooperation rather than the construction of shared interests and common 
viewpoints. In particular, the two countries’ disputes over sovereignty are 
hindering energy cooperation, but it may be that the two countries would 
struggle to find a different, more workable model of co-opetition than one 
based on the economy. The following section will use the model of PARTS to 
																																																								
33Assumption One: International Organisations play an important role due to the 
interdependence in co-opetition, but it still cannot replace the function of states. (Details have 
been examined in section 2.1.3)  
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analyse the concrete conditions of co-opetition in different aspects of 
Sino-Japanese energy cooperation.  
 
4.2 Sino-Japanese Energy Co-Opetition under the 
Model of Game Theory 
4.2.1 Players: Two Fair Symmetrical Opponents 
Two approaches relating to the players in the Sino-Japanese energy game will 
be analysed. The first approach is to discuss players from the angle of power 
and resources. In this regard, and in terms of energy, China and Japan are 
symmetrical powers. As stated in Chapter Two, it is easier for cooperation to 
be achieved between asymmetrical powers. So what is the effect of this power 
symmetry on Sino-Japanese energy co-opetition? 
In order to answer this question, the energy symmetry of these two 
players needs to be investigated more thoroughly; this will demonstrate that 
the symmetry dictates an intense competition between the two powers and 
hinders cooperation. Three factors define the symmetry: the similarity of the 
two countries’ growth in energy demand, the similarity of suppliers and energy 
type demands, and the similarity of energy development strategies. The 
similarity of the two countries’ growth in energy demand is the first factor 
defining the symmetry in power. According to BP (2013b), the primary energy 
consumption in Asia represents 40% of the world total, with China accounting 
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for 21.9% and Japan 3.8%. Although, China uses a far larger proportion than 
Japan, when taking into account the population of China, the symmetry 
between Japan and China is still apparent. China’s imports of crude oil 
reached 239 million tonnes in 2010, with a value of 134.936 billion U.S. dollars. 
(Matsumoto, 2012) Meanwhile, Japan needs to import up to 99% of its oil and 
95% of natural gas. (West, 2014) According to the U.S. Energy Information 
Administration (2013a), oil is the most significant energy resource in Japan, 
making up 45% of total domestic energy consumption. Therefore both China 
and Japan are heavily reliant on oil imports and both are concerned that the 
other is a potential rival in the struggle to secure supplies. The Institute of 
Energy Economics (2004) argues that Japan’s future global energy strategy 
will be determined in large part by the growth of China’s energy consumption 
and demand. In other words, both China and Japan are experiencing 
increasing energy demand and need to find supplies elsewhere, leading to 
direct competition. 
The second factor of energy symmetry is that China and Japan share 
similar principal suppliers and energy type demands. In particular, as 
mentioned previously, both rely heavily on foreign supplies of oil. In 2004, 40% 
of China’s oil and 97.9% of Japan’s oil was imported from abroad. (Snow, 
2005) By 2012, China’s total had risen to 53.8%, with an average 2.8 
percentage point increase each year. (National Bureau of Statistics of the 
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People's Republic of China, 2012) In addition, both China and Japan have 
found a similar profile of suppliers in the world market. 
Figure 7 represents the make-up of Japan’s oil import source 
countries in 2012, and clearly shows that Japan mainly relies on the Middle 
East for oil, making up 79% of total imports. Russia is the second energy 
supplier, followed by Iran. The rest of the world, including Africa, only accounts 
for 17% of the total. This indicates the potential opportunities for Japan to 
cooperate with Africa to increase supplier diversity.  
 
 
 
       Figure 7: Japan’s Crude Oil Imports by Source in 2012 (U.S. Energy 
Information Administration, 2013a:6) 
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Figure 8 is the equivalent pie chart for China in 2013. It can be seen 
that the major direction of imports is similar. Both countries rely on the Middle 
East, though the proportion of Japan’s reliance is greater. Japan’s urgency to 
reduce dependence on the Middle East is therefore greater than China’s. The 
second similarity is that both countries are looking to make energy deals with 
Russia. The largest difference between the two countries is the different 
suppliers outside of the Middle East and Russia, especially China’s growing 
dependence on Africa, which stood at 18% of total imports in 2013. Africa may 
prove a beneficial direction for China’s energy development in the future. (U.S. 
Energy Information Administration, 2013b) However, as Japan is also now 
actively pursuing cooperation with Africa, this undoubtedly increases 
competition between China and Japan. 
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Figure 8: China’s Crude Oil Imports by Source in 2013 (U.S. Energy 
Information Administration, 2013b:11) 
 
Finally, the third factor of energy symmetry is that both China and Japan have 
comparable energy development strategies. Both wish to achieve the goals of 
diversification and clean energy development in order to strengthen 
environmental protection. (METI, 2010; Information Office of the State Council 
of the People’s Republic of China, 2012b) In China’s case, pressure has been 
growing due to increasing consumption rates; for example, in the Eleventh 
Five-Year period from 2006 to 2010, consumption of crude oil rose by an 
average annual growth rate of 8%, 1.7 percentage points higher than the 
planned average growth. The consumption of natural gas has also been 
increasing at breakneck speed, with China becoming the world’s second 
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largest consumer after the U.S. (Li, 2012) Under pressure from these trends, 
with supply not meeting demand, and added challenges from emission 
reduction plans, the Chinese government proposed an acceleration of energy 
diversification to bridge the gap between supply and demand, and to help meet 
emission reduction targets in both the Eleventh and Twelfth Five Year Plans. 
(Information Office of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China, 
2006; Information Office of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China, 
2011)  
Figure 9 shows that Japan is also in the process of modifying its 
suppliers by reducing dependence on the Middle East for crude oil imports, 
with the share of Russia and other countries increasing year on year. 
(International Energy Agency, 2013) This indicates that Japan is focusing its 
efforts on diversifying supply. Further to this, the Japanese government has 
promised to meet the CO2 emission target of reducing 2020 emission levels to 
3.8% lower than 2005 levels, or 3.1% above 1990 levels. (International 
Emissions Trading Association, 2014) In fact, this is far removed from Japan’s 
original plan of reducing emissions by 25% on 1990 levels by 2020. (Japanese 
Ministry of Environment, 2013) Nevertheless, Japan, just like China, is under 
pressure to switch to clean energy usage to meet ambitious targets. Thus, 
both Japan and China are following strategies of energy source diversification 
and clean energy exploration; these strategies are leading to further symmetry 
in terms of energy. 
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Figure 9: Crude Oil Imports by Source (International Energy Agency, 
2013:9) 
 
In short, both players have the same resources and the same requirements. 
According to assumption Five34 China and Japan are unlikely to achieve 
successful cooperation on energy due to this symmetry. In addition, the global 
energy supply system cannot meet growing demand, meaning that suppliers 
are limited and competition from net exporters is intense. As Milner (1997) 
argues, international actors’ concern regarding the influence of cooperation on 
domestic distribution of energy supply is one of the key impediments to 
successful cooperation. In addition, non-renewable sources such as crude oil 
and natural gas have fixed distribution and reserves, meaning that both China 
and Japan hope to occupy as much as possible of these depleting resources. 
As a rising power, China is determined to find its place in the current 
international energy supply system, and will thus inevitably encounter conflict 
with concerned traditional energy importers such as Japan. 																																																								
34Assumption Five: Co-opetition is existed in two asymmetrical players.(Details have been 
examined in section 2.1.3)  
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The deductions in Chapter Two can be applied to consider 
Sino-Japanese relations in terms of game theory. China is P, and is at level xP, 
while Japan is Q and at level xQ, and (Q>/P+1). In the allocation of the Asian 
energy market, the amount of imports is fixed. Thus, according to the payoff 
matrix shown in Table 11, China and Japan will not achieve cooperation; as 
both players want to obtain the largest interest, both will chose defection.  
 
  Table 11: Payoff Matrices for Energy Allocation in the Asian Energy Market 
 Q C (Cooperation) Q D (Defection) 
P C (Cooperation) (4,4) (1,5) 
P D (Defection) (5,1) (2,2) 
        
Whether cooperation on energy exploration in the East China Sea will succeed 
is a different payoff, and it depends on how the two players view energy – as a 
private good or as a public good. Both China and Japan deem energy to be a 
private good and thus focus on how to obtain the largest possible interest. As 
we know, oil imports into the Asian market are at a fixed level, so both China 
and Japan hope to explore potential energy reserves in the East China Sea to 
increase their supplies. The total outcome of exploring the East China Sea is b, 
the cost of exploration is c, and b>c. 
Table 12: Payoff Matrices for Exploring East China Sea Energy 
 China (Explores) China (Does not 
explore) 
Japan (Explores) (b-2c, b-2c)* (b-c, -c) 
Japan (Does not explore) (-c, b-c) (0, 0) 
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It can be found that the Nash equilibrium occurs when both China and Japan 
take action and the payoff of both parties is at b-2c. However, both want to 
obtain a payoff of b-c, which represents the largest interest for both, leading to 
the failure of cooperation on joint development. As a result, as the two players 
deem energy a private good, efforts at cooperation will fail. In other words, the 
joint exploration will be difficult.  
The second approach to the players in the Sino-Japanese game is 
related to how many players are in the game. The original two-player 
Sino-Japanese game is extended to at least three players, reflecting the 
existence of a complex range of players with complicated interests. This can 
include the United States’ plan to re-assert influence in the Asia-Pacific, 
Russia’s ambitions for the Northeast Asian market, and struggles in the energy 
supply market. With the intervention of the United States and Russia, the 
game of Sino-Japanese co-opetition is even more complex.  
In terms of a third player, the major dispute between China and Japan 
is the Russian Far East energy market, particularly in terms of laying pipelines. 
In Chapter Five, which discusses Sino-Russian energy co-opetition, the issue 
of pipelines will be investigated at length again, but from the Sino-Russian 
perspective. Originally, China and Russia had agreed to construct the 
Angarsk-Daqing Line, which would have been 2400 km in length and would 
have cost Russia $1.7 billion, with China providing 50% of the funding through 
loans. If Japan had agreed to cooperate on the building of this pipeline, the 
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players could have shared the construction and management costs and oil 
revenues. However, due to their fear that China would pose an even greater 
threat to Japan in the Asian energy market after completion of the pipeline, the 
Japanese proposed a different 3765 km line from Angarsk to Nakhodka, with 
all of the cost – nearly $5 billion – borne by Japan. The final outcome was the 
decision that the pipeline would serve both China and Japan, and that not only 
would Japan provide the $5 billion, but China would also put in $12 billion in 
loans for the project. (Vassiliouk, 2008) In terms of numbers, there are only 
three players in the game: China, Japan and Russia. It can be seen that no 
matter what approach Russia takes to the cooperation, it will obtain the largest 
interest, and that Sino-Japanese cooperation involves the smallest investment 
and largest interest for Russia. In other words, the intense competition 
between the two sides can create increased revenue for third parties, but the 
original two players do not obtain more gains. 
 
4.2.2 Added Value within a Lower Degree of Complementarity 
The degree of complementarity, R, is an indicator of added value and it is 
currently relatively low between China and Japan in terms of energy imports. 
Solving energy security through increasing energy supply includes two 
aspects – increasing energy imports and improving technology to increase the 
exploration of new alternative energy. In terms of cooperation on energy 
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imports, in the formula P=(X+Y+RXY), where P represents common interest, R 
is small, even close to zero, because of the high similarity of China and 
Japan’s energy strategy. The lower the value of R, the smaller the common 
interest P will be. Thus, with less common interest, it will be difficult to achieve 
cooperation. 
Although complementarity in terms of energy imports is low, 
economic complementarity is higher. The end of China and Japan’s energy 
trade did not have a major overall effect on economic cooperation, which 
continued to grow rapidly. (Yu et al., 2010) Thus, the higher degree of 
economic complementarity cannot be denied; in the Sino-Japanese context, 
economic cooperation is a significant driver of energy cooperation, but only in 
terms of renewable, clean energy and energy reservation. According to Stern 
(2003), the relation between energy demand and economic growth present a 
positive correlation. In other words, energy demand and economic 
development grow in sync. China’s energy development confirms this pattern, 
as energy demand has been increasing in step with the economic indicator of 
GNP. (Yin and Wang, 2011) Further to this, as Chi-Hung (2004) states, China 
and Japan’s economic conditions make a good match for cooperation due to 
their mutual complementarity. Japan has abundant finance and needs to 
continue focusing on developing intra-industry trade, but is limited in terms of 
land and labour. (Porter, 2011; Lincoln, 2000) Pomeranz (2000) compares this 
with China, which instead has vast land space, a highly labour-intensive 
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economy, and an urgent need for investment, producing conditions of 
complementarity. However, with increasing labour costs in China, it may be 
that China’s labour advantage disappears, reducing the degree of 
complementarity and triggering further failure in energy cooperation. Liu and 
Wang (2011) counter that increasing labour costs in China will not catch up 
with the fast growing GDP and labour efficiency, so China is unlikely to lose 
this competitive advantage any time soon. Thus, both China and Japan could 
benefit from this long-term complementarity by resolving Japan’s land and 
labour issues through the location of overseas plants in China. 
In conclusion, the degree of complementarity on energy importingis 
unlikely to facilitate Sino-Japanese cooperation, whereas economic 
complementarity may be somewhat conducive to cooperation, at least in terms 
of the exchange of advanced technology to solve issues of energy security. 
 
4.2.3 Rules: Difficulty in Establishing Commitment 
In terms of rules, two aspects may guarantee successful cooperation: the 
establishment of commitment and the establishment of reciprocity. In Chapter 
Two, it was discovered that repeat games can increase commitment. In other 
words, the regular meeting of countries can play a significant role in 
establishing commitment. For instance, on April 11th 2007, the Sino-Japanese 
Joint Press was released. As The Central People's Government of the 
People's Republic of China (2006) states, the two countries confirmed their 
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win-win cooperation agreement and consensus on building peace, cooperation 
and friendship across the East China Sea. This statement mentioned peaceful 
cooperation on the East China Sea marking a first step in establishing 
commitment. In addition, as an interim arrangement before the final 
delimitation, both of the parties had the responsibility of exploring and 
protecting this area based on the principle of reciprocity. (The Central People's 
Government of the People's Republic of China, 2006) In the Foreign Ministry 
Spokesman Qin Gang’s regular press conference, he responded to questions 
about the East China Sea by stating that the joint development was based on a 
disputed area of sea, not the area that are currently being unilaterally explored 
by China, and as a result China will not stop exploration of these oilfields. 
(Office of Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of China, 2007)  
Later, in December 2007 at the First Japan-China High-Level 
Economic Dialogue meeting, energy was discussed again. As the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs of Japan (2007) stated, both sides are committed to 
cooperation in specific areas, such as energy conservation and environmental 
protection. This meeting is the extension of the Sino-Japanese Joint Press, but 
also touches upon the issue of the sensitive East China Sea and focuses on 
the topic of joint development on new energy and energy reservation. 
In order to establish long-term commitment, a condition of positive tit 
for tat is vital, so that positive actions encourage subsequent positive actions. 
In 2007, China became Japan’s largest economy partner and in 2009, bilateral 
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trade reached $232.18 billion. (Zhnag, 2010) In 2008, Hu Jintao visited Japan, 
and issued the Joint Statement between the Government of Japan and the 
Government of the People’s Republic of China on Comprehensive Promotion 
of a Mutually Beneficial Relationship Based on Common Strategic Interests. 
As Xinhua News Agency (2008) reports, the two sides declared their intention 
to increase mutual trust in politics by establishing a mechanism for the periodic 
exchange of visits by the leaders of the two countries. 
This atmosphere of cooperation faltered dramatically in 2012 when 
conflict over the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands intensified. The Japanese 
government unilaterally announced the nationalisation of the islands, claiming 
they had been legitimately purchased; a move which was met with outrage in 
China. This conflict has left a rift in Sino-Japanese relations which leaves 
many unanswered questions regarding East China Sea cooperation. (Xinhua 
News Agency, 2012c) Japanese actions are deemed by China to be a serious 
betrayal to which China had no choice but to respond. The Chinese 
government drafted a white paper to solemnly denounce Japan’s behaviour. 
(Information Office of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China, 
2012a) Meanwhile, trade between the two states dropped by 43%. (Wang, 
2014) 
The second aspect relating to rules is reciprocity. The documents 
from recent meetings and official speeches almost always mention the concept 
of reciprocity. From the first Joint Communiqué in 1972 to the latest joint 
		 217	
statement in 2008, each have used the term reciprocal. For example, in the 
first Sino-Japanese Ministerial Energy Cooperation Dialogue, the two parties 
signed a joint press statement in order to implement a reciprocal large-scale 
exchange programme on saving energy, alternative energy and new energy 
exploration. (The Central People's Government of the People's Republic of 
China, 2007) The Sixth Japan-China Energy Conversation Forum also clearly 
outlines the plan to achieve reciprocity: 
When promoting Japan-China cooperation in the fields of energy 
conservation and energy, enhancement of business between the countries 
would be the most realistic strategy to realise improvements in energy 
conservation and environmental fields through the diffusion of Japan’s 
advanced technology in China’s enormous market in particular. Based on this 
idea, concerned parties of considerable influence in these fields from both 
countries will meet together so as to increase specific business and 
cooperation opportunities through improvement of mutual understanding. 
(METI, 2011) 
        In conclusion, reciprocity has always been advocated in 
Sino-Japanese energy cooperation, and has been brought up at every 
Sino-Japanese bilateral meeting. Unfortunately, commitment and reciprocity 
cannot be established through a repeat game in joint development and 
exploration because the Chinese government deems Japan’s actions a 
betrayal, which has upset the chance of positive tit-for-tat in the repeat game 
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scenario. In other words, in terms of the assumption seven35, it is difficult for 
China and Japan to establish and adhere to commitments, even if there are 
attempts at reciprocity. Nevertheless, although cooperation is out of the picture 
in terms of joint exploration of areas with disputed territory, it can be said that 
cooperation is still possible in other areas, such as in aspects of energy 
supply. 
 
4.2.4 Tactics: Play Tough or Compromise 
Current Sino-Japanese energy cooperation focuses on three aspects. The first 
is advanced energy-saving technology. The first time China officially 
mentioned energy conservation was in 2004, but Japan has been paying 
attention to this issue since the 1970s, establishing the Energy Conservation 
Law in 1979. (Nishiyama, 2013) By the end of 1982, the total output capacity of 
nuclear power generation equipment was 12.3% and nuclear power installed 
capacity was 9.2% of the world total, after the United States, France and the 
Soviet Union. Due to the implementation of its energy-saving plan, Japan’s 
dependence on foreign oil dropped sharply by 51.8% after the two oil crises. 
(Wang, 2012b) 
However, the outlook for energy-saving in China is less positive. 
According to the National Bureau of Statistics of the People's Republic of 																																																								
35 Assumption Seven: Establishing commitment and reciprocity help achieve co-opetition. 
(Details have been examined in section 2.1.3) 
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China (2006), from 2000 to 2006, GDP increased at a high speed, but the 
efficiency of energy utilisation 36  decreased year on year. Although this 
problem showed signs of slight improvement after 2008, there are still 
significant levels of waste. (National Bureau of Statistics of the People's 
Republic of China, 2012) As Deng (2007) explains, this kind of trend 
demonstrates that the Chinese economic growth model is characterised by 
high and extensive consumption levels, leading to intense energy demand and 
serious environmental pollution. As a result of this situation, the Chinese 
government put forward propositions for saving energy and improving energy 
efficiency in the 11th Five Year Plan. Japan is able to extend an olive branch by 
cooperating with China on this issue, which is extremely helpful for China’s 
energy-saving strategy. For instance, in the Sixth Japan-China Energy 
Conservation Forum, 51 projects on energy conservation were agreed, the 
largest number to date. (METI, 2011) 
The second area of cooperation is the energy reservation system. 
Japan’s strategic petroleum reserves system is fairly complete. It was 
established in the early 1970s and after the introduction of the Petroleum 
Reserve Law, the government and private companies were compelled to 
reserve oil. (Nishiyama, 2013) On the other hand, the government of China 
only began to focus on the importance of energy reserves in 2001. Therefore, 
under equivalent circumstances, the Japanese government can supply 92 
																																																								
36 Efficiency of energy utilisation is indicated by GDP/total energy consumption. 
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days of oil and private enterprises can support an additional 79 days, totalling 
171 days, whereas China can only guarantee 21.6 days of reserve oil supply. 
(Zha, 2004) 
To counter this instability, in the Eleventh Five-Year Plan the Chinese 
government proposed the development of strategic energy reserves. 
(Information Office of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China, 
2006) Even if this plan is successfully implemented, by 2020 China’s energy 
reserves will only hold 90 days’ usage, which is the lowest IEA reserves 
requirement. (Jiang and Luo, 2012) In other words, China still has a long way 
to go in terms of energy reserves. Thus, as Harrell (2013) illustrates, various 
Japanese companies such as Hitachi, a leader in energy-saving and 
environmental technologies, are involved in joint management and design of 
model projects under way in cities such as Kunming, Ningbo, Dalian and 
Chongqing. 
The third aspect is cooperation on the Clean Development 
Mechanism and environmental protection. According to the U.S. Energy 
Information Administration (2013a:1), ‘Japan is one of the major exporters of 
energy-sector capital equipment, and has a strong energy research and 
development (R&D) program supported by the government. This program 
pursues energy efficiency measures domestically in order to increase the 
country’s energy security and reduce carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions.’ Thus, 
Japan’s Clean Development Mechanism is fairly mature. On the other hand, 
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current typical Chinese energy sources involve combustion, which releases 
large amounts of CO2, leading to a series of environmental problems. 
Furthermore, due to the increasing pressure from international society on 
emissions reduction, China has no choice but to take steps towards reduction 
and actively find new sources of alternative energy. Thus, according to the 
Xinhua News Agency (2007), China is keen to strengthen cooperation on 
sustainable development in order to build a resource-saving and 
environmentally-friendly country by learning from Japan. In 2007, the Chinese 
and Japanese governments published the Joint Communiqué on The 
Promotion of Cooperation in the Field of Environment and Energy which hoped 
to focus on cooperation on new clean energy. (The Central People's 
Government of the People's Republic of China, 2007)  
Within game theory, this pattern is in accordance with the 
evolutionarily stable strategy in the Hawk-Dove game. In the cooperation on 
the three aspects outlined above, the two sides are clearly not evenly matched 
and possess asymmetrical resources. In the game, the resource that China 
can obtain is x, and so Japan can obtain 1-x, and 0.5<x<1. The conflict cost is 
C, which represents the two sides following different strategies (dove or hawk) 
and the cooperative cost is V, where both sides follow the same strategy (both 
dove or both hawk), and b represents common interest. The premise of the 
Hawk-Dove Game is C>V (because Japan’s help with supplying technology to 
China can allow China to obtain more interest than before). 
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(1) When C>V and both China and Japan choose the hawk strategy, 
the payoff for Japan is b(1-x)(v-c), while China can obtain bx(v-c) and the total 
payoff is b(v-c) 
(2) When C>V and both China and Japan choose the dove strategy, 
Japan’s payoff is xv while China’s (1-x)v 
Table 13: Payoff Matrices for the Asymmetric Hawk-Dove Game (Liu 
et al., 2012) 
Strategy China (Dove) China (Hawk) 
Japan (Dove) (xv,(1-x)v) (0,v) 
Japan (Hawk) (v,0) b(1-x)(v-c), bx(v-c)) 
 
Looking at China’s payoff, it can be found that the lowest payoff is when both 
China and Japan choose the hawk strategy, and the largest payoff is when 
China alone follows a hawk strategy. Japan would also choose to follow a 
hawk strategy because, when China chooses to act as a dove, Japan’s payoff 
from choosing the dove strategy is smaller than choosing hawk. That is to say, 
both of the two players would want to become a hawk, and thus the payoff is 
lowest.  
In fact, as cooperation in these three aspects is successfully in 
progress, it suggests that where China plays the hawk, Japan has chosen to 
take the dove strategy in the game. In other words, deeper factors influence 
the outcome, including various external factors. Firstly there is the high degree 
of economic complementarity. Japan can obtain more benefit in economic 
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pursuits and thus Japan is willing to be the dove in this game of cooperation. 
Secondly, the transfer of energy-saving technology is not only beneficial for 
China, but it is also beneficial for Japan. Japan imparts its energy-saving 
technology to China, which means that China’s energy consumption per unit is 
reduced. The demand for global energy supplies will therefore be reduced 
which means Japan can acquire a greater share. Furthermore, emissions 
problems are not bound by territory and can easily affect neighbouring 
countries, such as Japan and South Korea in the case of China. (Choi, 2009) 
That is to say, cooperation on transferring technology to China will contribute 
to resolving China’s environmental protection, which will be beneficial for 
Japan and other nearby countries. 
Thus, Japan is helping China by cooperating on energy-saving 
measures, reserves, and environmental protection in large part due to the two 
states’ significant economic complementarity. This outcome is the result of an 
evolutionary strategy, but in terms of cooperation on energy supply, 
particularly the issue of exploration in the East China Sea, Japan is not content 
to concede to playing a dove in the game. 
On the surface, Sino-Japanese energy co-opetition is a two-player 
game between China and Japan, but in fact, as mentioned previously, located 
within the context of international society, it becomes a finite dynamic 
non-cooperative game, and its complexity cannot be clearly explained by a 
model or an algorithm. This complex game is described as finite because the 
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players’ strategies are limited, more or less restricted to war, peace and 
toleration. It is said to be dynamic because of the constant flow of domestic 
and international political and economic issues which directly affect the 
outcome. In addition, the game is non-cooperative because both parties want 
to obtain the largest relative gains rather than absolute gains. In addition, the 
game is a complex multiplayer game due to the fact that since the initial 
minimum of two players, the United States and Taiwan have also been 
inextricably incorporated. (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Republic of China 
(Twaiwan), 2013) For political reasons there is some dispute as to whether 
Taiwan should be considered a separate country in the game, but for the 
purposes of this study, Taiwan has certainly been an active and separate 
player, and therefore can be considered as such. In such a complicated game 
with asymmetrical information, the static method of using a mathematical 
game theory approach cannot arrive at a win-win solution. Therefore the case 
of Sino-Japanese energy co-opetition must also call on basic ideological 
theory to consider possible strategies of joint development. 
The traditional Chinese stance proposes ‘harmony is most valuable 
and what you do not want done to yourself, do not do to others.’ (Confucius, 
1998:XV) While the new military white paper mentioned that China would not 
attack unless it was attacked, but it will surely counterattack if attacked. 
(Information Office of the State Council of the People's Republic of China, 
2015) Thus, taking into account the agreements for shelving disputes and 
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engaging in joint development signed in 1978 and in 2007, and the fact that the 
joint development would continue to be pursued in the long-term, the Chinese 
government believes that Japan took advantage of China’s hope for peaceful 
cooperation in the face of disputes, and aggressively nationalised the 
Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands in 2012. Nevertheless, still pursuing the benefits of 
long-term cooperation, the Chinese government took no action beyond issuing 
an official warning to Japan, and is still pursuing joint development 
opportunities.  
Yet the Information Office of the State Council of the People’s 
Republic of China (2012a:V) states that Japan’s nationalisation of the islands 
has ‘not only seriously damaged China-Japan relations, but also rejected and 
challenged the outcomes of the victory of the World Anti-Fascist War.’ The use 
of the term Anti-Fascist War is a strong indicator of China’s historical position 
towards Japan. Further to this, ‘the Chinese government has taken active and 
forceful measures such as issuing diplomatic statements, making serious 
representations with Japan and submitting notes of protest to the United 
Nations, solemnly stating China’s consistent proposition, principle and position, 
firmly upholding China's territorial sovereignty and maritime rights and 
interests, and earnestly protecting the safety of life and property of Chinese 
citizens.’ (Information Office of the State Council of the People’s Republic of 
China, 2012a:V)  
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According to this statement, up until this point, the Chinese 
government has still expected to use peaceful solutions to solve the territorial 
dispute, and at the very least to maintain enough peace to allow normal joint 
development. However, China was angered by what was seen as continuous 
Japanese provocation on issues of sovereignty like, for example, on 14th 
September 2012, six Japanese patrol boats roamed within 12 miles of the 
islands. Furthermore, in a Japanese newspaper, U.S. President Obama was 
reported to claim that ‘the bilateral security treaty that obligates America to 
come to Japan's defence applies to the island disputes between Japan and 
China.’ He opposes ‘unilateral attempts to undermine Japan’s administration 
of these islands.’ (Benderich, 2014:para.4) These actions triggered the 
Chinese government to send out strong signals to lay claim to the 
Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands. For instance, the foreign ministry spokesman Gang 
Qin (2013:para.8) declared that ‘the U.S. should respect facts, take a 
responsible attitude, remain committed to not taking sides on territory and 
sovereignty issues, speak and act cautiously, and earnestly play a constructive 
role in regional peace and stability.’ On 2nd August 2014, Gang Qin argued that 
China has named all its subsidiary islands, which included the Diaoyu Islands, 
and stated that Japan’s naming of the islands is invalid. (Qin, 2014) Following 
this, on 11th September, the foreign ministry spokesman Chunying Hua 
reaffirmed that none of Japan’s actions could cause China to feel threatened. 
(Hua, 2014) All of these examples show that the Chinese government’s 
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attitude is tending towards hawkishness, although the government does state 
that it welcomes peaceful methods to resolve the dispute. 
The game in the Diaoyu/Senkaku Island mirrors the experience of 
Mao Zedong’s nuclear blackmail. Just as in the Hawk-Dove game of Mao’s 
nuclear blackmail, no matter which strategy Japan chose, China insisted on 
the hawk strategy. As the two sides continuously run into serious differences, 
concession cannot lead to cooperation. Building up national strength thus 
becomes the most rational tactic for both sides, rather than being forced to 
concede in recurring disputes. However, this attitude does not sit well with the 
peaceful coexistence espoused in Hehe culture, which may prevent China 
from becoming too hawkish. 
Faced with this dilemma, increasing the number of players in the 
game can help to broker responsibility, but with the pre-condition that 
conceding sovereignty will be unlikely to occur, and only relevant players can 
join. Taiwan is an appropriate player which means that involving Taiwan in 
joint development may be beneficial. Geologically, the Diaoyu/Senkaku 
Islands are an extension of the Datun Hills of Taiwan (Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs of Republic of China (Twaiwan), 2013) and the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands 
were considered sovereign territory in the Ming and Qing dynasties, 
predecessors to the current Taiwanese government. (State Council of 
Information Office, 2012) From historical and geographical perspectives, 
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Taiwan (or rather the Republic of China) has a strong claim to the islands and 
would therefore be a useful choice of additional player in the game. 
However, due to the difficulty in pinning down Japan on this issue, 
this situation would require China to extend equivalent rights to Taiwan on the 
islands, such as joint oil and gas exploration or working together to protect the 
marine environment. However, as Japan was the first to offer an olive branch 
to Taiwan, cooperation has become more difficult. In April 2013, Japan and 
Taipei signed fishing agreements regarding the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands 
region. (Hsiu-Chuan, 2013) Under these agreements, Japan will allow 
Taiwanese fishing boats in the islands’ exclusive economic zone. China is 
therefore left with the option of focusing on relations with Taiwan, and 
persuading Taiwan that they have the right to fish in the territory without 
requiring Japanese permission to do so. 
In conclusion, with reference to the assumption eight37, the tactics 
between China and Japan are finite and complex; pure dependence on the 
tenets of Hehe culture strategy cannot do enough to bolster cooperation as 
following a hawk strategy in the game is the ultimate choice for both sides in 
overall Sino-Japanese energy cooperation. If bilateral cooperation cannot help 
China and Japan with shared energy security, do trilateral and mutual regimes 
offer a solution?   
 																																																								
37 Assumption Eight: Tactic in co-opetition is decided by states (Details have been 
examined in section 2.1.3) 
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4.2.5 Scope: A New Mutual Cooperation Mechanism 
The scope for successful Sino-Japanese energy cooperation seems to be 
limited to the establishment of a mutually cooperative regime for regional 
energy security. In terms of the establishment of an Asian energy mechanism, 
according to Japan’s Institute of Energy Economics (2004), in order to protect 
its long-term energy security, Japan should focus on the establishment of a 
stable international energy mechanism, based on a multilateral framework, 
and in particular, aim to consolidate the relations between Japan and other 
Asian energy consumers. This demonstrates that Japan has the will to 
cooperate with other countries in building an energy mechanism. At the third 
ASEAN+3 energy ministry summit, the construction of regional cooperation 
measures to handle regional energy security was proposed. (The Central 
People's Government of the People's Republic of China, 2009) The most 
recent energy meeting of APEC also advocated regional cooperation to 
contribute to energy security in the Asia-Pacific area. (Zhang, 2014) However, 
Japan’s actions in this respect appear to differ from its words. According to Wu 
(2005), Japan’s strategy in building an East Asian energy community seems to 
have been a policy of dialogue with inhibitions, which is to say promoting 
regional cooperation on the one hand, but attempting to forestall China’s 
development on the other, in order to reduce perceived threats. 
Why can establishing a mutual cooperation mechanism contribute to 
regional energy security? The first key factor is the importance of regional 
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energy security to ensure continuing stable supplies. China and Japan are 
closely located and share similar energy suppliers and energy type demands, 
and it is useful for both to explore nearby resources to ensure greater energy 
security. The U.S. Energy Information Administration (2012) estimates that the 
East China Sea has between 60 and 100 million barrels of oil and between 1 
and 2 trillion cubic feet of gas in proven and probable reserves. China and 
Japan have also carried out research on the East China Sea, and establishing 
consensus on joint exploration can resolve a catalogue of problems in one fell 
swoop. 
The second reason behind the importance of cooperation is that 
cooperation can secure energy transportation, particularly in terms of 
maintaining security of key transport channels such as the Malacca Strait. 
According to Luft and Korin (2004), in the year 2003 alone, 42% of global 
pirate attacks occurred in this infamous 500-mile-long strip dividing Indonesia 
and Malaysia. Despite the constant risk to maritime transport, China and 
Japan have no choice but to rely on shipping energy resources through the 
Strait: ‘oil imports passing through the Straits of Malacca from the Middle East 
to Asia account for one-third of the total oil trade volume in the world.’ 
(Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation, 2009:53) In fact, for Japan and China, 
this proportion is even higher. According to Zhang (2005), 80% of Japanese oil 
imports must be transported via the Malacca Strait, while China’s figure is 
even higher at 85%. By 2011, this had risen to 90% for Japan, indicating that 
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Japan’s energy transport is in a precarious situation. (Yin, 2012) Therefore, 
cooperation between China and Japan can maintain the security of maritime 
transport; both will benefit from a stable and secure supply of energy. 
The third area of regional cooperation is energy mechanisms to 
resolve the issue of the Asia premium. According to Doshi and D’Souza (2011), 
Asian importers of oil from the Middle East pay an average of $0.94 more per 
barrel than European countries, and more than $1 more than the United States. 
For Japan, increases in oil prices cause serious problems for small enterprises. 
(Ding, 2009) Furthermore, if oil prices rose by one U.S. dollar per unit, the cost 
of China’s oil imports would increase by $1 billion annually. In 2005, because 
of rising oil prices, China had to pay over $15 billion more than in 2004. (Jiang 
and Zhang, 2007) As they continually point out, in 2003, 46.1% of OPEC crude 
oil was sold to Asia-Pacific countries, and Japan purchased 19.7% of the total, 
but this did not bring any discount to Asian countries. Jiang and Zhang go on 
to argue that if China and Japan work together, for example by joint bargaining 
over Middle Eastern oil imports, they may be powerful enough to influence oil 
prices. 
This situation resulted in the Qingdao Initiative, which aimed to 
encourage Asian countries to promote fair energy price cooperation between 
energy-consuming and energy-producing countries. (Hu, 2004b) Although the 
issue of the Asia premium has been discussed at the Boao Asia Energy Forum 
and the ASEAN +3 forum, a consensus for its resolution is yet to be reached.  
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Regional energy security therefore relies on the establishment of 
mutually cooperative mechanisms regarding energy to reduce dependence on 
energy supply through establishing commitment (the Sino-Japanese bilateral 
establishment of commitment has resulted in failure as shown in Section 
4.2.3). 
If it is assumed that only China and Japan are in the system, the 
stock of overseas oil resources is R, and China’s dependence on foreign oil is 
D, China will need to import oil from elsewhere to the amount of DR. Japan is 
left with access to the amount of foreign oil (1-D) R. As overseas oil resources 
R are finite, the only way for Japan to have freer access to more oil is for D to 
be reduced. Otherwise, if China increases its own imports, D will increase, 
whereas Japan’s access to imports may decrease. 
Consequently, it can be concluded that both sides would benefit from 
reducing the impact of D and alleviating the negative relationship of mutual 
restraint. Reducing the impact of D would require the establishment of 
long-term commitments, because without trust slight changes in D increase 
anxiety and may trigger preventive or damaging strategies which waylay 
attempts at cooperation. 
APEC could be a possible choice of mutual cooperation regime to 
assist Sino-Japanese energy cooperation. In fact, the United States can 
significantly influence cooperation between China and Japan, and may 
present another stumbling block in Sino-Japanese cooperation. As Kelly (2005) 
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mentions, Japan’s external relations are affected by the Japanese alliance with 
the USA, as this alliance is the cornerstone of Japan’s diplomacy. According to 
Buzan (2010), the deterioration in Sino-Japanese relations has brought great 
benefits to the superpower status of the United States in Asia. During the time 
that Japan announced the nationalisation of the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands, 
Japan's prime minister visited the United States, calling for strengthening of 
the US-Japan alliance. (Klingner, 2013) In addition, the Obama administration 
also promised to guard the security of the islands. As Sieg and Spetalnick 
(2014) explain, this reveals that the U.S. is pursuing a return to Asia strategy, 
meaning that both the U.S and Japan are strengthening security procedures. 
As a result, the energy competition between China and Japan can be seen to 
some extent as an indirect contest between China and the United States. Thus, 
with regard to the assumption nine38, putting Sino-Japanese cooperation 
under this kind of mutual mechanism is perhaps not a wise move. 
In conclusion, due to inferior domestic energy resources, Japan has 
to constantly locate energy imports from overseas markets. Meanwhile, with 
China and Japan located close to each other in Asia, sharing a similar energy 
import profile and future energy strategies, there is a strong likelihood of 
intense competition in the Asian energy market. Despite relatively little energy 
complementarity, the two sides do enjoy economic complementarity, which 
can spill over into cooperation on energy, particularly in terms of establishing 																																																								
38 Assumption Nine: Co-opetition requires step-by-step supervision from the international 
organisations. (Details have been discussed in section 2.1.3) 
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energy reserve systems, improving energy conservation and developing new 
clean energy alternatives, as well as joint bargaining to reduce the Asian 
premium on oil imports. The difficulties the two parties share in establishing 
commitment dictate that cooperation cannot exist in bilateral cooperation. 
Cooperation between China and Japan is, however, not impossible; a 
critical factor is the establishment of a clear framework for energy organisation. 
In other words, in assumptions one and nine, international organisation can 
help supervise co-opetition but cannot replace the position of a state. For 
success in Sino-Japanese energy cooperation, it would be beneficial to 
sidestep APEC, which contains too many alternative players and runs the risk 
of interference from third parties. By establishing a separate East Asian energy 
agency, the two sides can involve only those most pertinent players and 
thereby reduce uncertainty. Within such a mechanism, the two sides can 
maintain their distinct nature whilst demonstrating respect for each other’s 
equal development and constructing conditions of peaceful coexistence. In 
particular, establishing a joint energy reservation mechanism can help both 
sides make a timely response to any energy crisis. The two sides could also 
pool their strengths to supply foreign aid and thereby change the face of their 
energy development. 
In all, the strategy of the two countries’ co-opetition is based mainly 
on competition with minimal cooperation, and a clear future direction is the 
attempt to establish a mechanism for East Asian energy. In addition to this, if 
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the East China Sea issue is framed within the mechanism, it would be in 
China’s best interests to bring in Taiwan and maximise potential Taiwanese 
advantage, as this would be one of the best strategies to ensure a win-win 
outcome for all. 
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Chapter Five: A Case Study of 
Sino-Russian Co-opetition on Energy 		
Chapter Four examined how co-opetition plays an important role in 
Sino-Japanese energy relations, clearly demonstrating that China and Japan 
are likely to cooperate on emissions reductions and the development of new 
clean energy. However, as any cooperation between the two states is built on 
the premise of economic complementarity, co-opetition becomes unstable 
whenever this complementarity of economic interests decreases. The chapter 
also explained how cooperation cannot exist for energy imports and joint 
exploration. In terms of energy, China and Japan are symmetrical powers, and 
both share the perspective that energy is a private good. As both sides strive 
for relative gain rather than absolute gain, it is difficult for cooperation to exist. 
Further to this, considering the existing dispute in the East China Sea, 
establishing bilateral commitment is difficult, and multilateral regimes seem to 
offer a more feasible solution. However, the intrusion of powerful third states 
such as the U.S. or Russia could adversely influence the outcome of 
co-opetitive efforts. To sum up, Sino-Japanese energy competition is 
struggling to get off the ground. 
Compared with this, co-opetition between China and Russia is a 
different matter. Sino-Russian co-opetition is extremely complex, in large part 
due to the shared geographical and historical experiences of these two great 
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powers. Nevertheless, Russia remains an important energy supplier for China. 
Unlike with Japan, cooperation between Russia and China has not become so 
difficult over time, thanks to the two states’ complementary geopolitical 
advantages. Even so, the development of Sino-Russian energy relations has 
been a long-winded and difficult process. 
During this process, China has managed to negotiate a series of 
issues with Russia regarding energy, including energy prices, the annual 
amount of energy supply, additional energy transport fees, and even how to go 
about laying pipelines. Importantly, though, when attempting to engage in 
cooperation with Russia, it is not enough for China to only take pure 
investments and the establishment of infrastructure into consideration; the 
Russian Federation’s national strategy puts realistic national interests at the 
forefront of all decisions, and this must also be taken into account. China and 
Russia are far more equal partners, though it could be said that in terms of 
energy, Russia holds the absolute advantage. 
As a result, from a Chinese perspective, there are certain limitations 
to the potential of Sino-Russian co-opetition. However, this does not mean that 
co-opetition is out of the realms of possibility, and indeed the pace of 
cooperation has sped up since 2012. This chapter will discuss the specific 
application of Sino-Russian energy co-opetition, divided into two main sections. 
The first section will introduce the importance of Russian energy from the 
perspective of China’s energy security, analysing Russian energy conditions, 
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and how these factors influence China’s own energy security. The second 
section will move on to discuss the historical progress and specific 
development of Sino-Russian co-opetition. Finally, this chapter will analyse 
Sino-Russian energy co-opetition using the PARTS model of game theory.  
 
5.1 Russia and China: New Relations for Old 
Comrades 
Russian energy is of significant importance to China due to the two states’ 
geopolitical relations and the abundance of Russian reserves which can help 
ease China’s energy security. Access to Russia’s reserves will go some way to 
resolving the principal problem plaguing China’s energy security – supply 
cannot meet demand – as importing from Russia can provide a large amount 
of supplies in addition to greater import diversification. In addition, importing 
from Russia across land can offset another aspect of China’s energy security, 
by reducing the security risk of reliance on maritime transportation. There is no 
doubt that Russian energy is of primary importance to China and presents a 
useful future direction for development. 
China and Russia have been described here as old comrades with 
new relations due to the historical development of the Soviet Union, and later 
Russia, with China. Their relations will be discussed in greater detail in Section 
5.1.2. The Soviet Union of course included other countries in addition to what 
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is now Russia, but it is only Russia that has inherited the formal status of the 
former Soviet Union, including, for example, the permanent seat on the UN 
Security Council. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Sino-Russian 
cooperation on energy recommenced at a new starting point, but Russia’s 
comprehensive national strength had been significantly reduced by the inner 
turmoil. (Yan, 2006) At that time, international oil prices continued on a 
seemingly unstoppable ascent, hinting at the potential power behind the 
possession of energy reserves. Due to this combination of circumstances, 
Russia changed its energy strategy, and according to Hill (2004), has 
transformed itself from a now-defunct military superpower to a new energy 
superpower. In order to maintain its status as a superpower, Russia has 
harnessed its vast energy reserves as its most effective approach. (Goldthau, 
2008) Thus, within the Russian National Energy Strategy up to 2020, the 
objective for 2006-2010 was to accelerate the development of new energy 
resources and explore new markets, and the objective for 2011-2020 was to 
reform the energy transport infrastructure in the regions of Europe and Asia, 
develop international energy and transport systems, and provide targeted 
energy transit systems within the framework of Russia’s strategic interests. 
(Ministry of Energy of the Russian Federation, 2003b)  
China’s relations with the former Soviet Union were complex, but 
have now metamorphosed into new relations with Russia, and can thus be 
dubbed new relations with old comrades. Although it seems that Sino-Russian 
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energy cooperation has been enjoying rapid growth, in truth it has taken a long 
and arduous process to reach a point where cooperation is possible. This 
difficult process has been shaped by the different energy policies of different 
eras. In the past twenty years, little progress has been made, but in the most 
recent four years energy cooperation seems to have entered the fast lane. For 
instance, the latest reports from Xinhua News Agency demonstrate that, 
according to a contract signed under the witness of Chinese President Xi 
Jinping and Russian President Vladimir Putin during their Shanghai meeting in 
May, a joint pipeline will transmit 38 billion cubic metres of natural gas every 
year from Russia to China over a period of 30 years starting from 2018. 
(Xinhua News Agency, 2014) In addition to the pipeline, China and Russia 
have ramped up cooperation in a wide range of fields, including finance, trade, 
and energy and transportation infrastructure. (Mu, 2014) Thus it can be seen 
that upon Russia’s decision to explore the Asian market for energy in pursuit of 
the 2020 energy strategy, Sino-Russian cooperation in other areas also 
accelerated. Cooperation is certainly in accordance with both sides’ 
requirements, but what exactly triggered this acceleration of Sino-Russian 
co-opetition? In order to understand the exact importance of Russian energy to 
China, discussing Russian’s energy conditions and analysing the historical 
development of Sino-Russian energy are first necessary. 
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5.1.1 Russian Energy Conditions 
With the current instability in the Middle East and increasing global energy 
prices, Russia’s importance as an energy abundant country is unprecedented. 
According to the BP Statistical Review of World Energy in 2013, the proven oil 
reserves in Russia account for 5.2% of global oil supplies, and the reserves to 
production ratio (R/P) is 22.4. In addition, the EIA (2013) states that the proven 
natural gas reserves in Russia measure 1688 trillion cubic feet, and predicts 
that this will account for 24.7% of the world’s reserves in 2014. In other words, 
it can be said that Russia possesses a massive proportion of the world’s oil 
and natural gas reserves, granting it certain leverage in negotiating with other 
countries. 
 As Figure 10 below shows, the make-up of Russian crude oil 
exports has been gradually changing, with less reliance on the markets of 
Europe and the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), and greater 
reliance on the Asian market. This directly reflects Russia’s strategy to explore 
and develop new markets. However, it can also be seen that the total export 
amount is on the decline.  
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Figure 10: Predicted Russian Crude Oil Production (Henderson, 
2012:5) 
The reason behind the decline is revealed in Figure 11. Production of oil in 
Russia is expected to begin to decline after around 2020, decreasing rapidly 
year on year thereafter. It is predicted that by 2020, Russia’s oil production will 
reach around 500 kbpd (thousand barrels per day). According to predictions, 
oil production is most likely to start falling after 2020, reaching less than 50 
kbpd by 2048. Has the spectre of peak oil become a reality for Russia? Doubts 
are being raised as to whether it is wise for Russia to maintain such high levels 
of exports when production levels will soon go into decline. However, as Yep 
(2013:para.16) argues ‘of course, peak-oil prognosticators have been wrong 
before. Just as the U.S. has been able to reduce its reliance on foreign 
supplies thanks to technological advances in recent years, Russia may also 
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find ways to tap additional supplies to meet its export commitments.’ 
 
 
Figure 11: Russia’s Oil Production from 2012 (Henderson, 2012:13) 
In fact, currently, thanks in large part to the advantageous outlook for global oil 
prices, oil companies in Russia are striving to extract and explore as much 
crude oil as possible. (Pang, 2013) As such, crude oil production can be 
expected to continue for the short-term. However, due to the inefficiency of old 
technology and energy usage during exploration, this increase is predicted to 
slow down in the near future. Russia’s proven oil reserves account for 5% of 
the world total, yet Russia continues to produce and export at maximum 
capacity, which has started to foment anxiety domestically. In fact, according 
to a recent report, at the current rate of oil production and exporting, and if no 
new technology is engaged to bring more reserves into production, Russia will 
exhaust all its accessible reserves before 2040. (Telhami et al., 2002) 
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 So for oil importing countries, is reliance on Russian energy a 
stable option? Russian energy extraction may soon reach its peak, which will 
influence all areas of cooperation with other states which have grown from 
energy trade, including the various aspects of Sino-Russian cooperation. 
What’s more, since the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia has transformed 
itself from a military power to an energy power. Without energy reserves, will 
Russia follow the old road to collapse? It will be argued here that in the case of 
China, these doubts may be too excessive, as Sino-Russian co-opetition has 
precluded this possibility. In order to see how this has played out, the historical 
background of Sino-Russian energy co-opetition will first be outlined.  
 
5.1.2 The Historical Development of Sino-Russian Energy 
Co-opetition 
For ease of comparison across chapters, the historical development of 
Sino-Russian energy co-opetition has also been divided into four main 
sections, covering the chronological eras of Mao, Deng, Jiang and Hu. Energy 
co-opetition between China and the Russian Federation, including the Soviet 
Union period, has been developing over more than six decades, but the 
progress has been slow and at times unsteady. This is largely due to the 
differing national energy strategies, and the fact that, in terms of 
complementarity, China and Russia’s different stages of development have 
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not always matched up.  
Co-opetition in the Era of Mao Zedong 
As with Sino-Japanese co-opetition, there were difficulties with progress in 
Sino-Russian energy co-opetition during this tumultuous era. At this point, 
relations were in fact with the former Soviet Union, not the modern-day 
Russian Federation. Co-opetition during this period went from honeymoon to 
rupture.  
The main period of energy cooperation came in the 1950s. The two 
states were so close during this time that this can be seen as the honeymoon 
period of new China’s relations with the Soviet Union. Closely following the 
maxims of the Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence, China and the Soviet 
Union signed joint statements in 1954, advocating that both states will respect 
one another and will work to build equal and mutually beneficial cooperation. 
(Deng et al., 2013) According to Zhou (2014), during the period of China’s First 
Five Year Plan, the Soviet Union provided aid for 156 major industrial projects 
concentrating on energy, power generation and heavy industry. In addition, 
Khrushchev’s first visit to China in 1954 changed the face of nuclear energy 
development. Although, Khrushchev did not promise to support China’s 
nuclear energy development programme in practice, he did suggest that 
Chinese specialists could train in the Soviet Union. (Peng and Zheng, 2009) 
Regardless of the Soviet Union’s motivations for helping China during this time, 
it cannot be denied that Soviet aid allowed China to restructure its system and 
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begin a process of industrialisation. However, in truth the relationship was not 
one of co-opetition; the relations consisted more or less of a flow of aid from 
the Soviet Union to China without much capacity for reciprocity. 
However, by the 1960s, China and the former Soviet Union had 
diverged ideologically and energy assistance was withdrawn by the Soviet 
Union. China was left to learn by itself to achieve self-sufficiency and 
self-reliance. (Woodard, 1980) Strictly speaking, the relations between the two 
countries became so strained that it is fair to say there was no co-opetition 
during this period. During the Soviet era, due to the atmosphere of tense 
confrontation between the East and West, a zero-sum game was more 
common than cooperation across the world. (Fang, 2012)  
In conclusion, during the era of Mao, relations between China and the 
Soviet Union closely followed the Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence, 
granting a 10-year honeymoon in terms of energy cooperation. But after the 
countries went their separate ways due to political reasons, energy 
co-opetition also fell through. 
Co-opetition in the Era of Deng Xiaoping 
Sino-Russian energy relations significantly changed in the era of Deng 
Xiaoping, because Deng’s policy was to overlook ideological disputes for the 
sake of peaceful development and cooperation. (Gao, 1996) From 1978 
onwards, Deng provided an opportunity for China to open up and for reform to 
flourish, creating an atmosphere of peaceful development that was highly 
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conducive to economic growth. This policy was an important step for the 
peaceful co-existence championed by traditional Chinese thought. During this 
era, China was able to escape the trap of basing relations purely on ideological 
conformity in the socialist camp, and could therefore initiate peaceful relations 
and cooperation with the Soviet Union despite their differences. As Moltz 
(1995) argues, the visit of Gorbachev to China in 1989 hinted at the beginning 
of the normalisation of Sino-Russian relations. 
Indeed, with the introduction of Gorbachev’s new thinking in the late 
1980s, the Soviet Union’s own energy diplomacy also began to change. The 
Soviet Union planned to leverage the favourable opportunity of East-West 
détente to strengthen their oil and gas diplomatic offensive. (Yu and Yang, 
2010) However, in the difficult transition from the Soviet Union to the Russian 
Federation, the country was brought to the brink of collapse. In this chaotic 
period, the ensuing crisis led to a dramatic drop in the country’s economic 
prowess, and at this point energy production also decreased. In order to 
re-balance this situation, active bilateral diplomacy and energy cooperation 
became the primary tasks of Russian foreign energy strategy. 
As such, the era of Deng Xiaoping can be seen as a transition period 
for Sino-Russian co-opetition. Due to the intense economic pressure brought 
about by Russia’s restructuring after the fall of the Soviet Union, the Russians 
had no choice but to seek cooperation with other countries, including their 
former adversary China. And by fortunate coincidence, the changes in 
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Russia’s outlook came just as China’s own reforms were accelerating.  
In 1992, the two sides signed a Joint Statement on the Foundation of 
Mutual Relations between the People’s Republic of China and the Russian 
Federation, and this point marks the shift from Sino-Soviet to Sino-Russian 
relations. (Chen, 1999) Xinhua News Agency (1992) explained that the 
statement stipulates that Russia and China would establish a 
good-neighbourly and mutually beneficial relationship, and also emphasised 
that the two countries would hold regular high-level talks to continue 
cooperative efforts. This statement once again reflects the fundamental Five 
Principles of Peaceful Co-existence, particularly the concept of working 
together for mutual benefit. Sino-Russian bilateral cooperation began to take 
shape, and a further 24 cooperative documents were swiftly signed, covering 
varied aspects such as trade, technology and culture, but at this point, still not 
mentioning energy. (People's Daily, 2000) This suggests that during the era of 
Deng Xiaoping, energy cooperation had still not reached the strategic level. 
Co-opetition in the Era of Jiang Zemin 
From the signing of this first joint statement in 1992, cooperation between 
Russia and China increased like wild fire. In 1994, another declaration, the 
China-Russia Joint Statement, was signed by Jiang Zemin and Boris Yeltsin, 
which reiterated the joint declaration of 1992 and further promoted cooperation 
in many fields including the military and the economy, taking into account 
		 249	
geopolitical and economic complementary advantages. (Xinhua News Agency, 
1994) This document shows that in 1994, cooperation was still based largely 
on traditional national security. Energy cooperation at this point was restricted 
to cooperative efforts in the oil trade. The two sides had identified the added 
value of geopolitical and economic complementary for future co-opetition. 
In April 1996, Yeltsin visited China, which was the true beginning of 
formal cooperation. During his visit, China and Russia signed the 
Sino-Russian Joint Statement, in which the two sides insisted on the principles 
of equality and trust when establishing their strategic partnership. Crucially, the 
two parties put energy cooperation at the forefront of their relationship. (Xinhua 
News Agency, 1996a) In December 1996, the two sides decided to establish a 
regular meeting mechanism for the Chinese and Russian prime ministers, and 
set up a special energy council to supervise energy cooperation. (Xinhua 
News Agency, 1996b)  
On November 9th 1997 Yeltsin visited China once more, and the two 
governments discussed the issue of laying a gas pipeline from Russian East 
Siberia to China. (China Oil News, 2003) In the same year China and Russia 
signed an agreement for the implementation of cooperation on projects in the 
Kovykta natural gas fields. The conference paper Kovykta Project 
Development outlines the benefits of the project for Russia, China and Korea. 
Russia would benefit from greater profit due to increasing exports; China 
would achieve greater energy diversification; and finally, the project would help 
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relieve the strains on energy security faced by both China and Korea. (Griffith, 
2005) However, the progress of the project was critically stalled. According to 
Zhuang (2004), on January 29th 2004, the Russian Gas Company announced 
that the Kovykta Project did not match Russian national interests as it would 
not allow Russia to sustain the requirements of developing a prosperous 
economy. So the plan to lay a gas pipeline from Irkutsk to China and South 
Korea was abandoned. 
Perhaps one reason behind the Russian volte-face can be explained 
by the policy in Russia at the time. The era of Jiang Zemin in China roughly 
coincided with the rule of Boris Yeltsin (1991-1999) Yeltsin’s energy policy 
during this period initially favoured the West due to the need to obtain greater 
economic support. (Liu, 2011b) Russia hoped to boost energy exports in order 
to exchange foreign currency, aiming to thereby resolve the country’s 
worsening economic and financial situation. In fact, this period in Russian 
history was particularly shaky in many aspects, including the approach to 
energy. For example, with the aim of boosting exports, Yeltsin proposed 
changes to the export limitation regulations, and in February 1995, he decided 
to cancel oil export limitations and licences. But just one year later in 1996, 
Yeltsin re-instated the export quota limitations. 
During the first significant phase of Yeltsin’s period in office, from 
1991 to 1995, Russian economic conditions were so unstable as to preclude 
Sino-Russian co-opetition. In fact, China passed up an excellent opportunity 
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for cooperation with Russia - after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the 
Russian economy went through a period of crisis, and the Chinese authorities 
were wary about investing in the country. China had also learnt to be 
self-sufficient in terms of energy, and at the time, the needs of its own national 
economic development had not yet reached today’s desperate hunger for 
resources. Investing in Russia was not seen as a necessary or wise choice for 
China’s energy security. In 1994, Russia proposed the construction of 
pipelines to China, but China showed insufficient interest in the project. (Liu, 
2011a) The failure of cooperation at this point left its mark on the Sino-Russian 
co-opetitive relationship, meaning subsequent progress was slow and erratic. 
The second significant phase of Yeltsin’s rule was from 1996-1999. 
Cooperation between Russia and China seemed to be on the up. By this time, 
China’s own rapid economic development was generating massive demand 
for energy. Due to these new challenges for China’s energy security, the 
Chinese government became far more amenable to Russia, and even began 
to take the initiative on energy cooperation. However, at first Russia was 
somewhat reluctant to enter into cooperation with China, as after China’s 
previous stalling, Russia had turned its focus toward establishing multilateral 
dialogue with Europe and other Asian countries. (Monaghan, 2006; Perovic et 
al., 2007) But in 1996, according to the Office of Minister of Foreign Affairs of 
the People's Republic of China (1998), China and Russia formally established 
strategic cooperative relations with the signing of the Sino-Russian Joint 
		 252	
Statement in 1996, which included Strategic, Cooperative, Partnership 
Relations Oriented toward the 21st Century. This agreement clearly denotes 
the importance of establishing strategic relations, but most importantly reveals 
that the two sides had noticed the importance of establishing bilateral 
mechanism under the premises of trust and mutual benefit. A cooperation 
committee was formally established in 1996 and various sub-committees were 
also established, including the meeting of the Sino-Russian Energy 
Negotiators. 
In conclusion, during the Jiang Zemin era, Sino-Russian energy 
cooperation achieved a little progress, although no great strides were made. 
Both countries expressed the importance of energy cooperation and reached 
spoken consensus on the issue, but due to poor timing, China’s initial 
inaccurate assessment of its own future energy needs, and Russia’s strategy 
of leaning towards Europe, the two sides missed out on many excellent 
opportunities for cooperation. 
Co-opetition in the Era of Hu Jintao 
Sino-Russian co-opetition in the era of Hu Jintao has gone through many 
twists and turns over the decade, which can be attributed in no small part to 
the foreign policy of President Vladimir Putin. China’s economic development 
has taken off and the country is in constant need of energy, particularly oil, to 
supply the demands of economic growth. China has therefore been 
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increasingly keen on enhancing cooperation with energy-abundant countries 
such as Russia.  
However, Russia’s own policies have not always directly aligned with 
China’s needs. Putin has proposed two long-term national energy strategies – 
the 2020 energy strategy and 2030 energy strategy. In order to achieve the 
aims of energy diversification and national development entailed in these 
strategies, Russia is pursuing a comprehensive foreign energy policy. 
According to Balzer (2005), Putin’s energy strategy includes cooperation with 
European CIS countries, Asia-Pacific countries, and even with North America. 
In the 2020 energy strategy, as Ivanov (2003) points out, the CIS countries are 
of primary concern to Russia due mainly to their geographic position. The 
European Union is also a traditional export market for Russia, but for oil and 
gas exports to reach most of Europe, they must pass through CIS countries. 
Stable energy cooperation with European CIS countries is therefore imperative 
for Russia’s strategy both in their own right and for their gateway to Europe. 
The Asia-Pacific, on the other hand, represents a new, dynamic market. The 
2030 energy strategy thus proposed that Russia’s energy focus should turn to 
the East. (Ministry of Energy of the Russian Federation, 2003a) The strategy 
also points out the importance of China, Japan and Korea to the overall 
Asia-Pacific markets. (Ministry of Energy of the Russian Federation, 2010) 
Finally, North America, especially the United States, represents a potential 
future market for Russian energy exports, favourable due to advanced 
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technology and financial strength. It is arguable that Putin held this in mind 
when attempting to relieve the tensions of US-Russia relations by supporting 
the USA’s War on Terror in 2001. (Stent and Shevtsova, 2002) Russia aims to 
establish energy cooperation on the basis of equality and mutual benefit, 
encouraging economic development and maintaining an overall balance in 
regional and global interests by engaging with the USA. (Åslund, 2005; Jaffe 
and Manning, 2001) Thus, although the Asia-Pacific, including China, does 
feature in Russia’s overall strategy, Russia’s plan for global diversification 
means that China has not been in a position to dominate the Russian energy 
trade.  
Nevertheless, Sino-Russian energy co-opetition has still been 
improving in recent years. In 2000, Putin visited China for the first time, and 
China and Russia signed the Sino-Russian Government Agreement on 
Continuing Joint Cooperation on Energy. (Peng and Qian, 2000) In 2001, 
Russia and China signed an agreement to continue discussing the feasibility of 
constructing the Angarsk-Daqing oil pipeline. Then, in 2002, a seventh 
ministerial meeting was held, with both sides declaring their intentions to 
continue cooperation on the foundation of equality and mutual benefit. In this 
meeting, the two sides also discussed the possibility of encouraging greater 
cooperation between East Siberia and the Far East to meet China’s energy 
requirements and take full advantage of the vast potential of the Far East 
markets. (Xinhua News Agency, 2002) In 2003, Russia signed a contract to 
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deliver 6 million tonnes of crude oil to China by railway, with a further 400,000 
tonnes approved in 2004. (CNPC, 2013) It appears that cooperation was 
smooth during this time, but in fact, the results of these many agreements 
were not forthcoming. For example, the abandonment of the Angarsk-Daqing 
line plans in particular raised many doubts for Sino-Russian co-opetition. 
Putin’s early desire to woo the U.S. market could explain the reluctance to 
follow through on Sino-Russian projects, slowing down the speed of 
co-opetition. 
However, during the later stage of the Putin era (2004 onwards), due 
to the rapid economic development of the Asia-Pacific region and many Asian 
countries’ subsequent rising demand for energy, the Putin administration 
began to initiate adjustment policies regarding Siberia and the Far East 
markets. Sino-Russian energy co-opetition began to make substantial 
progress. In the statement Energy Strategy of Russia: For the Period up to 
2030, the Ministry of Energy of the Russian Federation (2010) particularly 
stresses the importance of cooperation with emerging markets in the 
Asia-Pacific region, and the main objective is to keep a stable balance 
between Europe and the Asia-Pacific. There is massive potential for Russia as 
the Far East is a relatively new market, so Russia intends to develop a 
balanced proportion of market share in Europe and Asia-Pacific, attaining 
stability through diversification. 
 In addition, although both the earlier Angarsk-Daqing and 
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Angarsk-Nakhodka pipeline projects were shelved, in 2006 approval was 
granted for the construction of the Taishet-Nakhodka line between Russia and 
Japan. (CNPC, 2013) Russia made plans to build lateral sidelines from this 
pipeline leading to Daqing in China. (Bellacqua, 2010) President Hu Jintao 
visited Russia in 2007 and signed Sino-Russian joint statements stressing 
bilateral cooperation and encouraging further cooperation on natural gas in the 
future. (Xinhua News Agency, 2007b) According to data from the National 
Energy Administration of China, due to the use of this pipeline, the oil imported 
from Russia reached 157,531,680,000 tonnes in 2013; 650,000 tonnes more 
than in 2012. (National Energy Administration of the People's Republic of 
China, 2014a) This suggests that Sino-Russian oil cooperation has recently 
been particularly successful. 
Putin visited China once more in the year 2012. It is suggested that 
this visit marked an opportunity for the two sides to begin a new age of energy 
cooperation. (Perlez, 2012) Then, after becoming the Chinese President, Xi 
Jinping notably took his first overseas visit to Russia in 2013. During his trip, 
Russia and China signed 32 important contracts concerning coal, oil, natural 
gas and alternative energy. After 10 years of negotiation, a plan for 
establishing natural gas pipelines finally reached a formal agreement in 2014, 
with the objective of pumping natural gas from Russia to China by 2018. (Shen, 
2014) In addition to cooperation on oil and natural gas, the development of 
Sino-Russian nuclear energy cooperation is also noteworthy. China and 
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Russia collaborated on the construction of the Tianwan nuclear power plant, 
which was officially put into use in 2007. (Yemelyanenkov and Gazeta, 
2013)This indicates that China and Russia have stepped up cooperation 
beyond the bounds of traditional energy, but are also seeking significant 
advances in alternative, cleaner energy sources. 
Energy cooperation between China and Russia seems to have 
reached a new level, which is based on the establishment and pursuit of 
common interests. (Yan, 2013) As discussed in Chapter Four, in addition to 
these common interests, China has also been encouraged to engage in 
greater cooperation with Russia to forestall the inroads of their competitor 
Japan into the Russian energy supply market. Although China must 
unavoidably remain aware of Russia’s loyalty to its own national interests first 
and foremost, it seems that Sino-Russian cooperation is finally on the right 
track, after a long drawn-out period of unsuccessful or poorly timed attempts to 
work together on energy. In fact, as the Office of Minister of Foreign Affairs of 
the People's Republic of China (2014) reports, at the SCO summit in 2014 Xi 
Jinping and Putin themselves officially declared a new stage in the 
Sino-Russian comprehensive strategic partnership. This new statement aims 
to further improve energy cooperation not only for oil and natural gas, but also 
for new energy exploration and efficiency. (Office of Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
of the People's Republic of China, 2014) 
To conclude, during the era of Hu Jintao, co-opetition on energy has 
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existed, with cooperation taking a greater share of the relationship than 
competition. However, Sino-Russian cooperation has been somewhat erratic 
over time, with much of this due to changes in national interests and the 
approaches of different leaders. The path of Sino-Russian energy relations 
has moved from cooperation to competition, back to cooperation, and most 
recently has moved into the co-opetition stage. Historically, Russia has been 
able to help solve China’s energy security from the perspective of securing 
greater supplies and low-risk transportation, but in general Russia has been in 
a more favourable position than China, allowing Russian terms to dominate 
the cooperative relationship. In recent years the proportion of China’s strength 
has grown, which may continue to have a heavy and possibly favourable 
impact on the co-opetitive relationship from China’s perspective. In fact, it 
could even be the case that Sino-Russian co-opetition becomes so significant 
as to change the pattern of the Asian energy market in the future. In order to 
identify the possibilities of this development, the following section will employ 
the model of game theory to analyse Sino-Russian co-opetition. 
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5.2 Sino-Russian Energy Co-Opetition under the 
Model of Game Theory 
5.2.1 Players: Asymmetrical Partners and Slow Progress 
According to assumption five, it is easier for a relationship of co-opetition to be 
established between players with asymmetrical power. It must be reiterated 
that in this case, the ‘power’ mentioned refers to the resources that each side 
is able to access and obtain. In this sense, Russia and China are asymmetrical 
powers, which is conducive to greater levels of co-opetition. As this section will 
show, originally, Russia’s absolute advantage was a complicating factor for 
successful co-opetition, but as China’s position has strengthened and Russia’s 
has weakened, Russia’s absolute advantage has been somewhat eroded, 
leaving a relatively more balanced asymmetry.  
In terms of players in the energy game, Russia’s approach to energy 
co-opetition has moved on from only Russian Confederation countries during 
the Soviet era to a multinational approach which today involves countries 
worldwide, even the Soviet arch-enemy, the United States. Sino-Russian 
cooperation has moved on from being bilateral to being multilateral in nature. 
Bilateral cooperation between China and Russia also continues and has great 
potential, but as the previous section has shown, progress has been halting. 
Multilateral cooperation here refers mainly to projects such as the laying of oil 
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and natural gas pipelines with the involvement of a third country such as Japan. 
This is difficult to achieve, but if successful, brings benefit to all parties. 
As Gulick (2007) points out, due to the high price of world energy and 
growing demand, Russia has been of increasing importance to China. The 
significance of Russia to China and the disparity of power mean that up until 
only very recent years, Russia had still been able to take the dominant position 
in Sino-Russian cooperation. The roles of Russia and China in terms of energy 
were almost purely that of a supplier and a customer respectively. Aside from 
investment and labour, the only other bargaining chip that China had was the 
added value of cooperation between the two states. (Nyiri and Saveliev, 2002) 
Although China had little to boost its negotiating power with Russia, 
co-opetition between the two did exist, but it came with a twist. 
Essentially, the twist in this relationship is that the ultimate outcome 
of cooperation is dictated by the strongest player in the relationship. The 
example of Sino-Russian cooperation on pipelines is most illustrative. As early 
as 1994, Russian oil companies proposed the idea of laying oil pipelines from 
Russia to China. Russia suggested that the pipeline be laid across Mongolia 
directly to China, which is the shortest, most secure route. However, China 
wanted to take into consideration Daqing in the North-East of China, where 
China’s major petroleum production has historically taken place. Daqing has 
fallen into gradual decline due to depletion, but as it has historically been a 
resource-based city, China hoped to incorporate Daqing into the plans in order 
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to revitalise it and make use of its historical infrastructure. (Burles, 1999) China 
thus proposed building the pipeline from Angarsk to Daqing, which would be a 
more difficult undertaking. This suggestion set the two sides at loggerheads 
and the game began. 
Both China and Russia had two choices – to compromise, or to fight 
for their interests. If only considering pure economic interests, it would be 
rational for both sides to choose to fight. Even without the construction of an oil 
pipeline to China, Russia’s oil can still fetch a high price in the European 
market. Meanwhile, at the time China’s purchase of imports from the Middle 
East was roughly equivalent to the cost of oil transportation by pipeline from 
Russia, so there was no pressing economic need to use the pipeline to cut 
costs. (Zhu, 2009) In this case, this would put the two sides into deadlock, and 
if the situation didn’t change, negotiations would eventually move to rupture. 
However, in actual fact neither China nor Russia entered into 
cooperation purely for economic value. Economic benefit was a major part of 
the project, but was by no means the only consideration. As a rational players, 
maximising national interests is the most important objective and as a result, 
the real fundamental factor determining Sino-Russian strategies and actions is 
the two countries’ respective national interests. So what precisely are the two 
sides’ national interests regarding this matter?  
For Russia, the government aimed to develop the Siberian and Far 
East regions by absorbing and attracting foreign investment in order to 
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stimulate economic development in the entire area. Russia thus considered 
the cooperative project from the angle of energy and economic security. Their 
preoccupation with the Chinese market was due to their aim to achieve 
diversity in energy exports and reduce the risk that their domestic economy 
would become over-reliant on the West. As a result, their optimal choice was 
to fight rather than let the Chinese side push for a compromise. Compromise 
would be a suboptimal choice for Russia, but in fact, no matter which approach 
ultimately led to the construction of an external pipeline, it would be beneficial 
for Russia’s maximisation of national interests. 
For the Chinese, the optimal choice was also to fight and make the 
Russian side give in to compromise. The suboptimal strategy was China’s own 
compromise. Since 1993, China had become a net oil-importing country. 
Meeting the rapidly growing energy demand was the most important issue in 
China’s energy security. (Downs, 2000) Importing energy via rail or pipeline 
from Russia were both far less risky options than the sea transport necessary 
from Africa and the Middle East. As a result, choosing compromise in the 
game was also an acceptable choice for China. In other words, as long as the 
outcome of cooperation is ultimately successful, both Russia and China will be 
able to maximise their own national interests whether they do so by struggle or 
by compromise. In conclusion, under the absolute advantage of Russia, the 
Chinese government still would like to accept the offer proposed by Russia 
due to considerations of national interest. 
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However, further to this dynamic of bilateral cooperation, 
Sino-Russian co-opetition has also encountered new variables due to the 
participation of third parties. As assumption five mentions, co-opetition is 
always more stable between just two players than multiple players. In this case, 
the intrusion of extra players was as a result of the extra costs to China of 
choosing to cooperate, as the huge cost of initiating and completing a pipeline 
project represented a security dilemma in public goods. Negotiations over the 
ultimately unsuccessful Angarsk-Daqing Line project took 10 years. According 
to Sina Finance (2008), the length of the pipeline would include 795 kilometres 
within Chinese territory and 1450 kilometres in Russia, and according to the 
cost estimates and the differing lengths within the two countries, it was 
expected that China would pay $8 billion and Russia would pay $17 billion. In 
addition, each side would stump up $15 million – half of the 30 million dollar 
fee for prior research into the feasibility of the pipeline. However, Russia was 
not satisfied with this even splitting of costs, and requested that China pay half 
of the Russian expense for the pipeline, adding $8.5 billion to China’s 
expenses for the project. For Russia and China, the game thus centred around 
how to negotiate and allocate each side’s specific expenses, with the following 
potential outcomes: 
1) If China promised to cover half of Russia’s costs in the project, 
China would need to pay 0.15+8+8.5 = 16.65 billion dollars. Russia would 
have to pay 0.5+8.5 = 8.65 billion dollars. 
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2) If Russia paid its own costs for the pipeline laid in domestic 
territory, Russia would be required to pay 0.15+17 = 17.15 billion dollars. 
China would pay 0.15+8 = 8.15 billion dollars. 
3) If the cooperation broke down then neither side would have to pay 
the costs for laying the pipeline, although each side would still pay the 0.15 
billion dollars apiece for the prior research. 
 
The payoff matrix regarding the costs of laying the pipeline in Russian territory 
can thus be drawn as follows: 
Table 14: Payoff Matrices for Pipeline Costs in Russian Territory 
Strategies  Russia (Cooperation) Russia (Defection)  
China (Cooperation) (8.5, 8.5) (8.5, 0.15) 
China (Defection) (0.15, 17) (0.15, 0.15) 
 
Both China and Russia had two choices before them: cooperate with each the 
other side, or betray by refusing to bear the cost. If Russia chose to cooperate 
on the pipeline costs and unilaterally pay their share, then the cost would be 17 
billion to them. If the two sides were able to reach a mutual commitment then 
both would pay half of the 17 billion price – $8.5 billion each. Finally if both 
sides refused to bear the cost of construction in Russian territory, then the 
Angarsk-Daqing Line project would fall through. Neither side would gain from 
this, although both sides would minimise their costs. The $30 million spent on 
research would also be wasted. 
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Consequently, this game fell into Prisoner’s Dilemma if deem energy 
supply as a public goods. Contrasting the four possible strategic combinations, 
only (-0.15, -0.15) can achieve the Nash equilibrium. That is to say, no matter 
which action either side prefers to take, if the other side refuses to bear the 
cost of construction, the best choice for both is to also refuse to bear the costs. 
Faced with this dilemma, the suggestion of the Angarsk-Nakhodka 
line by the Japanese presented Russia with a convenient solution. Changing 
the terminal of the line from Daqing to Nakhodka would allow Russia to obtain 
more investment from Japan. As Vassiliouk (2008) mentions, Japan was fully 
prepared to supply $50 billion to Russia in order to ensure that the entire 
pipeline was completed successfully. This was due to Japan’s domestic need 
for greater energy diversification. The amount the Japanese were willing to 
invest was markedly higher than the amounts Russia was attempting to 
negotiate with China. Further to this, by constructing a terminal at Nakhodka in 
Russian territory, Russia would avoid restricting the pipeline’s supply to one 
sole customer – China – as it would with the Angarsk-Daqing Line. From the 
Nakhodka terminal, Russia could supply potential customers in all of North 
East Asia and even cross the ocean to the Americas. It was thus in Russia’s 
greater national interests to withdraw from the Angarsk-Daqing negotiations 
and begin the Angarsk-Nakhodka project (although this was changed to the 
Taishet-Nakhodka line at a later stage due to other domestic considerations by 
Russia, including the environmental impact of the pipeline). 
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From the Russian standpoint, once Japan introduced the possibility 
of the Angarsk-Nakhodka line, whether China chose to cooperate or betray 
became inconsequential. Choosing betrayal would lead to greater gains for 
Russia than cooperation. As a result, for Russia, China’s suggested 
Angarsk-Daqing line was no longer the optimal choice, and it did not offer the 
full maximisation of Russia’s interests. Firstly, the Angarsk-Daqing line would 
lead straight down to Daqing, with around half the pipeline in Chinese territory. 
But the planned route of the Angarsk-Nakhodka line lay across the entire Far 
East region of Russian territory, which would be conducive to the development 
of related industries along the pipeline route. The Angarsk-Nakhodka line 
would be far more beneficial for the development of the local economy in the 
Far East and Siberian regions than the Angarsk-Daqing line. 
Secondly, the scope of Russia’s oil exports had been increasingly 
expanding, radiating across North-East Asia, including China, but spreading 
as far as the United States. The pipeline to the Nakhodka terminal in Russian 
territory would enable more spin-off than the Angarsk-Daqing line. China 
would be the sole customer of the Angarsk-Daqing line, with the terminal lying 
in China. 
Thirdly, according to the original plans for the Angarsk-Daqing line, 
Russia would need to afford a $17 billion outlay, with 50% financed by China, 
to construct the pipeline in Russian territory. However, for the construction of 
the Angarsk-Nakhodka line, Japan had agreed to provide $50 billion which 
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would be sufficient to complete the pipeline. (Vassiliouk, 2008) Choosing 
Japan would save Russia a huge amount of capital. 
Finally, another reason that Russia abandoned the Angarsk-Daqing 
line plans was the ecological pollution it would trigger. The Angarsk-Daqing 
line would need to cross the Tuningsiji National Park, just 20 km from Lake 
Baikal, which would cause unwarranted pollution to that area. (Blagov, 2004) 
When all these considerations are taken into account, it was inevitable that 
Russia would choose to abandon the Angarsk-Daqing line when a more 
favourable option was readily available. 
In this case, as China was in a weaker position, Russia chose to 
betray for the sake of their interests. For China, there was little choice but to 
bend, and ultimately begin compromise on a different solution, building a 
branch of the pipeline to Daqing, to which Russia did agree. That is because 
Sino-Russian relations at this point fell into the Dictator Game category, in 
which maximising profit does not always reach Pareto optimality due to the 
pressure of reputation and long-term stable development. As discussed in 
Chapter Two, in the Dictator Game, the final result is dictated by the strength 
of the most powerful player. Or in other words, in this case, no matter how 
China chose to bargain, the final outcome – the allocation of gains – would 
always be decided by Russia. Whether or not to bother with the Daqing branch 
was also up to Russia, and for the sake of maximising interests, Russia chose 
to go ahead with the project. As in the initial negotiations, China would be 
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responsible for covering the costs of the pipeline in Chinese territory, and 
Russia would still gain from increased oil exports to China. This case shows 
that in the case of absolute Russian advantage, with the final outcome resting 
on Russian assessment of their own national interests, the progress of 
Sino-Russian co-opetition was doomed to be slow and twisting. 
 However, in recent years the speed of co-opetition has sped up, 
and this can be attributed to the adjustment of the degree of power asymmetry. 
In addition to Russian and Chinese domestic factors, various external factors 
have also influenced Russia’s position in terms of energy advantage. 
Firstly is the occurrence of shale gas extraction, which adversely 
influences the potential of the energy market. The success of shale gas 
exploration and development in North America has encouraged Russia to 
re-consider the future of its natural gas supply, giving Russia the potential 
scope to break into the Far East market. (Ernst & Young, 2011) In 2011, China 
imported nearly 30 billion cubic metres of natural gas, and it is predicted that in 
the next five to eight years, China will begin to import more than 100 billion 
cubic metres per year. While China’s proven reserves of natural gas only equal 
7% of Russia’s total reserves, technically recoverable shale gas resources in 
China amounts to 36.1 trillion cubic metres, ranking first in the world. (IEA, 
2012a) It is conceivable that China could explore shale gas and thereby 
reduce its reliance on Russian supplies. In short, the discovery and 
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exploitation of shale gas could reduce the likelihood of either side to engage in 
sustained cooperation, particularly in terms of natural gas. 
A second factor is the difficulty of energy exploration. According to 
research by Dienes (2004), even though Russia currently possesses a large 
amount of oil resources, this situation can only be temporary if Russia is 
unable to explore new reserves. Dienes (2004) goes on to state that a great 
deal of evidence indicates that the recent increase in oil exploration in Russia 
centres upon the exploitation of oil resources that had not been explored in the 
past 20th century. But since 1999, only a few companies have invested in new 
technology for the exploration of new oil fields, the construction of drilling 
platforms, or the drilling of new oil wells. (Paque, 2013) This has resulted in a 
situation where Russia is unable to compete with other oil production countries 
in terms of the exploration of future oil reserves. For example, Yukos, a 
petroleum corporation that once attracted many investors, tended to extract 
only those oil reserves that can be easily explored. In 2000, Yukos was the 
second largest petroleum corporation in Russia but it invested in only 22 new 
oil wells accounting for less than 2% of all new wells across Russia. (Qi, 2006) 
The region of West Siberia is one of the main oil production regions of 
Russia. Currently, according to reports, around 80% of the oil reserves in West 
Siberia have already been explored. (Sutyagin, 2004) But with the growing 
demand for exports from the Asia-Pacific region, Russia now has to focus on 
exploiting and developing the reserves of East Siberia as well. Even if there is 
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promise to be found in East Siberia, a considerable amount of time and 
funding would need to be invested in exploration. (EIA, 2013) As a result, the 
progress of exploration of all fuel reserves in East Siberia is relatively slow. For 
example, one of Russia’s largest natural gas corporations, Gazprom, is 
suffering from slow progress of exploration of gas reserves in East Siberia, 
where it has to pay a relatively higher price proportionally for the gas it is able 
to extract. (Anonymous, 2013) What’s more, the extreme weather conditions of 
this region makes exploration extremely difficult. (EIA, 2013) Further to this, 
the lack of transportation infrastructure also seriously limits Russia’s energy 
strategy in the long-term. There are only a limited number of pipelines in the 
Russian Eastern region and this may influence the exploration and 
development of the oil and gas fields in East Siberia and the Far East region. 
In order to combat this difficulty, Putin has proposed to focus on the 
construction of more pipelines in East Siberia in order to help boost the 
exploitation and exploration of reserves in the area, thereby improving the 
local economy and increasing export diversity. (Ivanov, 2003) 
The third factor influencing the change in Russia’s absolute 
advantage is that Russia’s energy strategy involves high associated costs and 
investment. Many analysts believe that Russia’s oil exportation cannot 
continue to grow, or even be maintained at the current level unless changes 
are made. (Hill, 2004) The European Union predicted in the year 2000 that 
Russia’s energy sector would require investments of $460-600 billion to 
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ensure its long-term investment requirements. According to Telhami et al. 
(2002), in order to expand the oil export market, Russia will have to build 
large-scale deep-water ports and pipelines for the outlet of oil. However, these 
two types of project will require massive amounts of investment. For example, 
the development of Murmansk Port will cost approximately $7 billion. (Gorst, 
2004) Russia also needs to continue to increase investment to upgrade 
existing energy extraction technologies. At the moment, Russia is still insisting 
on employing existing drilling technology. But without research and 
development of new exploration technology, Russia will struggle to maintain 
such high levels of production.  
Finally, the European Union has been striving to reduce its energy 
dependence on Russia which will have a knock-on effect on Sino-Russian 
co-opetition. According to Monaghan (2006) the European Union is Russia’s 
largest oil customer, importing around 50% of its gas and 30% of its oil from 
Russia. Indeed, Russia uses the bargaining chip of energy as political 
leverage when dealing with the EU. Leonard (2007) corroborates that Russia’s 
position as a monopoly gas supplier for the European Union boosts its 
leverage over Europe. The higher the EU’s dependence on Russia, the more 
Russia will benefit politically. Although as Monaghan (2006) points out, Russia 
and the European Union member states could use this mutual dependence to 
their advantage, with it helping to sustain each other’s economies, the 
European Union continues to remain wary of Russia. Since Russia unilaterally 
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cut off gas supplies to Ukraine in 2006 (Barysch, 2007), the European Union 
has begun to minimise potential future risk by actively seeking alternative 
energy sources to reduce dependence on energy imports from Russia. 
(Monaghan, 2006) With the escalation of the EU policy, in addition to the 
introduction of sanctions against Russia due to Russian actions in Ukraine, 
Russia may be pushed into abandoning its initial strategic plan and finding a 
new solution, which is likely to involve increasing exports to China. In this case, 
China’s bargaining chips will be further strengthened and the co-opetitive 
relations will be influenced as a result. 
In conclusion, the asymmetry of Russia and China is a powerful 
indicator of the likelihood of success in co-opetition. The acceleration of 
Sino-Russian co-opetition is a natural progression caused by the continuous 
reduction in Russia’s absolute advantage in the Dictator Game. The 
involvement of Japan has added a new layer of complexity to Sino-Russian 
co-opetition, demonstrating why a game of two players is more stable than one 
of three or more. Even so, China and Russia are ultimately able to engage in 
cooperation, which is aided by the erosion of Russia’s absolute advantage. 
Added value in particular can help boost the likelihood of successful 
cooperation. 
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5.2.2 Added Value: Sufficient Complementarity 
In terms of assumption six, in the case of China and Russia, the degree of 
energy complementarity is sufficiently high to achieve successful cooperation. 
Additionally, the sufficient complementarity also supports assumption two the 
interdependence between China and Russian relating to energy is not only 
due to the economy and strategy, but also due to geopolitical considerations. 
Thus, there are three dimensions of high complementarity: the balance of 
supply and demand, strategic complementarity, and geopolitical advantages, 
which include aspects such as proximity, convenience and stability of 
transportation, and related cost reductions for both parties. 
Firstly, Sino-Russian complementarity is principally concerned with 
the balance of supply and demand; essentially, Russia needs to increase 
export diversity just as China needs to increase import diversity. This can 
reduce the high risk inherent in both Russia and China’s energy security. Due 
to Russia’s abundance of energy reserves, China stands to gain another 
choice of energy supplier. One of China’s energy security issues is 
over-reliance on potentially risky sources such as Middle Eastern oil suppliers, 
and securing energy supply from Russia allows China to diversify its sources 
and minimise risk. Russia’s Eastern Siberia Pipeline Oil (ESPO) started to 
export regularly to China in early 2011, at around 600,000 barrels/day. (Platts, 
2011) At this point, according to the International Energy Agency (2012), 7% of 
China’s crude oil imports hailed from Russia, 20% from Saudi Arabia, 12% 
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from Angola, and 11% from Iran. Although Russian supplies did not match 
those of China’s primary suppliers in Africa and the Middle East, they still 
came to account for a substantial percentage after only a short while of new 
regular exportation from ESPO. As shown in Figure 12 below, the proportion of 
imports from Russia continues to increase year on year. 
 
       Figure 12: China’s Crude Oil Imports by Source (Robison, 2012:app.1) 
In Figure 13, which shows recent trends in Chinese crude oil imports, the light 
blue section represents Russia and the former Soviet Union countries. The 
fluctuation in the proportion of Chinese crude oil imports over time indicates 
that the important position of the Middle East is eroding, whereas the African 
and Russian supplies are begin to grow. Africa still maintains a higher 
proportion of imports than Russia, which will be discussed in further detail in 
Chapter Six. 
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Figure 13: China’s Crude Import by Region, 2009 and First Half of 
2010(Jiang and Sinton, 2011:12) 
 
In addition, Russia not only supplies non-renewable fuel sources such as 
crude oil and natural gas, but it also provides China with assistance on some 
renewable energies such as nuclear power, thereby further diversifying 
China’s energy portfolio. Moreover, the use of nuclear power instead of fossil 
fuels can reduce CO2 emissions. Russia helped China build the Tianwan 
Nuclear Power Plant (TNPP), which began operations in 1997. TNPP is the 
largest Sino-Russian energy cooperation project, generating up to 14 billion 
kWh of electricity per year. Technology was provided by 150 Russian 
companies. (Russia Today, 2007) Additionally, due to safety considerations, 
Russia helped build another two units in Tianwan, absorbing the experience of 
the catastrophic Fukushima-1 nuclear accident, and accepting the strict safety 
checks required by post-Fukushima safety requirements. (Yemelyanenkov 
and Gazeta, 2013) 
Although on the surface this could be viewed as a relationship of 
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dependence, in truth, China and Russia’ energy relationship is one of 
interdependence, achieved due to the suitable degree of complementarity 
between the two states. Although Russia has the advantage of being a 
producer country, with the decrease in exports to the European Union, the 
basic target of Russian energy strategy is full integration into the world energy 
market, as well as maximum leverage of energy resources. (Poussenkova, 
2010) According to the Ministry of Energy of the Russian Federation (2010), 
the long-term goal is to consolidate Russia’s position in the international 
energy market and derive maximum benefit from this status. Within the scope 
of this strategy, China is an ideal location for exports due to its proximity and 
its ability to act as a gateway for Russia’s entrance into the vast Asian market. 
Although Japan and South Korea are also suitable markets, close cooperation 
with China is favourable due to China’s growing influence and reputation. As 
energy strategy forms the backbone of Russia’s fundamental national policy, it 
is vital for Russia to make the wisest choices of export market.  
In addition, as mentioned previously, the new level of close strategic 
relations between China and Russia can also prevent Russia from heading 
down the same road to collapse as the Soviet Union. For instance, Putin (2014) 
announced that Russia and China will actively use their own currencies in the 
energy trade, which is an important mechanism to reduce external risk. Farchy 
and Hille (2014) point out that the terms of the new agreement to import 
natural gas into China include payment in roubles. Russian companies have 
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also prepared for trade in Chinese yuan (renminbi). Considering the economic 
sanctions put in place against Russia by Europe and the U.S., using yuan and 
roubles could neatly sidestep excessive reliance on U.S. dollars. (Hudson, 
2014) In addition, as Lin (2014) argues, using the two states’ domestic 
currencies rather than the global currency can increase Russian reliance on 
the Chinese market. In other words, Russia needs China just as much as, if 
not now more than, China needs Russia.  
However, a potential risk to the relationship comes from the trend in 
oil price decrease. With OPEC unable to rescue production, Russia may have 
to adjust oil prices, which could shorten the new honeymoon of cooperation 
between Russia and China. The possibilities for securing long-term 
cooperation by incorporating energy prices into mutual cooperative 
mechanisms will be discussed in Section 5.2.5. 
Further to the crucial aspect of supply and demand, the 
complementarity of Russia and China’s domestic strategies is also conducive 
to greater cooperation. For instance, Russia’s 2030 energy strategy underlines 
the importance of the Far East market. (Ministry of Energy of the Russian 
Federation, 2003a) Meanwhile, the Chinese government has proposed the 
strategy of revitalising the old North-East industrial base. This plan intends to 
develop the North East economic area through financial support and new 
investments. (Zhang and Wang, 2003) Due to the close location of China’s 
North East and Russia’s Far East, these two strategies are able to work in 
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concert to the mutual advantage of both parties. As Xinhua News Agency 
(2010b:para.4) explains, in the process of revitalising the old North East 
industrial base, the Chinese government has encouraged the enhancement of 
regional cooperation and the increase of imports, which has directly resulted in 
the ‘Program of Cooperation between the Regions of the Far East and East 
Siberia of the Russian Federation and Northeast of the People’s Republic of 
China for 2009-2018.’ China is also backed by its enormous labour market. 
With a population of 1.4 billion people, the world’s largest, China is able to 
supply a large amount of much-needed labour to boost numbers in the 
sparsely populated Far East region of Russia. (Bradshaw, 2001) Cooperation 
in the Far East market therefore requires China to supply sufficient labour to 
complete cooperative goals. 
The third dimension of complementarity is the geopolitical 
advantages of working together. China and Russia are neighbouring countries 
with a long border line. Energy cooperation between Russia and China, rather 
than with other countries, can greatly reduce the cost of energy transport both 
for the supplier and the customer. (Zhu, 2007) The vast majority of energy 
transportation between Russia and China is by railway or by pipeline. As such, 
Sino-Russian cooperation on these areas can save enormous costs on 
transportation. (Cazzola et al., 2013) As Jiang and Sinton (2011) explain, this 
geopolitical advantage will also improve China’s overall energy security by 
reducing dependence on sources requiring sea transportation, which have to 
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navigate the risky Malacca Strait. 
However, despite the geopolitical advantage of proximity, the high 
cost of building pipelines remains a persistent point of potential conflict 
between the two states. Progress on a joint project to lay a natural gas pipeline 
stalled for a long period of time, but as mentioned previously, in 2014 it was 
announced that China and Russia had finally agreed on the terms of the 
project and expected the pipeline to be running by 2018. This sudden push of 
progress hints at the pervasive reduction of Russia’s absolute advantage, 
allowing Sino-Russian bargaining on the cost of pipelines to finally achieve 
success. Although Russia is still blessed with the powerful advantage of 
natural resources, in the context of international politics Russia has little choice 
but to turn strategic attention to China. But does this bode well for the stability 
of cooperation? The stability of the co-opetitive relationship can be greatly 
influenced by the establishment of reciprocity and firm commitments.  
 
5.2.3 Rules: Well-Developed Commitments and Reciprocity 
The first and foremost condition of Sino-Russian energy co-opetition is the 
existence of common targets. Both Russia and China put safeguarding their 
national sovereignty and territorial integrity at the forefront of all considerations. 
According to the Russian foreign policy review of 27th March 2007, the 
principal goal of the Russian Federation is to maintain the integrity of its 
		 280	
sovereignty. (Xing, 2008) Likewise, one of China’s Five Principles of Peaceful 
Co-existence, which are the backbone of foreign policy, demands respect for 
the integrity of sovereignty and territory. This emphasis on the fundamental 
importance of sovereignty and territory is a shared understanding between 
Russia and China. In 2001, China and Russia signed the Sino-Russian Treaty 
of Friendship, a document drafted on the basis of respect for sovereignty and 
territorial integrity, aiming to achieve cooperation under the conditions of 
equality and mutual benefit. (Xinhua News Agency, 2001) With shared aims in 
mind, Russia and China have been able to iron out territorial disputes and 
have a growing relationship of trust due to mutual understanding of each 
other’s fundamental standpoints. As we have seen in previous sections, there 
is no doubt that China and Russia share a matching complementarity and 
shared common interests, but these must be backed up with reciprocity and 
firm commitments. 
China and Russia’s current regular high-level dialogue on energy 
demonstrates the existence of commitment and reciprocity. Unlike 
Sino-Japanese discourse, Sino-Russian dialogue has ultimately culminated in 
action and progress, albeit slowly. Table 15 below shows the major progress 
on Sino-Russian energy cooperation since 2008, and demonstrates that 
Sino-Russian cooperation has followed the Five Principles of Peaceful 
Co-existence. The regular meetings show the gradual establishment of 
commitment which has resulted in successful cooperation. 
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Table 15: Timetable of Sino-Russian High-Level Dialogue on Energy 
(Researcher’s own)  
 
Time Name Major Content 
October 
2008 
Sino-Russian Energy 
Negotiators’ Meeting, 
First Round 
Established three principles to be used as a 
guideline in future cooperation:  
1. Comprehensive long-term cooperation 
2. Market principles 
3. Mutual beneficial and win-win 
April  
2009 
Sino-Russian Energy 
Negotiators’ Meeting, 
Fourth Round  
Signed China-Russia Ink Oil Cooperation 
Agreement39 
 
Enhanced cooperation on oil trade and 
loan-for-oil 
September 
2010 
Sino-Russian Energy 
Negotiators’ Meeting, 
Sixth Round40 
Sino-Russian joint project in Tianjin, China 
 
Strengthening cooperation on energy and new 
energy exploration based on the Five Principles 
of Peaceful Co-existence 
January 
2011  
Daqing oilfield begins to receive oil from Russia 
(Xinhua News Agency, 2011a) 
May  
2011 
Sino-Russian Energy 
Negotiators’ Meeting, 
Seventh Round41 
Exchanged views and plans for future energy 
cooperation 
 
Demonstrated mutual trust as well as candid 
and pragmatic spirit of cooperation 
																																																								
39 Xinhua News Agency. (2009)  ²|må;Ë ¼DÀàV®§ (China and Russia 
Signed China, Russia Ink Oil Cooperation agreement: An important Achievement), Beijing: 
Xinhua Publishing House. 
40 Xinhua News Agency. (2010a)  ¼Õ1Ã¯'Â (The Opening of Sixth 
Round Sino-Russian Energy Negotiators' Meeting), Beijing: Xinhua Publishing House. 
41  Xinhua News Agency. (2011b) China, Russia Expect Progress in Gas Cooperation. 
People's Daily. Beijing: Xinhua Publishing House. 
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December 
2012 
Sino-Russian Energy 
Negotiators’ Meeting 
Ninth Round42 
Signed a memorandum of understanding on 
cooperation on energy market assessment, a 
roadmap on cooperation in the coal sector, and 
an agreement on electricity supply 
December 
2013 
 
Sino-Russian Energy 
Negotiators’ Meeting, 
Tenth Round43 
Cooperated not only on oil and natural gas, but 
also enhanced cooperation on energy saving 
and renewable energy 
May  
2014 2014 SCO Summit 
Signed agreement on a natural gas pipeline to 
formally start to supply gas in 2018 (Xinhua 
News Agency, 2014) 
 
In addition to regular high-level meetings, a series of memoranda of 
understanding on energy have been signed by Russia and China. A 
memorandum of understanding is signed on the basis of both sides’ mutual 
understanding of circumstances and commitments and lays out concrete 
measures to deal with disputes. For instance, in terms of gas cooperation, Xi 
Jinping and President Vladimir Putin have signed a memorandum of 
understanding on the western gas supply route to China in 2014. (RT News, 
2014) As RT News (2014) quotes, Putin announced that ‘we have reached an 
understanding in principle concerning the opening of the western route and we 
have already agreed on many technical and commercial aspects of this project, 
laying a good basis for reaching final arrangements.’ 
																																																								
42 Xinhua News Agency. (2012a) 7ņďţR*őıù1æm¾ĪñÅó (Important 
Achievement on the Ninth Round Sino-Russian Energy Negotiators' Meeting). Xinhua News. 
Beijing: Xinhua Publishing House. 
43  People's Daily. (2013b) 7ņďt3|1ıaù1ŚŐ (The Tenth Round 
Sino-Russian Energy Negotiators' Meeting). People's Daily. Beijing: People's Daily 
Newspaper. 
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These memoranda are also helpful for ensuring reciprocity between 
the two sides. For example, according to Ifeng TV (2014), the natural gas 
agreement allows China to receive natural gas in return for a prepaid loan to 
Russia. Russia is able to secure a vital source of capital from China in the face 
of Western economic sanctions against Russia, and China is able to secure a 
steady supply of natural gas at a preferential rate, paying roughly $380-388 
per thousand square metres where the average Asian price for the same 
quantity is $62544. According to Wu (2013), China’s natural gas usage in 2012 
has increased by 36.3% compared with 2011 and the proportion of the total 
relying on foreign import has reached 29%.  
This case demonstrates the full understanding and reciprocity 
between China and Russia. Although Sino-Russian co-opetition got off to a 
slow start, the degree of reciprocity and mutual commitment is growing rapidly. 
However, it is undeniable that the progress of cooperation and the 
establishment of commitments have been affected by Russia’s unstable 
policies. Although the two sides have agreed to work together following the 
guidelines of the Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence, which entail mutual 
trust and respect, there have been issues over Russia’s backtracking and 
adjustments to agreements. 
																																																								
44 The price of the Sino-Russian natural gas (380-388 U.S. dollars per thousand square 
metres) has not been publicly announced, and Russia has said that this is a business secret. 
But experts have estimated the price based on what China is able to afford. (Ifeng TV, 
2014:56)  
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For instance, Russia has made repeated changes during negotiations 
over pipelines. Table 16 shows specific chronological events during the long 
Sino-Russian cooperation over pipelines since 1994. The table shows that the 
negotiation period was lengthy and that the attitude of Russia was constantly 
in flux. It took several meetings to agree to plans which were soon marred in 
difficulty, and more meetings were needed to re-address the plans. It took a 
considerable time for China and Russia to lay out plans, but there was no 
obvious progress. This arduous process and constant backtracking reduces 
China’s degree of trust and faith in Russian commitments.  
 
Table 16: Sino-Russian Pipeline Co-opetition 1994-2011, based on 
‘The Events of Sino-Russian Energy Co-opetition’ (CNPC, 2013) 
Time  Event 
1994 Russian oil company recommends 
the construction of oil pipelines from 
Siberia to North-East China 
1996 Discussion on the feasibility of 
Angarsk-Daqing line 
2001 CNPC signs agreements with Russia 
energy company Kukos on feasibility 
studies regarding the construction of 
the Angarsk-Daqing line  
January 2003 Japan proposes the Angarsk- 
Nakhodka line instead of the 
Angarsk-Daqing line 
February 2003 Russia agrees to the Japanese 
proposal, but decides to build a side 
line to Daqing 
May 2003 Russia changes plans, deciding to 
construct the Angarsk-Daqing line 
after all, signing an agreement on the 
supply of 7 billion tonnes of oil  
October 2003 Due to the intervention of Japanese 
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foreign oil policy, the Angarsk-Daqing 
line is shelved once again 
June 2004 Both the Angarsk-Daqing line and 
Angarsk-Nakhodka line are cancelled. 
Instead, construction of the 
Taishet-Nakhodka line is approved  
June 2006 Beginning of first stage of construction 
of Taishet-Nakhodka line. Plans are 
made to construct a side line from 
Skovorodino to Daqing 
May 2009  Beginning of construction of side line 
from Skovorodino to Daqing 
January 2011 Russia begins to supply oil to China 
 
 
In this state of diminished trust, how is it that Russia and China have still been 
able to succeed in cooperation? This is due to two main reasons, which have 
already been discussed at length. Firstly, Russia’s absolute advantage is 
decreasing, with a knock-on effect for the likelihood of successful cooperation. 
Secondly, external pressure such as the sanctions placed on Russia by 
Europe and the U.S. has triggered Russia’s growing need to cooperate with 
China. This high degree of complementarity has helped bolster cooperation, 
and the time of Russian inconsistency may be drawing to a close, but there is 
no doubt that the Chinese authorities will be on their guard against any 
resumption of Russian backtracking.  
 
5.2.4 Tactics: Loan-for-Oil and the Laying of Pipelines 
With regard to the assumption eight, there is not a specific concrete tactic to 
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achieve co-opetition; tactics instead depend on the player that China faces. In 
this case, China and Russia are asymmetrical players, but Russia’s absolute 
advantage means that Russia will require a great deal of contribution from 
China. Currently, Sino-Russian co-opetition on energy falls into two styles. The 
first is dubbed loan-for-oil, which is a typical style employed by Chinese energy 
companies when investing abroad. According to the EIA (2014b), by the end of 
2012, Chinese national oil companies (NOCs) had secured bilateral 
loan-for-oil deals with several countries – including Russia – amounting to 
around $108 billion worth of agreements. In addition, Chinese energy 
companies provide loans to these countries to extract energy reserves and 
build energy infrastructure in exchange for oil and gas imports at established 
prices. (EIA, 2014a) According to Jiang and Sinton (2011), in 2011 Russia 
signed one such deal with China, stating that in return for $15 billion in 
Chinese loans to Russian oil companies, Russia will supply China with large 
quantities of crude oil via new pipelines for the next 20 years. A 20-year deal is 
a relatively long period, and it will prove mutually beneficial; Russian oil 
companies will receive $15 billion of much-needed loans, and these 
companies will in turn generate 300 kb per day of energy to help meet the 
demands of the hungry Chinese energy market. Figure 14 is a visual 
representation of the structure of this Sino-Russian loan-for-oil deal. 
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Figure 14: Sino-Russian Loan-for-Oil Deal Structure (Jiang and 
Sinton, 2011:22) 
 
In addition, in the year 2013, Russian Prime Minister Medvedev signed an 
agreement to pump 200,000 barrels of crude oil per day over 10 years to 
China’s Sinopec Group, in a pre-paid deal valued at $85 billion. (Dyomkin, 
2013) In the same year, China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) and 
Russia’s Rosneft signed an agreement to lend another $270 billion to Russia 
for an additional 300,000 bbl/d of oil through the ESPO pipeline. This is one of 
the largest energy deals that China has ever made (EIA, 2014a), and also will 
be decisive with regard to Russia’s own future energy strategy. This kind of 
massive deal suggests that both China and Russia are turning their eye to the 
vast potential in Russian-East Asian cooperation. 
In the absence of mutual trust, could this kind of cooperation, dictated 
by economic needs, really be stable and long-lasting? Hill and Fee (2002) note 
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that Russia exports primary products such as oil and natural gas to China, but 
China exports manufactured products back to Russia. This unbalanced trade 
structure directly threatens Russia’s domestic manufacturing industry and runs 
the risk of Chinese products flooding the market, upsetting economic relations. 
In addition to this, although the Russian government seems to be willing to 
trust China, other observers are less optimistic, and China’s energy threat 
once again rears its head. Russian political analyst Piontkovsky (2007:para.8) 
points out that of China’s 24 neighbouring countries, 11 are engaged in 
territory dispute with China, and he laments that ‘Russia’s political and military 
leadership seem not to sense any threat; on the contrary, they continue to sell 
advanced weapons to the Chinese.’ 
Although these concerns cannot be overlooked, this data is already 
10 years old and China and Russia had solved the boundary issues of the 
Hexiazi/ Bolshoy Ussuriysky Island by 2008. (Nadkarni, 2010) The successful 
resolution of boundary issues is in direct contrast to the escalation of 
Sino-Japanese conflict over territory, and may be attributed in part to the 
signing of the Treaty of Good-Neighbourliness and Friendly Cooperation 
Between the People’s Republic of China and the Russian Federation (FCT) in 
2001, which follows the outline of the Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence. 
The treaty states that ‘the two sides are determined to build the boundary 
between the two countries into one of permanent peace and lasting friendship. 
The two parties will adhere to international principles concerned and strictly 
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observe the boundary between the two countries.’ (Xinhua News Agency, 
2001)  
Interestingly, the spectre of China Threat seems to now be 
transforming into a combined China-Russia Threat to the west due to the 
extensive cooperation between the two powers on energy in 2014. As Hopkins 
(2014:para.5) analyses, ‘China and Russia can leverage the global community 
against the U.S. and Europe, either through vetoes at the United Nations or by 
using energy as a weapon.’ But what exactly is the threat? If China and Japan 
were to reach similar agreements on energy, it is unlikely that the West would 
see this as a combined China-Japan threat, and may instead see Japan as 
mitigating China. So it would appear that the root of the issue is assumptions 
about the nature of Russia and China in global society. In the viewpoint of 
Mearsheimer (2010), China is a threat to the very security of the U.S. However, 
the Chinese government has consistently reiterated that the country’s 
development will be peaceful. Closely reflecting the ideas of traditional 
Chinese Hehe culture of peace is precious’ and ‘harmony without sameness, 
in a recent speech Xi Jinping declared that ‘the Chinese nation has always 
held such beliefs as ‘peace is most precious,’ ‘harmony without uniformity,’ 
‘peace among all nations’ and ‘universal love and non-aggression’… disputes 
and differences between countries should be resolved through dialogue, 
consultation and peaceful means. We should increase mutual trust, and settle 
disputes and promote security through dialogue.’ (Xi Jinping, 2014:para.29) 
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The Chinese government has never publicly wavered from the pursuit of 
peace and harmony in face of different ideologies. 
The second major style of co-opetition is associated with pipelines. 
Pipelines allow transportation of energy resources. The optimum construction 
of pipelines is vital to the future capacity of supply and demand. As the supplier 
of energy, the onus traditionally falls on Russia to construct the pipelines for 
energy transportation. Sino-Russian negotiations on the construction of 
pipelines began as far back as 1994, but construction only began in earnest in 
2009. As discussed, Sino-Russian cooperation on pipelines went through a 
long and arduous process, and the speed of progress was somewhat 
hampered due to the existence of other external players, notably including 
Japan. After substantial cooperation, the pipeline was constructed relatively 
quickly, and was formally put into use in 2011. (Xinhua News Agency, 2011) 
The map in Figure 15 allows for the clearest understanding of Russia’s ESPO 
(Eastern Siberia Pipeline Oil) pipeline system.  
 
Figure 15: ESPO Pipelines Development (Platts, 2011:2) 
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One of the main motivations behind the construction of a land pipeline is to 
avoid over-reliance on maritime transport, a major risk to China’s energy 
security. But whether the Russian pipeline is truly safer than maritime transport 
is still up for debate. According to Zha (2012), China’s major sea transportation 
relies on the Malacca Strait and the possibility of war in the Strait is actually 
very low, because as so many countries rely so heavily on the this stretch of 
water, cooperation is in everyone’s best interests. As for the Sino-Russian 
pipeline, relations are currently in a very positive stage, but if the Sino-Russian 
relationship were to take a turn for the worse, would the pipeline supply really 
be safe? It may be that the pipeline offers no more of a long-term secure 
solution than maritime transportation. 
 
5.2.5 Scope: Mutual Energy Cooperation: The Best Choice for 
Sino-Russian Energy Co-opetition? 
Finally, in terms of the assumption nine, the best scope for Sino-Russian 
energy co-opetition is mainly the establishment of a bilateral or mutual 
cooperation mechanism. Thus far, the crux of negotiation between China and 
Russia is almost invariably a dispute over who should bear responsibility for 
the price in bilateral cooperation. This includes not only pipeline projects as 
outlined above, but also, for instance, negotiations over the price of exporting 
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natural gas. The bargaining process is protracted and regularly produces little, 
if any, positive outcome. 
With regard to bilateral bargaining over price, using the Rubinstein 
model, Russia and China would essentially be negotiating over how to divide 
the cake of energy cooperation. Both sides have a clear vision of how they can 
ultimately gain the greatest profit for themselves. If Russia were to put forward 
a price first and China agreed with this price, then cooperation could move 
fairly smoothly into the following stage. However, if China refuses to accept the 
price, then the natural next step is for China to offer their own price and await 
Russia’s response. Once again, if Russia rejects this offer then it falls to 
Russia to make a new, revised offer. This back-and-forth process will last until 
the two sides are able to agree upon a suitable price. 
This model of bargaining is slow, drawn-out, and often unsuccessful. 
However, the demand for energy and the need for energy exchange are still 
vital for both sides, and as a result, certain mechanisms are beginning to 
emerge to enable optimised bargaining on energy prices. For example, 
according to Pang (2007), the President of Kazakhstan Nursultan Nazarbayev 
suggested the establishment of an energy agency, or energy exchange, 
conducted under the framework of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation 
(SCO). Following this suggestion, Sino-Russian cooperation was presented 
with a new challenge: establish an energy body to supervise and plan the 
details of energy cooperation, in order to make negotiations smoother and 
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more transparent. (Overland et al., 2010) In 2007, Russia announced that an 
SCO Energy Club would be established. This club would represent a unique 
cooperative decision-making centre. Energy markets in the SCO nations 
would be directly influenced by the SCO’s energy exchange guided by the 
Energy Club. (Pang, 2007) 
As Overland et al. (2010) argue, some experts believe that the 
establishment of this Energy Club could present a powerful opponent to OPEC, 
with some going so far as to describe the cooperating SCO nations as ‘an 
OPEC with nukes.’ The SCO is therefore powerful enough in itself to dictate 
energy prices between its members. What’s more, within the SCO, there are 
both energy suppliers and customers. It can thus be argued that the 
establishment of any price-setting mechanism within the SCO will be once 
again dictated by the degree of complementarity of the SCO nations. In other 
words, as the two most powerful actors within SCO, the scope of Russia and 
China’s energy co-opetition under the SCO will also be decided by their 
complementarity. 
Based on Pang and Zhang (2011)’s design, the schema of 
establishing an energy price-setting mechanism within the SCO is complex 
because it includes both potential agreements and disagreements on building 
a price mechanism within the SCO as well as the same possibilities for using 
another price mechanism such as one dictated by OPEC. Eight different 
choices can be identified, but first there are certain considerations to take into 
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account. To begin with, it is supposed that if Russia does not move to prevent 
the establishment of price-setting within the SCO, then the mechanism will be 
established. However, if an energy price-setting mechanism is established 
only within the SCO, where China has greater leverage, China can obtain a 
profit of 4 (the figures are hypothesised in order to display the outcome most 
clearly), whereas a dissenting Russia would obtain -4. This is because Russia 
would be forced to make a concession on its prices. If an energy price-setting 
mechanism is not established within the SCO, but an alternative mechanism, 
such as that of OPEC, is taken up, then Russia stands to gain a profit of 8 due 
to a beneficial energy price, whereas China will obtain -2. If both sides agree to 
cooperate, both will receive a profit of 2, whereas if either side disagrees, the 
agreeing side will obtain 1, and the disagreeing side must pay the cost of 
betrayal at -1, as the disagreement will influence the bilateral trust-building 
relations between the two sides. With these conditions in mind, the eight 
potential choices, represented with letters, can be outlined as follows: 
A: China agrees on a price mechanism within the SCO; Russia also 
agrees. In addition to the SCO mechanism, another price-setting mechanism 
is used in concert. In this situation, the profit of China is 4 (-2+4+2); the profit of 
Russia is 6 (-4+8+2).  
B: China agrees but Russia disagrees on the SCO mechanism, and 
another mechanism is used instead. In this situation, China gains 3 (-2+4+1) 
and Russia also gains 3 (-4-1+8). 
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C: Both China and Russia agree to establish an SCO mechanism and 
do not use an alternative mechanism. In this situation, China will obtain 6 (4+2), 
but Russia will receive -2 (-4+2). 
D: China agrees but Russia disagrees on the establishment of an 
SCO mechanism, and no alternative mechanism is employed either. In this 
situation, China obtains 5 (4+1), whereas Russia will receive -5(-4-1). 
E: China disagrees on the establishment of an SCO mechanism, 
whereas Russia agrees. An alternative mechanism is established. Under this 
situation, China will obtain -3 (-1-2) and Russia will gain 5 (-4+8+1). It is 
specifically argued that this situation will not occur, because as a benefitting 
member of the SCO, it would be irrational for China to reject the profit it would 
gain from agreeing if Russia were also willing to establish an SCO price-setting 
mechanism. 
F: China and Russia both disagree and another mechanism is 
established. In this situation, China will receive -3 (-2-1) and Russia will obtain 
7 (8-1). In other words, if an SCO price-setting mechanism were not 
established, China would lose out in this regard and also be hit by the pressure 
of the alternative pricing mechanism, thereby losing out twice. 
G: China disagrees, Russia agrees and an alternative mechanism is 
not established. In this situation, China will obtain -1, and Russia will accept 1.  
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H: Both Russia and China disagree, and no other mechanism is 
established. Under these circumstances, both Russia and China would obtain 
-1. These eight alternatives are laid out in the table below: 
Table 17: Payoffs of Alternative Price Mechanisms (Pang and Zhang, 
2011:49) 
(China/ 
Russia) 
A
A 
B
B 
C
C 
D
D 
E
E 
F
F 
G
G 
H
H 
Total profit (
4,6) 
(
3,3) 
(
6,-2) 
(
5,-5) 
(
-3,5) 
(
-3,7) 
(
-1,1) 
(
-1,-1) 
 
From the analysis of these choices, it can be clearly seen that the best choice 
for China is to establish a price-setting mechanism within the SCO. In addition 
to the initial construction of an energy price-setting mechanism, questions also 
arise around how energy prices could be adjusted within the SCO Energy Club. 
As we know, Russia is the largest supplier in the SCO, but Kazakhstan also 
supplies oil and natural gas to China. Price adjustment will be helped and 
hindered by the involvement of other countries, but as the major supplier in the 
SCO, Russia simply cannot ignore the fluctuation in international energy prices. 
According to Goodrich and Lanthemann (2013), up to half of Russia’s overall 
budget derives from two main trades: 80% of the half from oil and 20% from 
natural gas. Russia is thus extremely economically vulnerable to fluctuations in 
the price of energy. Rautava (2004) calculates that in the long-term, every 10% 
increase or decrease in international oil prices may give rise to a 2.2% 
increase or decrease in Russian GDP. As a result, if oil and gas prices fall, it 
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will be very difficult for Russia to maintain steady economic development. It 
can thus be summed up that Russia is facing a constant risk of global energy 
price fluctuation, as energy revenue accounts for such a large proportion of the 
Russian economy. Therefore, for Russia, stabilising and guaranteeing the 
security of the SCO Energy Club and any resulting price-setting mechanisms 
is a crucial issue, and the management of this challenge may influence 
Sino-Russian bilateral co-opetition. 
In conclusion, Sino-Russian co-opetition can achieve success due to 
the two states’ asymmetrical energy power, high complementarity, and 
gradually developing commitment and reciprocity. With this in mind, 
Sino-Russian energy co-opetition requires attention to the following aspects. 
Firstly, the establishment of a Sino-Russian strategic dialogue mechanism 
regarding energy is important for long-term cooperation. With the supervision 
of a strategic dialogue mechanism, these two countries will be in a better 
position to make full use of the favourable opportunity from their current 
political and economic relations, and actively work towards improving their 
degree of complementarity. This can enable both sides to successfully 
negotiate and establish an effective long-term mechanism for energy dialogue 
with each other.  
Secondly, China must re-examine its bilateral and cooperative 
relations with Russia, and try to seek out multilateral cooperation that works in 
everyone’s favour. As this chapter has shown, the involvement of Japan and 
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other countries in the energy game in the Asia-Pacific market has created 
instability for China’s bilateral energy negotiations with Russia. On the other 
hand, the disparity of power between China and Russia is also not to China’s 
advantage. Russia has been able to leverage its power to take absolute 
advantage in the energy games, pushing China into a passive position, 
although this is beginning to change. There is thus the possibility that carefully 
chosen multilateral cooperation may benefit China by re-addressing the 
balance of power in negotiations. However, due to current circumstances in 
international and regional politics, for the time being it remains unlikely that 
China would be able to secure a cooperative third party ally within the 
Asia-Pacific region.  
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Chapter Six: A Case Study of Sino-African 
Co-opetition on Energy 
 
Chapter Five reviewed the successes and difficulties of Sino-Russian 
co-opetition on energy by outlining the historical development of the two 
countries’ energy relations throughout teach Chinese leaders’ era, and by 
conducting a game theory PARTS analysis of the possibilities for energy 
co-opetition between Russia and China. It was demonstrated that closer 
cooperation with Russia would enable access to Russia’s massive energy 
reserves, thereby helping resolve China’s major energy security concern of a 
shortfall of energy supply. The building of overland pipelines would also help 
relieve the secondary concern of risk associated with over-dependence on 
maritime transport. Originally, the slow and long-winded progress of 
Sino-Russian energy co-opetition was shaped by Russia’s absolute advantage 
and the differing policy stances of successive generations of leadership both in 
China and Russia. However, with changes in the global energy pattern, the 
establishment of new strategic relations between China and Russia 
symbolises the acceleration and success of co-opetition. In the PARTS model 
analysis, it was deduced that the extremity of the power asymmetry was 
behind the initial slow progress of co-opetition; as the weaker side in 
Sino-Russian energy relations, China is buffeted by Russian decisions and 
has relatively less power of negotiation. However, within their new strategic 
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relations, the two countries’ strategic, geopolitical and economical 
complementarity strengthens China’s bargaining and promotes successful 
co-opetition. In addition, loan-for-oil and the laying of pipelines represent 
commitments and reciprocity, smoothing bilateral cooperation through the 
advancement of peaceful coexistence and mutual benefit. However, it is 
unlikely that complex bargaining over energy price will be resolved by bilateral 
cooperation, and instead it would be more efficient to find a method of 
multilateral cooperation, such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation 
(SCO). Nonetheless, it has also been shown that an increase in players in 
Sino-Russian energy co-opetition may cause swings and changes in Russia’s 
commitment; China must therefore remain aware of Russia’s interests in 
global energy frameworks and take this into account for China’s own strategy. 
In all, the current conditions of Sino-Russian energy relations 
represent a relatively successful case of Chinese co-opetition, but progress 
has been slow and difficult up to now. By comparison, Sino-African energy 
co-opetition has been developing at lightning speed. Africa collectively 
possesses vast energy reserves and in this sense is comparable to the 
absolute advantage of Russia. So why exactly has Sino-African energy 
co-opetition been so smooth and rapid compared to co-opetition between 
China and Russia? This chapter will focus on Sino-African energy co-opetition 
to investigate the precise factors influencing the success of relations. 
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Notably, the previous two cases have discussed China’s energy 
relations, whereas this chapter looks at relations with an entire continent. This 
may appear inconsistent, but African countries have been taken as a whole for 
several reasons. Firstly, China has applied the lessons from the Five 
Principles of Peaceful Co-existence to various countries across Africa, and has 
supplied aid such as infrastructure in return for energy in the name of mutual 
benefit, but the exact strategy has varied slightly across countries due to 
different internal conditions. In terms of co-opetition, these different strategies 
can be treated as one large overarching strategy towards African 
energy-producer countries. Secondly, in this research Africa refers mainly to 
sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) rather than the whole African mainland per se. This 
is due to the complex situation in the Maghreb following the Arab Spring, 
including tense relations with Western powers and uncertainty about the future. 
In addition, according to Katsouris (2010), energy in SSA is particularly 
abundant, making up over half of total Africa energy reserves. Collectively, 
SSA countries make up a formidable energy partner worthy of analysis. Thirdly, 
the African countries are collectively not merely a supplier to China, but they 
also provide a platform for China’s relations with other countries, including 
other African countries themselves, producer countries such as Russia, or 
energy-importing countries like Japan. That is to say, Africa is of great 
importance to China as the continent’s collective energy traits match China’s 
energy security needs, in that China’s energy supply is at risk of falling short of 
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demand so the country needs to increase and diversify sources of energy 
imports. Greater levels of co-opetition with a range of African countries may 
allow China to conduct energy relations differently with other partners. 
Different African countries may benefit from co-opetition with China by playing 
to their own competitive advantages; as for China itself, cooperating with 
African countries provides access to much-needed resources, whereas 
maintaining a certain degree of competition protects China’s own interests. 
Thus, for the reasons outlined above, it is rational to consider African supplier 
countries collectively. 
As in the previous two case study chapters, this chapter on 
Sino-African energy co-opetition will also divide the case into two separate 
parts. The first will explain in more detail how Sino-African co-opetition 
develops by investigating why African energy is so important to China, and 
outlining the historical development of the relationship. The second section will 
move on to analyse Sino-African co-opetition according to the PARTS model 
from game theory, in order to deduce the way in which China currently 
conducts co-opetitive energy relations with African players. This section will 
illustrate how these asymmetrical powers play the energy game and how other 
players might influence the game.  
The complementarity of Africa and China will also be addressed, 
presenting certain debates on the nature of Sino-African co-opetition, such as 
the argument by many Western observers that not only do China and Africa 
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not enjoy equal cooperation, but China even represents a neo-colonialist force 
on the continent. If this is the case, can Sino-African co-opetition in its present 
form last for very long? Furthermore, there is the persistent question of the 
Chinese energy threat. This generally refers to the intense competition and 
increased consumption of world supplies triggered by China’s economic rise. It 
is often postulated that the world’s energy structure and security will be 
destroyed as a direct consequence of this development. Some go so far as to 
suggest that China is ‘plundering’ the world’s energy reserves. (Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China, 2012) Under the shadow of 
the China energy threat and neo-colonialist cooperation, will it be easy for the 
two sides to make firm commitments? Thus far, loan-for-oil has represented 
China’s main tactic in Africa, which has stepped on the toes of other opponent 
energy-importing countries. Will the situation of competition between other 
rivals played out on the African continent affect the trajectory of Sino-African 
co-opetition? Finally, the scope of Sino-African co-opetition under UNFCCC 
will be analysed in order to discuss whether this dialogue will be conducive to 
further co-opetition between China and Africa. 
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6.1 Sino-Africa Energy Co-opetition: Smooth but 
Challenged 
This section will pinpoint the specific relations between China and Africa by 
analysing the conditions of African energy as well as the historical 
development of Sino-African cooperative relations. Primarily, the co-opetition 
between China and African has been smooth but in recent years, more and 
more disputes have upset the co-opetition. This includes major accusations 
such as the China energy threat and possible Chinese neo-colonialism in 
Africa, which are pejoratively affecting and calling into question the co-opetitive 
relations between China and African. What scope is there for Sino-African 
co-opetition in the future?  
 
6.1.1 African Energy Conditions 
African energy is crucial to China because it is precisely situated to resolve the 
major issue facing China’s energy security – that current supplies may not 
meet demand. As discussed in previous chapters, China is desperately in 
need of consistent and steady supplies of energy, and one way of achieving 
this is through creating cooperation with new suppliers of sources previously 
untapped by China. African energy is especially attractive to China due to four 
key reasons: abundance, quality (including variety) of the reserves, low 
exploration costs, and favourable geographical advantages.  
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Firstly, Africa is one of the eight major oil-producing areas of the 
world, pointing to the abundance of African energy reserves. According to the 
International Energy Agency (2014), 30% of global oil production during the 
past five years has been in Africa, and this proportion is on the increase. 
Furthermore, statistics from BP (2013c) show that by the end of 2012, Africa’s 
proven petroleum reserves numbered 130.3 billion barrels, or 7.8% of the 
world’s total. The production of petroleum in Africa averages 9442 thousand 
barrels daily, which makes up 10.9% of total global production. However, 
Africa itself consumes only 3523 thousand barrels per day, a mere 4% of the 
world’s production total. Compared to levels of production, consumption in 
Africa is exceptionally low, allowing a huge proportion of reserves to be 
earmarked for export. Figure 16 demonstrates that the proportion of proven 
reserves of petroleum in Africa increased from 1992 to 2012, whereas the 
Middle East’s share was in decline. What does this suggest? It can be clearly 
deduced that importing energy from Africa can significantly reduce 
dependence on the Middle East market, which is plagued by political turmoil 
and instability. In terms of energy security, cooperation with Africa on energy 
exportation can both increase China’s capability of meeting increasing 
domestic energy demands and relieve the current over-dependence on risky 
Middle East supplies. 
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Figure 16: Distribution of Proved Reserves in 1992, 2002, and 2012 
(BP, 2013a:7)  
In addition to oil, natural gas is also an important energy resource found in 
abundance in Africa. According to a report from KPMG Africa (2013), proven 
natural gas reserves measured 14.5 trillion cubic metres in 2012, a 7.7% share 
of the global total. In addition, according to a 2013 BP report, African natural 
gas reserves have an exceptionally high RPR(Reserves-to-Production ratio)45 
of 67.1, whereas the world average is 55.7. (BP, 2013c) This suggests that 
Africa has great potential for exploration in terms of natural gas, and that it may 
represent an alternative partner for China to reduce reliance on Russian 
natural gas. 
																																																								
45 RPR (Reserves-to-Production Ratio) refers to the ratio of proven reserves of fossil fuels, 
such as petroleum, to annual production. Generally, numbers under 10-14 are dangerous, 
hinting that production is plummeting and production is becoming instable. The higher the 
number, the longer production will meet requirements. (Feygin and Satkin, 2004) 
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Most African countries – with the exceptions of Nigeria, Angola and 
Algeria – are not members of OPEC. Non-OPEC countries are not limited by 
production quotas (Cline, 2008), and oil production in non-OPEC countries is 
largely controlled by the private sector, with production centred around the 
attainment of higher revenue. There is thus much greater flexibility for 
investment in non-OPEC countries. In 2000, more than 40 energy contracts 
were signed by China and African countries including Algeria, Egypt, Kenya, 
Morocco, Nigeria and South Africa, and many others have been engaging in 
continuing exploration and contract bidding. (Yang and Chen, 2005) 
In addition to the abundant amount of proven reserves in Africa, 
foreign investment is also attracted by the extensive variety and high quality of 
energy resources available. For example, as Energy Intelligence Research 
(2009) reports, in the Republic of Guinea alone, there are more than 40 
varieties of oil, most of which offer high quality crude and are easy to process 
and refine due to low sulphur content and mineral composition. In Nigeria, the 
API gravity number46 in 65% of the crude oil is above 35. (EIA, 2012b) Most of 
the export crude in Nigeria is of a light, sweet grade, the gravities ranging from 
API 29 to 47 degrees, with low sulphur contents of 0.05% to 0.3%. (Energy 
Intelligence Research, 2009) By way of comparison, the average API gravity in 
																																																								
46 The American Petroleum Institute (API) established a measure of the density of oil and 
petroleum products. Degrees API is now the most commonly used density scale. The higher 
the API gravity number, the lighter the crude. Crude oils with low carbon, high hydrogen, and 
high API gravity are usually rich in paraffin and tend to yield greater proportions of gasoline 
and light petroleum products. (Bacon and Tordo, 2005)  
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the Middle East is 31.1 and the average in Africa is 38.6. The oil in the Middle 
East is well-known for its quality, and yet African oil has a higher API, 
indicating the value of African oil exploration. (Lantz et al., 2012) Further to this, 
the most recent two years of BP review reports (2013 and 2014) indicate that 
Africa’s petroleum RPR (Reserves-to-Production ratio)47 increased from 37.7 
in 2013 to 47.7 in 2014. (BP, 2013c; BP, 2014) Production rates are increasing 
and Africa is therefore a valuable source for China to consider. 
Thirdly, although Africa’s reserves are of such high quality, the costs 
of exploration remain significantly low, one of the major attractive advantages 
of the African energy market. According to data from EIA (2011b), the average 
cost of world oil and natural gas is $9.95 a barrel. The equivalent in the Middle 
East, with highly developed production, costs just US$9.89, but the African 
cost is only slightly higher at US$10.31 a barrel. Nevertheless, this is far lower 
than the US$12.18 cost in the United States, and US$12.69 in Canada. In 
addition, most African oil is located near the Gulf of Guinea, at shallow levels. 
This allows for a high rate of success in well drilling, significantly reducing the 
exploration costs. (Oliveira, 2007) 
The fourth advantage of African energy is the favourable 
geographical conditions. Africa’s energy resources are distributed in certain 
key locations, which is conducive to easy access. As Gawenda et al. (2004) 
mention, in 2003 alone, 30 wells were successfully drilled in Angola, Congo, 																																																									
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Equatorial Guinea, Gabon and Nigeria, showing the significant energy 
capacity across the Gulf of Guinea. The richest reserves are in West African 
Craton in North and West Africa.  
 
 
Figure 17: Production of Petroleum in Africa (Feygin and Satkin, 
2004:59) 
 
However, there is a key geographical disadvantage to Africa’s energy. A third 
of African energy resources are distributed offshore, three quarters of which 
are concentrated in the Gulf of Guinea, particularly off the coast stretching 
from Nigeria to Angola. (Dieterich, 2004) Unfortunately, this means that 
maritime transportation is the optimum choice for African energy imports to 
China. The common import route from SSA to China is from the Gulf of Guinea 
through the South Atlantic Ocean, past the Cape of Good Hope into the Indian 
Share	of	Total	
ALGERIA	
ANGOLA	
CHAD	
REPUBLIC	OF	CONGO	
EGYPT	
EQUATORIAL	GUINEA	
		 310	
Ocean, through the Strait of Malacca to the Taiwan Strait where imports finally 
arrive in China. 
 
Figure 18: Geographical Transportation Route of China’s Energy 
Imports from Africa (Maps of word, 2013) 
 
Just like Middle Eastern imports, African imports to China must also pass 
through the infamous Strait of Malacca, increasing the risk to China’s energy 
security. Securing the Strait is of utmost importance not only to China, but also 
to many other importing nations in East Asia, and so this narrow stretch is 
subject to coordinated patrols by Singapore, Malaysia and Indonesia (The 
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Jakarta Post, 2004), which somewhat increase security and reduce risk. 
However, many of China’s remaining territorial disputes cross the China South 
Sea, which influences the Strait of Malacca, because as Schofield and Storey 
(2009) point out, it provides the shortest route between the Indian Ocean and 
South China Sea. Territorial disputes reduce the likelihood of coordinated 
security efforts and increase instability and risk, so for the sake of energy 
security, China may need to turn attention to securing the Strait. 
Due to these four advantages, African energy is undoubtedly an 
interesting proposition for China, and the significance China places on 
securing a new supplier of energy strongly influences the inevitability of 
increasing interdependence between China and Africa. So how exactly have 
Sino-African relations developed over time? 
 
6.1.2 Historical Development of Sino-African Energy Relations 
Generally speaking, Sino-African co-opetition has been smooth and free from 
the hiccups seen with Sino-Russian co-opetition, or the rivalry that besets 
Sino-Japanese relations. Chinese Hehe culture has been a major influence in 
Sino-African relations, with China extending support to Africa since the very 
beginning of Mao’s era in the name of mutual support. Today’s Sino-African 
co-opetition has grown from virtually nothing; Sino-African relations began with 
unilateral aid flowing from China to Africa and have metamorphosed into 
		 312	
co-opetition with the discovery of African resources and the acceleration of 
China’s energy security concern. 
Naturally it can be questioned whether China’s co-opetitive efforts are 
truly sincere; Sino-African co-opetition has so far been driven almost entirely 
by rapid energy exploitation financed by China, creating sometimes runaway 
profits for Africa and possible risk to Africa’s balanced development. According 
to Taylor (2006a), China’s vast investment in Africa in the relentless quest for 
energy is seen to prop up autocratic and corrupt regimes, causing yet more 
disputes about the goal of China’s energy programmes.  
However, considering historical developments, this chapter argues 
that China’s co-opetition with Africa is a reasonable evolution of the previous 
aid-based relations, built upon the principle of mutual benefit and mutual 
respect for both sides. Although it takes an economic form, this does not mean 
that the motive behind co-opetition is necessarily based purely on economic 
profit, but rather it is still influenced by Hehe culture, the Five Principles of 
Peaceful Co-existence, and the gradual progression of mutual understanding 
between partners. The nature of cooperation has never changed; China has 
long supported Africa, but the existence of energy complementarity has 
injected new life – and greater equality – into Sino-African relations. Here, as 
assumption ten 48  mentioned, Hehe culture made the co-opetition with 
																																																								
48 Assumption Ten: Hehe can keep the balance in co-opetition and compensate for 
the add value on economy interdependence. (Details have been examined in section 
2.1.3) 
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Chinese character and restored the limitation of purely economic 
complementarity.  
Relations between Africa and New China began in the era of Mao, 
who proposed his three world theory: the first world of superpowers, the 
second world of lesser powers, and the third world of exploited countries. Mao 
believed that the oppressed people of exploited countries should strive for 
liberation, and that if they were unable to do so themselves, it was the 
responsibility of successfully liberated countries to offer their assistance to 
those still struggling to foment revolution. Mao (1977a) considered this to be 
nothing less than an international socialist duty. Although this Maoist thought 
has been criticised, it was generally framed as an altruistic attempt to support 
those in need, including in particular the underdeveloped post-colonialist 
countries of the African continent and elsewhere. For example, in 1959, China 
supplied 10,000 tonnes of rice to Guinea and 15,000 tonnes of wheat to 
Albania. (Ogunsanwo, 1974) As Figure 19 shows, even though 1960-1963 
was a period of natural disaster in China, and failed industrialisation schemes 
were causing havoc nationwide, China’s aid to Africa was still rising.  
What’s more, Figure 19 also shows that 1973 was the first peak year 
of aid to Africa – but in 1973, China itself was mired in the ten year Cultural 
Revolution (1966-1976). Economic recession was rampant and 
industrialisation had ground to a halt. (Bai, 2014) But until 1973, China’s aid to 
Africa continued to rise unabated. This does not seem to be a particularly 
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practical or rational undertaking, and indeed levels of aid did drop dramatically 
as China’s economy reeled from the effects of domestic political change. 
Nonetheless, until no longer able, China supplied aid to Africa based on Hehe 
culture, which emphasises cooperation and harmony between countries.  
 
Figure 19: China’s Foreign Aid to Africa (RMB) (Li, 2006b:2) 
In the early 1950s, the Chinese government started pursuing the Five 
Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, followed by the Eight Principles for 
Economic Aid and Technical Assistance49 proposed in 1964 to dictate policy 																																																								
49 These principles were proposed by Zhou Enlai in 1964, and include the following eight 
points 
1. Be based on the principle of equality and mutual benefit 
2. Respect the sovereignty of recipient countries and never attach any conditions or ask 
for any privileges 
3. Provide economic aid in the form of interest-free or low-interest loans and extend the 
time limit for the repayment when necessary 
4. Help recipient countries embark step-by-step on the road to self-reliance and 
independent economic development 
5. Help recipient countries complete projects which require less investment but yield 
quick results  
6. Provide the best quality equipment and materials manufactured by China at 
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toward Africa as a whole. (Lu, 2000) These principles underline the equality 
between the two actors, the Chinese government’s respect for Africa, and the 
desire to employ complementary advantages in order to achieve mutual 
benefit. Crucially, as Zhou (1964) points out, all aid was provided without any 
attached conditions, and was therefore based on equality and mutual respect. 
In other words, although aid was provided unilaterally, China saw the 
fundamental relations between China and Africa as mutual, and gifted aid on 
the basis of respect for an oppressed partner. Zhou (1964) also notes that the 
major objective of Chinese aid was to help boost the self-reliance of the 
recipient by transfer of capital, experience and technology. Thus, although the 
levels of aid in Mao’s time were irrational and surpassed China’s capacity, they 
derived from a principle of sincerity.  
It is important to note that, as Li (2007) explains, although China 
offered assistance to Africa, formal cooperation existed only between a few 
limited countries, particularly those fighting for the communist ideology, 
including the African National Congress (ANC) in South Africa, and Guinea 
and Cape Verde. China particularly supported countries which had broken with 
the Soviet Union. As such it can be seen that although China’s aid was based 
on mutual respect, it was only extended to countries with shared ideologies as 																																																																																																																																																														
international market prices 
7. Ensure that the personnel of the recipient country fully master the technology being 
transferred  
8. Chinese experts will have the same standard of living as the experts of the recipient 
country (MOFCOM, 2009)  
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part of China’s assumed international duty to assist the socialist liberation of 
the third world. 
As China’s political stance changed at the dawn of Deng Xiaoping’s 
era, aid began to drop dramatically. China was engaged in restructuring its 
own economy and irrational aid for the sake of ideology was no longer a 
realistic possibility. According to the Modern Chinese Research Institute 
(1977), in 1950-1976, China had already spent 44.5 billion yuan on foreign aid, 
and had signed aid agreements totalling 61.9 billion yuan. It was decided that 
future foreign aid should be in proportion to total expenditure, and be limited to 
only 4% of the amount, in order to reduce underdeveloped countries’ reliance 
on Chinese aid. 
Furthermore, China still requires considerable funds to develop its 
own economy, and due to the damage caused by the Cultural Revolution, the 
government has little choice but to reduce aid expenses in order to make up 
for the shortage of capital. (Zhou, 2014) However, although the amount of aid 
expenditure decreased in Deng’s era, this does not mean that China 
abandoned aid to Africa in entirety. According to the Ministry of Commerce of 
the People's Republic of China (1985), the Chinese government instead 
focused on medical and educational aid to Africa. For example, medical teams 
were dispatched to 45 countries in 1984 alone, treating around one million 
patients. As the Chinese economy slowly began to recover, aid to China also 
crept up from 1982 onwards. 
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Another significant change occurred in Deng’s era: China began to 
offer aid to countries with different ideologies, such as Egypt. (Shu, 2010) In 
this way, it can be seen that the aid structure under Deng Xiaoping was even 
more closely aligned with the ideas of Hehe culture, particularly harmony 
without sameness. The goal of Sino-African co-opetition in the Deng Xiaoping 
era was to help African countries stand on their own two feet, rather than rely 
on others, regardless of ideological differences. Even as China moved on 
politically from Mao’s ideological stance of international socialist duty, 
traditional Hehe culture still encouraged the continuation of aid for the sake of 
mutual respect and benefit. The government had also conceded the 
importance of respecting China’s true capabilities and needs, and although 
cooperation at this point was still almost entirely limited to aid, this concession 
marked the beginning of embryonic co-opetition. 
As Figure 19 shows, from 1993 onwards, aid spiked again. In the 
context of China’s energy security, this increase in aid was inevitable. 
According to Ma (2006b), China became a net crude oil import country in 1993, 
and African energy was poised to develop. Before 1979, China’s earliest 
policies in Africa focused mainly on agriculture, with very low amounts of 
investment. (Gillespie, 2001) The period from 1979 to 1990 showed the 
beginnings of growing investment plans, and after this point, due to China’s 
specific energy security requirements, cooperation with Africa accelerated. 
Since 1991, the first stop of China’s foreign ministry official visits every year 
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has always been Africa. The fact that Sino-African relations have been driven 
by energy has caused many observers to question the sincerity and nature of 
China’s aid and investment in Africa. 
However, there has been no real change to the nature of China’s aid 
to Africa. According to the Information Office of the State Council of the 
People's Republic of China (2011a), China’s foreign aid continues to be 
offered without any associated conditions, and China provides reciprocal loans 
and aid in many different areas, such as support for medical services, 
education and infrastructure. 28 countries have established political 
consultation mechanisms with China and cooperation with these countries 
entails an increasing number of fields, particularly education and health. 
(Thompson, 2005) China also supplies technology to Africa to develop clean 
energy and reduce environmental pollution. In a 2011 government white paper 
on foreign aid, it was reported that in the past 10 years, China has transferred 
advanced clean energy technology, including wind and solar, to Africa and 
other developing countries, and has held 50 training courses, with 1400 
experts attending the training. (Information Office of the State Council of the 
People's Republic of China, 2011a) 
The Chinese government has also noticed the importance of 
multilateral organisations for balanced cooperation, including the 
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establishment of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) in 200050. 
The framework of FOCAC can significantly improve understanding on both 
sides and push cooperative efforts in a manner beneficial to both parties. Due 
to the large number of Africa states, China has also signed bilateral joint 
declarations with different countries. For instance, an agreement signed with 
Ethiopia on 6th May 2014 reiterates the significant progress that has been 
made since the formal establishment of Sino-Ethiopian relations in 2003, and 
emphasises the importance of maintaining peaceful cooperation in Africa 
through continuously increasing understanding under the principles of mutual 
benefit and respect. This declaration also noted the importance of FOCAC in 
shaping Sino-African cooperation. (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's 
Republic of China, 2014b) China and Kenya also signed a joint agreement in 
2014, with similar content, including the importance of the existence of FOCAC 
in pushing Sino-African cooperation work in different fields, such as education, 
technology and energy. (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of 
China, 2014c) Outside of such bilateral agreements, the framework of FOCAC 
treats African countries as a whole, which is convenient for China’s application 
of the principle of harmony without sameness although the countries are 
different, this forum allows China to maintain positive, harmonious relations 
with the member states as a whole, without discrimination.  																																																								
50 The objective of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) is: ‘Equal consultation, 
enhancing understanding, expanding consensus, strengthening friendship and promoting 
cooperation.’ Five Ministerial conferences have been held within the forum thus far. (FOCAC, 
2013) 
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China’s aid has transformed from pure aid in the early era of Mao to 
the modern age of co-opetition. In addition to bilateral co-opetitive agreements, 
multilateral organisations such as FOCAC also shape Sino-African 
co-opetition, collective relationships based over time on the principles of deep 
understanding, mutual benefit and respect seen in traditional Hehe culture. 
Although the format of China’s relationship with African countries has evolved 
over time, the nature of Sino-African cooperation historically began with mutual 
respect, and the inclusion of energy trade in the relations does not defeat this 
principle, but rather allows Africa to act as a more equal partner with China. 
Nevertheless, this is the way that Sino-African co-opetition has been 
framed by China, the context of Africa’s colonialist past cannot be ignored. It is 
this context that raises external concerns about the nature and motivation 
behind China’s actions, which have been labelled neo-colonialist by many 
observers. The idea of China energy threat also comes into play as rival 
countries see China’s extensive presence in Africa as a threat to their own 
energy security. Will these issues influence co-opetition between China and 
African countries? The following section will apply the PARTS model of game 
theory to investigate this riddle. 
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6.2 Sino African Co-opetition under the Model of 
Game Theory 
Sino-African co-opetition is different to the previous two cases, because the 
co-opetitive environment for China and Africa is much more complex. In 
addition to the fact that many African countries have been treated collectively 
in this research, additional players such as the U.S., the European Union, 
Japan, India and Russia have all brought their energy ambitions to Africa, 
influencing the Sino-African game of energy co-opetition. The objectives of 
these third players will be discussed in turn, but the main PARTS analysis of 
Sino-African co-opetition will be compared principally to Sino-Japanese and 
Sino-Russian co-opetition in order to tie the three cases studies together.  
 
6.2.1 Players: Asymmetrical Power in a Complex Environment 
The first section concerns the players in the Sino-African game of energy 
co-opetition, and debates how asymmetrical power within a complex 
environment of complementary advantage affects the prospects of 
commitment to co-opetition, in particular when faced with the aforementioned 
risks of China energy threat and neo-colonialism. 
Due to the abundant reserves of African energy, the continent is 
rapidly growing into an intense market not only for China, but also for other 
actors around the world. In other words, in terms of the co-opetition for 
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resources on this platform, China is pitted against rivals, which include not only 
African countries themselves, but also other actors. China and Africa are 
asymmetrical powers in terms of energy, and as discussed in assumption five 
a relationship of asymmetry is conducive to successful co-opetition. Unlike the 
unsteady pace of Sino-Russian co-opetition, Sino-African relations have been 
expanding relatively smoothly. In 1992, China’s oil imports from Africa were as 
low as $0.77 hundred million, accounting for only 4.49% of China’s total oil 
imports. Since then, imports from Africa have increased year on year. By 2008, 
China’s crude oil imports from Africa reached $38.944 billion, making up 30.11% 
of total imports. Following the global financial crisis of 2009, imports from 
Africa dropped to $27.127 billion in amount, but the proportion actually 
increased by 0.28% to 30.39% of the total. (Liang, 2011) These statistics point 
to the growing importance of Africa to China’s energy structure, revealing that 
the degree of China’s dependence on African oil is increasing continuously.  
In other words, African energy now also has absolute advantage in 
the game. In addition, as in the Dictator’s Game, with absolute advantage 
Africa also has the ultimate say on decision-making over the allocation of gains. 
China does not have the power to control the final decisions of Africa. And yet, 
the results of the Sino-African game differ from those of the Sino-Russian 
game. Why is this? 
In the energy game, in terms of resource asymmetry, China is P while 
Africa is Q, and Q>P+5. (The abundant reserves of African energy dictate that 
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Africa has more advantage than China, and therefore Africa’s position can be 
represented as P+5). Africa has more flexibility to influence absolute gains, as 
shown below in Table 18. 
Table 18: Payoff Matrix of Sino-African Co-opetition 
 Africa (Cooperation) Africa (Defection) 
China (Cooperation) (4, 5) (1,6) 
China (Defection) (5,1) (2,2) 
 
(1) When both players chose cooperation, Africa is able to obtain 
more interest than China due to its relative power. In other words, the relative 
gain that Africa can obtain is 1 more than China. In addition, due to different 
energy requirements, China is on the hunt for energy whereas Africa is 
exporting energy. Thus any interest that Africa obtains will not influence 
China’s interest. 
(2) When both players choose to defect, both can obtain 2. The 
reason that the gain is not 0 is because there are other players in the game. In 
other words, even if China does not purchase energy from Africa, there are 
other players who will; in turn, China will still buy from another channel. This 
outcome will not influence relative gains. 
(3) When one of the two defects, the situation becomes more complex, 
particularly if both sides wish to produce long-term cooperation. If in one round, 
Africa chooses to defect, China would obtain -5 relative gains, which can 
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damage long-term cooperation. Thus, in this case strategies would have to be 
changed to achieve success under a repeat game to enlarge absolute gain. 
This demonstrates that from the beginning of Sino-African energy 
co-opetition, Africa has had the good will to cooperate with China, as 
cooperation could not have been produced under the circumstances of 
extreme asymmetrical power unless Africa chose not to defect. This is 
markedly different to Sino-Russian energy relations, where China has been at 
the whim of Russia due to the asymmetry of power. In other words, this payoff 
matrix highlights Africa’s sincerity in cooperation in comparison to Russia’s 
somewhat fickle approach. 
One key factor is that although China and Africa are asymmetrical in 
terms of energy, with Africa holding the absolute advantage, this is not the 
case in other fields. First and foremost, China’s economy is far more advanced 
than SSA. According to Trading Economics (2014), Africa is suffering a 
serious debt crisis and an average of 46.1% of GDP is used to pay this debt. 
Angola, a country with huge amounts of natural energy resources, has a lower 
level of debt at 29.29% of GDP, but even this is far higher than China’s 22.4%. 
Thus, taking the average of African countries includes both countries that are 
relatively more successful than the average like Angola, as well as other 
countries with far deeper levels of debt. Thus, in terms of economy, there is a 
massive gap between China and Africa, and power is asymmetrical in China’s 
favour. Chapter Two explained that energy security is closely related to the 
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economy. According to Keohane and Nye (2011) economic interdependence 
drives cooperation in other fields. Is this the case with Africa and China, or is it 
instead that energy cooperation is conversely driving economic 
interdependence? This will be discussed further in terms of added value in 
Section 6.2.2. 
Co-opetition between China and other countries within Africa is 
another inevitable influence over the result and progress of Sino-African 
co-opetition. Many other countries have been showing significant interest in 
Africa due to its abundant energy production capacity, and have taken a series 
of actions to gain a foothold on the African energy market. In this sense, China 
has many opponents in the battleground. Table 19 shows the total energy 
imports and exports of various countries and regions such as the United States, 
Europe, China, India and Japan, revealing that imports are significantly greater 
than exports in many cases. Like China, these countries have to chase fixed 
energy markets. China is thus faced with many opponents in the race to 
secure African energy, and must take positive action to cooperate with African 
countries whilst simultaneously balancing relations with other competitors in 
the African market. 
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Table 19: Global Imports and Exports 2012 (BP, 2013a:19) 
 
 
One of the strongest players in the African market is the United States. As 
shown in Figure 20, in 2011 U.S. imports from Africa accounted for 10.3% of 
total oil imports, whereas the Persian Gulf represented 12.9%. In other words, 
the U.S. dependence on Africa is nearly equal in importance to that of the 
Middle East. 
 
Figure 20: Where does the U.S. get its oil? (Flintoff, 2012:app.1) 
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Figure 21 shows that of the top ten countries importing to the US, three are 
from Africa, namely Nigeria, Algeria and Angola. Nigeria and Angola belong to 
SSA. Imports from Nigeria are a little lower than those from Saudi Arabia, but 
higher than those from Venezuela, another growing producer country. 
 
 
 
Figure 21: Top 10 Sources of U.S. Crude and Petroleum Product 
Imports 2010 (EIA, 2011a) 
 
The reason behind the large amount of energy imports from Africa is related to 
the long-term U.S. energy strategy. According to the U.S. National Security 
Strategy of 2002, in terms of United States’ involvement in Africa, improving 
cooperation with African energy-producer countries is an important method of 
relieving the U.S. energy situation. (National Security Council, 2002) In order 
to guarantee cooperation on energy trade, the United States has focused on 
different aspects, particularly foreign policy. Since 2002, the American 
Secretary of State and other senior government officials have frequently 
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visited Africa, and President Bush not only visited in Africa in 2003, but also 
met with African energy-producing countries’ leaders during the United 
Nations General Assembly meeting. (Niu, 2008) The U.S. approach advocates 
a humanitarian plan to build up the infrastructure of democracy, significantly 
different to the Chinese foreign policy toward Africa. The U.S. government 
standpoint is that the rich rewards from Africa should be based on human 
rights protection and effective government regulation, which should be 
followed by institutionalisation of political and economic reforms. (Schutz and 
Wihbey, 2001) The National Security Strategy maintains that long-term 
cooperation with Africa should be built upon trust, which can be reinforced 
through the establishment of infrastructure, education and health to improve 
governance and the quality of life. As a result, ‘the United States will increase 
its own funding for education assistance by at least 20 percent with an 
emphasis on improving basic education and teacher training in Africa. The 
United States can also bring information technology to these societies, many 
of whose education systems have been devastated by HIV/AIDS.’ (National 
Security Council, 2002:para.12) Consequently, cooperation between the U.S. 
and Africa carries many additional conditions, in particular the establishment of 
a reasonable and controllable management mechanism for the exchange of 
African energy. 
China and the U.S. have taken different approaches to supporting 
Africa, and although the U.S. attaches conditions to aid, ultimately the targets 
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and fields of aid are noble and of vital importance to Africa’s balanced 
development. In this sense, particularly when considering the possibility of the 
China energy threat, would humanitarian U.S. aid edge out China in Africa? 
Some even debate whether the United States should ally with other players in 
order to resist the encroachment of China in Africa. (Schaefer, 2006) In 
addition to the U.S., other international players have also used the 
humanitarian aid playing card to engage with Africa and secure access to 
energy supplies.  
For example, Japan is the world’s second largest economy; it is also 
the third largest energy consumer, third largest petroleum importer, and the 
largest natural gas importer in the world. (EIA, 2012a) However, in contrast to 
the United States and European countries, the Japanese government tends to 
avoid politics, highlighting economics in its energy cooperation with Africa. The 
Japanese government provides economic aid in an attempt to improve 
relations with Africa. By 2007, Japan had provided aid to 27 African countries, 
with 48 projects (including loans and debt relief) equal to $2.88 billion. (Yu, 
2008) These efforts seem to have obtained the desired results: in February 
2005, Japan signed a cooperation agreement with Egypt, winning the 
exploration rights in the central Gulf of Suez, producing more than 5000 
barrels daily from mid-2007. (Kuwait News Agency, 2005) 
Nonetheless, in recent years, Japan has begun to show interest in 
the aid for resources approach, providing financial and technical assistance 
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and subsidies for resource development projects in exchange for stable 
energy supplies in Africa. For example, former Japanese foreign minister 
Maehara Seiji clearly indicated that Japan had the desire to promote bilateral 
relations when he visited Algeria in December 2010, based on a plan of 
assisting Algerian economic development in exchange for the country’s oil 
resources. (Anonymous, 2010) In sum, Japan’s plan for energy cooperation in 
Africa is based largely on economic aid, in order to guarantee energy supplies. 
Different players play different roles in Africa, each with their own 
aims and schemes, and the competition is more intense for China than ever 
before. As a result, faced with the pressure of humanitarian and supervised 
co-opetition conducted by the U.S. or the considerable economic support from 
Japanese-African co-opetition, what advantage can China offer? In fact, this 
question also returns to the original question of the section: why has 
Sino-African co-opetition developed so smoothly despite Africa’s absolute 
advantage in the game? The answer seems to lie in the high degree of 
economic complementarity. 
 
6.2.2 Added Value: Intense Economic Complementarity 
According to a government white paper, China has become Africa’s largest 
trade partner, and Africa is now China’s major import source, second largest 
overseas construction project contract market and fourth largest destination for 
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investment. (Information Office of the State Council of The People's Republic 
of China, 2013b) According to Schaffnit-Chatterjee (2013), Africa’s economy 
grew by 5% in 2013, which is higher than expected, and hints at the possibility 
for complementary trade between China and Africa. Figure 22 shows that from 
2000 to 2012, the total volume of Sino-African trade continuously increased, 
including both China’s exports to Africa and imports from Africa. Further to this, 
in 2013, President Xi Jinping promised to allow a further $200 billion in loans to 
Africa in the next three years. (People's Daily, 2013a) This trade balance 
shows the success of Sino-African co-opetition, but according to Hai (2013), 
the Chinese public misunderstands the nature of this large loan and many 
consider it a waste of money. The huge amount of money also raises 
comparisons to Mao’s irrational aid to Africa when China simply could not 
sustain such levels of foreign aid. Although the Chinese economy is the 
second largest economy in the world, there is a large gap in the per capita 
GDP compared with developed countries such as the U.S. (Yueh, 2014) 
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Figure 22: China-Africa Trade Volume (2000-2012) (Information 
Office of the State Council of The People's Republic of China, 
2013b:I) 
 
In fact, the rationale behind the provision of this loan is very straightforward. 
Like many countries in other regions of the world, the most common difficulty 
plaguing African economic development is the persistent lack of funding, 
meaning that many promising developmental policies and important projects 
cannot be brought to fruition. To combat this, international organisations such 
as the IMF, World Bank, the Islamic Bank of Africa, and the African 
Development Bank have responded positively by providing development 
capital to African countries. China’s promise of loan provision to Africa shares 
the same objective of supporting African economic development – which will in 
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turn benefit China in terms of increasing trade volume. (Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs of the People's Republic of China, 2014a) 
In addition to this loan-for-oil tactic, direct investment in Africa is also 
growing. In the Fifth Forum of the China-Africa Cooperation Ministerial 
Conference, Yang Jiechi, China’s former Minister of Foreign Affairs, 
mentioned that, by the end of 2011, direct investment in Africa had reached 
$147 hundred million, with over 2000 enterprises investing in Africa. Figure 23 
demonstrates that mining is currently by far and away the main field attracting 
Chinese investment in Africa. This immediately raises China energy threat 
concerns, with China dominating cooperation with Africa purely for the sake of 
securing energy supply.  
 
Figure 23: Distributions of Chinese Direct Investment in Africa (up to 
end of 2011) (Information Office of the State Council of The People's Republic 
of China, 2013b:II) 
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However, China stresses that in terms of scale and quality, China’s energy 
cooperation with Africa is radically different to that of European and North 
American countries. In 2008 China’s foreign ministry spokesman, Jiang Yu, 
pointed out that 79% of Africa’s oil is used for exports, and of this total, 36% is 
imported by Europe, 33% by the United States, and just 8.7% by China. Thus 
by comparison to other large global actors, China’s far smaller stake of the 
total can hardly be regarded as predatory. (China News, 2008) Zhai Juan 
(Assistant to the Director of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs African Affairs 
Department), responding to questioning by journalists, stressed that whilst 
energy cooperation is vitally important, it is not the whole picture of 
Sino-African cooperation. Instead, evaluated impartially, it is merely an 
extension of the traditional relations between China and Africa and is in accord 
with both sides’ interests. (China News, 2009) In addition, foreign ministry 
spokesman Liu Weimin argued that not only did energy cooperation not 
represent the full extent of Sino-African cooperation, it was also not the starting 
point of China’s foreign policy toward Africa. (FMPRC, 2012) 
Ma (2006b) also refutes the concept of China energy threat, stressing 
that China is making full use of its own capacities to help relieve its energy 
issues, and that this does not represent a threat to other countries. He goes on 
to elaborate that China has been able to solve energy issues on the basis of its 
own strength, and that China is not only a consumer, but also a producer of 
energy. What’s more, in China’s energy structure, coal accounts for 67.7%, but 
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oil for only 22.7%. The structure reflects China’s rich domestic coal reserves, 
thus prioritising coal as far as possible in order to guarantee domestic sources 
of energy supplies. In other words, only considering China as a rapacious 
consumer of energy is a one-sided argument, as China is also a strong 
producer of the largest part of its energy resources. Furthermore, a 
government white paper on energy also emphasises that China will rely most 
of all on domestic sources of energy; entering into the international market is a 
method of relieving the environmental pollution pressure caused by coal, as 
well as providing support for economic development. ( Information Office of the 
States Council, 2012) 
In addition to this, in the BP report Energy Outlook 2030, the growth 
in global energy consumption is declining, down from the yearly 2.5% growth 
rate recorded over the past decade to an annual average of 2% over the next 
ten years, and a further reduction to 1.3% from 2020 to 2030. Moreover, 
energy use intensity is predicted to decrease by 2030 – including in China – 
due to the development of new clean energy and shale gas. This report 
suggests that although China’s expected demand growth in 2030 will account 
for roughly half of new global demand, this demand can be met, and does not 
represent a threat to overall world energy. (BP, 2012a) 
In conclusion, the degree of Sino-African economic complementarity 
is particularly high, but complementarity in other fields is not high enough. After 
the honeymoon of Sino-African economic complementarity, can co-opetition 
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continue to last?  China’s asymmetry is balanced in large part by the high 
degree of economic complementarity, but this situation is not multifaceted 
enough to be truly stable. If economic complementarity develops out of kilter, 
this will likely upset the balance of Sino-African co-opetition. Establishing 
commitments may be one way to redress this issue. 
 
6.2.3 Rules: Hehe Culture Puts Neo-Colonialism to the Test 
Complementarity itself is not enough to ensure the success of co-opetition. 
Another vital aspect is the creation of firm reciprocal commitments, and 
neo-colonialism is the key debate influencing the establishment of 
commitments in Sino-African co-opetition. As (Barnwell, 2011) states, this 
inevitably leads people to question, is this now China’s Africa ? Additionally, a 
special report carried about by Behar (2008:para.7) states that ‘this 
commercial invasion is without question the most important development in the 
SSA since the end of the Cold War – an epic, almost primal propulsion that is 
redrawing the global economic map.’ Africa has been labelled a new Chinese 
colony in common parlance. China no doubt invests huge sums of money into 
the region and supports many local governments, and of course Chinese 
interest is seen to be driven for the most part by the energy resources of many 
African countries. Through, the oil diplomacy China has already settled deep 
and prospective partnerships with some of these countries. (Goncharuk, 2011) 
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China has also been accused of propping up corrupt governments 
across Africa. (Taylor, 2006) Many thus question whether China is becoming 
an irresponsible power. For example, Lyman (2005) debated the purpose of 
cooperation and aid in Sino-African relations, arguing that aid flowing to Africa 
lacks transparency and offers a protective umbrella for countries which should 
instead be sanctioned. This lack of transparency fuels corruption within African 
governments; unconditional aid packages allow many projects to be approved 
without question, providing yet more opportunity for corruption. Lyman 
criticises China’s reluctance to get involved in other countries’ politics, 
because he believes that as politics affects the circulation of energy, China 
could wield great influence in this regard. He claims that China’s pure 
investment, regardless of the specific flow of funds, encourages greater 
tolerance of corruption and represents an irresponsible force in Africa. Shinn 
and Eisenman (2012) offer a similar argument, declaring that in opening the 
door to African oil supply, China has sacrificed both democracy and human 
rights. They state the examples of Zimbabwe and Sudan when accusing China 
of disregard for human rights. In sum: ‘China’s no-strings-attached buy-in to 
major oil producers, such as Angola, will undermine efforts by Western 
governments to pressure them to open their oil books to public scrutiny.’ 
(Taylor, 2006b:para.19)  
In the Yellow Book Annual Report on Development in the Middle East 
and Africa No. 13 (2010-2011), Yang (2011) illustrates that as a result of 
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China’s industrial upgrading, a large amount of equipment is available for 
transfer to Africa. In addition, there are many small and medium-sized 
enterprises in China, which meet the needs of African countries in terms of 
capital, technology and products. Africa in turn provides valuable opportunities 
for these enterprises – this is another win-win situation. 
The Chinese government stresses that its aid is provided with 
sincerity and with no conditions attached. The goal of aid is to help African 
countries by building their capacity to achieve self-management. (Fourm on 
China-Africa Cooperation, 2012) As Moyo (2010) mentions in her book Dead 
Aid: Why aid is not working and how there is another way for Africa, Chinese 
aid differs significantly from that of Western countries. She argues that Africa 
must untangle itself from the yoke of dependence on outside aid in order to 
pursue its own path to independent development. Chinese aid aims to be 
based on equal conditions to achieve South-South, win-win cooperative 
partnerships. China attaches importance to African countries transforming 
energy resource products into a deep processing capacity, adding to the value 
of the products, thus helping African countries turn energy resource 
advantages into development advantages. (Xinhua News Agency, 2012b) 
Regarding arguments concerning human rights in Africa, as stated in 
Taylor (2006b:939), the Chinese government argues that ‘human rights such 
as economic rights and rights of subsistence are the main priority of 
developing nations and take precedence over personal, individual rights as 
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conceptualised in the West.’ As Hanson (2008) explains, Chinese leaders tend 
to consider human rights to be a relative concept, adaptable according to 
specific conditions and periods of time. For example, in terms of arms sales to 
Sudan, the Chinese government argues that it is helping Sudan to improve its 
conditions by ‘enhancing its status as an international political power, and 
increasing its ability to obtain access to significant natural resources, 
especially oil.’ (Grimmett, 2009:10)  
It is the Chinese belief that China and African countries are sincere 
cooperative partners. (Information Office of State Council, 2006) In 2007, 
President Hu visited eight African countries and delivered a speech stressing 
that in the past, present and future, the Chinese and African people share 
equality, mutual trust, friendship, mutual benefit and win-win cooperation. He 
underlined that China will never add any conditions to its aid nor interfere in 
African politics. (Xinhua News Agency, 2007d) 
However, the counter-arguments of the Chinese government outlined 
above are just that: government arguments. This is the official stance on the 
charges of neo-colonialism. There is no doubt that neo-colonialism would 
influence the establishment of Sino-African commitments, but it seems that 
commitments are being successfully drawn up, which suggests that the 
accusations of Chinese energy colonialism are not necessarily shared by 
Africa itself. Relations between China and Africa have historically been 
positive, and there have been no instances of betrayal or tit-for-tat revenge in 
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the game of Sino-African energy co-opetition. Instead, it would appear that 
commitment has been maintained in Sino-African co-opetition through a firm 
emphasis on the principles of Hehe culture, whereby peace is precious and 
both sides stress harmony but not sameness. From the Five Principles of 
Peaceful Co-Existence through to Zhou Enlai’s Eight Principles for Economic 
Aid and Technical Assistance, the Chinese government recognised the 
importance of treating aid recipients with respect and helping developing 
nations without conditions. From this positive starting point, Sino-African 
relations have continued to follow the tenets of Hehe culture; in China’s Africa 
policy in 2006, it was clearly stated that both China and Africa maintain mutual 
respect and mutually beneficial co-existence. (Office of Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs of the People's Republic of China, 2006) The latest Sino-African policy 
in 2013 also reiterates the importance of equal and mutually beneficial 
cooperation. (Information Office of the State Council of The People's Republic 
of China, 2013b) 
Furthermore, China’s loan outreach to Africa is neither a donation nor 
a crippling condition to force Africa’s hand. The Chinese government 
advocates long-term low-interest loans to Africa, which corresponds to the 
actual conditions of the African economy and allows development 
programmes to get on their feet. (Information Office of the State Council of the 
People's Republic of China, 2006b) In this way, Chinese loans will enable 
African economic growth and self-reliance, and will not encourage African 
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over-dependence on China. (Sun, 2014) 
In sum, the combination of positive historical relations supports 
assumption ten, and the firm adherence to Hehe culture in Sino-African 
relations has taken a natural path to the extensive cooperation of today, be it in 
terms of energy or in other fields; the accusations of neo-colonialism are 
largely unfounded. It is Hehe culture that has smoothed the way to firm 
commitments in Sino-African co-opetition, and it is not too optimistic to assume 
that these conditions will remain in the future. 
 
6.2.4 China’s Tactics in Africa 
In terms of the assumption eight, China has not taken a fixed approach to 
tactics towards African countries, but has chosen tactics based on the 
Sino-African resource asymmetry. China’s three major methods in co-opetition 
with Africa include: directly importing energy from Africa and supporting 
programmes such as loan-for-oil or investing in mining; exchanging technology 
to achieve cooperation; and using aid initiatives to boost cooperation. China 
became formally involved in Africa’s energy sector from 1990 onwards, 
beginning with petroleum trade and energy exploration. (Office of Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China, 2006) 
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Table 20: Top Ten African Trade Partners with China by Imports from 
2006 to 2010 (Lu, 2011:app.1) 
 
 
 
As shown in Table 20, the most significant country for energy exporting to 
China is Angola. Since 2000, China has made a series of pledges to cancel 
outstanding interest-free loans extended to Least-Developed Countries (LDCs) 
and Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPCs), most of which are in Africa. 
(OECD, 2012) These pledges set the stage for the beginning of China’s 
concerted investment in Angolan energy reserves, and spurred the creation of 
the so-called Angola Model.  
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Figure 24: The Angola Model (Researcher’s own) 
 
Figure 24 depicts the Angola Model. The Chinese government supplies loans 
to the Angolan government through the China Petroleum and Chemical Group 
(SINOPEC), helping Angola establish infrastructure. With improved 
infrastructure, Angola is better prepared to supply oil and gas to SINOPEC, 
which then enters the Chinese market. In other words, the Angola Model 
involves the purchase of Angolan oil by SINOPEC, which is transferred to 
Angola’s import-export bank. China then receives a steady, stable supply of 
energy. In turn, Chinese companies export commodities or contract 
construction projects in Angola, helping to resolve Angola’s lack of 
construction funds. 
Chinese	Enterprise	(SINOPEC)	
Angolan	Government	
Infrastructure	
Petroleum	and	Natural	Gas	
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In 2002, Angola began to apply for preferential loans from China. 
From this point until 2008 the Angolan government received financing from 
China on three occasions, totalling $4 billion. Angola exported 10,000 barrels 
of crude oil daily as a reimbursement guarantee. In addition to government 
funding, Chinese enterprises are also involved in Angola’s economic 
restructuring, not only for the oil project itself, but also agriculture, electricity, 
drinking water, highways, railways, hospitals, schools and infrastructure 
construction investment. In 2008, the Angolan railway (Luanda Railway), 
measuring 424 km in length, was completed through the channelling of 
Chinese international funding. (Xinhua News Agency, 2008) 
The Angola Model fits with the idea of mutual benefit, because China 
has been able to secure oil supply in Angola and implement the national 
Chinese strategy of going out [in business], whereas Angola has obtained the 
capital desperately needed for further economic construction. In the process of 
exploring Angolan energy, China has met its own national demands and 
Angola has been able to fund greater development. According to the Angolan 
Ambassador to China, João Bernardo, the Angola Model is welcomed by the 
Angolan government. (Zhang, 2012b) Furthermore, Chinese enterprise 
investment broke the virtual monopoly of Western countries, bringing 
competition and vitality to the Angolan market. (Yu, 2009) In other words, this 
kind of cooperation mode has not only won the support of the Chinese 
government, but also that of the partner country governments. 
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With the success of the Angola Model, several other countries soon 
followed suit. By the end of 2004, China’s oil and gas cooperation projects in 
Africa had expanded to Algeria, Libya, Egypt, Ivory Coast, Nigeria, Gabon and 
Sudan; eight countries in total including Angola. By the end of 2011, imports of 
crude oil from Africa accounted for 23% of China’s entire import total, a 
powerful support for the requirements of China’s economic development. 
(Wang, 2012a) In 2007, former President Hu Jintao visited Sudan, 
Mozambique and Zambia, signing a series of cooperation agreements 
including, but not limited to, cooperation on energy supply. (Xinhua News 
Agency, 2007c) These high-level diplomatic visits show the Chinese 
government’s attention to Africa, and the continuing progression of successful 
Sino-African relations. 
Nevertheless, some observers still maintain that China and the 
African nations are not equal partners in cooperation, even in the face of the 
successful Angola Model. Marysse and Geenen (2009) believe that 
agreements between Africa and China are inherently unreasonable because 
of the inequality in the relationship. They also argue that China relies on 
unequal political relations and economic plunder purely in pursuit of its own 
interests, sacrificing the interests of African countries. An American broadcast 
(SBS, 2013) also debated the Angola Model, pointing out that not everyone 
agrees on the use of the model. Whilst exchanging energy and resources in 
return for investment and the construction of infrastructure certainly appears 
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like a good deal on paper, it in fact may condemn local people to greater levels 
of poverty than before. Also, despite the growth of infrastructure in Angola, the 
country still lacks the domestic workforce to man the development. Further to 
this, many Chinese shops have opened which sell low-price products, and 
Chinese businessmen have begun to sell agricultural products to plant in the 
local land, potentially disrupting the traditional agricultural economy. According 
to Alizak (the director of an Angolan human rights organisation), between 40 
and 60 thousand Chinese people worked in Angola during 2009 and 2010, and 
the number has continued to grow. It is these Chinese workers who construct 
most of Angola’s new infrastructure, assisting the country as a whole. However, 
Angola’s benefit in this regard is somewhat limited: firstly, all the labour is 
provided by cheap Chinese workers; secondly, Angolan people will not benefit 
from any money earned by investment, because this money will counter-flow 
back to China. (SBS, 2013) Flynn (2013:para.24) mentions that Africans are 
themselves in great need of jobs, which are being taken by the Chinese: 
‘Unlike Western immigrants, the Chinese diaspora comes from the poorest 
section of society and competes directly for work with Africans, some 80 
percent of whom are in ‘vulnerable employment’ according to the International 
Labour Organisation.’  
This points to some of the major limitations of the Angola Model, and 
indeed in recent years passion for this model has been drying up somewhat. 
The cooperation between China and Angola worked so well because it came 
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at the exact time that both countries’ needs could be met by the model. (Zhang, 
2012b) In other words, China injected considerable capital into the Angolan 
economy, spurring much-needed growth, and China in return was able to 
relieve its own energy demands. This kind of cooperative model will work when 
the conditions are in place, but may not be a suitable method of long-term 
equitable co-opetition. 
The second method is the use of technological exchange to bring 
about cooperation. The director of the Chinese Energy Bureau, Zhang Guobao, 
mentioned in an interview on the maintenance of energy security that exploring 
new technology and cooperating with Africa on the reasonable use of nuclear 
energy would provide a suitable solution for China’s energy security needs. 
(Guo and Pan, 2011) The Chinese government cooperates with Africa on 
nuclear energy, developing this new source to reduce the dependence on 
traditional fossil fuel and helping Africa reduce pollution and achieve 
sustainable development. 
According to reports from the WWF, current water and electricity 
supply cannot meet the demands of the increasing population in Africa. 
(Nguyen-Khoa et al., 2012) However, Chinese imports of African oil fund the 
construction of useful related infrastructure, such as hydraulic electricity 
generation. Once again, this is of mutual benefit to both sides. The Chinese 
government has declared its intentions to assist Africa with groundwater 
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development (Xinhua News Agency, 2012b), suggesting that China is aiming 
to relieve the fundamental issue of water shortage in Africa. 
The third method is the use of aid initiatives including pure economic 
aid to boost cooperation. According to the principles of China’s policy toward 
Africa, aid is based on equality and mutual benefit and carries no political 
conditions. (Office of Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of 
China, 2006) Aid may include economic infrastructure establishment; China’s 
cooperation with Sudan can be considered economic cooperation of this sort. 
The Chinese government has provided different aid packages to assist Africa, 
such as free loans and interest relief. The timely provision of direct economic 
aid by the Chinese can help promote economic development in Africa. In 
February 2004, Hu Jintao visited Egypt, Gabon and Algeria, and signed a 
bilateral trade agreement and memorandum with Gabon. The first project 
agreed upon costs of a total of $12 billion and related to economic and 
technical cooperation. China offered this sum as free aid, Secondly, China will 
provide another $60 billion in loans to cooperative projects. (Xinhua News 
Agency, 2004) The Chinese government also provides funds to help local 
governments build fundamental infrastructure to serve the local people, such 
as libraries, roads, railways and hospitals. By 2010, China had carried out 
more than 900 projects, and trained 30,000 skilled experts and 180,000 
medical workers. (China.com, 2012) 
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In conclusion, China applies three different methods to Sino-African 
co-opetition, which match China’s own strategy for energy security. These 
tactics have mostly been successful, but certain negative aspects have drawn 
heavy criticism and accusations of inequality and predatory approaches. In 
truth, whether these accusations are founded or not, the existence of doubts 
over the nature of China’s assistance to Africa plays into Africa’s favour. 
China’s global reputation may be impaired by the negative aspects of 
Sino-African co-opetition, and in the complex game of many rival players in 
Africa, African countries are well-placed to make use of these doubts to 
maximise their benefits. This will cause greater difficulties for Chinese 
activities in Africa, and as such it is imperative that the Chinese government 
irons out the wrinkles in its tactics in order to ensure the long-term success of 
Sino-African co-opetition. 
 
6.2.5 Scope: Ensuring Long-Term Co-opetition 
African energy undoubtedly helps relieve China’s energy security concerns. In 
the short-term, it increased import channels in order to meet China’s 
increasing demand. But what about in the long-term? As Taylor (2006b) points 
out, China hopes to improve its global reputation and gradually become a 
more powerful player in long-term global energy allocation. Can this target be 
achieved through FOCAC or another multilateral dialogue such as the Forum 
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for Economic and Trade Cooperation between China and 
Portuguese-speaking countries (PSCs)51?  
Basically, establishing cooperation means finding common 
background or interlinked points to improve communication with Africa, 
thereby achieving the objective of cooperation. The establishment of FOCAC 
in 2000 was designed to provide a platform for Sino-African cooperative 
relations and a basis for the establishment of a Sino-African energy forum. 
(Fourm on China-Africa Cooperation, 2012) This forum is based on the 
principles of mutual benefit and sustainable development, with the hope of 
encouraging cooperative projects of clean energy and renewable resources. In 
addition, as the two largest developing global actors, co-opetition between 
China and Africa plays an important role in the promotion of overall world 
peace and development, in accordance with the fundamental interest of both 
sides. (Xinhua News Agency, 2012b) According to Beijing, the goal of FOCAC 
is to make the pie bigger, leading cooperation into a new fast-track of 
development and matching the national go out strategy. (Fourm on 
China-Africa Cooperation, 2012) However, this is simply the wording of official 
documents. In reality, the most important function for long-term Sino-African 
co-opetition is not necessarily making the pie bigger, but rather improving 
communication and information exchange. In this way, both China and Africa 																																																								
51  African Portuguese-speaking countries (PSCs) are also collectively referred to as 
Lusophone Africa. Formerly colonised by the Portuguese, these countries include Angola, 
Cape Verde, Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique and São Tomé and Príncipe.(European 
Commission, 2013)  
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will be able to understand each other’s viewpoints and behaviour, and will be 
able to take appropriate reciprocal actions based on this mutual 
understanding.  
In addition, due to the similar historical background and cultural 
context of Macau and Lusophone Africa, the Forum for Economic and Trade 
Cooperation between China and Portuguese-speaking countries can provide a 
key platform for communication and cooperation. Now booming bilateral trade 
between China and Lusophone Africa has experienced a sharp rise since the 
establishment of the Macau Forum in 2003. 18% of total trade comes from 
Africa and 2% of total trade comes from Lusophone Africa. (Alves, 2008) In 
2012, the trade between China and Lusophone Africa amounted to $128.5 
billion, an increase of 9.6% on the year before. In 2013, a new one billion dollar 
fund was officially established in order to support Chinese companies entering 
Portuguese-speaking markets. (Ventures, 2013) 
However, in terms of Sino-African energy co-opetition, due to the 
amount of players involved, it is most sensible for the Chinese government to 
cooperate with the most inclusive African body possible. The African Union is a 
suitable choice. (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China, 
2014d) It is possible that an energy mechanism similar to that of OPEC could 
be created under the auspices of the African Union, which may be beneficial 
for the future of Sino-African co-opetition.  
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In fact, the establishment of an African Union will be conducive to 
greater stability in energy supply and demand, but it may be difficult to allocate 
quotas amongst the many energy-producer countries across the continent. If 
the African Union were to establish an energy mechanism (M) it would also 
have the capability to adjust the energy price. Two players from within M – 
Angola and Tunisia can be considered as an example. Assuming the 
production of Tunisia is TA while that of Angola is AA, the discount rate is δ, 
and high demand is p, Dutta (1999) draws the conclusion that δ≥ !!!!!. AA will 
not break commitment on quotas if p>1. However, if p<1, it would be difficult 
for betrayal on quotas to be prevented within M. In fact, new oil exploration in 
non-OPEC countries such as Russia reveals that China’s reliance on OPEC 
has decreased. As a result, p has tended to be smaller than 1, which means 
that AA has the motivation to increase production to obtain more interest. In 
terms of TA’s discount rate, if δ≥ !"!"!!!, TA will not break commitment on quotas 
and the result is that the smaller p is, the higher the likelihood of betrayal on 
commitment. 
Global requirements for energy have recently weakened and OPEC 
does not plan to reduce production quotas, which is driving energy prices 
down. (Reed, 2014) It is thus not the right moment for African countries to 
establish an energy mechanism in the African Union. In terms of China, 
establishing a new energy mechanism in the African Union would mean that 
China would be limited to any quota decided by the AU. Thus it is not suitable 
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for either side to establish an energy mechanism at this stage. Although China 
supports cooperation with the African Union, this does not mean that China 
would necessarily support establishing a special energy mechanism in the 
African Union. 
In conclusion, due to abundant reserves and extensive variety, lower 
exploration costs and favourable geographical locations, Africa has become 
one of the most significant players in the global energy game. As a result of the 
large number of countries engaging in competition, the continent is becoming 
a battleground in the race for resources. This chapter has discussed the 
internal co-opetition between African countries themselves, between China 
and African countries, and between China and other, non-African countries 
within the African context, all of which affect China’s attempts at forging 
co-opetitive relations in Africa. Due to the different conditions of these partners, 
the outcome and success of co-opetition is variable. Nevertheless, the 
asymmetrical power between China and Africa dictates the success of 
Sino-African co-opetition. The intense degree of Sino-African complementarity 
supplies another important condition for successful co-opetition. The 
establishment of commitments based on Hehe culture and the possibility of 
establishing and balancing the supervision of FOCAC together represent 
fundamental conditions which may help ensure long-term Sino-African 
co-opetition. 
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Due to the development of China’s economy, increasing energy 
demands push the country to actively find replacement markets to reduce its 
dependence on the unstable Middle East. This causes other countries to feel a 
sense of threat from China. Debates on China’s energy threat and Chinese 
neo-colonialism have arisen, not in small part from the fear of Western 
countries that China will secure too large a portion of Africa’s energy reserves. 
The Chinese approach may not be as predatory as it has been judged to be, 
due to the continuing commitment to mutual respect and benefit espoused by 
China’s traditional Hehe culture and the long-term adherence to the Five 
Principles of Peaceful Co-Existence. Nevertheless it cannot be denied that 
there have been certain issues with the implementation of China’s assistance 
to Africa within the scope of Sino-African co-opetition. For the sake of ensuring 
long-term cooperative relations, the next step for China in this sense would be 
to concede the existence of these problems and find ways to address the 
improvement of China’s own performance within the game of Sino-African 
energy co-opetition.  
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Chapter Seven: Analysis and Conclusion 
 
Chapter Two of this research analysed relevant literature in order to provide a 
theoretical background for understanding the strategic value of co-opetition. 
Based on these theoretical insights, an analytical framework was developed to 
investigate how China conducts co-opetition in energy security. Chapter Three 
addressed the development of the co-opetition strategy in China’s energy 
policy, with Hehe culture running through Chinese foreign energy policy. 
Chapters Four, Five and Six applied the framework from Chapter Two to the 
cases of China’s energy relations with three different international actors: 
Russia, Japan and Africa. This final chapter will consolidate the findings of the 
three case studies in order to proffer three key propositions for China’s energy 
security, and finally present the conclusion of the research. 
This research has interpreted the features of co-opetition theoretically, 
demonstrating that competition need not be seen as a threat, but that by 
transmuting competition into a relationship of co-opetition, there is more 
opportunity for integration and thus greater benefit to all involved parties. The 
PARTS model from game theory, consisting of Players, Added value, Rules, 
Tactics and Scope, has been employed in this research to clearly define the 
conditions necessary for successfully achieving co-opetition. These 
conceptual ideas can be applied to China’s energy security, which has 
coherently adopted a co-opetitive approach to energy relations over time, due 
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to the heritage of China’s ancient Hehe culture and the idea of peaceful 
co-existence espoused in China’s modern foreign policy. With these insights in 
mind, three propositions have come through in the case study analyses: 
(1) The strategic value of co-opetition promotes a new approach to 
China’s energy security 
(2) The PARTS model helps China to accurately evaluate the 
prospects for achieving co-opetition 
(3) Chinese Hehe culture lends certain Chinese characteristics to 
China’s co-opetition in energy security. 
These three propositions will be discussed in turn in the following 
sections, and then the conclusion to the research will be presented. 
 
7.1 A New Approach to China’s Energy Security is 
Generated by Co-opetition 
This section will respond to Section 3.1 of the analytical framework by 
analysing the transformation of China’s energy policies, and will demonstrate 
how the strategic value of co-opetition can shape China’s energy security. As 
examined in Section 2.1.3, the strategic value of co-opetition weakens the 
stranglehold of competition, moulding relations into a balance between healthy 
competition and cooperation that leads to greater integration. In the 
introductory chapter, this research illustrated that the principal and long-term 
problem plaguing China’s energy security is that energy supply cannot meet 
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demand. This leads to a high dependence on foreign energy supplies. 
(Information Office of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China, 
2012b) The source just referenced also points out that secondary issues 
related to energy reserves, transportation, and emission reduction also trouble 
China’s energy security. However, China’s approach to energy security not 
only attempts to maintain or obtain more interest, but it also aims to make the 
interest larger and allocate it effectively. In other words, the strategic value of 
co-opetition, which enables greater integration and increased interests for all 
parties, can be applied to China’s energy security to generate the most 
effective approach to achieving China’s aims. By framing co-opetition as a 
benefit to the national energy security approach, China can take the 
opportunities afforded by greater integration whilst re-interpreting the timeworn 
idea that competition inevitably means threat. As Section 2.1 shows, 
co-opetition enlarges the common interest, which precisely matches China’s 
energy security objectives. 
As demonstrated in section 3.2, China’s energy policy has been 
transformed over time from self-sufficiency in Mao’s era to a co-opetitive 
approach that aims for co-existence and benefit for all parties. This 
transformation demonstrates that the emphasis on competition has been 
continuously weakening, and been replaced by a greater focus on mitigating 
conflict and building lasting peace with other nations and regions on the issue 
of energy. The former policy of self-sufficiency was introduced by Mao Zedong 
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for ideological reasons, and although self-sufficiency in essence meant China 
had to rely on itself more than others, there was also a great deal of 
competition in this era. This policy can be interpreted as reflecting the deep 
disquiet Mao felt in terms of handling relations with other countries, especially 
those with ideological and political differences. Self-sufficient policies such as 
in industry learn from Daqing greatly limited China by forcing the Chinese to 
handle all issues domestically rather than taking advantage of the 
opportunities granted by mutually complementary integration. Although this 
situation and policy stance was linked to China’s internal and external 
influences at the time, the greater concern was what it meant for China: very 
few countries established friendly relations with China, or even recognised the 
legitimacy of the regime for a long period of time. (Wang, 2013a) China was 
unable to enter into the spirit of the internationalised world, and this isolation 
has left a lasting lesson for today’s politicians. In the era of Deng Xiaoping, the 
Chinese government finally admitted that self-sufficiency could not spur the 
development that China sorely needed, and accepted that, rather than taking a 
circuitous, ineffective route, learning from the outside could directly accelerate 
China’s growth. Deng thus deliberately downplayed competition, arguing that it 
should be overlooked for the sake of better development. However, due to the 
inheritance of Mao’s long-term focus on self-sufficiency, a competitive stance 
still shadowed China’s foreign policy, including energy relations. In Jiang 
Zemin’s time, the development of the economy had snowballed and China 
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required significant integration within economies and uninhibited access to 
energy resources. Consequently, as Speed (2009) argues, the true focus on 
cooperation in China’s energy relations formally began only in 2001. This 
suggests that China was now envisaging the concept of comprehensive 
energy security, and thus effectively relieving the limitations brought about by 
an over-emphasis on competition. Finally, during the era of Hu Jintao, the 
nature of co-opetition formally appeared in China’s energy policy. The Chinese 
government began to transfer competition into co-opetition by championing 
resource integration. In the 12th Five Year Plan on energy, the key target was 
to ‘go out and let the advanced in.’ (Information Office of the State Council of 
the People's Republic of China, 2013a:XII) The two points here are equally 
important: firstly, the slogan, go out demonstrates that China wishes to break 
free of the cage of competition, and secondly, ‘let the advanced in’ hints at 
what cooperation could bring to China. Compared to previous policies, this 
balanced approach shows that the Chinese government has formally changed 
its strategy due to the new situation in which the country is operating. 
The transformation of China’s energy policy naturally suggests 
change to China’s energy security. The policy reveals that neither a focus on 
competition or cooperation alone can solve China’s energy security problems. 
With a growing interdependence between countries regarding energy, for the 
sake of national energy security, China must formulate a new approach to 
comprehensively handle the situation. Co-opetition does not eliminate 
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competition entirely, but reformulates it as a healthy balance to cooperation, 
allowing greater integration and benefit. This balanced approach provides a 
better approach to China’s energy security than a focus on solely competition 
or cooperation. 
In addition to this analysis of China’s overarching energy policy, the 
three case studies of China’s historical and current relations with Russia, 
Japan and Africa demonstrate that Chinese commitment to co-opetition has 
been gradually and steadily developing over time, albeit with slight differences 
depending on the nature of the two dyadic players in the relationship. 
For instance, in the case of China and Japan, the two players are 
symmetrical in terms of their energy needs and demands, and have 
deep-running historical aggravations. According to Ferguson (2008), Mao 
refused to forgive Japan’s actions in the Sino-Japanese war, and cooperation 
could not exist under these conditions. In Deng’s era, China adopted the policy 
of overlooking grievances in the name of development, and began to sell crude 
oil to Japan and accept Japanese support for China’s economic development. 
This represented a brief time of cooperation. However, after 1993, China’s 
own rapid development had transformed it into a net import country for oil. The 
time of cooperation was over and China and Japan were now head-to-head 
rivals in the battle to secure international energy resources. In Jiang and Hu’s 
respective eras, China’s need for external energy supplies intensified, and the 
competition between China and Japan escalated in tandem. As this research 
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points out, China and other countries have come to realise that a relationship 
based purely on competition is not beneficial for any parties, and have 
recognised that co-opetition may alleviate both antagonistic bilateral 
competition and energy security issues alike. China and Japan have begun to 
enter into cooperation, but only on secondary issues such as energy reserves 
and emission reduction. These issues, whilst important, do not directly or 
immediately address the major problem of both countries’ energy security: that 
supply cannot meet demand. Nonetheless, for these two symmetrical players, 
this limited cooperation may be the best beginning. In this case, assumptions 
one to four have been further supported by the cases. The international 
organisations, such as ASEAN+3, supervised the short-term co-opetition 
between China and Japan. But the failure of the bilateral organisation shows 
that stable co-opetition still relies on states and economic interdependence 
rather than other aspects. 
Compared with Sino-Japanese energy relations, the Sino-Russian 
case is much more closely related to the transformation of China’s foreign 
policy, as well as the different conditions and needs of Russia through time. In 
Mao’s era, Sino-Russian energy relations went abruptly from cooperation to 
competition due to an ideological split between the two communist nations, but 
in Deng’s era, this rift began to heal and formal cooperative efforts began to 
take shape. In Jiang’s era, the real importance of energy cooperation was 
recognised and China began to make attempts to reach a more advanced 
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stage of mutual benefit. However, throughout this era, and into Hu’s era, 
Russia’s own geopolitical position was in a state of flux, which influenced the 
country’s strategies towards energy. This is to say, according to assumption 
two geopolitical interdependence will influence co-opetition, but the economy 
is the inside cause. Besides this, many cooperative efforts were stalled as 
Russia swung between different cooperative partners and possibilities. Later in 
Hu’s era, the two countries finally managed to reach a point where cooperation 
and competition were more balanced, and cooperative projects began to get 
moving. China’s strategy had to adapt to Russia’s changeable approach. 
The third and final case was China and Africa. Good relations 
between China and many African nations began in Mao’s era and have 
continued unabated until the present day. At the outset, China offered aid to 
African countries, and the relationship of co-opetition was based around this 
flow of assistance. The speed of cooperation and integration increased rapidly 
as Africa’s energy market began to develop, and China simultaneously began 
to require energy imports. However, this does not mean that competition did 
not exist in Sino-African relations; rather, the competition came from the 
existence of third parties with similar needs to China, fighting for influence and 
benefit on the African continent. The Sino-African case thus demonstrates a 
different permutation of China’s attempts to develop co-opetition in energy 
relations. 
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The existence of co-opetition with these three actors proves the 
transformation of the Chinese government’s attitude towards energy security. 
By focusing on co-opetition, which entails a balance of both cooperation and 
competition, the government no longer deems competition a threat. Other 
players can be seen as cooperative partners, rather than solely as threatening 
rivals; China can now begin to see its energy security situation as an 
opportunity for value-added co-opetition and integration, rather than as a 
national threat. As identified in Section 2.1, co-opetition aims to integrate 
energy resources to the greatest extent possible. As such, China’s energy 
security policies towards other countries, such as loan-for-oil programmes and 
laying pipelines, are a manifestation of China’s attempts to integrate resources 
as much as possible to achieve the largest interest. Co-opetition is different to 
other policies, neatly incorporating the disadvantages brought about by 
competition and transforming them into a powerful tool for greater integration, 
making the pie – in this case access to energy resources – bigger for everyone. 
In other words, a commitment to co-opetition generates an entirely new 
approach for China’s energy security. 
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7.2 How the PARTS Model Helps China Evaluate the 
Prospects of Co-opetition 
The PARTS model from game theory has been used in this research to 
illustrate five dimensions of co-opetition: Players, Added value, Rules, Tactics 
and Scope. Breaking co-opetition down into these separate aspects makes a 
useful tool for research but it can also be applied practically by China to 
evaluate the prospects of co-opetition on energy with different partners, 
thereby adapting strategy to dissimilar conditions. The five dimensions are 
interconnected, and only by understanding each aspect both individually and 
in concert can China effectively and accurately evaluate the concrete 
progression of co-opetition and make appropriate decisions. Chapter Two of 
this research analysed the factors leading to successful co-opetition according 
to the PARTS model, drawing another five assumptions. Firstly, co-opetition is 
more likely between asymmetrical powers. Secondly, a higher degree of 
complementarity means a greater likelihood of successful co-opetition. Thirdly, 
the establishment of firm and trustworthy commitments and reciprocity binds 
relations of co-opetition. Fourthly, tactics must be adapted to repeat games 
with different partners, taking into account current conditions and historical 
developments. Finally, the scope of co-opetition must be monitored by 
international regimes to ensure success. The following sections will outline the 
findings of the case studies with regard to these five assumptions.  
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7.2.1 Recognising the Role of Players in the Game of Energy 
Co-opetition 
Understanding the potential nature of different players in different scenarios 
can help China effectively pinpoint prospects for co-opetition with partners. As 
Chapter Two explains in depth, it is easier for two asymmetrical players to 
produce co-opetition, because their asymmetry can lead to mutual 
complementarity. However, symmetrical players will struggle to achieve 
co-opetition as they have the same resources and demand structure. For 
instance, China and Japan struggle to successfully reach a position of 
co-opetition because, in terms of energy resources, the two are symmetrical 
players. Both players have to rely on large imports of energy to meet the 
demands of their industrial growth, and thus the two are pitted against one 
another in the world market. As Section 2.2.2 elaborates, two symmetrical 
countries share the same requirements, and this is reflected in the 
Sino-Japanese case: both rely on the same suppliers and have constructed 
similar tactics to gain national interest in energy security. This scenario means 
that in the payoff matrices of the Sino-Japanese energy game, China and 
Japan will both seek to obtain the largest interest, and defection is the most 
probable outcome. Cooperative efforts are unlikely to succeed under these 
conditions. Furthermore, as shown in Section 4.2.1, both China and Japan see 
energy as a private good, rather than a public good, which further influences 
their attitude towards the energy game. As both sides view energy as a private 
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good, it is hard for the two rivals to overcome their seemingly irreconcilable 
differences on energy, particularly in terms of imports, but also on projects like 
joint exploration. Although co-opetition seems too much of a stretch for China 
and Japan in these particular areas, it does not mean that there is no potential 
for co-opetition whatsoever. This research has identified that the two players 
may be able to succeed in areas with greater potential for complementarity, 
such as renewable energy, energy reserves, and emissions reduction. In other 
words, the two cannot achieve co-opetition in aspects concerning more 
traditional non-renewable energy, but may do well in renewable energy 
cooperation. 
Unlike the symmetry with Japan, China and Russia are asymmetrical 
in terms of energy. As Section 5.2.1 shows, China is a customer and a net 
importer of energy, whereas Russia is a producer and supplier of energy. This 
means that in the Sino-Russian energy game, there is a great difference in 
resources between the two countries, and this asymmetry means that success 
in co-opetition is far more likely. However, as Russia is the side possessing the 
desired resources, it has long played the role of dictator in the game, able to 
change the outcome at whim. China has been a far weaker player throughout 
the eras of Mao, Deng and Jiang. During these periods, the involvement of 
third parties has allowed Russia to safely defect from cooperation without 
long-term consequences, gaining a greater interest from cooperating with 
others in the game. As China has remained keen to build relations with Russia 
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and access Russian energy reserves, the government has had little choice but 
to accept Russia’s stop-start approach to co-opetition. China’s relative 
weakness in the asymmetrical dyad has limited its flexibility and power in 
negotiations, so final decisions on pipeline projects and energy prices have 
typically rested with Russia. However, in the current geopolitical climate, 
Russia’s need for China has increased and since the era of Hu Jintao, the 
asymmetry has begun to work to China’s advantage; this will be discussed in 
more detail in the next section. The asymmetry between China and Russia has 
meant that co-opetition is a distinct and likely prospect, but the extent of 
Russia’s power has had destabilising effects on the progress of efforts. 
The third case in this research has been another asymmetrical 
relationship: that between China and Africa. Unlike Russia, Africa does not 
have absolute power in the game, and as a result, Sino-African relations have 
remained smooth over a long period of time. However, as Chapter Six explains, 
Africa is a special case. China and African countries do share asymmetrical 
relations, but the African energy market is complex and involves a great many 
other players. In this sense, Sino-African relations cannot be evaluated in 
isolation; rather, Africa is a battlefield where other asymmetrical partners, 
including both international players and other African countries, struggle 
amongst themselves for influence. Disregarding the role of these other players, 
relations between China and Africa have followed expectations for 
asymmetrical partners: mutual complementarity leads to integration and 
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co-opetition is smooth and straightforward. However, China’s improper 
governance and sometimes misguided involvement in local infrastructure in 
Africa has led to a gradual slowdown in co-opetition. Neo-colonialism 
accusations and the China energy threat have overshadowed the formerly 
successful cooperation between the two players. At this point, the existence of 
other players in the Sino-African energy game has meant that African 
countries are spoilt for choice when it comes to co-operation with asymmetrical 
partners, meaning that China will not necessarily dominate the continent.  
As identified in Section 2.2.2, the more players in the game, the less 
stable bilateral co-opetition will be. This is certainly the case for Africa, where 
the involvement of a large number of influential actors casts the 
incontrovertible success of Sino-African energy relations somewhat into doubt. 
Further to this, in the Sino-Russian case, the addition of a third party upsets 
the already volatile progress of co-opetition. For example, with the involvement 
of Japan, the Russian government is able to use its own absolute advantage in 
the game to swing between China and Japan in order to obtain the greatest 
interest for Russia. China must consider not only Russia’s situation, but also 
the intentions of Japan, increasing the level of uncertainty for all players. In the 
case of asymmetrical powers, another power similar to China, such as Japan, 
can widen the options available to China’s partner. This raises the level of 
complexity in the game and is an unwelcome twist for China. Thus in both the 
Sino-African and Sino-Russian energy games, the involvement of additional 
		 369	
players increases uncertainty and reduces the prospects for straightforward 
co-opetition.  
However, the situation is different when the two players are 
symmetrical. The addition of an appropriate third party can break the deadlock 
of symmetry by introducing a new balance to relations. For example, as 
Chapter Four proposes, the involvement of Taiwan or the United States in the 
energy game may create a new dynamic. Analysis of the influence and value 
of these third parties can help China evaluate the prospects for success in 
different aspects of the Sino-Japanese case, such as joint projects on 
exploration of renewable energy. 
In conclusion, it is difficult for two symmetrical powers to achieve 
co-opetition, particularly when energy is deemed to be a private good, but it is 
far easier and more likely for co-opetition to succeed between asymmetrical 
players. The inclusion of third parties in the energy game can have a different 
effect on the dynamic: in the case of asymmetrical powers such as China and 
Russia or China and Africa, additional players can upset the progress of 
co-opetition, whereas for symmetrical powers, other players can lend a degree 
of asymmetry to relations, increasing the prospects of successful and stable 
co-opetition.  
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7.2.2 Greater Common Interest Derives from the Added Value 
of Power Asymmetry 
The sixth assumption suggests that a higher degree of complementarity can 
bring added value to co-opetition, increasing the prospects for success 
between asymmetrical powers. For symmetrical powers, the lack of 
complementarity reduces the chances for added value and further reduces the 
chances of achieving co-opetition. In the case of Sino-Japanese energy 
co-opetition, the degree of complementarity is exceedingly low, as the two 
countries share similar attributes in terms of energy. However, there is a slight 
degree of economic complementarity; as Stern (2003) proposes, there is a 
positive correlation between energy and the economy. This economic 
complementarity is not sufficient to push China and Japan into cooperation on 
energy exploration or energy imports, but it is more influential in terms of 
renewable energy and emissions reduction projects. Japan is able to supply 
capital, whereas China is abundant in labour. Nonetheless, the economic 
complementarity is low and decreasing, and the chances for success remain 
limited. This demonstrates how the low complementarity of partners with 
symmetry in energy cannot do enough to boost co-opetition, even if there is 
somewhat higher complementarity in another field such as the economy. 
The story is very different for asymmetrical powers. For instance, 
there is a high degree of complementarity in Sino-Russian relations, not only in 
terms of energy supply and demand, but even more so with regard to 
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strategies and geopolitical advantages. As Section 5.2.2 argued, the degree of 
complementarity between Russia and China has been growing, which is 
reflected in the growing success of Sino-Russian co-opetition. In the eras of 
Mao, Deng and Jiang, Russian advantage was so absolute that China had little 
power to negotiate, but in Hu and Xi’s eras, China’s power has grown relative 
to Russia’s, for example in terms of economics and geopolitical power. This 
trend has reduced the absolute advantage of Russia, which increases the 
degree of complementarity. The added value of multifarious complementarity 
has smoothed the path for successful co-opetition. 
Similarly, in the case of China and Africa, the degree of 
complementarity seems high. However, this is a little misleading, as the 
complementarity is limited to energy supply and demand and economics. This 
may not be a sufficiently multifaceted complementarity to ensure the added 
value beneficial for continuous stable co-opetition. The supply and demand 
complementarity is high, but this is common between producer and consumer 
countries. Rather, it has been the high degree of economic complementarity 
that has promoted the speed and degree of Sino-African co-opetition. As 
explained in Section 6.2.2, African development has required considerable 
help from outside, and China has been a strong supporter of African 
development for decades. Considering African resources, Africa should be in a 
similar position to Russia, enjoying an absolute advantage which allows Africa 
to call the shots in the Sino-African energy game. But Africa’s low economic 
		 372	
development has been hindering this advantage and ensuring higher 
complementarity, which explains the success of Sino-African co-opetition thus 
far. Africa continues to rely on aid from foreign countries, and an average 46.1% 
of GDP is used for paying back debts. (International Emissions Trading 
Association, 2014) In these conditions, despite massive energy reserves, 
African countries’ hands are tied, and contrary to the expected outcome for 
energy producer countries, co-opetition has been dominated by consumer 
countries such as China. However, as Section 7.2.1 pointed out, the great 
number of players attempting to gain influence in Africa is creating a new layer 
of complexity in the Sino-African game and eroding some of China’s share in 
the African market. As these other competitors, such as Japan, India, the 
United States and the European Union, also share economic complementarity 
with Africa, the findings regarding the importance of added value demonstrate 
that, in order to compete, China needs to work on building up alternative areas 
of complementarity to ensure that a secure co-opetitive relationship can be 
maintained in the long term. 
In other words, besides complementarity of supply and demand, 
economic complementarity between asymmetrical partners is not enough 
alone to ensure co-opetition. As further areas of complementarity have 
developed, Sino-Russian co-opetition has improved; Sino-African co-opetition, 
based on the sole added value of economic complementarity, may not be 
strong enough to withstand the involvement of third parties. To bring about the 
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added value necessary to ensure successful co-opetition with partners, China 
would benefit from considering diverse areas of complementarity. 
Another aspect to consider is that the degree of complementarity can 
actually dictate how large the pie of interest is. As shown in Section 2.2.2, in 
the function P=(x+y+RXY), where R is the degree of complementarity, P is the 
total common interests, and all other values are constant, it is the degree of 
complementarity that decides the ultimate size of the pie that players can 
share in the game (P). As this chapter has mentioned, one key objective of 
engaging in co-opetition is to make the pie as big as possible. Thus, within 
co-opetition, the higher the degree of complementarity, the bigger the pie and 
the more interest players can obtain. 
In the case of China and Japan, this degree of complementarity is 
particularly small, suggesting that the two are unable to create a large pie of 
common interest. In the Sino-Russian case, the degree is larger and the pie is 
correspondingly enlarged through successful co-opetition. Finally, for China 
and Africa, the degree of complementarity is high, but not as high as 
Sino-Russian complementarity. It is not yet multifaceted enough to reach this 
degree. The higher the degree of complementarity, the more interest that can 
be created; or in other words, the interest that asymmetrical players can earn 
is higher than that available to symmetrical players.  
In conclusion, the degree of complementarity brings added value to 
co-opetition between two players, and the extent of this complementarity 
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decides the size of the pie, or the common interest, of two players. In a 
symmetrical dyad, the added value is weak, and co-opetition is a less 
attractive option. In an asymmetrical dyad, the added value is high and 
co-opetition will increase interests for both players. However, if the asymmetry 
is skewed excessively in the favour of one player, this can lead to a dictator 
game, where the powerful player almost unilaterally controls the final outcome. 
The conditions most conducive to successful co-opetition are asymmetry 
balanced by complementarity in a wide range of different areas. The added 
value of other balancing areas strengthens existing co-opetition and creates a 
scenario of greater mutual interdependence. Of the three cases, both Russia 
and Africa show excellent potential for co-opetition: Russia and China have 
strong complementarity in a range of aspects, and as Russia’s former absolute 
advantage lessens, Sino-Russian relations could strengthen. In the case of 
China and Africa, the dictator game seen between China and Russia has been 
avoided due to the extreme economic disadvantage of African countries, but in 
order for China to maintain a healthy relationship of co-opetition, it is important 
to engage the added value of areas outside purely economics and energy 
supply and demand. 
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7.2.3 Establishing Commitments is Important for Long-Term 
Co-opetition 
Assumption seven proposed that commitments and reciprocity are important 
for the ongoing maintenance of co-opetition, and that it would be easier for 
asymmetrical players to establish commitments than it would be for 
symmetrical players. In the case of Sino-Japanese co-opetition, it has been 
difficult to establish commitments due to the intense competition over energy, 
as well as strained political relations over territory. This outcome is expected 
for symmetrical pairs. 
As Section 2.2.2 explains, energy can be seen as either a private or 
public good, and a country’s stance on this can strongly affect their energy 
security strategy. Although fossil fuels could arguably be deemed public goods 
due to their non-renewable nature, the position of both Japan and China is that 
energy is a private good, and neither side is willing to give up and lose interest 
over a private good. It is therefore extremely difficult for China and Japan to 
establish commitments to, for example, joint exploration of the East China 
Sea. 
Even if an initial commitment on energy can be drawn up, game 
theory shows that it will end with a betrayal by at least one player. Furthermore, 
in repeat games, due to the occurrence of treachery, revenge would be a 
rational response. One player’s analysis of the degree of the other’s treachery 
may dictate the intensity of the revenge response, and any move that is out of 
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proportion may lead to the worsening of relations, spreading out well beyond 
the energy game itself. The difficulties of co-opetition between China and 
Japan can thus be framed in this sense; both sides are maintaining their 
interest, which doesn’t mean that either side is necessarily in the right or in the 
wrong. Neither side can tolerate an attack on sovereignty or territorial claim 
and compared with this high-interest issue, energy exploration is an easily 
sacrificed affair, particularly when the two sides lack added value of 
complementarity, and are symmetrical in terms of energy security. Although 
reciprocity can exist when the two sides attempt co-opetition, as explained by 
METI (2011) in Section 4.2.3, due to the unlikely success of establishing 
commitments, attempts at reciprocity may still not go much further to salvaging 
the situation. 
Compared with the difficulties of establishing commitments between 
China and Japan, the situation with the asymmetrical pair of China and Russia 
is more positive, and is in fact an ideal case to suggest the accuracy of the 
assumption that commitments and reciprocity are important for the ongoing 
maintenance of co-opetition. Chapter Five showed that the current trusting 
cooperation between China and Russia did not happen overnight; rather, over 
repeat games of co-opetition, the two players were able to slowly build a 
deeper understanding of one another’s demands and interests, establish 
long-lasting commitments, and demonstrate their trustworthiness through 
continual reciprocal actions. 
		 377	
As Russia had absolute advantage in the game, it was for Russia to 
initiate the first commitments. Russia’s attitude towards cooperation shaped 
the path for commitment-building between the two players. During the periods 
of Mao, Deng and Jiang, cooperation was shaky due to Russia’s own attitude 
towards cooperation, combined with China’s low level of complementary 
advantage, which decreased the attractiveness and effectiveness of 
co-opetition with China. With the high-speed development of the Chinese 
economy and the creation of national strategies relevant to Russia, such as 
revitalising the old North-East industrial base, as mentioned in Section 5.2.2, 
Russia was able to cooperate with China to bring about more added value for 
both sides. Sino-Russian interdependence became closer and cooperation 
was more and more frequent. Once commitments were established and 
consistently kept, and reciprocal actions were initiated time and time again, a 
deeper level of trust was achieved. This commitment and reciprocity has 
created a virtuous circle which could help cement long-term co-opetition. 
Finally, the case of China and Africa is similar to that of China and 
Russia, further corroborating the importance of establishing commitments, but 
one significant difference is the tense pressure of external influence. This 
includes disputes over the China energy threat and neo-colonialism, which 
may undermine trust-building and be harmful to the establishment of 
commitments. Even if China and Africa are able to construct initial 
		 378	
commitments, it may be that outside pressure detrimentally affects their 
continued success. 
In conclusion, the establishment of commitments can indicate the 
feasibilities of successful co-opetition. It is difficult for symmetrical powers to 
even initiate commitment, whereas asymmetrical powers may be able to 
establish solid commitments more easily. Once commitment has been 
established, it can be maintained through reciprocity and trust-building. 
However, commitments are not eternal or unshakeable, and are likely to be 
influenced by increasing or decreasing interdependence and tense external 
pressure. 
 
7.2.4 Flexible Tactics are Dictated by Historical Influences and 
Current Conditions 
According to the eighth assumption, the Chinese government must adapt 
tactics to the conditions in which it finds itself. When faced with an 
asymmetrical power, the role of dove may prove more effective, whereas a 
hawkish approach is preferable with a symmetrical player. The choice to be 
either a dove or a hawk in the game does not mean that China fears or 
threatens the other party; rather, it is a case of selecting the most effective 
tactics to gain interest by considering the circumstances of each individual 
game.  
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Due to the nature of the intense competition in energy between China 
and Japan, both countries have adopted a hawkish stance. As identified in 
Table 16 in Section 4.2.4, the combined payoff for both of them as hawks is 
the lowest. However, though both sides know this final payoff, neither will 
choose to act as a dove, lest the other obtains more relative interest due to 
their own weakness. By contrast, tactics in the cases of China and Russia and 
China and Africa are different. In both games, China opts for the tactics of a 
dove. The asymmetrical power prevents China or any one party from obtaining 
absolute advantage. Although China has relatively more complementary 
advantages paired with Russia than with Africa, China is not a producer 
country and must rely on energy imports. It is thus reasonable for China to 
obtain relatively less in the payoff. Although choosing a dovish approach in 
both the Sino-Russian and Sino-African game may not earn China the most 
interest in the immediate term, it is imperative for China to maintain imports, 
and a dovish stance is the most beneficial for continued co-opetition.  
China’s choice to be a hawk or a dove is not determined by any 
particular partner country, but rather by the situation in which China finds itself. 
In other words, there will not be any one specific, rigid strategy or set of tactics 
in different games of co-opetition with different partners. Instead, by allowing 
flexible strategy, China will be able to adapt to the conditions of each game 
and take into account current conditions. As a result, the three cases reveal a 
variety of tactics used by China. For instance, Japan and China are attempting 
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to turn their focus away from the fraught issue of energy exploration in 
contested territory to place greater emphasis on energy reserves and 
emissions reduction. With Russia, China has been committed to loans-for-oil, 
which exploits China’s current economic advantage, as well as deals over 
pipelines that relieve China’s energy supply concerns. Finally, the three major 
tactics in Sino-African relations are loans-for-oil, technological exchange and 
aid initiatives. These three approaches allow China to rely on Africa’s relatively 
low level of development in order to secure energy imports for China. 
Further to considering current conditions on a case-by-case basis, 
the case studies also corroborate the assumption set out in Chapter Two that 
tactics will be influenced by historical circumstances. Players are not only 
compelled to adapt tactics to current conditions, but also seemingly cannot 
help but be affected by past influences. The nature of historical relations may 
shape the likelihood of establishing commitments and opting for certain 
strategies in the contemporary situation. The key example is China and Japan: 
relations between the two powers have been strained since the founding of 
modern China in 1949 – due to historical reasons. Following the Second World 
War, there was a brief honeymoon period during which time China was able to 
export crude oil to Japan, and historical differences were set aside. However, 
as identified in Section 4.1.2, energy cooperation is highly driven by the 
requirements of economic development, and it can be easily destroyed by 
changes in this balance. (Guo, 2008) Since China became a net importer and 
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this brief flicker of early co-opetition was extinguished, it has been difficult for 
the two to establish any kind of long-lasting co-opetition. 
Sino-Russian relations are closer than those of China and Japan, 
although there have been rocky times and an ideological parting of ways due 
to decisions made by the countries’ respective elites, especially during the 
eras of Mao and Deng. However, due to the excellent prospects for 
complementary geopolitical advantages, China and Russia have maintained 
relatively good relations. There has not been a substantive conflict over energy, 
and China has applied gentle dovish tactics, even in the face of Russian 
vacillation on commitments. 
The third case, between China and Africa, further demonstrates the 
importance of good relations to final tactics. China has taken a gentle 
approach and has not shied away from playing a dove in the game. Even so, 
with the spread of the China energy threat theory, China’s endeavours in 
Africa have been interpreted by others, and Africans themselves, as an 
intention to colonise. Although China’s intentions may well be innocent - simply 
a win-win approach to energy supply and economic support in an 
underdeveloped energy-producing location - Africa’s colonial history 
unfortunately raises sensitivity and therefore potential misunderstandings. In 
order to avoid these accusations, China may have to assess its approach to 
investment in infrastructure and governance, and make sure no activities can 
be labelled improper. Perhaps an even deeper consideration for the Chinese 
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policymakers is whether China has in fact been too dovish and lost out by 
putting too much into the maintenance of good relations with African countries. 
The best tactics for a country to adopt vary on a case-by-case basis. 
There are no fixed or specific tactics in the energy game, and the same 
approach may not be used with the same partner at different points in time, or 
with different partners at the same time. In order to truly play the game, China 
can make use of flexible tactics to adapt to the current conditions of each 
game, and draw on the influences of historical legacy in order to further shape 
tactics.  
 
7.2.5 The Scope of China’s Energy Co-opetition: Entering into 
a Suitable Energy Mechanism 
In line with assumption nine the scope of China’s future energy co-opetition 
may be bounded by energy mechanisms, a function of the international regime. 
Chapter Two explained that bilateral commitments may be difficult to uphold 
when conditions waver or trust is called into question, and monitoring by the 
international regime may help consolidate trust and bolster any commitments 
made. This monitoring can take many forms, and it has been suggested in this 
research that the most suitable mechanism for China’s energy co-opetition 
may be multilateral in nature. Current existing energy mechanisms may be 
available to China, but may not be suitable. It lies with China to choose 
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whether or not to test these mechanisms – different mechanisms may suit 
different countries. A further option could be the creation of new mechanisms 
in which China holds greater sway. 
In the case of China and Japan, a bilateral energy mechanism is 
clearly unlikely to occur. It is even difficult for the dyad to make initial 
commitments, let alone build a strong and lasting mechanism for cooperation. 
The Institute of Energy Economics (2004), as cited in Section 4.2.5, suggested 
that it would be easier for Japan to help maintain regional security in Asia if it 
were to join a multilateral energy mechanism. Japan would be able to ensure 
energy supply, contribute to securing energy transportation, and work with 
other countries to abolish the Asia premium on energy. 
In the case of China and Russia, bilateral cooperation has become 
increasingly more positive despite many hiccups along the way. That does not 
mean to say that Sino-Russian energy relations would not benefit greatly from 
the establishment of, or participation in, an energy mechanism. China has 
already joined existing mechanisms which go some way to monitoring energy, 
namely the SCO and APEC. According to the examples given in Section 5.2.5 
of the price-setting mechanisms in both the SCO and APEC, it is evident that 
China stands to gain more in the SCO. China has more power over discourse 
in this multilateral mechanism and can therefore work to obtain more interest. 
The third case, that of China and Africa, once again appears similar 
to that of China and Russia. Entering into a multilateral energy mechanism 
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would also be beneficial to both China and Africa. As identified in Section 6.2.5, 
greater governance and monitoring by an impartial multilateral mechanism can 
ensure a higher level of transparency. This would be beneficial to the Chinese 
government in that it would help convince others of the benevolence of its 
intentions, and stamp out accusations of neo-colonialism or corruption in 
governance and infrastructure investment programmes. Although this 
opportunity for transparency may be very much welcomed by China, it might 
be wise for any mechanism put in place not to mirror a mechanism like OPEC. 
Although OPEC works for a collection of producer countries, allocating quotas 
amongst African countries may result in a betrayal of price mechanism 
commitments due to the different stages of production across the continent. 
Furthermore, OPEC’s current strategy is driving prices down, which would not 
benefit under-developed African economies dependent on the energy boom.  
Even if entering into multilateral agreements has a variety of different 
benefits depending on the case at hand, including regional security, 
maintaining current good progress, and raising levels of transparency, this 
research has also repeatedly stressed that the more players in the game, the 
greater the uncertainty. In other words, a poorly managed multilateral energy 
mechanism may well be less stable than a bilateral energy mechanism 
between two closely interdependent countries. That said, it has also been 
shown that a bilateral energy mechanism is practically an impossibility 
between symmetrical players, and so a multilateral mechanism is the only 
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solution in this case (aside from no monitoring by the international regime at 
all). For asymmetrical pairs, situations are in constant flux, and a multilateral 
mechanism can help reduce the onus on two bilateral players. In reality, the 
choice between a bilateral or multilateral energy mechanism is decided by the 
players’ resources, power, and objectives. In China’s case, multilateral 
mechanisms seem to offer a greater degree of benefit than sticking only to 
bilateral agreements, and this insight may dictate the future scope of China’s 
energy security co-opetition. 
To conclude, the five aspects of the PARTS model (Players, Added 
value, Rules, Tactics, and Scope) are all closely interconnected, and only a 
synthesised understanding of the factors can draw the full picture of China’s 
co-opetition. Recognising the involvement and role of the players in a game is 
a precondition to the game of co-opetition. Added value through a high level of 
multifaceted complementarity can bolster co-opetition by retaining a balance 
between players, ultimately deciding the size of the pie, or the total common 
interests, of the players. Rules, here described as commitments and 
reciprocity, allow for the continuing success of co-opetition through 
trust-building and deepening of mutual understanding in repeat games. Tactics 
may be adapted flexibly to different players, and do not need to be rolled out 
rigidly across the board. This flexible choice of tactics is influenced by both 
current conditions and historical influences. Finally, in terms of scope, bilateral 
and multilateral energy mechanisms provide a way to monitor the continuing 
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progress of co-opetition, but this will depend on the power and resources of 
the players in the game. It is argued that by applying the insights of the PARTS 
model, Chinese energy security policymakers will have a deeper 
understanding of the dynamic of co-opetitive relations and the interaction 
between the various players in a game. A more comprehensive understanding 
can assist in the creation of suitable and effective strategies for energy 
security. 
   
7.3 How Hehe Culture Contributes Unique ‘Chinese 
Characteristics’ to Co-opetition 
The previous section gave a comprehensive overview of co-opetition 
according to the PARTS model, and offered specific insights into China’s 
co-opetition with three specific partners: Japan, Russia and Africa. It has been 
emphasised that co-opetition is most readily achieved between asymmetrical 
players, and that the inclusion of fewer players can secure the stability of the 
co-opetition. Increasing added value by harnessing multifaceted 
complementarity is extremely beneficial, and following the rules of 
commitments and reciprocity can ensure co-opetition is long-lasting and 
steady. Many tactics are open to China, and these were discussed at length in 
the case studies. China also has the choice of entering into or even creating 
mechanisms to monitor relations, and it has been shown that multilateral 
		 387	
energy mechanisms may be the most beneficial for China’s current energy 
security situation. Through this paper, the three cases have been explored in 
full, but it is now important to note that these findings can be generalised out to 
other players. In particular, co-opetition can be achieved most easily with 
asymmetrical players, and there are many options in the world for China, 
including Middle Eastern energy-producing countries. But what distinguishes 
China’s policies and strategy of co-opetition? The answer is China’s traditional 
Hehe culture. Adherence to the tenets of Hehe culture can help increase trust 
between asymmetrical players, and the maintenance of good relations will help 
this develop ever more quickly. Secondly, Hehe culture is part of Chinese 
heritage, and it has influenced foreign policy over a long period of time. The 
evolution and development of China’s energy policies also reflect the 
significant role Hehe culture has played over time, and its consistent inclusion 
in energy policy underlines the continuity of this cultural influence, suggesting 
that it will continue to last into the future. The following section will analyse how 
Hehe culture shapes China’s co-opetition. 
 
7.3.1 How Hehe Culture Shapes China’s Co-opetition 
The fundamental principles of Hehe culture are harmony is precious and 
harmony without sameness. (Zhang, 2011) Both of these points are in fact 
reflected in the rules aspect of co-opetition in the PARTS model, which 
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highlights both commitment and reciprocity. These aspects are closely tied to 
the idea of harmony. As discussed in Section 2.2, the most difficult aspect 
behind establishing commitments is the challenge of building real and lasting 
trust between players. Hehe culture guides China to respect players, even if 
they have different approaches to China, and emphasises harmony above all. 
Open adherence to the tenets of this culture can be a persuasive tool for the 
increasing of mutual understanding – unconditionally – and building trust, 
based on harmony, between players. 
Section 7.1 analysed how co-opetition shapes China’s energy 
security strategy by re-framing competition as an opportunity for integration, 
reducing the over-emphasis on threat, and instead stressing the chance to 
build interest by integrating resources. Hehe culture goes one step further to 
weaken the conflictual and threatening nature of competition, as it demands 
that unity and harmony are paramount. Thus, China’s energy security is 
shaped by commitment to co-opetition, and this co-opetition is itself furthered 
by Hehe culture. 
There are certain examples in the case studies to demonstrate the 
Chinese government’s application of Hehe culture to co-opetition. Admittedly, 
it has not always been successful, demonstrating that Hehe culture is not fool 
proof in the face of other factors. For instance, in the case of China and Japan, 
the two countries are symmetrical in terms of energy and it has been reiterated 
that there is little scope for long-term or even fleeting co-opetition between 
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such a dyad. Yet the Chinese government has consistently proposed a stance 
of peace and harmony to deal with relations with Japan, which can be 
identified in official policies and meetings, including the China Joint Declaration 
on Building a Partnership of Friendship and Cooperation for Peace and 
Development. (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 1998a) This has allowed 
brief periods and projects of cooperation. However, a number of issues have 
arisen which have usurped the benevolent influence of Hehe culture. 
Wrangling over territory, influenced by the framing of energy as a private good, 
the tense historical relations between China and Japan have put a stop to the 
period of positive cooperation. Co-opetition on energy exploration has not 
succeeded, and the fundamental reason is the lack of trust. Hehe culture, in 
this case, has not been able to overcome the angst between Japan and China. 
Although documents and policies demonstrate that both China and Japan 
would like to keep the peace and respect their differences, the ultimate failure 
to work together to build co-opetitive commitments reveals that neither side will 
give up on a private good, nor will they be swayed from their positions 
informed by historical acrimony. Nevertheless, where energy is not seen as a 
private good, in the case of renewable energy and green energy choices, 
co-opetition is more successful. Although working together on energy reserves 
and emissions reduction is a secondary issue to that of securing supply and 
demand, the two sides have a higher degree of complementarity in this area, 
and due to the commitment to harmony despite differences – or even conflict – 
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elsewhere, the two sides are attempting to cooperate in this regard. The soft 
power of Hehe culture is not enough to overcome the lack of trust in 
Sino-Japanese relations, but it has helped prevent a total lack of cooperation.  
However, the Sino-Russian case is entirely different. Hehe culture 
here is able to help the two sides increase their level of trust. Although 
according to assumption three building trust is difficult, and this leads to the 
failure of co-opetition. Hehe culture compensate for this. When Putin first came 
to power, as mentioned in Section 5.1.2, Russian relations with the West were 
weak and Russia began to turn towards the East. (Jaffe and Manning, 2001; 
Ministry of Energy of the Russian Federation, 2010) The starting point of closer 
Sino-Russian relations came from two key points in Hehe culture: harmony 
and mutual respect. In spite of the many reservations of Western countries, 
China continued to respect Russia as a partner and adhered to the idea of 
harmony even in the case of differences. This is also reflected in the flow of 
bilateral energy cooperation meetings in the following years. It can be 
concluded that the declarations and cooperative dialogues were based on 
these tenets. Hehe culture was a significant factor in the initiation of a new, 
closer stage of co-opetition between the two countries, as Russia saw that 
China could be a trusted partner. Trust has continued to develop within this 
virtuous circle, enabling long-term co-opetition. Co-opetition between the two 
is not a one-off deal; it is long-term and steady, and this has been supported 
by the two sides’ observance of Hehe culture. The new period of strategic 
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partnership indicates the blossoming trust and mutual understanding – 
precisely what Hehe culture aims to nurture. 
Once again, the situation with China and Africa is similar to that of 
China and Russia. Hehe culture has once again played a significant role in 
establishing trust between the players. The trajectory of good relations over 
generations has been evidenced through history, in direct contrast to the 
Sino-Japanese trend. Section 6.1.2 showed how good relations began right 
from the founding of modern China, throughout Mao’s era and up to the 
present day Both sides have agreed to maintain harmony and respect each 
other’s differences in future co-opetition, as outlined in, for instance, the basic 
guidelines of FOCAC. (Xinhua News Agency, 2000) No obvious disputes, 
historical or contemporary, upset the application of Hehe culture to 
Sino-African co-opetition. China has cooperated successfully with African 
countries and has presented Africa with a large supply of aid for a long 
duration. China’s fundamental objective in aiding and cooperating with Africa is 
ostensibly to help Africa to achieve independent development. (Moyo, 2010) 
The Chinese government gave unconditional aid to Africa on a range of fields 
including technology, education and health training. (Yang, 2011)  
However, there is one major issue besetting the application of Hehe 
culture to China’s co-opetition with Africa. In fact, China has adhered very 
closely to the ideas inherent in Hehe culture, respecting counterparts, refusing 
to interfere in domestic political situations and supplying aid without attached 
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conditions. So well has China done in this regard, that other countries accuse 
the Chinese government of acting irresponsibly by propping up corrupt and 
tyrannical regimes, and of extending a pattern of neo-colonialism across the 
continent. Although the Chinese government believes it has been sticking to 
principles of cooperation that have evolved from Hehe tradition, this has been 
misconstrued as China throwing its weight around to obtain one-sided benefit. 
The lack of transparency in Sino-African relations is hindering the progress of 
co-opetition (Lyman, 2005), but this lack of transparency comes about in part 
due to China’s commitment to mutual respect, harmony and non-interference 
as derived from Hehe culture. Nevertheless, Chinese aid to Africa is popular 
precisely because no conditions are attached; China respects the differences 
between itself and its cooperative partners, including African countries, and 
commits to harmony without sameness. By offering aid without conditions, the 
Chinese government is not forcing the African hand, or demanding ideological 
unity before proffering assistance, but is allowing African countries to take their 
own path to development. Hehe culture is therefore beneficial to the two 
parties involved, though it may attract outside scrutiny which cannot be 
overlooked. 
China’s legacy of Hehe culture continues to play an important role in 
China’s modern day relations. In terms of the cases discussed in this research, 
evidence of Hehe culture is apparent in all three. However, it has only had 
limited success in Sino-Japanese relations, in the face of symmetry, historical 
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rancour and the framing of energy as a private good. In asymmetrical relations, 
Hehe culture fares better, building trust, helping both initiate and maintaining 
co-opetition and shaping it into a particular approach replete with these 
traditional Chinese characteristics. 
 
7.3.2 The Continuous Thread of Hehe Culture 
The previous section discussed the influence of Hehe culture on China’s 
co-opetition, and this section will address the continuous thread of Hehe 
culture through time, drawing together these two points to show how Hehe 
culture lends China’s co-opetition certain unique Chinese characteristics. 
The heritage of Hehe culture has been manifested in different energy 
policies across the different eras of different leaders. This is the result of the 
rational development of Hehe culture. Mao proposed the policy of 
self-sufficiency, which unfortunately was extremely detrimental to cooperation. 
However, in Mao’s era, it was more a question of cooperating deeply with 
certain actors rather than others. This was due to both ideological reasons and 
the wider political conditions of the time. However, considering Mao’s 
arguments and the speech he gave to African leaders in 1977 (Mao, 1977a; 
Mao, 1977b), it can be identified that he was dedicated to the tenets of Hehe 
culture within the limited cooperative relations that China enjoyed. In other 
words, although there is scant indication of any commitment to Hehe culture in 
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China’s relations with most countries, there is a wealth of evidence of the 
application of Hehe culture to China’s cooperative relations with Africa during 
this era. Mao focused more strongly on communist ideology and class struggle 
than later leaders, and regardless of whether this is seen as right or wrong, 
there is no doubt that it undercut the influence of Hehe culture. Harmony 
without sameness was swept aside for ideological reasons in relations with 
many countries. And yet, both harmony without sameness and peace is 
precious feature in early Sino-African relations, which shows the discrepancy 
in the consistency of Mao’s policies. 
Deng reduced the attention on class struggle to a massive extent, 
and began to cooperate with developed countries. The start of the Opening Up 
and Reform allowed China to begin integrating with a wider range of countries, 
including those with ideological differences. (Deng, 1993b) Thus there was 
considerable progress in the Chinese government’s application of Hehe 
culture to foreign relations and energy policy. In particular, China began to 
adhere to the idea of harmony without sameness by overlooking ideological 
and regime differences, as well as to peace is precious by shelving territorial 
disputes to allow cooperation. At this point, the influence of China’s Hehe 
culture began to spread to a wider scope. 
In the rule of Jiang Zemin, there were many cases that hinted at the 
contribution Hehe culture played in China’s development. It was only with 
strong commitment to trust-building and the construction of common interests 
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that China was able to succeed in new efforts at cooperation, such as the 
examples of Sino-Russian cooperation given in Chapter Five. Following this, 
under Hu Jintao, the racing pace of development highlighted the resounding 
success of the let the advanced in policy. (Information Office of the State 
Council of the People’s Republic of China, 2011) During this period, the seeds 
of cooperation that were sown in previous eras began to bear fruit and 
co-opetitive relations began to be consolidated and reinforced. One hindrance 
to this was that the high speed of China’s development and the obvious 
reaching influence of the huge nation began to raise doubts about the nature 
of China’s development, out of which arose the China threat theory and 
debates over China’s ostensible commitment to peaceful development. 
However, according to the guidelines of Hehe culture, the Chinese 
government advocates peace not only domestically but also across countries 
in the world. The Chinese government has consistently declared peaceful 
intentions, reiterating that countries should not interfere in each other’s affairs, 
and that China reciprocally will not use its influence for anything other than 
benevolent means. As Hehe culture existed throughout the three periods of 
leadership before Hu, it was inevitable that Hu would continue this legacy and 
negate suspicions of China’s threat to others. 
The application of China’s Hehe culture to co-opetition in energy 
policy has evolved through different stages, from a mere seed to the first 
shoots of progress, then from careful nurturing and growth through to the 
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positive harvest seen today. These four stages neatly match up with the four 
successive leaderships of Mao, Deng, Jiang and Hu respectively. When 
conditions have been conducive, the success of Chinese Hehe culture has 
flowed naturally, but this hasn’t been an immediate process. Although Hehe 
culture was proposed by ancient Chinese philosophers, it is in the globalised, 
interdependent modern world that it has achieved its greatest application. 
Consequently, the Hehe culture seen in China’s policy today has been drawn 
from the original tenets to fit the co-opetition of today, leaving the legacy of 
both tradition and modernity and stamping unique Chinese characteristics on 
China’s co-opetition. 
 
7.4 Conclusion 
This research has been broken down into seven chapters. The first chapter 
introduced the problems plaguing China’s energy security, stating that the 
primary issue is that supply is unabatingly at risk of falling short of demand. 
This situation pushes China to continuously increase imports, and this 
unavoidable reliance on the often unsecure supplies of producer countries 
leaves China’s security at a precarious impasse. Other than this major 
problem, China is also facing secondary issues, for example constructing 
energy reserves, securing energy transportation and working towards 
emissions reductions. These secondary issues in fact all stem back to the 
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primary issue. Due to the unsustainable and unstable current energy structure, 
China is aiming to diversify away from fossil fuels. Reliance on fossil fuels is 
adding to the stakes of unsafe crude oil transportation through the Malacca 
Straits, leaving China at the mercy of pricing policies and causing huge 
emissions of greenhouse gases. 
Faced with this somewhat critical scenario, China has little choice but 
to seek alternative options. The increasing interdependence between 
countries in the globalised world encourages China to cooperate more closely 
with other actors to more effectively utilise available energy or develop 
alternative sources. However, competition does not cease, and inevitably will 
not do so given the nature of global energy security and international relations. 
This research argues that co-opetition, by integrating both inevitable 
competition and beneficial cooperation, offers the best option for resolving or 
at least reducing the major problems of China’s energy security. The second 
chapter introduced the concepts of co-opetition and Hehe culture, explaining 
the close link and similarities between the two. Further to this, co-opetition was 
located within the insights of game theory and the PARTS model, which 
includes Players, Added value, Rules, Tactics and Scope. The existence of 
players and added value (through complementarity) are the necessary 
prerequisites for co-opetition, and the latter three aspects – rules (namely 
commitment and reciprocity), tactics and scope – are conditional on the 
existence of these two. As a result, it is useful for China to identify the players 
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in a game, as well as the prospects for added value, in order to shape 
successful rules, tactics and scope for co-opetition.  
The third chapter introduced China’s foreign and energy policy over 
time, and outlined how co-opetition had been applied to energy security thus 
far. It was shown that there has been evidence of co-opetition over time, but 
that this could be developed to a higher degree in order for China to reduce the 
burden of energy security even more. This research then moved on to three 
case studies in order to show the progress of co-opetition between China and 
three different global actors over time, pinpointing the successes and failures 
as well as the reasons behind them, and offering suggestions for future scope 
based on the insights of the PARTS model. 
The three case studies looked at Japan, Russia and Africa in turn. 
The PARTS model suggests that the two aspects of players and added value 
are the prerequisites for co-opetition, but discussion of the cases over 
Chapters Four, Five, and Six revealed that the only difference between reality 
and the five assumptions in Chapter Two is the evidence of strong rules. The 
Hehe culture inherent in China’s policy pushes the aspect of establishing rules 
as a third required aspect. Building up commitment and reciprocity is 
supplementary for co-opetition, and yet Chinese foreign energy policy is 
dedicated to building trust and therefore oiling the wheels of commitment and 
reciprocity. This is the legacy of Hehe culture at work, imbuing China’s energy 
security with unique Chinese characteristics. Analysing the findings of the 
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cases shows that Hehe culture can indeed help China build up trust with 
partners, initiating or maintaining commitments. In the case of asymmetrical 
players, this is a largely successful strategy, though it does not work so well 
with symmetrical partners. 
Co-opetition as an approach has played an important role in facing 
China’s energy security and has created a better platform for all parties 
involved. Besides this, Co-opetition is helping China re-generate the way 
energy security is viewed. No longer does energy security need to be seen as 
a growing list of problems and threats; instead China can use the strategies of 
co-opetition to grasp the opportunities afforded by integration and 
interdependence. Combining the positive traits of co-opetition with the special 
function that Hehe culture plays in China’s approach to cooperation and 
integration with other nations, it can be said that the strategic value of 
co-opetition is helping China to generate a new energy security outlook with 
Chinese characteristics. Thus the offering of co-opetition, combined with 
Chinese Hehe culture, to western academia as an approach to energy security 
is the original contribution of the whole research. 
Certainly, this is an attractive and feasible option for China. But how 
far can Hehe culture go in the international world? Will this co-opetition with 
Chinese characteristics be well-accepted by other countries? There is no 
doubt that there are still many issues to be addressed even by China; as this 
research has shown, even China’s relations with Russia and Africa are 
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hindered by difficulties despite the overall success of their co-opetitive efforts. 
With the continuous reduction in energy prices and the introduction of western 
sanctions, Russia has been hit hard. Should the Chinese government help 
Russia pass through this crisis or quietly wait to see developments? Will the 
decision at this time influence the outcome of reciprocity in Sino-Russian 
co-opetition? In Africa, how does China balance re-gaining trust and shutting 
down allegations of neo-colonialism whilst remaining true to the teachings of 
Hehe culture? As for relations with Japan, efforts to cooperate on energy have 
been growing more and more tense, and China must now decide whether to 
keep the softly, softly approach of Hehe culture, or turn to a harder power 
option. 
A vast array of questions still need to be considered by Chinese 
policymakers, but there is no doubt that the legacy of Hehe culture will 
continue to be seen, and that the practical contribution of co-opetition offers 
one of the best solutions to China’s energy security dilemmas. The continuing 
shift in conditions across the world will shape the path that energy policy takes, 
and this will remain an interesting direction for future research for much time to 
come. 
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